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Corporate scandals during the last decade fostered many Corporate
Governance reports. These reports aimed at restoring checks and
balances in companies to prevent fraudulent behaviour and restore
public trust. One of the functions active in many organizations is
Internal Audit. This function operates under the umbrella of the
Management Board and is geared towards monitoring lower level
management. Due to the Corporate Governance reports the interest
in the work of internal auditors has increased. In many reports special
attention is paid to this function. The Supervisory Board and the
Audit Committee are required to oversee the activities and results of
external as well as internal auditors. Furthermore, regulators are also
keen on the results of their work. The aim of this study was to
research the impact of Corporate Governance reports on the role,
position, and scope of services of the Internal Audit Function.
Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics were applied to
further theory around internal auditing. Information asymmetry and
asset specificity were used to test whether there was a correlation
between high scores on information asymmetry and/or asset
specificity for the organization and the size of an Internal Audit
Function, the ‘make or buy’ issue, or its scope of services. Results
showed that such was the case for the size but not for the ‘make or
buy issue or the scope of services. Furthermore, this study contains
descriptive characteristics of internal audit functions.
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Internal Audit: On the Rise? 
1.1 Introduction: Bottom Line for Top Management 
 
The speed of organizational changes, recent scandals – mega, mind-boggling fraud, 
embezzlement and book cooking - and the demands of shareholders, stakeholders and the 
general public for more transparency in how companies are run have led external supervisors 
and top managers to seek more assurance. Put simply, the concerned parties want to know 
about the quality and adequacy of internal control methodologies, systems and protocols for 
keeping abreast in semi real time of not only financial robustness, but also ethical and legal 
integrity. In the parlance of the audit trade, they want to know if they are "in control". And if 
not, what can be done to get back on track. 
 
The assurance urgency – according to most observers, not yet an emergency – is accelerating 
because of stronger codes, sometimes seen as regulations demanding compliance, sometimes 
as recommendations suggesting it. For example, the US Sarbanes-Oxley law, rammed through 
Congress in 2002 in the ground scar of the Enron crash, and, for slower moving traffic, the 
Winter Commission's Report for firms listed on the stock exchanges of the European Union 
(to be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). Sometimes it is the crack of the whip, and 
sometimes it is the mere shadow, but the bottom line is bleeding through with increasing 
clarity, frequency and legally binding specificity.  
 
That is, in the not too distant future it may not only be lonely at the top, but also potentially 
dangerous for your health and mental and financial well-being. Gone with the whirlwind will 
be the days of a perk-filled life and, when things went horribly wrong, a simple "I'm sorry, I 
did the best I could" was good enough to silence the baying for blood shareholders and 
general public. Sooner or later - and in some cases right now - top management will be asked 
to certify that their entire internal control system is adequate. And if that proves to have been 
overly and unjustifiably optimistic, in some cases they will be held personally accountable in 
a more than metaphorical sense. 
 
And it might not only be top management dangling before the cameras and getting gutted to 
appease the public's sense of payback. In January 2004 Enron's Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
was formally charged with malfeasance and fraud and convicted to 10 years imprisonment. 
Ken Lay, the Chairman of the Board, died of a hart attack awaiting his conviction. Jeffrey 
Skilling, the CEO has been convicted to 26 years imprisonment. Bernie Ebbers, Chairman of 
WorldCom, also faced charges and got a whopping and record setting punishment of 25 years. 
Which means he will likely spend the rest of his life in prison. While his wife will be allowed 
to keep some savings, most of his assets will be taken away. 
 
On January 6, 2005, one's day's fishing through several newspapers netted the following 
catch. The New York Times reported that 10 former WorldCom executives agreed to pay $18 
million out of their getting shallower by the second pockets - not those of the insurance 
company - as a result of their malfeasance in the collapse of the company. The 
Ondernemingskamer - Dutch Court of Appeal for stakeholders in companies suspected of 
wrongdoing - ordered a large scale investigation into the sequence of events that almost 
wrecked Ahold. Het Financieele Dagblad reported that the Autoriteit Financiële Markten 
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(AFM), the Dutch version of the US' Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), increased 
its staff to about 500 and its annual budget to € 70 million in response to the government's 
demands for their services.  
 
Thus there are problems. Or, if we prefer the more positive classifications of engineers and 
managers, "challenges" and "issues". And, as is demonstrated by the increasing number of 
sudden and spectacular crashes – previously high flying and even flagship banks and 
companies, such as BCCI, Barings, Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, Rite Aid, Global Crossings, 
Ahold, Parmalat and Shell – current control methodologies, systems and protocols aren't up to 
the job. You could say that we have a situation. "Houston, we have a problem!" 
 
Some might contend that the answer to the question, "Are we in control?" is "Are you 
kidding?" Others would call that hysterical doom glooming, alarmist orange and red alerts. 
Blips on the screen magnified into full battle dress panics by a sensationalism mongering 
media. The bottom line is that the basic body of the capitalistic system - and the companies 
functioning therein - is healthy, and if it ain't broke, don't fix it.  
 
Who is right? I don't know, and neither does anyone else. But one thing remains 
unproblematic. With so much at stake, all the main players will hunting for assurance on the 
actual state of not only companies, but also, in some countries (The Netherlands, for 
example), government programs. The more the better.  
 
That's the demand. But what about the supply? In the words of the catchy song from another 
film, Ghostbusters, "Who ya gonna call?" Management consultants? Economic forecasters? 
Futurologists? Trend gurus. The Delphic oracle? Or, as this study contends, someone much 
closer to home. In fact, in house. That is, Internal Audit (IA), also known as the Internal Audit 
Function (IAF), or Internal Audit Department (IAD).  
 
At first and second glance, a solution to some of the problems mentioned above seems 
anything but self-evident. Why not? Because IA itself is not traditionally self-evident. Many 
organizations don't have them. And even those that do often wonder why. What does it do? 
What can it do? 
 
Nevertheless, there are many organizations that do have IA. And even though they can't 
immediately put their finger on exactly why, they wouldn't be caught dead without it. What's 
more, and probably more due to current corporate governance (Corporate Governance) 
directives than perceived inner need, many more companies will be having them in the not too 
distant future. All of this points to some needs that IA satisfies, however vaguely those needs 
may be stated and, possibly, however inefficiently IA may be used. 
 
This research is intended to make practical contributions to not only how organizations are 
run and monitored, but also societies. How so? Because since the well-being of our societies 
depend to a large extent on the state of health of the organizations that drive the economic 
engines, improvements in the later will be impact the former. 
 
Considering the enormity and intricacy of the big picture and the, up to now, relatively trifling 
status and role of IA, such a contention might sound uncomfortably close to the proverbial 
mouse that roared. Or, special pleading - even lobbying - and a case of what many would 
consider a niche issue trying elbow its way onto center stage. There might be some truth in 
those perceptions. Nevertheless, remembering the words of Albert Einstein - "If at first the 
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idea is not absurd, then there is no hope for it." - it is a subject I deem worth exploring at 
some length and in some depth.  
1.2 Legitimating, justicification, and some preliminary notes 
 
The scientific rationale for this research is that the number of research that has been carried 
out regarding IA is limited (see Chapter 4 for details). There is a need to further that because 
this will allow us to substantiate the rationale for Internal Audit and provide insights for the 
phenomenon of Internal Auditing.  
 
From a societal perspective there is also a need for research like this. Organizations are very 
important institutions from an economic perspective as well as from a sociological 
perspective. There is great interest lately in the governance of organizations, mainly due to a 
large number of corporate scandals that shook public trust. Auditors, both external and 
internal, are regarded as a resort that might help to prevent corporate scams and thereby help 
to restore that public trust.  
 
From the perspective of practitioners there is also a need to further research. Many 
practitioners are confronted with compelling questions around Internal Audit. Why do we 
have an IAF? Should we have an IAF internally or buy it from a service provider? How large 
should it be? What should the Scope of Services be? All questions that are in need of 
conclusive answers instead of answers provided by rules of thumb.  
 
To be able to position this research New Institutional Economics (NIE) was called to the fore. 
NIE models institutions and economic behaviour (see for a more elaborated discussion 
Chapter 4). Williamson provided the following diagram (1998, 26 and 2000, 597): 
Embeddedness:
Informal instititutions
customs, traditions,
norms, religion
Institutional
environment:
Formal rules of the
game (polity, judiciary,
bureaucracy)
Governance: play of
the game
esp.contract
Aligning governance
structure with transactions
Resource allocation
and employment
(prices and quantities,
incentive alignment)
Get the institutional
environment right 
1st order economizing
Get the governance
structure right
2nd order economizing
Get the marginal
conditions right
3rd order economizing
Often non-calculative;
spontaneous 
Purpose
100 - 1000
10 to 100
1 to 10
continuous
Frequency
(years)
Level 4
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
 
 
Figure 1: Applicability of New Institutional Economics 
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These levels can be explained as follows: 
 
• Level 1: Social Theory: This is the level at which norms, habits, and traditions are 
established. The frequency of change is low, once every century to millennium. 
This level will be treated here as exogenous.  
 
• Level 2: Economics of property rights: Williamson calls this the institutional 
environment in which organizations function. Contract theory is a resultant, which 
has major impacts on how organizations function. The assignment of property 
rights is advantageous for individuals - incentives - and thereby influences their 
behaviour. Changes take place once every decade to a century. 
 
• Level 3: Transaction Cost Economics operates on this level. Transaction costs are 
those incurred searching for and gathering information, negotiating and deciding, 
supervision, and enforcing a contract. The main issue is that some contracts are 
such that verification of compliance is (nearly) impossible, thus making court 
enforcement also impossible. This means that there is a need for self-enforcing 
commitments. Williamson pays attention to this within the framework of 
Transaction Cost Economics, where the main problem is which governance 
structure should be chosen. Changes take place over a period from one year to a 
decade. 
 
• Level 4: This is the level of the marginal analysis and focuses on deciding on the 
right incentives under certain risk levels. Neoclassical theory and Agency Theory 
are applicable at this level. Agency Theory deals with "Information Asymmetry" 
(see below) between parties to a contract and the problems of assigning - 
especially ex ante – incentives to prevent ex post trouble. This is a continuous 
process. 
 
The arrows in the diagram pointing down indicate the restraints that a higher level places on 
the level just below. The arrows pointing up indicate feedback. The model is dynamic in the 
sense that there are connections between the different levels. But it seems that with every 
advantage come disadvantages. In this case that is the impossibility of testing the full model, 
because, given the time lines, that would take at least a millennium.  
 
According to Williamson, New Institutional Economics focuses on levels 3 and 4. Agency 
Theory and Transaction Cost Economics are theories that slot into New Institutional 
Economics. While New Institutional Economics sees the firm as a nexus of contracts 
(Furubotn and Richter, 1998, 152) though, Transaction Cost Economics sees it as a 
governance structure.  
 
As we will discover in Chapter 4, where we explore in considerable detail and depth two 
major contenders stemming from NIE for explaining the why and what for of IA: Agency 
Theory and Transaction Cost Economics. This research is therefore focussed at level 3 and 4. 
 
Agency Theory developed in a climate where the divide between ownership (principals) and 
management (agents) was getting wider, and it was becoming increasingly more important, 
and difficult, for the former to know what the latter was doing and, in many cases, even why. 
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In Agency Theory terms, this is called "information asymmetry", and revolves around the 
principals' fear that they are being cheated 
 
Transaction Cost Economics sees many of the operating expenses of organizations in terms of 
transactions. Transactions occur "when a good or service is transferred across a 
technologically separable interface. One stage of activity terminates and another begins." 
(Williamson, 1985, 1) The expenses incurred in such transactions - which include searching 
for parties to contract with, collecting information, negotiations, drafting contracts, and 
monitoring the fulfillment of contractual and other agreements - are called "transaction costs". 
Considering that some (Arrow, 1969, 48) have characterized these as "the costs of running the 
economic system", and others (Furubotn, Richter, 1998, 39) have estimated that they make up 
50-60% of the US Net National Product, this is more than chump change. Transaction Cost 
Economics is about keeping these costs as low as possible. 
 
In other words, both theories have been developed to deal with issues other than IA. And 
while they might be full-blooded and -blown as far as their original objectives are concerned, 
they are somewhat sketchy and end of the pipe in their application to auditing in general and 
IA in particular. So why have we selected them for our tasks?  
 
That is, Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics may not be much of theories about 
auditing - and this comment is by no means to be interpreted as a slur on their successes and 
validity in their own areas of expertise - but they are the only viable ones we have. As far as I 
know, Agency Theory is the only theory used in the literature to deal with the justification for 
auditing in general and, in a handful of papers, IA in particular. Transaction Cost Economics 
is also occasionally also applied to IA. 
 
The reason is that to some extent they do have explanatory and predictability power for some 
of the issues we will be dealing with. For example, Agency Theory offers explanations of the 
rationale of IA. And Transaction Cost Economics offers starting points for determining IA's 
scope of services, and a foot in the door of the "make or buy" issue. 
 
Let's now take a look at the bigger picture. That is, IA's position in the scheme of things. As 
we have indicated above and will learn more thoroughly below, in most business 
environments IA is exclusively in the hands of the Management Board. Or, in a one-tier 
system1, the executive management side of the Board of Directors.  
 
In Agency Theory terms, executive management is for all intents and purposes the principal 
and IA the agents. IA has been, and to a large extent still is, controlled by the principal, and 
that has had a major impact on its scope of services. But that is hardly the whole story. Quite 
often, the Management Board didn't understand the exact purpose of IA and what to do with 
it, and, therefore, had a rather ambivalent attitude about the whole phenomenon. On the one 
hand, they were extremely "helpful", coming up with detailed findings about what was 
happening within the organization. But, on the other, they were also a nuisance. Because they 
were placing those findings on the Management Board's already overcrowded plates. In many 
cases, the findings were hard to swallow, and even harder to digest.  
 
                                                 
1 In a one-tier system executives and non-executives "supervisors" meet in one board. In a two-tier system 
management executives meet in a Management Board (Management Board, or its equivalent) and non-executive 
"supervisors" meet in a Supervisory Board. This will be further elaborated in Chapter 3.  
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As we will discover in more detail in Chapter 2, there are variations on the themes of not only 
what IA is, but also what it does, where to find it, and even what it is called. And variations 
on those variations. For example, sometimes IA is decentralized, subdivided into subunits, 
and very much in the hands of lower (or line) management and just about anyone else who 
can get their hands on it. And IA, "like an unloved dog in a poor family" (in the words of the 
late Canadian economist John Kenneth Galbraith), has a conditioned reflex to wag its tail and 
try to please as many people as is humanly possible. Or perhaps more than is humanly 
possible. 
 
There are situations where IA is not even "internal". That is, it is either completely or partially 
outsourced. There are situations where it isn't called IA, but, rather, is given another 
nomenclature. Thus while IA may look like a simple enough description, it teems with 
subtext. More specifically, IA is a collective noun that includes some or all of the following 
actors and activities: 
 
 Registered Operational Auditors (RO's), who audit Management Control Systems. 
This is sometimes known as Management Control Auditing. They also do operational 
audits. That is, monitor how the processes and/or organization operate; 
 Registered Accountants (RA's), who perform financial audits. This is where the 
reliability of the financial reporting is checked; 
 Registered EDP Auditors (RE's), who do EDP audits. That is, monitor the reliability of 
information systems; 
 Multidisciplinary Teams doing integrated audits. That is, integrating all the above 
audits into an integrated whole;  
 Certified Fraud Examiners (CFE's), who perform fraud audits. As the name implies, 
these are carried out to see if fraud is happening within the organization. And if so, 
where and how much?; 
 Compliance Auditing: checking to see if practices adhere to the latest regulations and 
legislation. 
 
But that is hardly an exhaustive list. Some organizations might have quality-, safety-, 
environmental-, and/or technical-auditors.  
 
In order to make things simpler than they should be, however, we will exclude many of the 
variations and focus on IA "als of" - as if - it were a single unit working at the highest levels 
of an organization. That is, just below the Management Board or its equivalent.  
 
But this cozy and confidential relationship - sometimes love-hate, sometimes "functioning 
perfectly well" - is currently opening up, expanding and becoming more like a ménage à trois, 
ou quatre, ou cinq. In other words, there are more players and more dynamics to manage. 
These players and their relationships are depicted in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: The context of internal audit 
 
In order to simplify the picture, let's break it down and parse it out. The shareholders provide 
equity and, in a two-tier system, appoint the Supervisory Board at the annual meetings. They, 
or at least the more important among them, are demanding more transparency and 
accountability. The Supervisory Board appoints an Audit Committee to supervise and monitor 
the organization's accounting and auditing processes and financial results. The Management 
Board is top management, which uses many tools to keep an eye on lower management. 
Among them is IA, whose Chief Audit Executive (CAE) also has a working relationship with 
the External Auditor. 
 
In addition to these players, there are also regulators, which, especially in the financial 
services sector, impose strict rules and regulations on both IA and External Auditor. Then 
there are other stakeholders that have an interest in the well-being of the organization. For 
example, employees, or the general public in places where that organization is one of the 
main economic support systems in a village or region. 
 
In this research we deal only with those players contained within the red dotted oval. The 
research object is IA and those actors that exercise a direct influence on its functioning. 
Regulators such as De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB, the Dutch Central Bank), the Pensioen- en 
Verzekeringskamer (PVK, the supervisor for pension funds and insurance companies), and the 
aforementioned Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) were interviewed and their regulations 
and recommendations included. Other regulators that are internationally relevant were studied 
only via reading the relevant publications and regulations. This explains why they are not 
placed within the red oval. Other "participants", such as stakeholders other than shareholders 
and lower management are also excluded. 
 
While these stakeholders might have a direct impact on supervising and governing bodies, 
their impact on IA is indirect. Their influence is exercised via regulators and shareholders – 
or, in the case of governmental organizations, stakeholders - and trickled through to IA. 
Lower management is excluded for the same sorts of reasons. Because they don't have direct 
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influence on establishing the Audit Charter, which defines IA's position, role, and scope of 
services. And, in Agency Theory terminology, they do not have a principal-agent relation 
with the IAF.  
 
The changing needs of shareholders, expressed in regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley, VBTB 
(Van Beleidsbegroting Tot BeleidsVerantwoording2), and the Corporate Governance Codes3, 
has led supervisors, such as the Supervisory Board and the Audit Committee to spread their 
wings over IA and meddle with its scope of services. According to some of these codes, these 
supervisors should supervise internal auditors, be involved in the appointment and appraisal 
of the CAE and have meetings with him without the presence of the Management Board. I 
envision that Corporate Governance regulations will create a need for the Supervisory Board 
and Management Board to adjust the Audit Charter to suit these changing conditions. This 
change can have consequences for the relation of IA and its CAE with most parties involved: 
the Supervisory Board, the Management Board, management, and the External Auditor.  
 
In other words, while up until now the Management Board has, in many cases, been IA's sole 
principal, in the near future it might be sharing this "mastership" with the Supervisory 
Board/Audit Committee. In some instances, the Management Board might be bypassed, and 
the contract (in the form of the Audit Charter) with IA might require the input of the 
Supervisory Board or, at the very least, its consent. That could mean that IA might be tasked 
to monitor not only lower management, but top management as well. While the former job 
has been the mainstay of the profession for as long as most people can remember, the latter is 
very much terra incognita. This will have consequences for the contract that is created and 
the scope of services stipulated in this contract. 
 
Not to mention other spin-off effects, which in some aspects, might be highly beneficial, and 
in others might be disastrous. In order to understand how that might play out, we have to 
realize that different actors within the organization have different needs, and these needs can 
often conflict. For example - again in Agency Theory terms - principals seek assurance about 
the activities of their agents and the reliability of the information they receive from them. 
Agents, such as lower management, need help and advice about their problems. About, say, 
how to increase efficiency - to give it a positive twist - or reduce inefficiency and sheer waste. 
Principals may wish to know some things - especially when things aren't going according to 
plan - that agents would prefer to keep hidden. 
 
In a re-alignment of traditional roles the pivot point - center of gravity - will no longer be in 
one place only. That is, IA will be providing assurance not only to the Management Board, 
but also the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee. The traditional receiver of audits will also 
become a subject of them.  
 
1.3 Research Questions  
 
All of the above have led to the following core research question.  
 
                                                 
2 VBTB is intended to create more transparency and accountability in government, and is relevant to Corporate 
Governance initiatives in the private sphere. VBTB aims at strong linkage between approved budgets and plans 
and actual results achieved, which should be detailed in the annual report.  
3 See Chapter 4 for a more extensive elaboration.  
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 How have Corporate Governance regulations affected the position, role, and scope of 
services of the Internal Audit Function?  
 
This core research question needs to be more detailed to allow proper research. The first step 
was to research what is meant by a function. An analysis of relevant literature showed that the 
concept of an organizational function is scarecely defined:  
 
The concept of organizational function is scarcely defined in literature and the word 
function is used in several kinds of contexts with different meanings. (Aveiro et al, 
2006, 1-2) 
 
Alveiro et al (2006) refer to Kampfner, who describes functional subsystems in three binary 
relations: (1) the subsystem relation, that relates a functional subsystem to its parent system; 
(2) a controls relation (who controls it?); and (3) the reports-to relation (who is the boss?). In 
their paper they develop these ideas further and describe a number of functional artifacts such 
as (a) goals (what is the rationale of the functional subsytem? what does it contribute?); (b) 
business rules (which activities does it perform?; how is it controlled?); (c) exceptions and 
error dynamics (which processes are available to deal with exceptions and errors to be 
adaptive? therefore you need to know how it is controlled).  A function also interrelates to 
other functions and other organizational participants. We have to keep in mind that their 
endeavour to develop an ontology of organizational functions focussed primarily on the 
information systems environment.  
 
Although Alveiro et al (2006) provided some clues, their contribution was not conclusive 
enough. Keuning and Eppink (2004) described a function as a coherent set of tasks, 
responsibilities, and authority. A function provides a common goal for the activities 
undertaken. Furthermoe, they mention (213-214) that a function should explicitly state its 
contribution to the organization. It also requires an understanding of the relationships it has 
with others, also outside the organization.  
 
With the above in mind I asked myself a number of questions to define the attributes of the 
IAF that needed to be researched. First of all the question comes to mind that there needs to 
be a goal, a rationale to have IA activities performed in the first place to install an IAF. Based 
on my knowledge of organizational theory (see Chapter 4 predominantly) I know that if there 
is a need for IA activities, the question is how to get them? One can buy them of the shelf 
from a third party (‘buy’) or one can decide to integrate them into the organization (‘make’). 
If the latter is the case, the issue will be where to position it in the organization. Looking at 
Figure 2 the Management Board and the Supervisory Board are the most likely candidates to 
report to. If one has decided that there should be an IAF, the next question will be how large it 
will be. If that has been decided upon, we need to think of how to control this function and 
make it work properly. Next there is a need to define the specifics of the activities; what does 
it exactly need to do and what does it contribute? Given the specifics of the IA auditing 
activities and the natural relationship of the IAF with the external auditor, we need to look at 
their relationship as well.  
 
Thus, in some more detail the core research question leads to the following questions. 
 
 What is the role of IA? Why does IA exist? What is its raison d'être, or, as some 
would put it, its "license to operate"? 
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 What are the considerations for the "make or buy" issue for IA (in-source or 
outsource)? 
 
 What position can it have within the company? That is, what can its relationship be 
with the Management Board and Supervisory Board/Audit Committee? And in a 
conflict between those two, which relationship could have precedence? 
 
 How large can it be?  
 
 How can IA be controlled? 
 
 What can it do? In other words, what is its scope of services? 
 
 What is the relationship with the external auditor? 
 
This is depicted as follows: 
IAF
III. Scope of 
Services
II. Position
I. Role
a. Rationale (Why does it exist?)
b. Make or buy (Inhouse or outsourced?)
c. Organizational position 
(Where positioned?)
d. Size (Staffing?)
e. Control  (How is control exercised?)
f. Objects of audits 
(Which and what objects?)
g. Relationship with external auditor 
 
Figure 3: Scheme for researching the Internal Audit Function 
 
This scheme is used throughout the remainder of this thesis. Again, the aim of the research is 
to look at what has changed in the above aspects during – roughly - the last decade when a 
number of Corporate Governance regulations came into effect.   
 
1.4 Research Approach and Methodology 
 
With these questions in mind I read numerous publications on research methodology. One of 
the more useful books for me was one written by Johnson and Duberley (2000). They provide 
some essential insights and an excellent overview for a better understanding of the matter. 
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They underpin the importance of epistemology - knowledge about knowledge. It aims at 
providing a basis and criteria to distinguish real science from pseudoscience. This research is 
based upon the positivist perspective.  
 
Research like this is aimed at furthering theory, in this case theory around internal auditing. 
Before starting off, we need to create a starting point by taking stock of the current state of 
affairs of IA. Next to that we need to elaborate the developments around Corporate 
Governance during the last decade and look at the changes that might have affected internal 
auditing and it’s relationships with parties in the governance domain. Following that, we 
research Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics, their applicability to IA, and 
search for clues that could further theory.  
 
Since theory development with regard to internal audit is relatively limited, as will be shown 
in Chapter 4, this research uses explorative case studies to describe "facts" and further theory 
development through generalizations from empiricism (Yin, 1994, 2003). Based on that 
research I developed a number of preliminary "conclusions" to use in the case studies. 
Preliminary because the “conclusions” that were derived from existing theory were not 
conclusive and in need for further support by real life facts. I then turned to four case studies. 
The rationale was twofold. One, to check if the predictions that could be gleaned from 
Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics - limited as they were - had actually 
happened, or were happening. Two, to supplement existing theory with additional information 
in an attempt to generate some revised generalizations and hypotheses. The case studies were 
thus used to further amplify theory and the results were used to develop a survey. The survey 
was mainly developed again to explore and describe "facts" but a few hypotheses to be tested 
were also included. The rationale behind case studies and the survey will be elaborated in, 
respectively, Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
Considering the near absence of theory specifically applicable to IA, this research can't be 
anything other than exploratory in nature. Given the plea entry - under special circumstances - 
I am, nevertheless, attempting to sharpen the discussion by at least starting to find and ask 
some of the right questions, even if I can't answer most of them. And I would like to at least 
show how some of the results of this research could then serve as ingredients - nothing so 
grand as building blocks - in a theory that can be tested empirically, challenged and refined. A 
theory that could go some way toward helping the internal audit profession to adequately 
define and defend itself in these changing times. And for those making use of its services - the 
Management Board, Supervisory Board/Audit Committee, and, possibly, others - to know a 
bit more about what it is capable of and should be doing. In the right climate and hands. And, 
equally importantly, what is better left in the hands of others. 
 
1.5 Overview of the thesis  
 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
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1. Introduction
2. Internal Audit:
The Current State
of Affairs
3. Corporate
Governance &
Internal Audit
4. Internal Audit: 
Theoretical
Foundations 
5. Casestudies
6. Survey
7. Conclusions and
Recommendations
 
Chapter 2 demonstrates the state that IA is currently in and makes a case for attempting to get 
more of a grip on the situation through, first, recognizing and acknowledging that there are 
structural problems - not incidental ones that can be fixed with a patch here and a bit of 
superglue there - and, second, more overview and deeper insights. 
 
Chapter 3 explores the developments in Corporate Governance rules and regulations over the 
last decades, both internationally - that is, in the US, UK, and EU - and in The Netherlands. 
Compared with the versions that came to light some decade ago, IA has made significant 
progress. It is mentioned and specifically addressed in many of those reports.  
 
Part of being prepared means having solid theoretical ground under its feet for the judgments 
it is making. Chapter 4 explores the possibility of casting Agency Theory and Transaction 
Cost Economics in the roles of IA's knights in shining armor, which can provide some useful 
insights.  
 
Chapter 5: After discovering that our chosen theories are much better in supporting roles than 
as main players, we carried out four case studies. This Chapter presents the rationale, 
methodology, results and discussion of them. 
 
Chapter 6 covers the survey - constructed out of the predictions and results derived from the 
two theories and four case studies. 
 
Chapter 7 sums up the entire thesis, comes to a few conclusions and makes recommendations 
for further research. 
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Chapter 2: Internal audit: The Current State of Affairs  
2.1 Introduction 
 
In order to be able to assess whether there is a gap between the current and the desired role, 
position, and scope of services – the is and the should – stock has to be taken of its current 
role, position, and scope of services and compared with the optimal pathways suggested by a 
combination of theory and best practices. If this exercise is carried out,  then the profession as 
a whole will be able to gaze into the crystal ball and see a series of possible futures. And by 
doing so, professionals will be able to make deliberate choices and help steer events rather 
than, once again, being steered by them. A conscious and contributing player in the game of 
what happens next rather than a pawn subject to the whims and mood of the moment of 
whomever happens to be at the helm of Internal Audit at any given time or location. 
 
There is lack of consensus about definitions, job descriptions, what to do, and what not to do, 
and for whom, measures of success and failure, what steps to take, or things to disagree about, 
is part and parcel of the chaos. It might not actually be the fons et origo of the chaos. But it 
certainly does help to keep it going.  
 
In the second section we will look at what (internal) audit is all about. In the third we will take 
a closer look at what constitutes an internal auditor. Sections 4, 5, and 6 will deal with the 
issues of Role, Position, and Scope of Services as depicted as a generic scheme for the entire 
thesis in Chapter 1.  
 
2.2 What is (internal) audit all about? 
History 
When in doubt about the logic and justification for any decision, history is a good place to 
start. Check the archives and look for patterns. When available, theories, that will show how it 
all fits together. Don't, unless you absolutely have to, invent the wheel. 
 
Most (1969), for example, describes auditing practices that go back to ancient Babylonian and 
Egyptian civilizations. Brown (1968) gives an idea of how things were handled in the latter.  
 
Nothing was given out of the treasury without a written order. Peculation on the part 
of the workmen was provided against by the records of one official checking those of 
another. When the corn was brought to the storehouses each sack was filled in the 
sight of the overseer and noted down, and when the sacks were carried to the roof of 
the storehouse and emptied through the receiving opening the scribe stationed there 
recorded the number received. (1968, 21) 
 
Ramamoortie (2003) gave an overview of the history of internal auditing and goes back as far 
as 4000 BC! Formal record keeping systems were instituted to allay concerns about correctly 
accounting for receipts and disbursements and collecting taxes. Ramamoortie describes the 
similarities in developments during the Zhao dynasty in China - around 1000 BCE - and 
public finance systems in Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, the Roman Empire, city states in Italy, 
etc. All of them developed a detailed system of checks and counterchecks.  
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But auditing wasn't concerned only with numbers. How many sheep there were in a flock, and 
how quickly they were going forth to multiply. Or the amount of grain in the state barns. 
Auditing was also involved with psychological-sociological-moral issues. Writers such as 
John Cassian (fifth century Gaul) wrote about the need to eradicate secret "hiding places" 
(laterbrae) and make monks totally transparent to themselves, their fellow monks and 
superiors, and God.4 Are you true to yourself? Are you who you say you are? Does the 
apparent tally with the real, the rhetoric with the reality?  
 
In medieval times another example can be found: the circator, or roundsman, who night and 
day policed the corridors of Benedictine monasteries, on the lookout for inappropriate 
"hidden" behaviour among the monks, including, "lingering with intent". 
 
"The roundsman was a product of this age of selective amalgamation. The office 
seems to have originated during the eighth century when the circumstances at some 
monasteries necessitated that the general duties assigned to the senior monks in the 
rule of Benedict be divided among more specialized officials. The paucity of evidence 
for the internal life of cenobitic communities in this period makes it difficult to 
determine with certainty what kind of circumstances resulted in such a reorganization 
of the monastic infrastructure, but it is most probable that the population of 
monasteries grew large and unmanageable. Whatever the reason, some legislators of 
this period found it necessary to create new officials endowed with more precise 
duties. The duty of making patrols or rounds of the monastery to supervise the 
brethren fell to an official most commonly known as the circator (and more rarely as 
the synonymous circa and circinnator). The title clearly indicates the primary function 
of the office: to make the rounds of the monastery (circumire monasterium)."5  
 
When things were simple, the abbot himself was solely responsible for seeking out "intimate 
enemies". That is "enemies" not on the outside, where one would expect and watch for them, 
but those lurking within the organization. But as monasteries expanded physically and 
became a warren of buildings, ill-lit corridors and nooks and crannies, he could no longer do 
this on his own. Therefore, he had to delegate these responsibilities to his snoop patrols, the 
circatores, who noted breaches of monastery rules and reported them back to him. Nowadays, 
we would call this notion an "agency problem". We will return to this point in Chapter 4.  
 
Why need audit? 
Some clues have been hinted at in the above. It is not always possible to oversee what is 
happening on the premises - e.g., temples, estates and monasteries. Therefore, complexity and 
scale seem to foster the need to have some kind of an auditor around.  
                                                 
4 David Brakke, "The Problematization of Nocturnal Emissions in Early Christian Syria, Egypt, and Gaul", 
Journal of Early Christian Studies, 1995. 
5 Scott Bruce, "'Lurking With Spiritual Intent': A Note on the Origin and Functions of the Monastic Roundsman 
(Circator)", Revue Bénédictine, 1999 
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Another factor might be the need to verify information and interpretations in messages and 
reports that one relies on to make important decisions. Is it true? False? Somewhere in 
between? Accurate? Exaggerated? If those relying on these messages and reports have neither 
the time nor the ability to verify the contents, they will obviously need someone else who 
does. Thus an allegedly more independent and objective function will evolve "organically", 
out of perceived internal demands. If this is the case - as it to a certain extent has to be - such 
a function will depend on its "credibility". 
 
What does that "credibility" depend on? Or, put differently, what does it consist of? 
Obviously, the ability to assess the correctness of the above-mentioned "information" and 
"interpretations" of it. But how does one assess the ability to assess, or the lack thereof? What 
are the measures? Guidelines? For the present, let us assume what most people are already 
assuming - at least until things go terribly wrong - that these abilities are a given and everyone 
knows and agrees about what they are. 
 
Another ingredient in the credibility debate is being able to do the job effectively, 
economically efficiently, and in a timely manner. How does one assess "effectively" and 
"economically efficiently"? Both would have to include knowing what to focus on, when, for 
how long and in what breadth and depth. And, obviously, knowing what not to focus on, or 
generally skip over. In other words, having a sense of perspective, knowing what's important, 
the difference between center and periphery, essence and accident. 
 
How does one separate the wheat from the chaff, core issues from blips and happenstance? 
And while resolving them is hardly more than a distant dream, pointing in that general 
direction normally involves some bold attempt at overview and mapping. In other words, 
some kind of theory, however flawed, that permits some kind of value charting. In our case, 
that would mean a useful theory about what audit is and how it works.  
 
Definitions 
A quick sampling of numerous definitions of audit making the rounds demonstrates that it is 
difficult to define. Mautz and Sharaf (1961), Silvoso (1972), Mautz (1975), Flint (1988), 
Paape (1999), Kocks (2003), Paape, Otten, De Korte (2005) are just a few of those rushing in 
where wise men fear to tread.. The first quoted here comes from Mautz (1975)6, reproduced 
by Flint (1988). 
 
The role of auditing in an advanced economic society can be and has been stated in 
very simple terms – to add credibility to financial statements. 
 
This definition briefly reflects what the function of an audit is. Namely, adding credibility to 
(financial) statements. One could argue that you cannot add credibility like you toss 
mayonnaise on the salad. The credibility is organically derived from the fact that a trusted 
party, having assessed the reliability of the facts and numbers, states the same with his 
consent. A further interpretation of the requirements for an efficient realization of this 
objective is not taken into consideration by Mautz or by Flint.  
 
                                                 
6 R.K Mautz (1975), "The role of auditing in our society", unpublished background paper for the AICPA 
Commission on auditors' responsibilities. See also Flint (1988, p. 6). 
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While the definitions reflects back on what auditing is supposed to be doing – and probably 
also contain a huge, smuggled in cargo of ideology and other agendas – the sheer number of 
them forces us to ask, "Are there more dissimilarities in the definitions than similarities and 
overlaps?" In other words, while it may be convenient to speak and write about audit as a 
whole, is it meaningful? Does it conceal as much as, or more than, it reveals? The fact that so 
many definitions exist indicates that it often involves attempts to indicate "what it could be".  
 
Power (1997) states: 
 
Definitions are more an idealistic, normative projection of the expectations from 
practice. As a consequence of this diversity the expectation gap has only widened. It is 
a product of the vagueness of the objective [that is, definition] and scope of the audit, 
which is also founded by numerous research committees. 
 
The literature discussing methods and the process of auditing grew slowly over the years. 
Little attention was paid to the development of specific audit theories. Generally speaking, the 
concept and underlying auditing philosophy was taken for granted for a long time. Probably 
too long. More recently, there have been attempts to come to a universal theory around 
auditing. In other words, to audit auditing. 
 
Like unified field theory, this theory would - so they said - would transcend all the possible 
variations of any particular audit and demonstrate what they have in common. In other words, 
it would be applicable to all audits insofar as they are audits. As such, a mighty contention. 
But, nevertheless, one adhered to by a number of researchers. For example, Wilschut (1994) 
and Kocks (2003).  
 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961) and Flint (1988) – all three representing the External Auditor 
(external audit) community - have taken some important first steps. Silvoso (1972) reported 
on the results of the Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts. The International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) report (1999) later built on the basic framework developed by the 
Committee. Wilschut (1994) has also indicated what elements should be contained in a 
"general theory of auditing". He noted that: 
 
 There should be an assignment to carry out an audit. 
 The subject matter should be derived from the assignment. 
 Audit objectives need to be defined. 
 The audit criteria (when will the audit objectives be met?) should then be established. 
 There should be a clear formula about how to come to a conclusion. 
 Methods and techniques should be used to come to that conclusion. 
 A risk analysis approach should be used. 
 Interrelationships between all the aforementioned subjects should be analyzed. 
 Professionals should be subject to a professional code of conduct and ethics.  
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Such elements as expertise and reliability are not mentioned. Flint considers the fact that the 
definitions omit some elements as irrelevant, because the true objective of an audit in these 
(and all the other) definitions is still lacking. This does not imply that all these elements are 
unimportant. "Lending credibility to financial statements is only one manifestation of the 
social function of auditing, although, no doubt, a very important one." All the 
abovementioned definitions lose sight of what he considers to be the ultimate objective of an 
audit. That is, providing an opinion about the behaviour of the actors involved in relation to 
the ruling cultural, social, political, and ethical standards.7 
 
Thus the basic concept and idea was that audits should contribute to the reliability of the 
information provided, in most cases via the annual report and the published accounts. Silvoso 
(1972) has been shown that this is not an easy undertaking. When chairing the Committee on 
Basic Auditing Concepts he wrote:  
 
Fortunately, the profession has realized that the auditor can never assert the fairness of 
financial statements as true. He cannot even assert the truth of many minor 
propositions from which the fairness proposition is inferred. Some propositions are 
evident to the auditor because they are proven observation statements. Many 
propositions, however, are evident to the auditor because either he has postulated them 
or he has confirmed their validity. Thus, the distinction between empirical truth and 
validity is an important one in any inquiry. (1972, 39)  
 
With regard to the level of credibility: 
 
We realize, of course, that modification of the auditor's opinion to include a degree of 
credibility will require many years, if indeed it can ever be accomplished. (1972, 42) 
 
Professional auditors speak about "reasonable assurance" without specifying exactly what 
reasonable is. Of course what is reasonable depends on the situation and, therefore, is 
contingent and somewhat fluid. One of the often quoted defense mechanisms of auditors is to 
drag in the "professional judgment" deux ex machina. That's something professionals make 
judgments about. And even if the amorphous public can't understand what that silly putty 
means - and, let's face it, they can't - they still could be convinced by it. But if financial 
scandals occur too often, the "professional judgment" mantra will inspire more disgust than 
confidence. 
 
Power had some strong opinions on this subject in 1994.  
 
Audit is a particular manner of (re) presenting administrative problems and their 
solutions, one that is becoming universal.... In place of proximity of control, such as in 
supervisory practices or real time inspection, audits function at a temporal and often 
spatial distance from the organizational processes to which they are applied. (1994, 
299-300) 
 
                                                 
7Flint (1988). On page 15 he defines an audit. On page 13 he talks about the objectives of audit: "compliance 
with specified norms of what is acceptable behaviour, it is clearly culturally, socially and politically dependent".  
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Power (1996) was clearly worried that the audit concept might become so pervasive that it 
could be seen as the magic potion Asterix swallows to become better than he is, or even 
should be. A perceived - rather than a real - fix for all problems. "Hey, you have this issue. No 
problem. Audit it." In his article, "Making things auditable", he warned: 
 
Making things auditable is a constant and precarious project of a system of knowledge 
which must reproduce itself and sustain its institutional role from a diverse assemblage 
of routines, practices and economic constraints. It is when this knowledge system 
extends its reach into new areas that this project, and the logic of auditability, which 
requires facts for its procedures, is most apparent. (1996, 312) 
 
Examining the consequences of such laws as the US' Sarbanes-Oxley (elaborated in Chapter 
3), it seems that his worst fears could come true. In this law the urge to make things auditable 
is pre-eminent, perhaps even screamingly so. And one doesn't have to look far for the 
motivation for such red alert concern. In the wake of frequent, costly and very public business 
scandals, governmental regulators and the public at large want to assurances that something 
meaningful and effective is being done to punish the guilty parties, and, more importantly, to 
ensure that these sorts of thing "never happen again".  
 
Classification 
But what can assurance and/or credibility be provided about? Over the years the number and 
diversity of audits has increased and numerous variations have been created and tweaked. 
Auditing has become a fleeting concept, a moveable feast. Audit practices are anchored in 
developed capitalistic societies and the trend over the last 15 years is that auditors are 
elbowing their ways into regions, some of which are already occupied by other professionals. 
And some of those other professionals strenuously believe that auditors have no business 
being anywhere on, or even sniffing around, their turf. Or, for that matter, any place else 
outside their traditional, and very small, box.  
 
In addition to financial audits we now hear of environmental audits, value for money 
audits, management audits, quality audits, forensic audits, data audits, intellectual 
property audits, medical audits and many others besides.... If linkages between [these] 
practices are more than superficial, then some consistency should be evident between 
them over and above the sharing of a common terminology. (Power, 1996, 299)  
 
Power's list is not exhaustive. Pickett and Vinten (1997, 53) added about ten more. IFAC 
published through its International Auditing Practices Committee (2000) a new framework for 
Assurance Services, starting at the historical financial data, extending through systems and 
processes, and moving on to behaviour. 
 
IFAC presented descriptions and examples of subjects that could be classified under each of 
those categories in the framework. IFAC then defined two levels: assurance and review. 
Assurance is the top of the line, the A brand. Review is the second best thing. But this 
framework was developed by external auditors and operates completely from the perspective 
of financial audit. Therefore, it doesn't take into account the vast array of other kinds of audits 
that are currently on the menu. 
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Vaassen and Schelleman (2000, 102) criticized the IFAC classification. They wrote that by 
choosing arbitrary criteria and omitting clear borders between, say, financial and non-
financial, and systems and processes, and behaviour, confusion is created. The whole matter 
should be investigated further. While their comments have merit, they do not mention that it 
may be very difficult, if not impossible, to make clear distinctions where they don't exist. To 
draw to here and no further lines in the sand between, say, financial, operational, EDP/IT and 
compliance audits.  
 
Although classifications along those lines are also arbitrary, they would be better understood 
in practice. Thus in the context of this thesis the following definitions will be adhered to. 
 
Financial Audit: 
 
An audit of financial statements enables the auditor to express an opinion whether the 
financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an 
identified financial reporting framework. (NIVRA8, 2003, 192)  
 
This type of audit deals with financial data and statements in any form. The reporting 
framework is national laws or (inter)national accounting standards. "Fraud audits" are a subset 
of financial audits that focus on possible attempts of fudging and finagling the numbers.  
 
Management control uses varying terminology. Some are fond of "management control 
auditing" (Paape, 1999). Others use "operational auditing", "the audit of the internal control 
system", or plain vanilla "internal control" (COSO, 1992, 1994). To prevent an even bigger 
Babel-like confusion and because it is the most frequently used term, we will use "operational 
audit" throughout this thesis.  
 
Operational Audit is defined as: 
 
An audit of (parts of) the management control (or internal control) system of an 
organization to provide additional assurance whether this will enable the organizations 
to reach its objectives and, if needed, provide advice for improvement. (Paape, 1999, 
303) 
 
Since individual management teams design and adapt management control systems to suit 
their very specific needs, the framework for the audit will be provided by management, not 
the auditor. Therefore, frameworks will tend to be highly resistant to any attempt to generalize 
them for renewed use, at least for other companies. EDP or IT auditing is assumed to be part 
of the operational audit domain and will not be defined separately. This category includes 
many of the audits discussed above: performance, quality systems, ISO, and environmental. 
 
Compliance Audit is defined as: 
 
An audit to assess whether the organization adheres to certain specific requirements of 
policy, procedures, standards, or laws and governmental regulations. (Ratliff et al, 
1996, 763)  
 
                                                 
8 Nederlands Instituut van Register Accountants.  
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This kind of audit uses both internal and external frameworks and is, therefore, less in-house 
specific.  
 
There are limits to what should be audited and what is, in fact, auditable. Power (1996) is 
justified in his concerns. Whenever a major scandal occurs, there seems to be a knee-jerk urge 
to do something, and do it quickly. For example, legislate to improve transparency by means 
of increasing the level of auditing. Without wondering if there is an exact fit - or even an 
approximate match up - between "solution" and "problem".  
 
Pentland (2000) adheres to Power's ideas. He also has his doubts about what should be 
audited, and who should be doing the auditing. The tail end of that sentence raises some 
interesting questions. While many professions make assessments and evaluations, that does 
not mean they are auditors. So what's the difference between an audit and an assessment? 
What are the boundaries of auditing?  
 
Boundaries of auditing 
When complexity and risks increase, an independent expert, an auditor is exactly what the 
doctor ordered. Increased "ungraspability" is an important contributing factor to the 
heightened recent attention being paid to auditing. Power (1994, 304-306) notices that 
auditing might offer a solution to estimate the value of organizations. But the flip side of that 
coin is that auditing does not contribute to the "opening up" of organizations. On the contrary, 
auditing assigns more value to verification and validation than to transparency of the 
organization. And in this context Power speaks of a new "obscurity" in society. While 
auditing may create new transparency within the organization - at least for its bosses, the 
managers - it may also be creating more obscurity for everyone else. 
 
Flint (1988) sketches a number of developments clarifying this. Examples of such 
developments adding to the increasing complexity are the strong growth of capital markets, 
more complex and unwieldy organizations, and the development and growth of pension funds 
and investment agencies. Other factors include the accessibility of information and data. This 
involves not only geographical restrictions, but also legal, organizational, time, or cost 
factors. For example, do the auditing (verification) savings justify the efforts, expenses, and 
whatever ill will that might be stirred up? Is changing things and making them, say, .5% 
better, necessarily better than leaving them as they are and not rocking the boat? 
 
Auditing can be seen as a normative image of what an audit ought to be. At a technical level, 
auditing can be seen as a variety of specific operations, procedures and practices. Pentland 
(2000, 309) states: "Clearly, if we are to understand what auditing is, and what it is becoming, 
we need to do some investigation." Power (1997) calls this the "deep epistemological 
obscurity" of auditing. Pentland makes a provocative statement: "If so, then it may be equally 
illuminating to compare auditors to movies or television critics." (2000, 311) 
 
If Pentland (2000) had said this at a gathering of professional auditors, he would have had 
good reason to fear for his physical well-being. Nevertheless, it is not as whimsical as it 
sounds, and deserves to be at least pondered over. What distinguishes an auditor from a 
television critic? In what else besides his opinion does his credentials and professionalism 
reside and abide? There must be more to it than, "because I say so". Otherwise, as almost 
everyone can imagine, freedom of speech could, and would lead to an epistemological worst 
case scenario. 
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Has it to do with the social aspect of auditing? It's true that the more social function of the 
audit stems from a combination of distrust of unverified data and confidence in the auditor.  
 
In a richer and larger cultural life, however, existence rests on a thousand 
premises which the single individual cannot trace and verify to their roots at all, 
but must take on faith. Our modern life is based to a much larger extent than is 
usually realized upon the faith in the honesty of the other. Examples are our 
economy, which becomes more and more a credit economy, or our science, in 
which most scholars must use innumerable results of other scientists which they 
cannot examine. We base our gravest decisions on a complex system of 
conceptions, most of which presuppose the confidence that we will not be 
betrayed. Under modern conditions, the lie, therefore, becomes something much 
more devastating than it was earlier, something which questions the very 
foundations of our life.... modern life is a "credit economy" in a much broader 
than a strictly economic sense.9 
 
As we have already said - without any claims for originality - knowledge is power. And the 
same is true of auditing, which strives toward certain types of knowledge. But, as with all 
power, it comes with risks and consequences. For example, if the auditor's message is not liked, 
his employers might reject the message and shoot the messenger. 
 
An audit is, therefore, by definition ex post. To come to a professional and reliable judgment 
one should be able to use the underlying evidence. The audit product is a report, which contains 
an opinion about the object researched. The only way to come to an opinion is to base it on the 
acquired evidence in relation to the research object. Without evidence it is impossible to form 
an opinion. Based on the type of evidence, the quality and the persuasiveness of the opinions 
will vary. Evidence can exist in different forms (e.g., oral, written, and inferential). The weight 
of each type of evidence is determined in the context of the research. In this context the expert 
judgment of the auditor plays an important role. This should determine if in that particular 
situation a piece of evidence could be described as a "sufficient competent evidential matter".10  
 
While helpful tips and rules of thumb on this subject are extensively discussed in professional 
books, the theoretical frameworks are in the same premodernist phase as audit definitions. If 
you think about that for more than a nanosecond, you will probably note that this is much more 
than coincidental. Silvoso (1972) referred to the issues of sufficiency of evidence and when 
observations are admissible as evidence. The latter is the case only if they meet the condition of 
inter-subjectivity. In science this would be dealt with through "repeatability". If observations 
can be repeated, especially by more than one person, producing the same result - more or less - 
that will increase credibility and it can be admitted as evidence. But, unfortunately, observations 
of business transaction are never repeatable.  
 
The most that we can hope for is this: S1 observes Y. Would S2 have observed Y, 
provided he had been in the place and time when S1 observed Y?' This is called 
repeatability. He then lists a number of factors contributing to errors in observation 
that forces one to question the usefulness of the concept of inter-subjectivity as well. 
(1972, 45).  
                                                 
9Georg Simmel, "The Secret and the Secret Society" 
10 Mautz & Sharaf (1961), pp. 43-68 
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How very real those obstacles are is also acknowledged in many other sciences. Partington 
(2002, 86) stated, "Yet even in experimental research there may be no such thing as the 
completely detached observer". Positivists may claim that objectivity is something that can be 
achieved. Many others disagree, and vehemently. For those interested in beating their brains 
against these conundrums, see Johnson and Duberley (2000).  
  
2.3 What constitutes an (internal) auditor? 
Authority and professionalism 
The word auditor originates from Latin and literally means listener. It was the task of the 
auditor to listen carefully and, based on his knowledge of the conditions, to evaluate if the 
farmers who had to account for their revenues did this in a manner that was consistent with 
both regulations and reality. (Most, 1969, 17) 
 
Within the audit concept, authority is one of the most important starting points. Without 
authority little value will be attached to the opinion of the auditor - or anyone else, for that 
matter. But what is authority? Where does it comes from and what is it based on? And how 
does one obtain and retain it? Or, when things go horribly wrong, lose it? 
 
Authority in the realm of auditors is intimately entwined with professionalism. But which 
comes first: authority or professionalism? Fasten your seat belts, because once again - and by 
no means accidentally - we find ourselves on the slippery slope of chicken and egg questions. 
 
Some say that professionalism implies authority. This also implies that society should have 
confidence in the expertise and independence of any auditor: the basic elements of authority. 
Without these two core concepts, auditors cannot fulfill their social function. These elements 
will be addressed separately.  
 
Burns, Greenspan and Hartwell (1994) researched professionalism in internal auditing. Their 
view is that prior to 1977 internal auditing did not qualify as a true profession, because it 
failed to set professional standards. This changed in 1978 by the release of the "Standards for 
the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing of IIA Inc". The events that led to a significant 
elevation of professionalism were the enactment of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 
1977, passed on Friday, December 9, 1977 in response to the scandal of Lockheed's bribing 
schemes in order to induce foreign countries, including Germany, to buy up very difficult to 
fly Starfighter jets. 
 
Expertise requires knowledge and professionalism that the auditor should acquire from 
education, on the job training, and experience. Thus legislators set requirements that must be 
met before people are qualified and entitled to perform audits. The knowledge that an auditor 
should possess is not limited to financial knowledge. To form a professional judgment one 
should have knowledge of different disciplines. This knowledge is important to place issues in 
the proper context and perspective. Expertise is not only a requirement for an auditor to form 
a judgment on a certain subject. It is also the stone that the concept of reliability is built on. 
Third parties will only accept the judgment if they believe that the auditor is knowledgeable 
of the business and also demonstrates this.  
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O'Connor (2004) would argue that this has to do with competence. Competence is the basic 
feature of any professional: primarily vested by education and training and demonstrated via 
licenses and "education permanente". A well known expert in psychology, Professor 
Wagenaar once said: "If we cannot solve a problem, we go for another problem that we think 
we can solve". This seems to be the case with defining professionalism, authority, expertise 
and competence - and, as we will see, objectivity and independence. If we cannot define the 
one properly, let us focus on the other and try to define that. Something along the lines of if 
two wrongs don't make a right, try three. It looks like an endless game of postponement. 
 
Further, strict behavioural rules should apply to auditors. From the moment auditors started to 
become an independent profession, the most important professional ethical values were 
expertise, clearness in performance and expressions, trust, confidentiality, impartiality and 
independence. These are the core concepts of auditing ethics. Organizations such as the 
American Institute for Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and The Netherlands' NIVRA 
tightly control and safeguard these behavioural rules, either in the form of standards for 
auditing, or in a professional code, and accompanying disciplinary powers.  
 
According to Flint (1988, 64), the elementary characteristics of an auditor are "probity and 
strength of character". An auditor should approach an audit assignment without bias or any 
prejudice. This requires integrity and adherence to professional codes of conduct. Auditors 
should also not have personal involvement with the audit due to existing relations, financial or 
other interests, or interest regarding the outcome. One question is if these characteristics are 
the first thing that springs to mind when the public thinks "auditor". 
 
Confidence is based on the belief in the presence of these characteristics. The auditor is an 
honorable man - he wouldn't lie - and, therefore, the fruits of his labor are worth more than the 
paper they are printed out on. In other words, an auditor's word is his bond, and reputation is 
key to both him and the profession as a whole. Society's trust in auditing is also dependent on 
the results of earlier audits, and to maintain that trust and the legitimacy to, the independent 
attitude of the auditor should appear from inviolable behavioural rules. An auditor who does 
not comply with the regulations is subject to the disciplinary law of the professional 
organization. As shown above from the Georg Simmel quote, faith and confidence have 
become increasingly important in modern society. Perhaps, in contrast with his assertion, this 
has always been so. 
Independence and objectivity 
Now let's look at the myriad of concepts used to make up for the characteristics of any 
auditor. Professionalism, authority, integrity, independence, probity and strength of character, 
trust, confidentiality, impartiality, objectivity, without prejudice, expertise, knowledge, and 
competence. All distinguished and lofty words that sound like they must mean a lot. But when 
push comes to shove, or even before, what exactly? 
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Let's try to nail down two of those highly debated and debatable terms: independence and 
objectivity. Independence, one of the main themes in the audit profession, both external and 
internal, has many aspects.11 Arens and Loebbecke (1994) distinguish "independence in fact" 
and "independence in appearance".12 This distinction occurs more often. Factual 
independence has no value, as audit stakeholders do not see the objectivity of that. Therefore, 
it is important that auditors clearly indicate the extent and validity of their findings. Kocks 
expands the concept with two other aspects, namely independence "in mind" and "in 
behaviour".13 This subject was already touched on above. From that perspective, one would 
be inclined to regard this as more rhetoric than reality.  
 
The authority of an audit and the degree of acceptance is partially based on an auditor's 
perceived, and actual, independence. In all cases where an audit is executed the audited party 
has accepted the underlying norms with regard to the reporting, duties, and other criteria. The 
audited persons have an interest in the research and are also in a position to influence results. 
The objective of the audit is "to secure accountability" (Flint, 1988, 29). It is important for 
credibility and objectivity that the audit stands completely apart from the person whose 
behaviour is being evaluated. If this wasn't the case, the audit could be seriously compromised. 
 
The audited party agrees to be audited because he basically has no choice. Do it or else. But he 
will continue to do his utmost to control damage. That is, not reveal any more than he 
absolutely has to. At the same time, the auditor needs unrestricted access to all relevant sources 
of information. What information is relevant can be determined only post facto. That is, after it 
has been scrutinized. Otherwise, the auditor's judgment about the value of, say, an annual 
report, could be seriously impaired. Based on his research, a report is written presenting 
findings and conclusions. This report should be published without further consequences for the 
auditor. The importance of this postulate is such that it forms a separate subject within auditing 
theory.  
 
Defining independence and objectivity is a difficult task. That wouldn't overly concern us if the 
audit profession didn't lean so heavily on these concepts. One could even say, without 
exaggeration, that it is founded on them.  
 
Independence is a subjective concept that connotes a willingness to bring a high degree of 
rigor and skeptical objectivity to the evaluation of company management and its plans and 
proposals. However, these studies (on independence of corporate boards in this case) have to 
use rough proxies for independence: the simple absence of a job with the company, a close 
family connection or (perhaps some regular stream of income from the company apart from 
directors' fees and dividends are all that it take to qualify. (Langevoort, 2000, 3) 
 
The chairman of the dissolved Independence Standards Board (ISB) – an initiative of the SEC 
and the AICPA - Allen, delivered the 1997 Seymour Jones Lecture in Accounting at New York 
University's Stern School of Business. 
 
                                                 
11 Which is quite remarkable since both operate in different spheres. One outside the company and, therefore, 
supposedly more independent than the in-house player. 
12Arens and Loebbecke (1994), p. 79. See also Flint pp. 54-61. 
13H.C. Kocks (1997), "General principles of auditing", incorporated in reader postdoctoral education RO at 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, p. 10. 
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Our capital markets are the envy of the world and are an important component to the 
efficiency of our economy. The capital markets work on information, including 
financial statements audited by independent professionals. We believe that the 
attestation of a competent, independent auditor adds value. There is unanimous 
agreement that the independent judgment of expert auditors and the perception of that 
independence is a condition of the utility of the auditors' attestation. What does and 
should constitute independence in this context is not however always obvious.  
 
Allen's contention is that independence and the lack thereof might in the end be related to the 
efficiency of pricing of securities in the market. In other words, independence has 
instrumental value. According to O'Connor (2004), the AICPA and SEC claim that 
independence has a value in and of itself. 
 
O'Connor continues: 
 
But if regulators are not clear on what the real purpose and value of independence is, 
then it is no wonder that the regulations they promulgate appear fragmented and lack 
cohesiveness. (2004, 42) 
 
It is Allen's claim that independence is a proxy (it has no intrinsic value) of objectivity and 
integrity. In that respect he differed from the SEC and the AICPA and might have come up 
with fresh views. However, according to O'Connor, the ISB was influenced by the views of 
AICPA SEC because it allowing a number of CPA's to join. Before discontinuing the 
organization on July 31, 2001, ISB produced a number of Discussion Memorandums. One of 
them dealt with auditor independence and came up with four personal attributes: competence, 
diligence, integrity, and objectivity.  
 
Competence is the ability of an auditor to perform the technical audit itself. Diligence, the 
new addition, is the useful notion that considers whether a competent auditor actually uses it 
in any given audit. Integrity is the capacity of the auditor to resist temptations to perform and 
report the audit with intentionally less than scrupulous adherence to presented facts. 
Objectivity is the capacity of the auditor to perform and report the audit without intentional or 
unintentional biases.  
 
Is this progress? O'Conner (2004) doubted it and concludes: 
 
"Independence" per se is unnecessary or irrelevant in these examples [doctors and 
lawyers] for two reasons. First, a client or patient is unlikely to hire a professional 
whom he believes to have a strong alliance with an individual or organization whose 
interests are adverse to his own. Second, in the traditional professional services 
environment where doctors are simply doctors, lawyers simply lawyers, and 
accountants simply accountants, the "reputational capital" of the professional is based 
on the public's belief that the professional acts with objectivity and integrity. 
Professionals who engage in reputation-depleting activities will likely find themselves 
with few clients over time, regardless of their "independence".… The solution [for 
auditors] is to institutionalize "objectivity" and "integrity" such that auditors who meet 
the criteria will generally act with objectivity and integrity even on behalf of the 
unknowable investing public. The result is "independence".  
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One might argue that this debate draws heavily on the notion of the external auditor. But the 
IIA Research Foundation (2001b) also produced a study on independence and objectivity. It 
notes that the focus of Standards and other literature regarding independence is mainly 
focused on "perceptions" of independence. 
 
Our analysis of the literature indicates that independence and objectivity are often 
treated synonymously and often with a lack of clarity. Standards have invariably 
focused on independence and have paid only scant attention, if any, to the concept 
of objectivity. Standards have also variously discussed "independence in 
appearance", "independence in fact", "independence of mind", and "mental 
attitude". Little effort has been spent on defining those concepts, explaining the 
difference between these concepts and that of objectivity or on how they relate to 
an effective audit. (2001b, 13) 
 
The report continues that "objectivity" should be the primary focus of attention. The rest 
follows as a result from enhanced objectivity. Objectivity is defined as a state of mind and as 
freedom from bias, expressing or involving the use of facts without distortions by personal 
feelings or prejudice. The stand of the IIA Inc is that the organizational position is a 
determinant factor for independence, which in turn fosters objectivity. Already in 1972 
(Silvoso, 1972) the Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts declared freedom from bias as the 
main concern of audit. Again, from the perspective of the external auditor. This report stated 
that "the condition of 'conflict of interest' is the most important single determinant of the need 
for the audit function" (1972, 31). The issue was drawn into the core concerns of auditing and 
audits. 
 
What have we learned thus far? Independence seems to be a result rather than an instrument. 
If we focus on objectivity and integrity, independence will be the outcome. Okay. But does it 
bring us any closer to our goals? Probably not, because defining objectivity and integrity and 
putting it to work isn't any easier than independence itself. This much is obvious. While 
beating the drums of "independence" seems to be an essential part of the rhetorical rituals of 
the profession, it is essentially that. It might be best for internal auditors not to emphasize 
independence too much. Because if it is problematic for external auditors, it is doubly so for 
this sub-species. Internal auditors are by definition part of the organization and paid by 
management itself.  
 
Organizational position 
According to IIA Inc's Professional Standards (2001d), the organizational position is highly 
intertwined with independence and objectivity issues. In another report (2001b, 8), it takes the 
position that professionalism and objectivity make up for effective internal audit services. It is 
important to note that the IIA report points out that independence for internal auditors is more 
problematic than it is for the external auditors. The reasons for that are internal auditors are 
not only dependent on management, but also the increasing importance of internal audit 
activities conjoined with the growth in demand of IA consulting services leads to escalating 
concern and requires a response from the profession (2001b, 3).  
 
40
40 
Interestingly, the report continues, it is not appropriate to copy the SEC and AICPA approach 
by listing hundreds of pages of regulations to steer independence. Surely, that would add up 
to many more pages than there are for the external profession. The IIA tries to learn from the 
"negative experience of the external audit profession with this approach over the past 70 
years" (2001b, 4).  
 
The report focuses on the objectivity subject as a process that can be managed. In a footnote it 
is stated: "The concept of managing conflicts of interests is important since one can never be 
totally free of conflicts that may impair objectivity." (2001b, 16) In a way it is just a matter of 
downsizing the problem as much as possible.  
 
Professionalism in its turn is defined as integrity, competence and the use of due care (or 
diligence). Integrity is defined by the IIA Inc as "an uncompromising adherence to a code of 
moral values and the avoidance of deception, expediency, artificiality, or shallowness of any 
kind" (2001b, 9). How on earth will this be measured – if at all - and against what standards?  
 
Competence is easier to understand. "Competence means having the intelligence, education, 
and training to be able to add value through performance." (2001b, 9) Surely, competence is 
acquired via education, training, intelligence, and a system of licensing and education 
permanente. On top of this there might be supporting systems, such as quality reviews and the 
possibility of disciplining by other professionals. 
 
Due care has to do with the way internal auditors carry out audits. While elaborating on due 
care, the IIA Inc suggests to include "perspective compatibility" (2001b, 10), referring to an 
individual's view or perception of a given situation. Auditors should be aware of the interests 
of the stakeholders to whom they owe a duty. This is an extremely important point. First, 
because this means that the internal auditor has to readjust his focus and understand who his 
"bosses" or "responsible parties" are, their interests, and how he should set about looking after 
them. 
 
It is useful at this point to discuss the issue of the auditor's position within the organization. If 
there is more than one boss to serve, there surely will be different interests. Would it be fair to 
say to say that this needs to be part of his job description? Surely, that would make easier both 
his life and the ability to measure whether services were rendered as requested and demanded 
by his superiors. If there are differing, and even conflicting, interests, the implicit would 
become explicit by writing them down, and then they could be sorted out in terms of 
priorities. Otherwise, the poor auditor would be squeezed like a lemon. Or a stone. It would 
also demand making a case for make for why certain audits are required and who the auditor 
should report to. As long as the number of stakeholders is limited to one, these problems will 
not arise. But this is most certainly not the case. Interestingly, the IIA Inc study took stock 
and came up with the following 6 parties: management, employees, board of directors, audit 
committee, owners (shareholders), and the general public.  
 
The study already acknowledged that, "Each of those parties will want, or at least will be 
perceived to want, different things from the audit, highlighting the importance of a consistent 
perspective across the audit team and function" (2001b, 10).  
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The IIA Inc (1994) agreed that the interests of constituents to whom an auditor owes a duty 
drive the auditor's obligations. But this does not necessarily require an explicit statement by a 
stakeholder. No. The auditor is often in a better position to understand what actions to take to 
act in the best interests of his constituents. The IIA Inc study calls this "perspective 
compatibility", between internal auditor, audit team, management, the board, and, if 
performing regulatory assurance services, the general public. That's interesting! Without even 
touching on the grand notion of "perspective compatibility" one most certainly could argue 
whether any internal auditor would be pleased to make the judgment calls that require 
balancing differing needs by differing constituents without prior written consent. Who will 
cut the Gordian knot in the cases of conflicting interest, which, as we have already said, are 
inevitable? The auditor himself? Any auditor who has been around will know by experience 
the difficulty, if not the impossibility of this task.  
 
As shown above, independence and objectivity are relative in nature. If we – like Allen of the 
ISB - would define independence as a result of objectivity and integrity, then the issue would 
be that we need to foster those attributes and that an increased independence will result from 
that. This would imply that the organizational position in itself would need to be such that 
objectivity and integrity would be enhanced. Whether integrity will be affected by a different 
organizational position might be difficult to envision. But objectivity might be enhanced if 
IA's organizational position is as high as possible.  
 
Since IA and the Chief Audit Executive are members of the organization, they are subject to 
and report to the Management Board. And sometimes even further down the pecking order: to 
lower managerial levels. In Agency Theory  terms, the principal resides within the company, 
thereby creating, maintaining, and possibly even exacerbating dependence. Not independence. 
He who pays the piper calls the tune. The situation is not much different for an outsourced 
internal audit services provider. Again, management pays the bill. The question then is 
whether independence will be enhanced if the organizational position is altered. If so, the 
question becomes what will be the best level to report to.  
 
The IIA Inc, of course, stresses the need to have an in-house IA. But what if it is outsourced? 
Would that foster objectivity and integrity? According to O'Connor (2004), no. And, 
according to the IIA Inc study (1997a), this is not an argument in favour of outsourcing either. 
From an Agency Theory perspective, this is rather strange. After all, the outsourced IA 
members will not be part of the organization and, therefore, less subject to some of the 
abovementioned pressures. In their study, IIA Inc acknowledges that outsourcing may be a 
solution to the problem of impaired objectivity (p. 35). But, "Such decisions, however, will 
require additional financial resources and may lead to unease among internal audit staff". One 
might conclude that impaired objectivity is not a problem because solving it involves 
incurring extra costs?!  
 
2.4 Role  
 
This section deals with the role and rationale of IA and whether it should be in-sourced or 
outsourced (make or buy).  
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In 1957, MacPherson, Sinnott and Stokvis placed the internal audit profession in the realm of 
the industrial revolution and subsequent growth of scale and complexity of organizations, 
thereby explaining the rationale for internal audit from the perspective of Agency Theory. 
From what the speakers said the answer to the questions, "Why does IA exist?" and "Why do 
some companies have them and others don't?" was simple: management needed them. The 
simple truth must be that there is no other answer than that. Since internal auditing is not 
mandatory, a direct need must be met. That in itself doesn't end the dispute. Take a look at the 
following.  
 
In an IIA Inc study (1997a) pertaining to outsourcing the following was noted: "we need to 
think about what is truly 'unique' about the internal auditing function. When we asked internal 
auditors to define what was 'unique internal auditing', no one thing stood out. The closest 
thing to being unique is the internal control orientation of existing external internal auditing 
departments." (1997a, page xii) If the internal audit community isn't able to formulate what is 
unique about them, then there is really a need to worry! The same study also concluded that 
internal auditing is not homogeneous (1997, 125). Therefore, we shouldn't hold our breaths 
waiting for an  
one size fits all answer to what it is and isn't. The study also concluded that if a function is not 
unique, it will be more susceptible to outsourcing.  
 
If management has a need, then the option is to either create one internally or hire them in the 
market: make or buy. There is a market where these services can be obtained. The best suited 
candidates would be the public accountancy or specialized firms. There has always been some 
kind of animosity between internal audit practitioners and external parties providing internal 
audit services. This should come as no surprise, since out- or in-sourcing will impact the job 
market for internal auditors and the services of internal audit from an expert perspective might 
be rendered by an outside provider. On the other hand, internal auditors can make their career 
within the professional auditing firms as well.  
 
The Research Foundation of the IIA ordered a study (1997a) on the outsourcing issue. 
Although the study was quite lengthy – almost 150 pages – the lack of substantiating data was 
staggering. The study concluded: "There is not a large enough database available to reach any 
final conclusions about total outsourcing, but it is safe to say that there have been many 
successful partial and full outsourcing arrangements." From a scientific perspective that is a 
disappointing conclusion.  
 
The IIA Inc. Standards (2001d) do not deal in any shape or form with the make or buy issue. 
In 1998 it published "A perspective on Outsourcing of the Internal Auditing Function", which, 
since it never achieved the status of a "standard", was deemed a professional practice 
pamphlet. According to this pamphlet, it is best to keep IA in house. What else might one 
expect from the IIA Inc? 
 
A study of Widener and Selto (1999), using a Transaction Cost Economics perspective, is 
useful for studying the outsourcing issue. There are two main conclusions to be learned from 
it. One, the higher the Asset Specificity the less outsourcing will be used. This is consistent 
with the findings of Williamson (1996): Asset Specificity is the most determining factor in the 
question of make or buy. Two, the more often internal audit is used, the more often the 
function is positioned internally. For a more detailed discussion we refer to Chapter 4.  
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The issue is whether buying internal audit services would be valued by outsiders due to a 
perceived increase of "independence" of the outside provider compared with an internal 
provider. An interesting experiment was done by Lowe, Geiger and Pany (1999). One 
hundred and seventy-seven loan officers were supplied with a realistic loan application for a 
medium-sized retail grocery company and asked to evaluate auditor independence, assess the 
reliability of financial statements and decide whether they should, or should not, grant the 
loan. The participants were given the same information, except for the description of IA, 
which varied as follows: 
  
1. Not outsourced, done in-house.  
2. Outsourced to an external auditor other than the one that performed the company's 
external audits.  
3. Outsourced to their own external auditor, which performed management functions.  
4. Outsourced to their own external auditor; same personnel used for the internal and 
external audits.  
5. Outsourced to their own external auditor; different personnel used for the internal and 
external audits. 
When number 3 came to the fore independence and reliability ratings dropped, and loan 
officers were least likely to grant loans. By contrast, with number 5 - same external audit 
company, different personnel - independence and reliability ratings were significantly higher 
and loan approvals were the highest. These results were consistent with the AICPA's position 
of allowing external auditors to perform outsourced internal audit activities for clients as long 
as they did not perform management functions in connection with the internal audit. 
However, the results also show that perceived auditor independence and financial statement 
reliability could be enhanced by requiring CPA firms that perform internal audit services for 
clients to use different personnel for each type of engagement. The study was done from the 
perspective of the external auditor providing internal audit services, and not at the perceived 
differences in independence between internal and external auditors providing the same 
services per se. The data, however, does provide support that there is no real gain in the 
perceived level of independence either by in- or outsourcing IA. Further, the current status of 
corporate governance affairs, as described in Chapter 4, prohibits certain outsourcing to the 
current external auditor, even if they do they use different personnel for each type of 
engagement.  
 
In the financial services industry (full) outsourcing is prohibited if it is economically viable to 
afford one. Recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act law and the subsequent guidelines from the 
SEC and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) prohibit certain internal 
audit services to be delivered by the external auditor signing off on the annual report. Besides 
that, there are no Corporate Governance regulations and recommendations that provide clear 
guidelines regarding the make or buy issue. Professional bodies like IIA Inc and AICPA only 
provide guidelines about how to cooperate. We will come back to that later in this chapter. 
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While the outsourcing issue has sparked much concern and discussion among internal 
auditors themselves, there doesn't seem to be any evidence indicating that it is happening on a 
large-scale. True, there are cases of it here and there. But this seems to be limited and more an 
example of co-sourcing, whereby the external provider is compensating for a shortage in staff 
or skills on the part of the in-house IA. For the moment at least, I conclude that it is "Much 
ado about nothing". Competition in itself is prima facie healthy, not just from the perspective 
of management, but also from the profession, because stretches professionals to the limits of 
their competence. In addition to the data already provided here and in Chapter 4, the survey 
(see Chapter 6) will provide some more data to back this up.  
 
Concluding this section, one might say that despite the fact that there are no laws making IA 
mandatory (with the exceptions for the financial services industry), developments show an 
increasing interest. Surely, management must have an intrinsic motive to have IA. Much of 
the why of that will be discussed in Chapter 4. But perhaps there are less obvious reasons that 
also might explain this need. In the Chapter 5 case studies and Chapter 6 survey some 
answers will become apparent.  
 
2.5 Position 
 
This section will shed light on the issues of the organizational position, size, staffing, and how 
to control IA.  
Organizational position 
Let's begin with position and corporate governance: two very important factors when it comes 
to independence. There are a number of IIA Inc. Standards (2001d) dealing with 
independence and objectivity. No. 1100 is the generic one (independence and objectivity), 
further detailed in 1110 (organizational independence), 1120 (individual independence), 1130 
(impairments to independence or objectivity), and no less than five different Practice 
Advisories. Although independence is very much emphasized in the Standards and many 
publications, Hawkes and Adams (1995) found that customers feel that internal auditing is 
enhanced when auditors and their clients establish close relationships based on a cooperative 
and participative approach as opposed to an independent and prescriptive appraisal function. 
Thus despite the views of the profession in general, there is some disagreement from outside.  
 
Standard 1110, which deals with organizational independence, states: "The chief internal 
auditor should report to a level within the organization that allows the internal audit activity to 
fulfil its responsibilities".  
 
The relevant Practice Advisories, 1100 and 1110, continue:  
 
Internal auditors are independent when they can carry out their work freely and 
objectively. Independence permits internal auditors to render the impartial and 
unbiased judgments essential to the proper conduct of engagements. It is achieved 
through organizational status and objectivity.  
 
And: 
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1. Internal auditors should have the support of senior management and the board of 
directors (BOD) so they can obtain the cooperation of engagement clients and perform 
their work free from interference.  
2. The Chief Audit Executive should be responsible to an individual in the organization 
with sufficient authority to promote independence and to ensure broad audit coverage, 
adequate consideration of engagement communications, and appropriate action on 
engagement recommendations.  
3. Ideally, the Chief Audit Executive should report functionally to the Audit Committee, 
board of directors, or other appropriate governing authority, and administratively to the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO).  
4. The Chief Audit Executive should have direct communication with the BOD, Audit 
Committee, or other appropriate governing authority. Regular communication with the 
BOD helps assure independence and provides a means for it and the Chief Audit 
Executive to keep each other informed about matters of mutual interest. 
5. Direct communication occurs when the Chief Audit Executive regularly attends and 
participates in meetings of the BOD, Audit Committee, or other appropriate governing 
authority which relate to its oversight responsibilities for auditing, financial reporting, 
organizational governance, and control. The Chief Audit Executive's attendance and 
participation at these meetings provides an opportunity to exchange information 
concerning the plans and activities of IA activity. The Chief Audit Executive should 
meet privately with the BOD, Audit Committee, or other appropriate governing 
authority at least once a year. 
6. Independence is enhanced when the BOD concurs in the appointment and/or removal of 
the Chief Audit Executive.  
 
Quite frankly, the way independence and objectivity are used interchangeably by the Standards, 
may cause confusion. As demonstrated above, independence for IA is an oxymoron. The same 
goes for objectivity. As already described - not only above, but also in Chapter 1 - the scientific 
debate is around two extremes: objectivity and subjectivity. This research is based on the 
premises of neo-positivism, allowing for "a more subjective approach than any hard-line 
positivist would dream of'". Objectivity as in presuming one can take a look at facts without any 
bias from dominant paradigms and personal feelings is very hard to do, if at all possible 
(Johnson and Duberley, 2000 and Partington, 2002). Independent as in subject to no one else 
and not being ruled by anyone or anything is in this respect definitely not the case. However 
you slice it, the IA reports to some principal, is his agent and, therefore, not independent.  
 
The issue then remains, what is the best level to report to in order to foster the maximum 
amount of objectivity independence? From an Agency Theory perspective, the question is, what 
is the most appropriate principal for IA? An apparently feasible option is to go completely 
outside the organization. That is, outsource the IA. But then the Chief Audit Executive would 
no longer be seen as "one of us", which according to Williamson (1975, 1996) is one of IA's 
main advantages over External Auditor (see our discussion of Transaction Cost Economics in 
Chapter 3). He reasons that this insider status enhances the flow of information, and that would 
be eliminated if the Chief Audit Executive were an outsider. 
 
This study has been conducted from the perspective of a two-tier Corporate Governance system, 
since this is the dominant one in The Netherlands. The IA could either report to the 
Management Board or to the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee. Both options are still within 
the organization and, therefore, the IA would not be considered an outsider. This would lead to 
the following scheme: 
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IAF 
MB 
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IAF 
Agent
Agent
Principal
Principal
Agent
Agent
 
Figure 4: Possible Re-shift of the IAF: Increasing independence? 
 
The outcome would be that, in Agency Theory terms, the relationship between the Management 
Board and IA changes from a principal-agent to an agent-agent one. The question would then be 
whether the Management Board will cease to regard IA as its instrument. And if so, what might 
that mean? Are they going to create a new one, solely serving them? Surely, the most logical 
reaction would be that IA is now in the hands of the Supervisory Board and out of the direct 
control of the Management Board. On the one hand, that would inherently foster independence. 
On the other, that might stir up a fair amount of alienation within the organization, and not only 
within the Management Board. The Williamson argument that they are "one of us" might also 
be affected as well. In the case studies this issue has been addressed and this will be discussed 
in Chapter 5, with some surprising results.  
 
While the IIA Inc. Standards (2001d) do not provide a clear statement about whether or not 
IA should report to the highest level of an organization, the Practice Advisories do. The 
ambiguous distinction between "functional" and "administrative" reporting lines is further 
detailed in yet another PA (1110-2), where the following explanation is given: 
 
The functional reporting line for the internal audit function is the ultimate source of its 
independence and authority. As such, The IIA recommends that the Chief Audit 
Executive report functionally to the Audit Committee, Board of Directors, or other 
appropriate governing authority. Administrative Reporting is the reporting relationship 
within the organization's management structure that facilitates the day-to-day 
operations of the internal audit function. 
 
The IIA Inc seems to be of two minds. Standard setters seem to acknowledge via the Practice 
Advisories that the Audit Committee would be the most suitable candidate. But the Standards 
themselves are less outspoken and for reasons one can only guess. Maybe their perspective is 
influenced by what would be acceptable to members of the Management Board. And who 
would blame them?  
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Now let's take a look at some data pertaining to the positioning of IA within the organization. 
Using a 14-page survey that was sent to 750 CIA's in US associates, The Conference Board 
studied reporting lines in mid 1988 (1990). The response rate was 51%, and covered 375 
surveys. 
 
Table 2-1: Reporting lines of the Chief Audit Executive (surveys Conference Board) 
 
Reporting lines 
(in%)    
 1963 1978 1988 
 
CFO   7 34 48 
 
CEO   2   6 17 
 
Audit Committee   0   5 10 
 
Controller 54 30 15 
 
others 37 25 10 
 
The development is clear. There is an undeniable shift towards higher ranked officers and also 
the Audit Committee is increasingly reported to. There are other surveys (IIA, 2001c, p 88) 
showing that the trend continued.  
 
Table 2-2: Reporting lines of the Chief Audit Executives (survey IIA Inc) 
 
Reporting lines  
(in %) 
IIA Inc 
 2001
14 
CFO 59 
CEO  9 
Audit Committee 32 
Controller 12 
others 11 
 
 
The trend may even have gained in pace. According to Gray (2004), due to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act internal auditors might be on the verge of being reporting to the Audit Committee. 
"In terms of status, they are now reporting directly to the audit committee and play a greater 
role in the audit committee's meeting agenda." (2004, xvi) But it comes at a cost. That is, the 
image of IA is shifting back toward the dreaded "company police officers" - hatchet men - 
(2004, xxi) instead of the desired (by the profession that is) image of partners or consultants.  
 
                                                 
14 The numbers add up to well above 100% because multiple answers were possible.  
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As will be shown in Chapter 3, many IAF's functionally report to the CEO and 
administratively to the CFO or the like. At the end of the day, the administrative report will 
most likely be the one who "signs the pay check" and will be leading in appraising the Chief 
Audit Executive and the IA. From the agency perspective, nothing really changes. Both CEO 
and CFO are members of the principal body for IA. Hughes (2004) has some strong feelings 
on this issue as well. 
 
It is time that the audit committees quit undermining the internal auditors by having 
them report to the CEO or CFO, the most likely originators of fraudulent practices. 
The internal auditor should report both functionally and administratively to the audit 
committee.  
 
That these issues have been bobbing around for a long time can be seen by comparing 
statements from nearly 50 years ago and now. In 1957 Walker (1957, 9) wrote that IA could 
report to the controller, treasurer, or "any officer of sufficient rank as will assure adequate 
consideration and action on the findings and recommendations". But, according to him, it was 
neither necessary nor practical to report to the Management Board. He wrote, "in our opinion, 
it is not practical in most cases because we believe internal auditing can be most effective as a 
tool in the hands of active management" (1957, 9). Surely, almost 50 years ago it was a 
different era, allowing for a different set-up. As will be shown below, the current era would 
sharply disagree with what was then acceptable. 
 
In Chapter 4 I will come back to this subject. For the moment, let us conclude that Tabaksblat 
(2003, 31) is ambiguous about who should be responsible for the care and feeding of IA, and 
who it should ultimately be responsible to. Yes, it should operate under the Management 
Board. But the Audit Committee also has some responsibility for IA. 
 
Irish (1957), a representative of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, states that 
the internal auditor must be able to act without fear or favour and he should not be pilloried if 
he speaks unpalatable truths. "Superficially at least, this would seem to demand [that] he be 
given some element of independence." (1957, 17) A sentence like that nowadays would make 
many internal auditors shiver with horror. Words like "superficially" and "some element of 
independence" show a disdain not worth repeating. The tenor that one catches every now and 
then during drinks at the bar is the old dispute between internal and external auditors about 
who is best suited to serve the needs of management. And sometimes one notices glimpses of 
that in Corporate Governance codes like Tabaksblat.15 
 
Irish acknowledges of course that there is a principal-agent relationship that hampers 
independence. He goes on to stress the need to clarify the role and objectives of the IAF and 
the need for every internal auditor to be independent in mind. This also seems to be a 
Pavlovian response. It seems that everyone is aware that independence is not going to be 
solved via positioning the IAF somewhere in the organization under the jurisdiction of the 
Management Board. The deus ex machina is the independence in mind, relying heavily on the 
character of the professional, like the "probity of character" good luck mantra uttered by Flint.  
 
                                                 
15 One of the best practices reads as follows: "The external auditor and the audit committee shall be involved in 
drawing up the work schedule of the internal auditor. They shall also take cognizance of the findings of the 
internal auditor'." This shows that the internal auditor is what the external auditor would like him to be.  
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MacPherson (1957, 21) is exemplary in this respect. He stated, correctly, that independence is 
relative and not absolute, and referred to mental attitude as an essential element for any 
internal auditor. Stokvis (1957, 49) swam against the current at the 1957 conference and 
showed that he was ahead of the curve by proposing that "it is essential that the internal 
auditor should receive his instructions from top-management alone". His views are common 
ground today and have been elaborated in many ways in the IIA Standards.  
 
All to no avail to solve the independence issue, I would argue. From an Agency Theory 
perspective, the best solution to the problem is to make the Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee the principal of IA. The most important question resulting from that solution is 
whether there will be adverse effects that would lead the organization to come up with a 
second best solution. In the one-tier environment and the applicable corporate governance 
codes this is already forthcoming and envisioned. Whether Management Boards or 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committees like it or not, there is no other option than making IAF 
report to - and subject to - the Audit Committee. In a two-tier environment this might lead to 
more cut backs. 
 
As became clear in the Tabaksblat code and the case studies, Management Boards do not like 
the idea at all. Supervisory Board/Audit Committee's are also reluctant to embrace this idea. 
As are Chief Audit Executive's. But the last mentioned are more in favour of this position 
because it will enhance their independence. However, they acknowledge that this will come at 
a cost and will not necessarily make life easier. The alienation of the rest of the organization – 
no longer to be seen as one of us – and the envisioned difficulties in opening up of 
interviewees and accessing information are certainly aspects to ponder. In organizations 
where corporate governance and culture are very well developed, no real barriers might be 
encountered. But for those that are lagging behind in that respect, Chief Audit Executives will 
be facing more severe cut backs. 
 
There seems to be at least one differing view with regard to IA supporting the Audit 
Committee. Nagy and Cenker (2002) questioned 11 Chief Audit Executives and discovered 
that most of them said their role in assisting the Audit Committee of overseeing financial 
reporting had not changed in the last few years. And none of them anticipated that it would 
change in the near future. But this was in 2002, just prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act coming 
into effect. All that would change shortly thereafter. 
 
Tabaksblat came up with provisions that require the Audit Committee to stay in contact with 
IA. Biewinga, Bossert, and Dassen (2003) regretted that Tabaksblat did not allow for a direct 
communication line between Audit Committee and IA. In their view, the Audit Committee 
needs independent information pertaining to the risk and control systems of the organization 
and IA would be best suited to be their supplier. I couldn't agree more. There is other research 
providing supporting data for a closer relationship between the Audit Committee and IA. 
Goodwin (2003) studied the relationship between Audit Committee and IA. Her conclusions 
are also worth mentioning.  
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The most important finding of the study is that the independence of the audit 
committee and the level of accounting experience amongst committee members have a 
complementary impact on audit committee relations with internal audit. While 
independence is associated with a number of issues of process, it is the proportion of 
committee members with an accounting or finance background that is associated with 
the extent of the review of internal audit work.… It would appear that independence 
alone is not sufficient, and the extent of accounting expertise on the committee will 
help ensure that the audit committee makes appropriate use of the work of internal 
audit as recommended by the IIA. (2003, 274)  
 
According to Goodwin, adequate expertise on the part of the Audit Committee is a necessary 
condition to maximize the positive impacts of IA. I am in total agreement with this 
standpoint. 
 
Considering what happened later - after spectacular corporate failures like Enron, WorldCom, 
Ahold, and Parmalat - the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) seemed to 
have been in possession of a crystal ball in 1993. 
 
In our opinion the corporate governance framework within which external auditors 
operate is deficient. We believe it is reasonable for the public to expect that the 
external auditors are independent of the directors of companies being audited. Within 
the present corporate governance framework it is not clear that this is the case. (1993, 
29)  
 
And with regard to internal audit their opinion is equally noteworthy. The Chief Audit 
Executive "should report to a Financial Reporting and Audit Committee (FRAC) made up 
entirely of non-executive directors. The FRAC should approve the appointment, and the 
termination of the employment of the Chief Audit Executive. The Chief Audit Executive 
should be free to communicate with the external assessors at any time" (1993, 32). ICAS 
continued: "We believe that companies without a strong internal audit function will be unable 
to provide an audit committee with sufficient information to fulfil its responsibilities." (1993, 
35-36) 
 
According to the ICAS, the FRAC should run interference between two sets of needs. One, 
those of the IA for independence and authority. Two, those of the external auditor to 
supervise and control IA activities. The Chief Audit Executive and the external auditor should 
attend all meetings of the FRAC. It is tempting to say that the developments discussed in 
Chapter 4, are just that what the ICAS paper already pronounced as desirable, although many 
at that time probably would have considered it "a bridge too far".  
 
The IIA The Netherlands (1999) did a survey of Chief Audit Executives, and 58% of them 
agreed that the Supervisory Board should appoint the Chief Audit Executive. In a study by 
Paape, Scheffe and Snoep (2003) among 332 Chief Audit Executives of top-listed companies 
in the EU, it was shown that two thirds had an Audit Committee. But due to different 
regulations on the issue, the per country numbers went up and down like a yo yo. For 
example, in the UK - where Audit Committee's are required - 100% of the respondents had 
them. In Austria and Portugal – where they were not – the percentages dropped to zero. 
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When questioned who should appoint the Chief Audit Executive, 59% agreed it should be the 
Audit Committee. It seems Chief Audit Executive's in the EU like the idea of being appointed 
by the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee. Not surprisingly, because if they were to be 
appointed by the Audit Committee this would not only enhance their independence, but also 
their stature. Although the idea of being appointed by the Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee might be appealing to the majority of the Chief Audit Executive's, there are some 
concomitant issues. I've already discussed the ambiguity in the corporate governance 
regulations with regard to the reporting issue. The reconfiguration, whereby the Supervisory 
Board/Audit Committee becomes the principal of IA, raises some interesting questions. 
One of them is how to live up to the needs and expectations of both Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee and the Management Board at the same time? Will it be possible to become a 
trusted party, providing assurance to both the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee and the 
Management Board? Reporting both might lead to the dilemma of serving two masters. 
 
Van den Berghe and Baelden (2003) described this dilemma as follows: 
 
To whom should the internal audit (functionally) report? There are two possible ways 
of doing this. Either the internal audit is fully responsible to the audit committee, or 
the internal audit reports to the audit committee while being responsible to 
management. Conceptually, the first case seems more appropriate in order to align the 
(personal) interests of the internal audit with the audit committee's mission. But from a 
practical point of view, this approach is difficult to implement, as it is unclear how the 
audit committee should deal with the corresponding labor and management issues. 
Therefore, an approach where the internal audit functionally reports to management, 
but is ultimately accountable to the audit committee, is likely the best practical 
solution. This accountability could be affirmed in an internal audit charter. It is then 
the task of the audit committee to foster a culture of open disclosure and to make sure 
the internal audit unit can perform its tasks without any possible influence or pressure 
from management. (2003, 305) 
 
While this is in line with my idea to make the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee 
responsible for IA activities, it is still as fatally ambiguous as many of the Corporate 
Governance reports. Management Board's do not like the idea of an internal function 
reporting directly to their supervisors. And one doesn't have to be a rocket scientist to 
understand why. Certain IA findings may be sensitive and Management Board's would not 
like to have them reported on without being on hand to address them. Since auditors are 
required to listen to all sides and discuss findings with auditees before reporting, this is a 
highly unlikely scenario. However, even after such preliminary discussions, IA findings could 
be reported, and they might have a potentially negative impact on the evaluation of the 
Management Board. 
 
In those circumstances one could say, "so much the worse for the Management Board", 
because the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee definitely requires those findings in its task 
of supervising all aspects of the organization. If at the same time the Management Board is 
still responsible for appraising the Chief Audit Executive and IA this would almost definitely 
have severe repercussion. Therefore, it doesn't make sense to disconnect appointing the Chief 
Audit Executive and being reported to from appraising, supervising and directing him. That 
would be a waffling compromise that does nothing in practice to enhance Chief Audit 
Executive/IA independence. Once that is settled, let us deal with the practicalities in a 
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pragmatic way. In the eyes of Hernando de Soto, a Peruvian economist: "massive informality 
appears when governments cannot make the law coincide with the way people live and work". 
 
Koster (2003), a board member of Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) – the Dutch 
equivalent of the US' SEC and the UK's Financial Services Authority (FSA) – follows the 
same track of reasoning and goes one astonishing step further. He recommends that IA should 
not only report to the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee and have its Chief Audit Executive 
appointed by them (2003, 121), but it should also cooperate with the AFM. That would 
require a functional line between IA and an outside supervisor and regulator. Now this is a 
provocative statement!  
This may take some getting used to for some, but it isn't as far-fetched as it seems. These 
days, many in the alphabet soup of supervisors – the SEC, FSA and DNB – already have the 
authority to liaise and review IA's work. For some, the cure might be worse than the disease. 
For while it will undoubtedly foster IA independence from management, IA might wind up 
serving three masters. What's more, such an outside link would most likely alienate IA from 
the rest of the organization. Again, you don't need to be a Nobel Prize winner to start 
fantasizing about some of the negative blowback from that situation (discussed in more detail 
by Williamson in Chapter 3).  
 
Koster, representing the AFM, is seeking to get as much information on what is going on 
inside any company. Supervisors like the AFM, suffer from information asymmetry, far more 
than the Management Board and the Supervisory Board. Thus he is inclined to dream up a 
fiscal Patriot Act to be able to execute his supervisory responsibilities. Although his problems 
are real, his solutions are not. Regulatory bodies like the AFM should have their own 
apparatus to investigate whatever they need to investigated. Making IA a player on their team 
would be the worst of all possible worlds for those on the inside trying to get along and do 
their jobs. Further, it would encourage police state powers and would not be in sync with what 
we consider an open society and free market. 
 
I would like to conclude this section by quoting Jules Muis, previously acting Director-
General of Internal Audit at the European Commission of the European Union in Brussels, on 
the independence issue. 
  
Having returned to the internal audit profession, right at the top, with a perfect Charter 
protecting my independence, and at almost 60 years old, seasoned, I do think that 
independence in practice is and will remain a huge problem, the Achilles heel, for 
internal auditors, and that we do not speak enough about it. If stepping up to the plate 
on that confessional score helps the internal audit profession, this is the time to throw 
me a ball. (2003, 61-62)  
 
As shown, the independence of the IAF is according to the IIA fostered by its organizational 
position. The bottom line is that we are just beginning to scratch the surface of how crucial 
independence and objectivity are. Anything approaching an answer is still a long way off. But 
one thing is clear. As IA becomes more independent of the Management Board and more 
reliant on the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee, it might wind up more often in that sticky, 
tricky space that the Dutch describe as "between the dock and the ship", and the Americans as 
"between a rock and a hard place". IA might wind up having to serve two masters or, if 
Koster has his way, three.  
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Size  
While a number of surveys were available to research the IA size issue, they had some major 
limitations. For example, there were such differences in the questions asked, ranges and scales 
used, countries, sample sizes and respondents used that comparison is difficult if not 
impossible. 
 
The Conference Board study (1990) presented the following data regarding staffing levels. 
 
Table 2-3: Staffing levels of Internal Audit by Company size 
 
Internal Audit Staff by Company Size (n=362)  
Staff size 1 to 10 11 to 20 21 to 50 51 to 100 101+ 
Company size      
$ 25 - 499 million   95   3   0   2  0 
500 - 999 million   82 16   2   0  0 
1 - 1.9 billion   41 45 12   2  0 
2 - 2.9 billion   10 31 59   0  0 
3 - 4.9 billion   19 35 41   4  2 
5 billion +     7   8 38  26 21 
total companies 145 72 89  32 24 
total percentage   40% 20% 25% 9% 6% 
 
 
Table 2-4: Staffing levels of Internal Audit by Industry 
 
Internal Audit Staff by Industry Group (n=364)  
Staff size 1 to 10 11 to 20 21 to 50 51 to 100 101+ 
Industry Group      
Manufacturing  46  21 20   8  5 
Financial  17  16 33 14 20 
Utility  40  27 25   8  0 
Transportation  25  25 50   0  0 
Retail  57   0 29   0 14 
Other Services  27  55 18   0  0 
Diversified  50   6 31 13  0 
total companies 144  75 89 32 24 
total percentage 39%  21% 24%   9%   7% 
 
A Basel Committee (2002b) survey showed that in the EU banking sector an average of 1% of 
the workforce is in IA (71 respondents from 13 countries).  
 
A number of others surveys, conducted by IIA The Netherlands (1999, n=30; 2002, n=53) 
arrived at the following results.  
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Table 2-5: Staffing levels of Internal Audit in the Netherlands 
 
 IIA 1998 IIA 2002 
number N =32  N = 53 
less than 11 43% 37% 
11 to 50 34% 35% 
51 + 23% 28% 
 
 
The Conference Board study (1990) also surveyed the budget for IA. 
 
Table 2-6: Budget for Internal Audit by Company size and Industry 
 
Internal Audit Budget by Company Size (n=331)    
Budget under 400k 800k 1200k 1800k 2500k 5000k+ 
Company size $400k 799k 1199k 1799k 2499k 4999k  
$ 25 - 499 million  84  14   2   0   0   0   0 
500 - 999 million  57  36   7   0   0   0   0 
1 - 1.9 billion   7  42 26 15   8   0   2 
2 - 2.9 billion   0    4 30 30 26 10   0 
3 - 4.9 billion   4  10 14 28 26 14   4 
5 billion +   1    2   3   6 13 28 47 
    
Internal Audit Budget by Industry (n=347)    
Budget under 400k 800k 1200k 1800k 2500k 5000k+ 
Industry  $400k 799k 1199k 1799k 2499k 4999k  
Manufacturing 24 20 11 11 10 10 15 
Financial 10 9 10 13 13 20 26 
Utility 27 21 17   8 13   6   8 
Transportation 14 14 14 29 14 14   0 
Retail 14 43   0   0   0 29 14 
Other Services 27 18 27   9   9   9   0 
Diversified 27   7   0 20 20   7 20 
Total companies 74 61 40 39 39 40 54 
Total percentage 21% 18% 12% 11% 11% 12% 16% 
 
 
The data shows that: 
 The Financial industry has the highest staff levels and the largest budgets. 
 The larger the company the larger the staff size.  
 
A NIVRA survey (1993) came up with the following data.  
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Table 2-7: Size of the IAF in the Netherlands 
 
Size of the IAF in The Netherlands (n=42)  
 number of number of number of ratio 
 companies staff IA staff IA/total 
Industry    staff 
Retail   1 32,800    5 1 : 7,160 
Manufacturing 14 461,300 448 1 : 1,030 
Services   8 89,000 177 1 :    503 
Banking   9 146,000 720 1 :    203 
Insurance   8 38,500 196 1 :    196 
 
Although the number of respondents is low, the data provides support for the conclusion that 
financial institutions have by far the largest number of auditors.  
 
The recent results from an IIA Inc study, performed by Gray (2004), indicate that due to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as staff numbers tend to go up, so do budgets, and more financial skills 
are required. 
 
A few conclusions can be drawn. The financial services sector has the largest IA's and the size 
of IA increases as the size of the company does, be it by staff numbers or revenue. About 40% 
of organizations have an IA of less than 10. About 35-40% has a staff between 11 and 50, and 
about 20-25% have a staff over 50.  
Control 
There are many issues relevant for controlling IA. For example, quality reviews, leadership, 
and training programs. But for the purposes of this study we will be dealing with three sub-
questions. One, how should the Chief Audit Executive be appraised? Two, how should he be 
rewarded? Three, who should be doing the appraising and rewarding? These questions tie in 
very well with the issues addressed above. This section will show that very limited literature 
spends any kind of quality time on how these questions can be best answered.  
 
Nothing noteworthy was said about how IA should be controlled in the 1957 Seventh 
International Congress of Accountants, the mid 1988 survey of The Conference Board (1990), 
or the 1991 jubilee issue of Internal Auditor (IIA Inc.). While Sinnott (1957) only touched on 
the issue, he had some extremely interesting things to say. One, "the internal auditor should 
not to be judged by the number of mistakes uncovered" (1957, 34). But this just so happens to 
counter the image many auditors try desperately to get away from and that is the image of 
being a policeman and a bringer of misfortune and bad news. In recent decades, the added 
value drum was beaten hard and often, and that did not line up with the image stressed by 
focusing on mistakes and errors.  
 
Two, he advocated determining the extent to which management accepted IA and followed its 
recommendations, because this "denotes confidence in audit activities". The problem is of 
course that the output of IA is not easily captured in performance metrics and, therefore, is 
difficult to measure. But that is no reason to leave the issue unresolved.  
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The first area is the "how" question. The IIA Inc (2003b, 203) notes that: "IAF's utilize a 
variety of compensation systems, including traditional salary based systems, pay for skill, and 
pay for performance incentives. Unlike external auditors, internal auditors may even 
participate in company stock-based incentives." Nash and Flesher (1997) present some ideas 
on this matter. They argue that the shift towards operational audit may create the possibility of 
paying incentive compensation to internal auditors, because they are less involved in pure 
financial audits and limit the possibilities of "overlooking" income-enhancing errors.  
 
Which performance measures could be listed? Some examples are: number of errors found; 
realization of planned audits; number of audits; number of audits on request beyond the plan; 
client satisfaction levels; cost saving ideas; income increasing ideas; 
cost containment for IA; cost containment for External Auditor; results of external reviews; 
results of quality reviews; staff development; and absence of unpleasant surprises. 
 
Obviously, many of those measures are not directly linked to the effort and efficiency level of 
IA. Those that are may not always be telling the right story. For instance, the number of errors 
found may inspire IA to focus on finding errors wherever they can, even though it might not 
be looking in the areas with the most risk. Following the path of least resistance might be the 
result. Client satisfaction levels may induce IA to push the envelope of pleasing their clients, 
even when toughness and strong medicine might be more appropriate. Cost saving ideas 
might be copied from other company staff. The number of audits carried out in comparison 
with those planned might say something. But then again, IA might limit the number of 
planned audits to make it look like it was doing more than it is. IA is in the service sector, and 
services are by their very nature different from products and tangible assets and difficult to 
measure.  
 
Interestingly, IIA Inc has never issued Standards or Practice Advisories dealing with 
performance measurement. Even Sawyer (2003), widely recognized as one of the founding 
fathers and author of "Sawyer's Internal Auditing" – a 1400 pages standard book for internal 
auditors – does not address more than a few pages to performance metrics (2003, 1017-1019). 
He concludes (2003, 1018): "Productivity in service operations such as internal auditing is 
difficult to measure because …" He then goes on to include a list of qualities very similar to 
the list above.  
 
The second issue deals with how to reward the Chief Audit Executive. Even less has been 
said about that. Chief Audit Executive's are often high ranked officers in organizations the 
matter of rewarding him is left in the hands of management. Not a syllable is to be found in 
the Standards or the Practice Advisories. Sawyer is also mum on the subject. A Basel 
Committee survey (2002b) revealed that no performance or profit-related remuneration of 
internal auditors within the surveyed banks were to be seen (see Chapter 3 on this issue). This 
in itself is remarkable, because Agency Theory would predict that applying the right 
incentives has the proper motivation results with Chief Audit Executive's. It is my firm belief 
that properly designed and installed incentive programs will foster Chief Audit Executive 
productivity. This will include performance related rewards.  
 
The third issue is who should appraise the Chief Audit Executive? IIA Inc (2003b) came up 
with a number of research questions aimed at addressing this area. The underlying question is 
whether this needs to be the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee or the Management Board. 
As mentioned above, this will depend on who the Chief Audit Executive reports to. The 
reader should know by now my answer: the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee.  
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The IIA Inc. Standards refer to the issue of quality control and a number of measures that 
should be taken.  
 
 Adherence by the Chief Audit Executive and staff to the Standards and referring to them 
in the course of activities.  
 Make sure proficiency is taken care of and training programs are in place. 
 Make use of a quality assurance program and assessment. 
 Internal reviews 
 An external assessment once every five-years by a qualified independent reviewer.  
 
For Dutch internal auditors who are member of professional bodies, such as NIVRA or the 
Vereniging van Operational Auditors (VRO, Association of Operational Auditors), 
disciplinary powers are also applicable. Interestingly enough, the VRO has never used 
disciplinary powers. The NIVRA does keep statistics. I have kept up with the professional 
literature but cannot recall more than a few isolated cases where internal auditors were 
scrutinized. Such powers are not part of the IIA Inc. Standards. 
 
Very little has been said about how and who should appraise and reward the Chief Audit 
Executive. There is much ground for further research, as is also demonstrated by the IIA Inc 
(2003b). In Chapter 3, Agency Theory is brought to bear on the matter.  
 
2.6 Scope of Services 
Scope of Services of the Internal Audit Function 
This section will deal with the scope of services in general and the shift from financial to 
operational audit in particular. Traditionally, internal audits focused on finances, as should be 
more than abundantly clear by now. The Dutch roots lie in the era before World War II. The 
role of the internal auditor could be typified as an internal accountant. The annual account 
was certified internally, after which an external auditor, supported by the work of his internal 
colleague, could sign off on the annual report. There was a large overlap in the scope of 
services of internal and external audit. 
 
Sinnott (1957, 28-29) presented his view about IA's tasks. Its main focus would be detecting 
and preventing theft, fraud or any other loss of a similar nature. But it would also detect and 
prevent other errors, and continuously appraise internal checks. It would detect and report 
non-compliance with financial regulations and accounting instructions. It would also make 
suggestions for improving systems and methods, presenting financial and statistical data, and 
increasing income. 
 
Stokvis (1957, 48) provided a view from The Netherlands. The internal auditor should be 
commissioned to: 
 
 Give his expert opinion on the internal financial statements. 
 Judge the efficiency of the accounting system 
 Provide management with all information within the orbit of his specialized 
knowledge, which in his opinion could be of assistance in running the business, 
especially regarding planning and delegation the duties of subordinate executives and 
control over the performance of delegated tasks. 
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These views clearly mark the general perception of internal auditing 50 years ago. While it 
has definitely gone out of style in some businesses, it has continued in numerous nations and 
businesses in one form or another up until now. Sometimes overtly in the text of job 
descriptions and contracts, sometimes covertly in the subtext of un-stated, and perhaps not 
even consciously realized, expectations. 
 
It is fair to say that IA's scope of services remained rather stable from 1957 onwards to in the 
1980's. From then on, the shift from financial towards operational auditing was apparent. A 
1991 NIVRA survey conducted among 87 internal auditors supported this view: 76% of the 
respondents had noticed a shift from financial to operational audit. Since at that time the 
scope of services dated back to 1985, NIVRA's findings didn't pick up on more recent 
developments or mass scale jumping on a fashionable bandwagon. Sixty two percent of the 
respondents indicated that certifying the annual account formed only a part of their scope of 
services. This is noteworthy, because 85% of the respondents considered a combination of 
financial and operational audit important. According to that survey, financial audit was still 
ahead of operational. 
 
The already mentioned ICAS paper (1993) also addressed IA's scope of services and 
objectives. The paper made clear that IA should aim at reporting whether management 
information and internal control systems have been, one, established and maintained and, two, 
whether they are sufficiently reliable and contributing to:  
 
 Provide the true and fair information necessary for preparing financial statements. 
 Contribute to the information necessary for the board to be able to judge whether, 
given the environment in which the company is operating and expects to operate, 
adequate financial resources are available to enable it to remain a going concern for at 
least 12 months from the date the directors approve the financial statements. 
 Minimize opportunities for fraud and other illegal acts and maximize the likelihood 
that the directors will quickly detect any such irregularities. 
 
According to this, the ICAS clearly envisions financial audit as the proper work terrain of IA, 
which in itself contradicted the developments already noticed in the late 80's and early 90's. 
 
In the middle of the nineties a number of studies and publications emerged. According to Van 
Lieshout (1994), halfway through the 1980's there was in the US a shift from financial to 
operational audit. While he vaguely hinted that this trend had something to do with changes in 
international accounting practices, he didn't get any more specific than that. According to a 
study by Breedveld-Krans (1990), 90% of the organizations studied had their IA performing 
both operational and financial audits. Ekelschot (1993) and De Jaeger (1995) also noticed this 
trend towards operational auditing. Other organizations had fully outsourced the financial 
audit to external auditors. This often led to either axing IA or a deeper and broader focus on 
operational processes.  
 
A number of surveys provided data supporting this trend. They are (NIVRA, 1991; IIA The 
Netherlands, 1998 and 2002) presented in the table below. A few significant differences, 
which are indicated, hinder comparison. The table includes the average time spent on any 
service.  
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Table 2-8: Time spend by the IAF 
 
 Financial 
audit 
Operatio-
nal audit 
Compliance 
audit 
Other 
Average time spend 1991 46% 32% ** 22%* 
Average time spend 1998*** 30% 51% 9% 10% 
Average time spend 2000**** 22% 45% 9% 24%**** 
 
* IT accounted for 12% 
** not specified 
*** no IT included  
**** IT accounted for 16% 
    
 
The problem is that no reference was made to IT auditing, making a comparison very 
difficult. Although the percentage for operational audits went up significantly (from 32 to 51, 
falling slightly back to 45) and the percentage for financial audit decreased from 46 to 30 and 
then to 22, this might be due to the fact that EDP audit was categorized under operational 
auditing in the second study. Despite this shift, almost 80% of IA's still performed some 
financial audits and expected that this would still be the case 5 years hence. A total absence of 
financial audit is not to be expected. 
 
The ground gained for operational audit assignments is obvious. This is further demonstrated 
by a VRO study (1998). Out of its 29 respondents, 7 indicated that they had started 
operational auditing activities in the 80's. The remaining 22 started in the 90's.  
 
There may be two explanations for this development, both originating in the Anglo-Saxon 
world. One was the publication of the COSO report in 1992 and 1994. The other was the 
surge of the corporate governance debate in the 90's (to be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
4).  
 
The publication in 1992 of the COSO report highlighted the importance of internal controls, 
and went a long way towards nailing down what that means (see Van Lieshout above). As 
outlined above, the emphasis was initially placed on optimizing operational processes. After 
the COSO report was published this shifted, due to the broadening of the concept "internal 
control", towards statements of being "in control" and "risk management". McNamee (1997) 
published an article proposing a changing approach directed at COSO and with a primary 
focus on "business risk" instead of an internal control system. In his conclusion he stated that 
"the differences between the old and the new paradigm may appear subtle; nevertheless, the 
risk-based audit process is broader and richer in information content." (1997, 27)  
 
International literature also indicates that the audit increasingly takes shape as an internal 
control function. McCuaig (1998) indicates that the added value of an internal auditor lies 
primarily in assurance as intended in the COSO report and the corporate governance debate.  
 
60
60 
In The Netherlands the term operational audit is used to describe the differences in scope of 
services. Paape (1999)16 argued to change "operational auditing" into Management Control 
System Auditing (MCSA), because management considers it important to have a second 
opinion about how well the Management Control System (MCS) is functioning. This call was 
repeated in 2005 (Paape, De Korte, Otten). The call was backed up by explaining that the 
term "operational auditing" tends to cause confusion among users of IA, because it connotes 
operational processes. Further, the new term would better mark off the main area of focus. 
That is, pay more attention to management control. For an auditor it means that he must be 
capable of studying management control systems and their components. This subject will be 
returned to in Chapter 3. 
 
Paape, Scheffe and Snoep (2003) also surveyed IA's scope of services among the Chief Audit 
Executive's of the largest companies in the EU. They discovered that the predominant service 
was operational audits (97%), which is consistent with several other studies already discussed. 
A high number (64%) was also found for consulting activities. The consultative service 
delivery is strongly linked to the desire to deliver added value to management. The IIA Inc 
developed its new Competency Framework in 1999 via – among others – a Delphi study and a 
survey among internal auditors globally. Out of that it became apparent that consultative 
services seemed to be valued more by superiors and, therefore, deserved a prominent place in 
the framework. Consulting has been pushed forward as a valuable and viable service, but not 
without debate. 
 
Having read numerous IIA Inc publications (1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 
2001c, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2002e, 2002f, 2002g, 2002h, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c to name just 
a few) and IIA Nederland (2001) and research reports, I noticed that many of them contain 
reference to the added value dogma about consultative services. The image of a profession 
almost desperately searching to be heard and valued springs to mind. It isn't too far fetched to 
compare that mindset with what has been happening in the external audit profession. They 
have been criticized with regard to their "one stop shopping" concept and focus on 
consultancy services. It led regulators to impose a ban on certain services and led to the sale 
of many of the consultancy services by KPMG, Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers and 
Deloitte. At first sight similarities are easily found and it may not be that surprising that the 
same was happening in the internal audit community. In this respect the framework provided 
by Matthyssens et al (1998) at the end of this section is certainly worth examining and 
pondering. 
 
                                                 
16 L. Paape (1999), "OA, MCSA?!?! Over de toekomst van OA", pp 293-304. Dissatisfactions with the term 
"operational auditing" are aired. Included are the potentially limiting association with operational aspects; the too 
large emphasis on the control of the performance of the work by Anthony; and the definition of operational 
being too much influenced by ambiguities and the desire to expand the task of the auditor to opinion forming 
around MCS.  
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It is also worth noting the differences of opinion regarding the "legitimacy" of consultancy 
services (in relation to the independence issue). While more than half of the respondents in 
the study of Paape et al (61%) think it is allowed, 23% totally disagree with that contention. 
The issue bothering the profession is the collusion problem. Will an auditor be able to be 
"objective" about advice he gave when the results of the advice, especially when they are 
negative, turn up in the course of a subsequent audit? If so, he is a better man than I am. The 
Standards allow consulting services, but do acknowledge the possibility of it impairing 
independence and objectivity. They are allowed by the Standards if disclosed before an 
engagement. 
 
Church and Schneider (1991) researched the "collusion" issue. Students in a university class, 
having no experience with internal audit, were presented a case and made decisions that 
suggested an impairment of objectivity. In other words, they were susceptible to the 
temptations of collusion. Then they presented the same case to experienced internal auditors, 
who did not make comparable decisions. They concluded that experienced internal auditors 
maintained their objectivity. This demonstrates that while the danger of collusion is real, 
experienced internal auditors know how to handle it. Results like this might help to 
demonstrate that experience is a sort of inoculation against the illness of collusion. 
 
Consultancy services also appeared to be an issue in The Conference Board research. Asked 
about their expectations with regard to consulting services, The Chief Audit Executive's 
surveyed reported a marked increase in that area. The areas covered ranged from vulnerability 
assessments to executive compensation reviews and quality control functions. Unfortunately, 
the survey did not inquire about the time spent on consulting services.  
 
The collusion issue is also connected to broadening the scope of services. In earlier stages of 
the profession's development the area of expertise was quite clearly financial audit. . An 
auditor's education had everything to do with accounting and finance. Consulting was okay, 
as long as it was restricted to these areas. It was like going into an ice cream shop and being 
told you could have whatever flavor you wanted, as long as it was plain vanilla. The spread of 
the service pallet, however, made expertise less obvious, and service expansionism - 
sometimes known as "empire building" - more seductive. If one wants to be perceived as a 
value adder, one may be enticed to promote the image of expertise in areas where wise men 
would fear to tread. In other words, the issue might be getting more complicated. 
 
Van der Woerd (2003) advocates the need for adding consultancy to more traditional services. 
His argument is that the two are necessary, and needn't be obstructive. He suggests that 
consultancy engagements should not be mixed up and reports about those engagements are 
solely provided only to the lower level managers, not to the Management Board. He also 
advocates a strict separation of staff and does not allow an auditor or consultant to be 
involved in a subsequent audit of a previous consulting engagement where he was involved. 
 
De Korte (2003) and Paape et al (2005) tried to solve the issue of possible collusion between 
consulting and auditing activities. Their conclusion was that consulting should preferably take 
place at the beginning of any audit. In preparing the criteria to be used during the audit, the 
internal auditor is well placed to discuss with management the preferred set up of the internal 
control system. That is the time to demonstrate his knowledge and expertise and make it 
available for management. This will prevent uncomfortable surprises - "guess what we 
found?" - at the end of the audit and will also promote acceptance.  
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Another interesting topic is the question whether top management activities should be subject 
to internal audit. Stokvis (1957, 50), supporting the idea that IA should receive instructions 
only from top-management (see above), was clear on the subject.  
 
He should, therefore, be allowed to take cognizance of all documents which reflect the 
decisions of management, e.g., minutes, budgets, etc. If his findings give rise to any 
comment on top-management's activities, he should be able to report directly to the 
CEO and to any or all of the managing directors, thus ensuring that his position has 
the greatest possible independence within the organization.  
 
Sinnott (1957, 32) felt a bit more reluctant about this issue and would leave the matter to the 
discretion of management.  
 
If on the other hand, the scope of his activities is restricted to exclude top 
management, he can quite properly leave this field to the external auditor, having 
made his own restricted position clear to that auditor and having proffered advice on 
the appropriate internal check.  
 
Back then the issue of including top management activities in the scope of services was 
controversial. Nowadays, much is said about the "soft controls" and the "tone at the top". 
Verschoor (1992) reported that 65% of Chief Audit Executive's submitted information 
concerning the results of monitoring the corporate code of conduct or ethics to the Audit 
Committee. 
 
Jules Muis (2003) was quite clear. "For the internal audit profession to suggest that 360 
degrees reviews of corporate governance dynamics is easily within its professional reach – 
including 'tone at the top auditing' – is a dangerous illusion." (2003, 48) The newly adjusted 
IIA Inc. Standards – which came into effect on January 1, 2004 – made a giant leap forward 
by including Standard 2130.A1. "The internal audit activity should evaluate the design, 
implementation, and effectiveness of the organization's ethics-related objectives, programs 
and activities." Although one might approach this from a systemic perspective and not bring 
the "tone at the top" under this umbrella, expectations are clearly rising.  
 
But the clock might be turned back. While writing this thesis, the Sarbanes- Oxley Act came 
into effect, and the outcome with regard to the scope of services is becoming more and more 
apparent. Gray (2004) studied its impact on internal auditing. It may be significant. "Internal 
audit departments are shifting away from consulting and operational auditing and returning to 
their traditional financial auditing activities. In terms of status, they are now reporting directly 
to the audit committee and play a greater role in the audit committee's meeting agenda." 
(2004, xvi) He continued: "In terms of reporting relationships, usually there is a 'solid line' 
from the internal audit department to the audit committee, reflecting a functional relationship, 
and a 'dotted line' to the CFO (sometimes the CEO), reflecting an administrative relationship." 
(2004, page xx) 
 
In conclusion, the shift from financial to operational audit is obvious. The increasing breadth 
of the scope of services is also visible, and consulting, prominent in the IIA Inc's definition of 
internal auditing, while still subject to debate, is on the rise. The tone at the top and codes of 
conduct have, via the revised Standards, recently been appointed an area to include in the 
Scope of Services.  
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There seems to be an underlying trend, which emerges when taking a bird's eye view of the 
data and having been around in the profession for a while. The internal audit profession has 
always been an instrument in the hands of management and sought for its approval and 
recognition. Since it has never been mandatory, it had an inherent need to deliver value for 
money to management. Either that, or be shown the door. Marketers can tell you all about 
creating first a desire for products and services, and then a need. 
 
Starting off with its focus on financial audit, working closely with the external auditor and 
providing assurance on the financial data, it sought to expand its services to other areas. This 
trend can be explained using the framework provided by Matthyssens et al (1998). They 
presented the following model. 
Total standard
service package
Differentiated  custom-made
service package, focused
on applications
Low
Differentiation
in supply of products
and services
Superior logistic
service; basic service 
amendable with options
to be paid for
High
High
Low
Experience 
buyer
Unbundling
Innovation
 
 
Figure 5: Matthyssens et al (1998, 33): Service and Market evolution 
 
This scheme shows that from a standard package there will be a trend toward differentiation 
of services, which winds up in superior services, which, in turn, can become a new 
commodity, which requires innovation to adapt to the changing needs of customers. The 
convolutions of that sentence demonstrate the potential ongoingness of this process. 
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This development may be relevant to IA's scope of services. The financial audit became a 
commodity, which was also provided by the external auditor. This competitive force led IA 
along the path of differentiation and finding new services, such as operational audit, IT audit, 
compliance audit, and the like. Adding consulting services increased the service pallet even 
more. The question whether this trend could be called "push", whereby the profession started 
this trend, or "pull", whereby management demanded other services, might be difficult to 
answer. If one would were to plot the current status of the internal audit services in this 
scheme, the best estimate probably would be the right upper quadrant. A highly differentiated 
service spectrum aimed at different needs and different applications. Whether the trend 
continues into the right lower quadrant remains to be seen. Interestingly enough, albeit from a 
totally different objective, Wyatt and Gaa (2004) described a similar development for the 
public (external auditor) profession. 
 
If applying the Matthyssens et al (1998) model to internal audit services is valid, this might 
explain the trends shown by the data above. It would also enable us to come up with some 
possible predictions with regard to the service portfolio and learn from others. Matthyssens et 
al use their model to demonstrate how added value of services can be achieved and what 
needs to be done. They also demonstrate that differentiation in itself may induce high costs 
and requires skills other than are needed for a standardized basic service. Applying this to 
internal audit, it might also explain the increased need for higher and ongoing education of 
auditors - the education permanente mentioned above, or the concepts of "tour of duty" and 
multidisciplinary IA's to be able to deliver the differentiated services portfolio. 
 
They also foretell that on the road to add value to services and tread the "unbundling" road, 
one must take into account three "building blocks". 
1. Processes and systems that will facilitate superior service delivery and provide 
performance measurements to control it. 
2. Unique skills necessary to run projects, account management and managing interfaces. 
3. Culture - human resources and organization - aimed at transparency, a learning 
organization, empowerment and a market driven culture. 
 
Questions such as "what services add value?", "what costs are involved?" and "how to 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of services rendered"' are not easily answered. As 
shown in an earlier section, the performance measurement of internal audit services is rather 
poorly developed. This might be explained by the lack of a competitive market. In other 
words, the internal audit profession has a virtual monopoly. But if and when this competition 
heats up and becomes fierce, this might become a handicap that the profession will have to 
deal with.  
Internal auditors do have a unique skill set, but a much-heard argument by management and 
Audit Committee members is the perceived lack of business and customer focus. As might be 
expected in a situation of a kind of monopoly, the need to have a customer focus might be less 
developed than would be needed in case of a real market. Account management and 
developing relationships are attributed more to the External Auditor than IA. IIA Inc (2002c) 
said it eloquently. "If there is no universal answer to what adds most value, then the way to 
answer that question for yourself seems obvious: 'Ask your stakeholders!'" (xiii). 
Interestingly, this IIA Inc study, which aimed at investigating the added value area, revealed 
that the list of changes was headed by a change from "confrontational approach to partnering 
with line management (xv)".  
 
65
65
Hiding behind arguments like "professional judgment" and a culture of a closed shop - 
ascribed to many professional service providers - might not be the best road to run. 
Empowerment requires spreading power, information, knowledge and rewards (Matthyssens 
et al, 1998, 241). The concepts of multidisciplinary IA's to be able to address the broadened 
scope of services and to recruit management potentials (tour of duty), although widespread as 
ideas, are in reality not easy to achieve. 
 
The list of 14 major changes in IA services - expected and expressed by 11 thought leaders 
during interviews in an IIA Inc study (2002c) - contained a number of items that line up with 
the above. Shifting from Assurance services to Consulting; adding more value; staffing via 
internal transfers with broader skills; the use of technology (automated work papers, E-
commerce, etc.); applying knowledge sharing; and expanded areas of auditing (such as 
environmental auditing, etc.).  
 
These changes fit neatly in the three "building blocks" above. The study included a survey 
and case studies backing up the trends mentioned in the interviews by the thought leaders. 
 
One of the dangers, foretold by Matthyssens et al (1998, 152), is the danger of what they call 
the "non-committal route", whereby services offered are uncoupled and unbundled. This will 
attract buyers who shop for a bargain. To go the other, and harder, route, focusing on adding 
value, services need to be coherent and aimed at solving the problems of customers. Their call 
is to create a customer oriented philosophy and a strategy and organization that is aligned and 
able to measure their performance and progress. From the perspective of the difficulties with 
performance measurement of IA services, this could be a real challenge.  
 
Relations between Internal and External Auditors 
The last part of this section will deal with the relationship between the internal and external 
auditor. Coming from the same background and, in The Netherlands, being members of the 
same professional body, there is still room for improvement. The professional rivalry between 
them is gossiped about at social gatherings and paved with prejudice and platitudes. It is high 
time that some quality research was devoted to the topic. 
 
Walker (1957, 11) notes that "each must stay out of the other's road" and that the coverage of 
the internal auditor may reduce the detail work necessary to satisfy the external auditor of the 
existence of adequate internal control. Irish remarks that: "Effective coordination is 
practicable only if the external auditor is satisfied as to the competence of the internal audit 
staff and that its status and accountability within the organization ensure integrity of results" 
(1957, 15). He also envisions the external auditor as having 'de facto jurisdiction' over IA.  
 
Walker's call to include the external auditor in the planning process of the internal auditor is 
very much in line with Tabaksblat (2003), who describes as best practice that the external 
auditor should be "involved" in the planning process. Since "involved" is not clarified, that 
might be anything between being informed and given a say in the process. At least there is 
some ground to suppose that it is more than just sending the plan to the external auditor for 
his perusal, and provides grounds for the idea that the external auditors could in some ways 
impact IA. At least in the eyes of Tabaksblat.  
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It seems that not much has changed in the last 50 years. Irish goes so far as to say that "the 
public [external] auditor is placed in a position of psychological seniority; the internal auditor 
is impressed more indelibly with the duty he must feel towards him and the significance of the 
work he is doing" (1957, 16). He calls for a system of licensing and means for penalizing 
internal auditors if they fail to comply with duties as established by external auditors. This in 
itself is in tune with the findings in the literature discussed in Chapter 3. Since there are 
professional, and in some respects psychological, tensions between the professions - 
"separated by a common language" - having them mutually agree on work plans and a mutual 
review process would enhance the quality of the work of both of them. There is no other way 
of bringing this about than cooperation.  
 
MacPherson (1957, 24-25) sees many possibilities for that. But the most important for him is 
reducing the shareholders' auditor's (that is, the external auditor) attention to transaction 
details, thus freeing him to devote more time to assets and liabilities, analyzing operations, 
and appraising the fairness of the financial statements. He goes on to say: "The external 
auditor cannot accept the work of the internal auditor as part of his own; he cannot merge the 
internal audit staff temporarily with his and as his own." Sinnott (1957, 32-33) cites the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales in a publication of 1953 that the 
statutory auditor may: 
 
 Derive much assistance from the internal auditor's intimate knowledge of the 
accounting system and technical knowledge of the business. 
 When satisfied that the internal auditor has adequately covered part of the work, be 
able to reduce the extent of his detailed examination. 
 Be able to rely to a large extent on the internal auditors in determining whether the 
system of internal checks is operating satisfactorily and in assessing the reliability of 
the accounting records.  
 
The AICPA Standard 65 ("The Auditor's Consideration of the Internal Audit function in an 
Audit of Financial Statements"), which refers to the standards of the IIA Inc. and 
acknowledges IA as a profession, specifically addresses the coordination between internal and 
external auditor. This should include periodic meetings, scheduling audit work, providing 
access to internal auditors' working papers, reviewing audit reports, and discussing possible 
accounting and auditing issues. The first version of SAS 65 was published in April 1991 and 
was commented on by Jarvis and Moran (1992), two internal auditors.  
 
At last, an SAS has been released that recognizes the strides internal auditing has 
made as a profession and provides that the external auditor may use the professional 
internal auditing standards as criteria in making the assessment of competence and 
objectivity. (1992, 51) 
 
Not surprisingly, Verschoor (1992) in his study came up with the fact that 94% of Audit 
Committee's discussed coordinating activities of both internal and external auditor.  
 
Reviewing SAS 65, Braiotta and Marsh (1992) came to the conclusion that the work 
performed by internal auditors can help the external auditor in planning their audit. "This 
constructive relationship between the internal and the external auditors will assist the board of 
directors through its audit committee to effectively oversee the audit processes and the 
financial reporting process." (1992, 11) 
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This statement is backed up by a study by Schneider and Wilner (1991), which presented 
hypothetical cases to 264 study participants. One group was told that the company was not 
audited at all; a second that it was audited by a competent staff of internal auditors. A third 
that it was audited by competent staff of outside independent external auditors. Each group 
was confronted with three independent short case histories, including several factors expected 
to impact the effectiveness of auditing as a deterrent to not above board financial reports. 
Their conclusion was – perhaps surprising to some - that both internal and external audit had a 
similar clear deterrent effects on financial reporting irregularities, thus indicating that at least 
for some tasks IA is a viable substitute for the usually more expensive external auditing. "This 
could lead to an expanded role for the internal auditor in the audit process." (1991, 31)  
 
Following the implementation of SAS 65, Vessel (1991) studied this issue and concluded: 
 
It is time for internal auditors to stop frustrating themselves by pursuing recognition 
and acceptance through being designated a profession. If the goal of the pursuit is a 
higher level of reliance on internal auditors work by external auditors, then the pursuit 
is futile. Rejecting internal auditors' claim to professional equality appears to be in the 
external auditors best interest at this time. Therefore, internal auditors need to accept 
themselves and appreciate the very essential roles that they are currently playing in 
their organizations. (1991, 92) 
 
Following up the ICAS paper (1993), McInnes and Stevenson (1995) also commented on this 
relationship. They concluded that the Cadbury Committee (see Chapter 4) required companies 
to have a sound system of internal control and that IA is best suited to provide the assurance 
needed by management. They external auditor would not be best suited for many reasons. 
Among them, he might lost sight of his main responsibility: the statutory audit.  
 
The Standards of the IIA Inc also provide guidance pertaining to coordinating with the 
external auditor. Standard 2050 specified: 
 
The chief audit executive should share information and coordinate activities with other 
internal and external providers of relevant assurance and consulting services to ensure 
proper coverage and minimize duplication of efforts.  
 
IIA Inc also provides Practice Advisories (PA) for internal auditors, serving as a beacon, but 
having no binding power. One of them, PA 2050-1,17 covers the same ground as SAS 65 and 
goes further. The PA says that the Chief Audit Executive can support the board in its efforts 
to assess the performance of external auditors, and specifies the areas to look at. For those 
who have been following the story so far and the frankly demeaning opinions of some 
contributors to the debate, this plot turn may seem like a bolt from the blue.  
 
                                                 
17 www.theiia.org/iia/index.cfm?act=content 
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But, according to Agency Theory, as outlined in Chapter 4, cross-checking between the 
auditors is a logical and sound practice. The contract between the external auditor and a 
company is an "incomplete" contract in every way. First because the company and its 
management will lack the specialist knowledge necessary to fully comprehend the work of the 
external auditor. Second because the external auditor must live up to professional standards 
that almost by definition (and perhaps by intent) will not be easily understood by management 
of the contracting party. Third, the often used mantra "professional judgment" will even 
further throw smoke into the eyes of the contracting party. It takes a professional to 
understand the essentials of the methodologies and techniques used by an external auditor. 
And as already mentioned, measuring performance of the external auditor is no easier than 
that of the internal auditor. In short, the contracting party will need a professional capable of 
judging the completeness of the contract sign and the level of services delivered. 
 
It is also in the best interests of external auditors to have a professional partner on the inside 
to discuss technical issues. This will enable them to better assess not only needs, but also 
potential problems and difficulties they may encounter during the assignment. Obviously, this 
inside partner will be the internal auditor. Agency Theory predicts that principal-agent 
relationships create information asymmetry, which impacts the principal - especially in 
circumstances of incomplete contracts. The dangers of opportunism, discussed so eloquently 
by Williamson (see Chapter 4), also arise. After all, who is to say whether or not the contract 
was fulfilled in its entirety?  
 
Surely, this uncertainty and potential for lingering suspicions are also not in the best interests 
of the external auditor. The contract will benefit from a relationship in which each - the 
external and internal auditors – oversees the other. One potential danger is mutual blackmail  
or collusion between the parties. "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." These dangers 
are very real. Agency Theory requires another watch dog or countervailing powers to limit 
these risks.  
 
The external audit profession has imposed on itself many measures, such as oversight, peer 
reviews, disciplinary powers, educational programs and requirements for ongoing training. 
Contracting companies can also sue for liabilities. All of the above create pressure for 
External Auditor to measure up to its reputation. There are no such restraints and incentives 
on IA. Disciplinary measures are possible if the internal auditor is a member of the NIVRA or 
the VRO. But, as we have already noted above (2.4), they are hardly ever used. 
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The IIA Inc does not have disciplinary powers. It created the need for quality assurance and 
external reviews at least once every five years, but has no credible measures to check and 
enforce adherence to external review. If the outcome of such a review were negative, there are 
no provisions to correct non-adherence to Standards. The last resort would be dismissal. 
Between June 27 and July 8, 2003, the IIA Inc18 surveyed via their website whether internal 
auditors had undergone an external quality review and the results were shocking. Out of 380 
respondents, a mere 27% answered positive, 2% planned one for 2003, 9% planned one for 
2004, and a staggeringly 61% had not done so and did not have any plans to do so. Again, the 
Standards make such a review mandatory. This poll shows the need for enforcing power and 
could – or should - be reported to the board by the external auditor. A mitigating factor might 
be that many IA's, especially those in the financial services industry, are scrutinized by 
regulators on a regular basis and might rightfully claim to have undergone external reviews. 
For the others, no excusable factors are available.  
 
A 1999 IIA The Netherlands study showed large differences from firm to firm in the 
relationship between internal and external auditor. The most significant difference was that 
some IA's were heavily involved in certifying the annual report, and others were not. As 
might be expected, those that were worked more intensively with the external auditor. 
The Basel Committee has published several papers about auditors in general and IA in 
particular (2001, 2002a, 2002c, 2003). It carried out a survey (2002b) among banks in the EU 
to determine the relationship of the Supervisory Board to both external and internal auditors. 
It revealed that all regulators were aware of the importance of regular meetings between 
external and internal auditors. In the financial services industry, regulators monitor financial 
institutions and their IA's. Therefore, regulators actively seek to engage with internal auditors 
via onsite meetings and evaluations, reporting directly to the supervisor. This is also the kind 
of contact Koster of the AFM has in mind (se above).  
 
An IIA Inc poll,19 conducted between December 2003 and January 2004, showed that out of 
1074 respondents 51% were involved in the year-end work of the external auditor. The study 
revealed that respondents expected that the external auditor would include operational 
auditing in his approach and there would be a greater need to coordinate activities. One of the 
drivers is Corporate Governance regulations, and especially the US' Sarbanes-Oxley Act, that 
will require internal auditors to include financial audits more than they have done in the 
recent past. In a November 2003 poll20 of the IIA Inc, 907 respondents were asked what 
percentage of internal audits had shifted from operational audit to financial and compliance 
audit. There is an undeniable turning back of the clock! About 37% mentioned that more than 
25% of their work had already shifted from operational audit to financial and compliance 
audits. 
 
                                                 
18 www.theiia.org/iia/index.cfm?doc_id=3837 
 
19 www.theiia.org/iia/index.cfm?doc_id=3837 
 
20 www.theiia.org/iia/index.cfm?act=content.print&doc_id=4495 
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The AICPA issued an exposure draft, "Proposed Statement on Standards for Attestation 
Engagements: Reporting on an Entity's Internal Control over Financial Reporting" (2003). 
This exposure draft followed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and was issued to provide guidance for 
external auditors. The tone of the text is that external audit should be able to fulfil its 
responsibilities vis-à-vis the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley. The most provocative remark was: 
"The practitioner should not [emphasis added] rely on the results of internal auditors' 
procedures as the principal evidence of the operation effectiveness of controls over significant 
accounts, classes of transactions, and disclosures." (para 51) 
 
If the external auditor intends to use the results of tests performed by others - such as internal 
auditors - he should: 
 
Re-perform tests of controls on each significant account, class of transactions, and 
disclosures to corroborate the results of such tests; and also perform independent tests 
of controls related to each significant account, class of transactions, and disclosure. 
(para 74) 
 
If it were finalized unchanged, this exposure draft would have a profound impact on the 
relationship between internal and external auditor. If such a proposal came into effect, it 
would seriously devalue the work, prestige and professionalism of IA and, perhaps not 
coincidentally, enhance all of the above for external auditors and thus increase their 
bargaining power. But it would also significantly increase the amount of work to be done by 
them – with the concomitant hours – and lead toward as yet uncalculated inefficiencies. If any 
companies are interested in this no win approach, they will be in a distinct minority. 
 
2.7 Conclusions  
 
The foundations of (internal) auditing go back a long way. Nevertheless, up till now theory 
around internal auditing is limited. Legitimization seems to be found predominantly in 
Agency Theory. Some critics, like Power (1997) and Pentland (2000), question the validity of 
auditing and accuse it of obscurity. Having studied the different elements of auditing and its 
state of affairs, it is at least fair to say that there is more than prima facie merit in their 
critique. 
 
Auditing theory, focusing mainly on the financial audit, aims at providing assurance on a 
certain subject. That assurance is based on an assessment of the current state of affairs, as 
compared with a predefined state called "the norm" or "criteria". An audit should have 
benefits, and there should be interested parties in need of the assessments of the auditor. In 
addition to knowledge and expertise, one of the main features of an auditor is independence. 
He is not supposed to have an interest in the outcome of his work that will bias his 
conclusion. Nor is he supposed to have a relationship with the parties involved that would 
create a possible conflict of interests.  
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The latter issue is especially problematic for an internal auditor, because he is part of the 
organization and, therefore, more than just incidentally tied to his supervisors. Thus it is all 
but impossible for him to fulfill the conditions of independence or avoid potential charges of 
conflict of interests. Independence is a much debated issue. Does it have inherent value? Or is 
it the result of something else, like objectivity and integrity? IIA Inc believes it is the 
cornerstone of the profession. Some, like Jules Muis (2003), contend it is its fatal flaw. In 
either case, defining independence is not easy. Some say it is all about professionalism, due 
care, competence, objectivity, probity of character, integrity, and the like. The external auditor 
profession developed many pages of rules cookbooks to try to come up with ideas about what 
might impair independence. The internal audit profession has a principle-based perspective 
and a framework and process to deal with the issue. Has it been resolved? No. 
 
Within the much debated issue of independence is the much debated issue of organizational 
position. The bottom line is who the Chief Audit Executive reports to. IA has always been an 
instrument in the hands of the Management Board. But due to Corporate Governance changes 
the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee is coming to the fore. In order to deal with what 
seems to me to be inevitable, and to a large extent intolerable, contradictions that have 
emerged as the way of doing things have changed over time, the profession and its masters 
have twisted, squirmed and come up with monstrous and barely comprehensible distinctions 
between "administrative" and "functional" reporting lines. Which does more to muddy the 
waters than make them limpid with light. 
 
It's time to take a stand and affirm that the responsibility for IA should be taken by the Audit 
Committee. The IIA Inc in its 1120-2 describes it as follows: 
 
The IIA believes strongly that to achieve necessary independence, the Chief Audit 
Executive should report functionally to the audit committee or its equivalent (IIA, 
2004, 55).  
 
Many Chief Audit Executives like the idea. Drifting in the arms of the Supervisory 
Board/Audit Committee would seem to strengthen their independence vis-à-vis top 
management. However, there is a catch: a big one. As IA becomes more independent of the 
Management Board and more dependent on the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee, it might 
wind up more often in that the Dutch describe as "between the dock and the ship", and the 
Americans as "between a rock and a hard place". IA might wind up having to serve two 
masters or, if Koster (2003) has his way, three.  
 
Solving the independence issue via outsourcing IA and having it done by an "outsider" – 
thought to be inherently more independent – is clearly not the answer. Because many of the 
advantages of having an IAF - such as knowledge of the organization and its culture, and 
being perceived as "one of us" - would go out the window with the whole department. What's 
more, who will it be bought from. The firm's external auditor is currently prohibited from 
providing many of the IA services. Hiring yet another outside company increases the number 
of participants on the playing field and increases coordination efforts and costs.  
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The animosity between external and internal auditors is a social gathering subject and 
reflected in the professional debate via the make or buy decision. The make or buy issue is 
exacerbating these traditional tensions. There are pro's and con's. As we will see in Chapter 4, 
Transaction Cost Economics predicts that a higher level of Asset Specificity increases the 
make decision. Agency Theory predicts the same when there is a high level on Information 
Asymmetry. Although a lot has been said about outsourcing (the buy option) there is no 
evidence that it is actually increasing. There also isn't any evidence the other way around.  
 
At present the make or buy issue is much ado about nothing. Whether the turning back of the 
clock towards financial audit and the shift in organizational position and drifting into the arms 
of the Audit Committee will move the scales in one direction or another remains to be seen. In 
the meantime, it is in the best interests of both external and internal auditors to closely 
cooperate and coordinate their activities. It will not only strengthen service payoff and reduce 
cost savings, but also demonstrate true grown up professionalism. It will also make the Audit 
Committees job, of supervising both, easier. 
 
The external auditor is an instrument in the hands of shareholder and the Supervisory Board 
to monitor the Management Board, mainly via signing off on the annual accounts. Hired by 
the Supervisory Board - though having his point of entry via the Management Board and 
corporate officers - he also deals with the internal auditor.  
 
The broadening of the Scope of Services is evident. Differentiation of the services portfolio 
and thereby ‘adding value’ is promulgated by the IIA Inc for the last decade. The question is 
whether this was due to a "push" strategy on behalf of the profession or a "pull" strategy by its 
masters. Marketing pointed at the most secure route to professionalism. Three building blocks 
are affected and need to be taken into account: processes and systems; skill set; the culture; 
and human resources and organization.  
 
The needs of the public at large and therefore those of Supervisory Boards, is shifting towards 
assurance on the reliability of financial data. This may lead to an overlap between the work of 
the internal and the external auditor, creating an increased need to coordinate their efforts. 
Although the shift from financial audit towards operational audit has undeniably been the 
trend of the last two decades, there seems to be some turning point. Again, Sarbanes Oxley 
might have stopped the pace of the development of consultancy services. Whether this is for 
the short or the long term remains to be seen.  
 
Corporate Governance regulations have gained pace during the last decade of the 20th century. 
These regulations have also had an impact on the internal audit profession and contributed to 
the status and its prestige. I am convinced that this development is far from over and, 
therefore, still subject to ongoing research. IA is being called to the fore because of an Audit 
Committees need to supervise what is going on. In the case of companies listed at the NYSE, 
an IA is now mandatory, and the emphasis on a proper internal control system may also push 
up the numbers of IA's. Although there is a trend towards regulatory requirements for an IA, 
the lack of such has not hampered the development of the profession. In the next chapter we 
will explore developments in Corporate Governance regulations and their impact on IA. 
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The heightened status comes at a price. IA has to increase its credibility and live up to 
expectations. Is it up to the task? The IA profession has been around for a long time without 
being able - or having - to define its "uniqueness" and back up its raison d'être and right to 
operate. Some existential uncertainty has come and gone and the profession has always come 
squarely down on the side of management. When management said "Jump!", the first 
response was "How high?". And the rationale for that was simple. "Management needs us 
and, therefore we are a legitimate function." And up to now that has been more than ample 
justification. 
 
After flying over the Corporate Governance landscape in Chapter 3 we will proceed in 
Chapter 4 to theory for answers and more interesting questions.  
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Chapter 3. Corporate Governance and Internal Audit 
 
"No effort of any kind is called for. You go to a meeting once a month in a car 
supplied by the organization. You look both grave and sage, on two occasions say 'I 
agree', say "I don't think so" once, and if all goes well you get 500 pounds a year. If 
you have five of them, it is total heaven, like having a permanent hot bath."21  
 
"Over twenty years – through various attempts to reform the governance of 
corporations and their directors – [Paul] O'Neill kept getting nudged toward the same 
conclusion: It was all about the Chief Executive Officer. 'The solution is to make the 
Chief Executive Officer responsible for the company he runs. Period,' he said. 'And I 
mean legally responsible. Everything else will flow from that. The accountants will 
either do their job or the Chief Executive Officer will have to fire them – he can't take 
the risk. That goes for the senior executives, too. And for the Board. Tie a high 
standard of accountability to the man in charge, and everyone will fall into line.' 
"[Alan] Greenspan sat for a moment, turning it around in his head. 'You may be right,' 
he said. 'But I'm not sure if it's not a little more complex than that.' He paused. 'Then, 
again, it may be the thoughtful solution. Nothing else has worked.'"22 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2 we studied the current state of internal auditing. One of the driving forces for 
shaping internal audit and its functioning in organizations is Corporate Governance. The 
number of reports issued during the last decade is large. Moreover, the subject of internal 
audit – as will be shown in this chapter – has been increasingly addressed over the years.  
 
Gregory et al (2002) did a comparative analysis of Corporate Governance codes in the 
member states of the European Union (EU) and defined a Corporate Governance code as: "a 
non-binding set of principles, standards or best practices, issued by a collective body, and 
relating to the internal governance of corporations". Many codes are issued from a broad array 
of groups -- governmental or quasi-governmental entities; committees (or commissions) 
organized by governments or by stock exchanges; business, industry and academic 
associations; directors associations; and investor-related groups. Thus, as one might expect, 
compliance mechanisms and the "official" status of codes vary widely. 
 
Many are voluntary. Some are indirectly mandatory via stock exchange listing requirements 
to disclose the degree to which companies comply with code recommendations, along with an 
explanation of any areas of non-compliance. Some of those codes, or at least parts of them, 
became embedded in the law. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States - 
which will be discussed below - or the Loi Sécurité Financière in France. In The Netherlands 
the Tabaksblat Code begot a semi-legal status via a so-called Algemene Maatregel van 
Bestuur (General Measure of Governance), meaning that in a court of law this code will be 
used as a reference point for judicial claims.  
                                                 
21 Quote from Lord Boothby, 1962, addressing a group of Yorkshire clubwomen, concerning board membership. 
From: L. Herzel, R. Shepro, L. Katz, "Next to Last Word on Endangered Directors", Harvard Business Review, 
January/February 1987, p 38 
22 Ron Suskind, (2004). The Price of Loyalty, p. 210f. 
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Although many of those codes are predominantly designed for listed companies, some of 
them are also "translated"23 to other domains. 
  
The Corporate Governance codes analyzed in this research emanate from different nations. 
Those differences impact the content of the codes. But globalization puts pressure on systems 
and has an inbuilt drive for convergence. As will be shown in this chapter, that is exactly what 
is happening. Further, movers and shakers maintain strong cross border networks. Board 
members are increasingly internationally active, spreading best practices and experiences 
globally. Companies call for a "global level playing field" to prevent lack of competitiveness 
due to incompatible differences in governance systems. Last but not least, corporate scandals 
also have repercussions beyond narrow country borders.  
 
Gregory et al (2002) have noted: "Given their distinct origins, the codes are remarkable in 
their similarities, especially in terms of the attitudes they express about the key roles and 
responsibilities of the supervisory body and the recommendations they make concerning its 
composition and practices" (2002, 18).  
 
The main aim of those codes is to contribute to the prosperity of companies and proper 
functioning of capital markets. To that aim, many, if not all, address such areas as the 
relationship with shareholders, voting rights, Board structures, the use of separate Committees 
(like the Audit Committee), relationships with auditors, both internal and external, and 
enforcement mechanisms and compliance. In that respect there is always an "external" 
element in the codes via defining relationships with stake- and share-holders and the way the 
company communicates with the market. There is also an "internal" element in the codes via 
"prescribing" how Boards should be structured and "behave", and the fact that many, if not 
all, codes strive to strengthen what is called the "internal control system" of the company. The 
rationale for internal auditors then is to understand and strengthen the internal control system 
in order to facilitate Corporate Governance in their companies.  
 
Further, many codes require companies to assess and express an opinion of the Board on the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the "internal control system". In order to do that, they will call 
upon internal and external auditors.  
 
Corporate Governance originates in Agency Theory (which will be discussed further in 
Chapter 4) and its foundation is rooted in the need to resolve or mitigate agent-principal 
issues. Corporate Governance is also an influential factor in studying auditing in general and 
internal auditing in particular. In fact, corporate scandals and Corporate Governance 
developments over the last decade were a source of inspiration and point de départ for this 
thesis. This chapter will highlight the most important Corporate Governance developments 
from the perspective of internal auditing. We will not address all issues, just those that may 
influence the internal audit profession in general and IA's in particular. We will study the 
situation in the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), EU, and last, and definitely least, 
The Netherlands.  
 
In the Western world there are two mainstream governance systems: the one- and two-tier. 
The one-tier, which uses one unitary Board, consisting of executives (management) and non-
executives, is dominant in the Anglo-American environment and the majority of the member 
                                                 
23 In The Netherlands there is a ''Government Governance'' initiative, a ''Health Care Governance'' initiative and 
the like, which use ideas comparable with corporate governance codes. 
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states in the EU. While executives run the organization on a day-to-day basis, strategy and 
far-reaching decisions are taken by the entire Board. The Board appoints several committees, 
including those in charge of Remuneration24, Audit25 and Succession26. The other is the two-
tier system, where Supervisory Board and Management Board are separated. This system is 
dominant in a few European countries, such as Austria, Denmark, Germany, and The 
Netherlands. 
 
Although the two vary, the similarities in actual board practices are significant. Both types of 
systems recognize a supervisory function and a managerial function, although the distinctions 
between them tend to be more formalized in the two-tier structure. Typically, both the unitary 
board and the Supervisory Board appoint the members of the managerial body - either the 
Management Board in the two-tier system, or a group of managers to whom the unitary board 
delegates authority in the unitary system. In addition, both the unitary board and the 
Supervisory Board are usually responsible for ensuring that financial reporting and control 
systems are functioning adequately and the corporation is in compliance with law. 
 
Each board system has its own merits. The one-tier system may be preferred for the closer 
relationship and better information flow between the supervisory and managerial bodies. The 
two-tier system, however, has a clearer, formal separation between the Supervisory Board 
body and those being "supervised", the Management Board. Quite often, the Supervisory 
Board uses many of the same committees as used by its one-tier brethren. This thesis is 
written from the perspective of the two-tier system. Figure 1, shown in Chapter 1, illustrated 
the two-tier system. 
 
Both of those two systems have their own fair share of faults and have suffered major break 
downs. What's more, there is also a conventional distinction between rule-based and 
principle-based systems. Rule-based has a tendency to prescribe clearly what the rules are that 
should be adhered to. Principle-based systems aim for more broadly defined principles, which 
allows those subject to them more leeway to find their own solutions. It is generally assumed 
that the Anglo-Saxon world is an example of rule-based and the EU one of a principle-based 
system. While this generalization has been more or less true up to now, convergence is 
happening in this area as well, as this chapter will attempt to demonstrate. 
 
Before starting off with the analysis of the Corporate Governance codes we have to keep in 
mind that such is done is done from the perspective of what is most relevant for IA. 
Therefore, this analysis is limited by nature.   
 
 
3.2 What is Corporate Governance? 
 
It is generally accepted that Berle and Means (1932) are the founders of the issue of Corporate 
Governance. In the decades following their first steps economists of the caliber of Williamson 
(1975), Fama (1980, 1983), Fama and Jensen (1983), and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
addressed the issue of separation of ownership and control, and developed Agency Theory, 
which will be extensively discussed in Chapter 4. Corporate Governance is an agency 
problem pur sang (par excellence). Agency Theory says that monitors (Supervisory 
                                                 
24 A Remuneration Committee deals with remuneration issues. 
25 See Chapter 1. 
26 A Succession Committee deals with succession planning of Board members. 
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Board/Audit Committee members, auditors, etc.) should be independent of those monitored 
(Management Board). They also need to be experts in their tasks. Therefore, auditors have an 
important role to play in the area of Corporate Governance. 
 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published its vision 
about Corporate Governance in 1999.27 
 
One key element in improving economic efficiency is corporate governance, which 
involves a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate governance 
should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives 
that are in the interests of the company and shareholders and should facilitate effective 
monitoring, thereby encouraging firms to use resources more efficiently. (OECD, 
1999, 11) 
 
One should remember that the OECD Principles don't include even glancing references to 
Internal Audit. 
 
Van Manen (1999, 25) defined Corporate Governance as a process whereby stakeholders try 
to influence the decision-making process of an organization and its subsequent 
implementation. Many other definitions can be found in numerous publications devoted to 
this subject. Mouthaan (2000) swears by the definition of the Toronto Stock Exchange. 
 
Corporate governance means the process and structure used to direct and manage 
business and affairs of the corporations with the objective of enhancing shareholder 
value, which includes ensuring the financial viability of the business. The process and 
structure define the division of power and establish mechanisms for achieving 
accountability among shareholders, the board of directors and management. The 
directors of the business should take into account the impact on other stakeholders, 
such as employees, customers, suppliers and communities.  
 
Perhaps the simplest and most common definition of this sort is provided by the Cadbury 
Report (1992), which is frequently quoted or paraphrased: "Corporate governance is the 
system by which businesses are directed and controlled." For the sake of this thesis I would 
like to adhere to this definition.  
 
After studying the issue of corporate governance, McKinsey published its conclusions 
in July 2002. They concluded that "high governance standards" are valued by 
investors, and they are willing to pay a premium up to 30% in Eastern Europe and 
Africa.28 
                                                 
27 It was revised in December 2004. The basics, however, did not change. 
28 ''An overwhelming majority of investors are prepared to pay a premium for companies 
exhibiting high governance standards. Premiums averaged 12-14% in North America and 
Western Europe; 20-25% in Asia and Latin America; and over 30% in Eastern Europe and 
Africa.'' (Global Investor Opinion Survey: Key Findings, July 2002) 
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Cohen, Krishnamoorty, and Wright (2002, 579) noticed that auditors "are considered part of 
the corporate governance mosaic because they monitor the quality of the financial reporting 
process". While they were referring to the external auditor, this could be applied to the 
internal auditor as well. They studied the impact of Corporate Governance factors on the audit 
process and interviewed 36 external auditors. They concluded that in connection with 
assignment acceptance and planning and risk estimation, the auditors considered such 
Corporate Governance factors as the presence of audit committees, the tone at the top, and 
board composition as important for their estimate of the risk involved in an engagement. The 
same authors had another interesting observation about Internal Audit. 
 
Although 90% of respondents indicated that internal audit could potentially affect the strength 
of corporate governance, they [the external auditors] did not place a corresponding high level 
of emphasis on its importance …. This lack of emphasis could also be a function of the 
relatively infrequent and perhaps ineffective interactions between the internal audit 
department and the audit committee (Read and Raghunandan, 2001). Moreover, internal audit 
departments are perceived to be focused on a micro level rather than on overall corporate 
operations or controls, where the external auditor is most concerned. (Cohen, Krishnamoorty 
and Wright, 2002, 585) 
 
Van Ees, Postma and De Boer (2002) noticed that economic theory teaches that a good 
working corporate governance regime has a positive influence on the organizational results in 
three ways. One, effective corporate governance leads to lower transaction costs. Two, to 
lower agency costs. Three, to a better use of relation specific investments (2002, 27). They 
examined a large number of empirical studies on that issue and came to the following 
conclusion:  
 
We have again summarized the results of empirical research with regard to the relation 
between corporate governance and organizational performance.… From the analysis 
of these results it cannot be concluded that the results unambiguously confirm the 
theory. (2002, 27) 
 
Referring to Meckling and Jensen (1976), Klijnsmit (2002) stated that, if properly executed, 
auditing may very well lead to a decrease in total agency costs. Klijnsmit also stated that 
managers voluntarily hire external third parties, such as auditors, to provide quality checks on 
governance and disclosure, and thus reduce transaction costs of the investors by increasing 
their own bonding costs. There is a pay off for incurring either monitoring or bonding costs, 
because investors/shareholders and the like consider that that increases the credibility of the 
company and has an increasing effect on the value of the company.  
 
3.3 Internal Audit in Corporate Governance publications 
 
This section will discuss the most relevant Corporate Governance publications from the last 
decade from the perspective of Internal Audit.  
 
United States (US) 
The Treadway Committee report, published in 1987, was a response to what had happened to 
many small savings & loans banks. Despite the fact that they had all been professionally 
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audited, and in the eyes of the public at large were thus granted a clean bill of health, they 
went bankrupt. How could that happen? One of the findings of the Treadway Committee was 
that although auditors were present and annual reports were signed off on, that was not the 
same thing as a clean bill of health. In other words, while those were necessary components of 
any sound monitoring system, they were far from sufficient. The Committee found many 
flaws in the control systems of many of those banks, which led to bankruptcy. These control 
failures were the source of flawed information provided to Boards and, consequently, risks 
were not adequately covered.  
 
Not surprisingly, the Treadway Committee concluded that one of the major causes of the 
rampant bankruptcies was the lack of sound internal control systems. The Committee invited 
professional bodies and other interested parties to come up with ideas to increase the quality 
of those systems. Subsequently, a number of professional bodies, such as the IIA Inc. and the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, formed what they called "The Sponsoring 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Committee". They called it COSO 
for short. COSO took up where Treadway left off and in its 1992 report, "Internal Control: 
Integrated Framework", clarified what internal control is.  
 
Internal control is broadly defined as a process, effected by an entity's board of 
directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories: 
- Effectiveness and efficiency of operations; 
- Reliability of financial reporting; 
- Compliance with applicable laws and regulations. (COSO, 1992, 3) 
 
To substantiate internal control, the report itself had two parts. The first part is the explanation 
of the core concepts of the COSO model. The second part is a lengthy check list of more than 
1000 questions, which enables readers to have some reference points to come to grips with 
such an amorphous concept as "internal control".  
Since then the COSO report has been widely recognized and its definition is taken as a 
starting point for almost all reports where control is discussed. Practically speaking, it is 
embedded, and if there is a world standard, COSO is it.  
 
In the COSO-developed model attention is paid to internal audit at the monitoring level. 
Considering that IIA Inc. made a substantial contribution to its contents, this is hardly 
surprising. Internal Audit is considered to be a provider of insights in the daily practices of 
organizations. This vision is consistent with Agency Theory, which shows that internal audit 
has a monitoring (or bonding) function. The chapter that discusses the roles and 
responsibilities of numerous players also pays attention to internal audit. One of the relevant 
remarks is: "the scope of internal audit should encompass the examination and evaluation of 
the adequacy and effectiveness of the organization's system of internal control and the quality 
of the performance in carrying out assigned responsibilities" (COSO, 1992, 88). 
 
COSO continues to emphasize that "potentially" all activities are within the scope of the 
internal auditors' responsibilities. COSO stressed even back then that the selection and 
dismissal of the director of internal auditing - also known as the Chief Audit Executive (Chief 
Audit Executive) - should occur only with concurrence of the board of directors or audit 
committee, and that internal audit should have access to the board or audit committee.  
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While COSO subscribed to the vision of the IIA Inc., it did so without clearly indicating what 
Internal Audit's tasks should be, and who or what it should report to. As explained in Chapter 
2, this impacts the whole issue of independence and objectivity. In a one lump sum Board of 
Directors - the one-tier system - where principals (or their representatives) rub elbows and 
share the same executive bathrooms with agents, it is all too easy to lose sight of the fact that 
the right hand is supposed to be monitoring what the left hand is doing.  
 
In 1994 there was a follow up discussion about whether or not there should be mandatory 
reporting about the extent and quality of internal controls. But nothing came of it. Then, for a 
long time, more of the same nothing happened. It seemed as if a hush had been pulled over 
the whole matter and everyone went about their business as usual, somehow hoping that the 
whole problem would go away, and maybe even imaging that it had. Notable exceptions to 
that trend were the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and The Conference Board (2003).  
 
The former, an advisory board set up by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) published its findings in 1999. 
 
A prosperous and well functioning system exists, therefore, when the three main 
groups responsible for financial reporting -- the full board including the audit 
committee, financial management including the internal auditors, and the outside 
auditors -- form a "three-legged stool" that supports responsible financial disclosure 
and active and participatory oversight. However, in the view of the Committee, the 
audit committee must be "first among equals" in this process, since the audit 
committee is an extension of the full board and hence the ultimate monitor of the 
processes. 
 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) also stated that management, and not the Audit 
Committee, should directly monitor internal audit. Of course management should be 
supported in this task and, therefore, the Audit Committee should regularly review the 
relationship between management and both the external and internal auditors. Specifically, 
the Audit Committee should encourage procedures that promote accountability among all 
these players. That is, management should properly develop, and adhere to, a sound system of 
internal controls. Internal Audit should objectively assess management's accounting practices 
and internal controls. And the external auditors, through their own review, should assess the 
practices of both management and internal audit.  
 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) also acknowledged that there was some risk that 
management might be too much in charge of determining exactly what internal audit audited. 
 
The internal auditor occupies a unique position -- he or she is "employed" by 
management, but is also expected to review the conduct of management. This can 
create significant tension since the internal auditor's "independence" from 
management is necessary for the auditor to objectively assess management's actions, 
but the auditor's "dependence" on management for employment is clear. Recognizing 
this tension, the Committee believes that it is essential to have formal mechanisms in 
place to facilitate confidential exchanges between the internal auditor and the audit 
committee. These mechanisms may take the form of regular meetings independent of 
management, or regular confidential memos or reports circulated only to the audit 
committee. If such meetings or correspondence are regularly scheduled regardless of 
the identification of irregularities or problems, independent dialogue between the audit 
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committee and the internal auditor should lose its "taboo" nature and no longer imply 
treason against management. The audit committee must establish and support a culture 
that promotes open disclosure on the part of the internal auditor and a recognition that 
if the internal auditor identifies a problem and cannot obtain the support of 
management, that he or she has a duty to the audit committee, the full board, and 
shareholders to disclose the relevant information to the audit committee.  
 
Thus, while the Audit Committee is not the only client of internal audit, it should sharply 
supervise its activities. Apparently, the Blue Ribbon Committee took into account the risk of 
"he who pays the piper calls the tune". That is, management might use its not inconsiderable 
powers to postpone, undermine or hijack potentially tricky and even dangerous IA 
investigations and reports. Their response to that problem was to require the Audit Committee 
to supervise IA activities. As admirable and far reaching as their solution is - and if we were 
holding up the cards at the Olympics, we'd give them a 9 or a 9.5 - it does place Internal Audit 
in a rather awkward position. That is something we referred to in Chapter 2 and will come 
back to in more detail later. 
 
While outsourcing (buy) is an option, the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) noted, it is not 
preferred. 
 
Such outsourcing may be beneficial to an institution if it is properly structured, 
carefully conducted, and prudently managed. However, the federal banking agencies 
have concerns that the structure, scope, and management of some internal audit 
outsourcing arrangements may not contribute to the institution's safety and soundness. 
Furthermore, the agencies want to ensure that these arrangements with outsourcing 
vendors do not leave directors and senior managers with the impression that they have 
been relieved of their responsibility for maintaining an effective system of internal 
control and for overseeing the internal audit function.29  
 
With regard to the financial sector, specific rules apply under the Federal Deposit and 
Insurance Companies (FDIC) Act. With regard to internal audit, it was indicated that each 
institution should have an internal audit function that is appropriate to its size and the nature 
and scope of its activities. The board of directors (in a one-tier environment) and senior 
management is responsible for having an effective system of internal controls - including an 
effective IA - and ensuring that the importance of internal control is understood and respected 
throughout the organization. But the FDIC Act is also not clear about who the Chief Audit 
Executive should report to.  
 
Accordingly, the manager of internal audit should report directly to the board of 
directors or its audit committee, which should oversee the internal audit function. 
 
The Blue Ribbon Committee's train of thought can also be found in Commission on Public 
Trust and Private Enterprise, a 2003 publication of The Conference Board, the second of the 
above mentioned exceptions to the hush trend around internal controls. A non-profit 
organization comprised of top business leaders, The Conference Board presents opinions on 
many topics. It stated in its 2003 report that all companies should have IA, regardless of 
whether it is an in-house function (make), or performed by an outside accounting firm (buy). 
                                                 
29 FDIC Financial Institution Letter (FIL--133--97), dated December 22, 1997; 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/inactivefinancial/1997/fil97133.html 
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One caveat about the "external internal auditor" is that the firm should not be the company's 
regular external auditors.  
 
The Conference Board (2003, 11) also concluded: 
 
The internal auditor should have a direct line of communication and reporting 
responsibility to the audit committee, and he or she should attend all regularly 
scheduled audit committee meetings, report on the status of audits conducted by the 
internal audit group, report to the committee on other matters that the internal auditor, 
in his or her judgment, believes should be brought to the audit committee's attention, 
and meet with the audit committee in executive session.  
 
The Conference Board (2003) referred to the New York Stock Exchange Listing Rules. The 
NYSE, as a consequence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act – discussed in more detail below - 
required all listed companies to have IA. It went on to say that the Audit Committee should 
support the Board in evaluating the performance of both the internal and external auditors. In 
order to do this, procedures should include a regular meeting with internal audit. As shown 
above, The Conference Board also recommended more responsibilities for the Audit 
Committee, especially with regard to Internal Audit. 
 
While finding the optimal solution to the problem of preventing management from 
monopolizing the tunes that IA is to play is unlikely to be reached soon, there is a clear trend 
toward having the Audit Committee take more direct responsibility to reduce that risk. 
However slowly, the Audit Committee is gaining ground as far as supervising IA is 
concerned. But placing IA completely under its control seems like not just one bridge too far, 
but many. As one rather surprising response to the very idea - heard during the case studies - 
indicates. 
 
The NYSE guideline that each listed company should have an IAF is top notch and state of 
the art. This is the first time that such a function has been incorporated in a regulation 
pertaining to organizations other than financial institutions. The Audit Committee should also 
look at IA staffing, budget, and scope of services. With regard to the obligatory nature of 
having IA, the NYSE notes:  
 
This requirement does not necessarily mean that a company must establish a separate 
internal audit department or dedicate employees to the task on a full-time basis; it is 
enough for a company to have in place an appropriate control process for reviewing 
and approving its internal transactions and accounting. A company may choose to 
outsource this function to a firm other than its independent auditor.30  
 
This statement led Bill Bishop, the late president of IIA Inc. to let loose the following victory 
whoop: 
 
We just received the press release on the new New York Stock Exchange listing 
requirements - they specifically say that "Every listed company must have an internal 
audit function" and go on to say this is to clarify that it is intended to be a requirement 
- a direct result of our letter I'm sure. This is a great victory and also means that our 
                                                 
30 Corporate Governance Rule Proposals Reflecting Recommendations from the NYSE Corporate Accountability 
and Listing Standards Committee, As Approved by the New York Stock Exchange  Board of Directors, August 
1, 2002. 
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profession now really must step up to the task. Standards and guidance, certification, 
research, quality, and professional development are all impacted. Setting up an audit 
department will be necessary in many organizations and we had already begun 
developing a program for this. It remains to be seen if this will make us "regulated". 31  
 
In the US the most radical act on Corporate Governance in the last decades has undoubtedly 
been the passage of the already frequently mentioned Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Hot on the 
Achilles' heels of such scandals as Enron and WorldCom, the US Senate rushed through this 
bill into law in July 2002 with an unprecedented vote of 522 for. 3 against (with 9 abstaining). 
But Sarbanes-Oxley does not mention anything about the position and role of internal audit, 
except for the fact that external auditors are not to perform both external and internal audit 
functions for the same organization at the same time. But even that stipulation has been 
weakened by a SEC specification. In the process of drafting the Act, the US Congress and 
Senate held numerous hearings and received many comments.  
 
One of them was issued by IIA Inc. (2002d). Among its proposed governance principles was 
one32 whereby IA would be made mandatory for public companies, and it should report 
directly to the Audit Committee. One has to keep in mind that from the two-tier perspective 
this would be a subcommittee of the Supervisory Board. In this position paper the IIA Inc. 
played its cards and made clear that they believe the Chief Audit Executive should be 
responsible to the Audit Committee. Further, in its position paper to the Congress, issued 
April 8, 2002, the IIA Inc. stated:  
 
Internal auditors and audit committees are mutually supportive. Consideration of the 
work of internal auditors is essential for the audit committee to gain a complete 
understanding of an organization's operations.… In establishing and providing 
oversight for the internal audit function, audit committees should charge Chief Audit 
Executives with the responsibility of ensuring that internal auditing work is performed 
in accordance with The IIA Standards. Internal auditors - and especially Chief Audit 
Executives - should demonstrate their professional competency by attaining 
appropriate professional certifications.  
 
Although Sarbanes-Oxley did not provide such a provision, some tendency in that direction is 
visible in one of the SEC proposals about further guidelines for the act, when the following 
questions were raised. "Should the audit committee also be directly responsible for the 
appointment, compensation, retention and oversight of an issuer's internal auditor? Should 
other responsibilities be under the supervision of the audit committee?"33 But they never 
openly declared that the Audit Committee should take full responsibility for Internal Audit. 
The situation in the UK, as the next section shows, is quite different.  
 
The IIA Inc. (2002d) also urged for companies reporting on the adequacy and effectiveness of 
their internal control systems. They referred to the FDIC Act, which requires financial 
institutions to do just that. It contended that half of the companies already reported on that 
matter in their annual reports. But their study also showed lack of clarity. 
 
                                                 
31 Email from Bill Bishop, the late President of the IIA Inc., in August 2002. 
32 All public companies should maintain an effective, full-time internal audit function that reports directly to the 
audit committee. A position paper presented by The Institute of Internal Auditors to the U.S. Congress, April 8, 
2002. 
33 Proposed Rule: Standards Relating To Listed Company Audit Committees, February 18, 2003. 
84
84 
The study also found that among those companies that do such reporting, it generally lacks 
consistency and usually fails to provide an assessment of the control system's effectiveness. 
Further, public reporting on controls generally is limited to accounting controls concerning 
financial reporting and does not address the issue of organizational risks. 
 
Needless to say, the IIA Inc. was in favor of broadening reporting across the board of internal 
control systems, and that internal auditors should be among those providing the necessary 
assurance. At the end of the day, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not go along with any of these 
requests. 
 
But Sarbanes-Oxley most definitely lit fires under the chairs of chairmen and other officers, 
because there are severe penalties34 for possible non compliance. Since its enactment the SEC 
and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) have drafted numerous 
pages with elaborations and furtherance of its meaning and impact. They in its turn were 
closely followed by professional organizations, such as the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) and the IIA Inc. 
 
Although Sarbanes-Oxley did not go along with the requests of the IIA Inc. there is one 
important provision that came close. The Board has to sign off on the adequacy and 
effectiveness of internal controls regarding financial reporting - the so-called Section 404 
statement. Statement 404 requires not only the Board to sign off, but the external auditor as 
well. If we take a good look at the definition of internal controls provided by COSO, we will 
notice that of the three main elements financial reporting is just one.  
 
But that in itself is already a large undertaking for any company. In December 2004, the Big 
Four35, issued a 48 page report to help financial market participants understand issues related 
to the new internal control reports mandated by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and 
the implementing regulations of the SEC and PCAOB. This report referred to the public 
statement of the PCAOB with regard to the "reasonable assurance" that is achieved through 
the "404". 
 
Internal control over financial reporting cannot provide absolute assurance of 
achieving financial reporting objectives because of its inherent limitations. Internal 
control over financial reporting is a process that involves human diligence and 
compliance and is subject to lapses in judgment and breakdowns resulting from human 
failures. Internal control over financial reporting also can be circumvented by 
collusion or improper management override. Because of such limitations, there is a 
risk that material misstatements may not be prevented or detected on a timely basis by 
internal control over financial reporting. (Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board Standard No. 2, para. 16) 
 
The impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on the audit community in general and the internal audit 
community in particular is tremendous. The IIA Inc. issued a research report in 2004 and 
came up with an extensive list. The main consequences included: increasing external audit 
fees by as much as 100%; the giant step backwards – already noted at the end of Chapter 2 – 
                                                 
34 Maximum penalties of up to 20 years of imprisonment if Board members willingly violated the provisions of 
the Act. 
35 Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, issued 
Perspectives on Internal Control Reporting: A Resource for Financial Market Participants, which contains 
frequently asked questions about Sarbanes-Oxley Act 404 requirements. 
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in IA's scope of services towards traditional financial auditing; and the changing relationships 
between parties, such as the Board and the Audit Committee, the internal and the external 
auditor, and the Board and the external auditor.  
 
The words that come to mind with regard to the changing relationships are best described by 
"more distant and formal". Whether that will be an ongoing new status quo remains to be 
seen. Internal auditors may expect to be confronted with a change in image. During the last 
decade they have focused on being (or becoming) a management aid. But it is now predicted 
that there will be "a shift back to company police officers instead of the desired image of 
partners or consultants" (IIA, 2004, xxi). On the other hand, the effect on the relationship with 
the Audit Committee is more promising. The report mentioned that internal auditors were 
more frequently on the agenda of the Audit Committee and that there is a "solid line" from IA 
to the Audit Committee "reflecting a functional relationship, and a 'dotted line' to the Chief 
Financial Officer (sometimes the Chief Executive Officer), reflecting an administrative 
relationship". The emphasis on both functional and administrative is in the report: not added 
by me. Now, a functional relationship presupposes that the Audit Committee is to be seen as 
the party bearing the responsibility for the IA. The report doesn't elaborate on the question 
whether this is a contention by the internal auditors involved and surveyed in the study or a 
factual situation corroborated by the Audit Charters and real life.  
 
The relationship of IA with the external auditor is also affected. The reports mentioned the 
strengthening of their relationship and mutual support, also enhanced by the fact that they 
have become less competitive due to the ban on internal audit services provided by the current 
external auditor. As wonderful as that sounds there may be some drawbacks. The AICPA 
issued an exposure draft: Proposed Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements; 
Reporting on an Entity's Internal Control over Financial Reporting (March 8, 2003). 
Following Sarbanes-Oxley, this was issued to provide guidance for external auditors. The 
tenor of the text is that external auditors should be able to fulfill their responsibilities with 
regard to the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley. The most provocative remark was: "The 
practitioner should not [emphasis added] rely on the results of internal auditors' procedures as 
the principal evidence of the operation effectiveness of controls over significant accounts, 
classes of transactions, and disclosures." (para 51)  If he nevertheless intends to use the results 
of tests performed by others (such as internal auditors), the practitioner should: 
 
Re-perform tests of controls on each significant account, class of transactions, and 
disclosures to corroborate the results of such tests; and also perform independent tests 
of controls related to each significant account, class of transactions, and disclosure. 
(para 74) 
 
If finalized unchanged, this would have a profound impact on the relationship between 
internal and external auditor. If such a proposal comes into effect, it would seriously 
undermine the work, prestige and professionalism of Internal Audit and, perhaps not 
coincidentally, enhance all of the above for external auditors and their bargaining power. But 
it would also significantly increase the amount of work to be done by them – with the 
concomitant hours – and lead toward as yet uncalculated costs. If any companies are 
interested in this loose approach, they will be in a distinct minority. 
 
The scope of services is also impacted. At the end of Chapter 2 we noticed a shift from 
operational to financial audit. This trend is underscored and almost made a permanent fixture 
by this report. "Back to basics", some may call it. Others a "strategic advance to the rear" - US 
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Army slang for "retreat". This clearly affects the hiring of internal auditors and which skills 
will be emphasized in schools and resumes; more financial than operational and consulting. 
Further, internal auditors noticed that salaries went up, budgets were increased and the report 
exclaimed almost in exaltation the very same words Bill Bishop emailed after reading the 
mandatory status of Internal Audit for listed companies at the NYSE:  
 
During this research project, many words were associated with Sarbanes-Oxley, 
including paradigm shift, profound, scary, disruptive, changing corporate cultures, 
time-consuming, and expensive. Most of those words are usually considered 
pejorative, but as this research report will illustrate, those words represent 
unprecedented opportunities for internal auditors to increase their visibility, status, and 
value in their companies. (IIA Inc., 2004, xv) 
 
Whether this is for the better or worse is in the eyes of the beholder, and which position he is 
looking from. In any case, the jury is still out. The relevant point here is that these profound 
changes all seem to be directly attributable to Sarbanes-Oxley. One question that comes up is, 
"Why did we need a law?". Weren't internal auditors able to stand up, speak out, and be heard 
before Sarbanes-Oxley? Shouldn't those changes have been happening long before the 
scandals occurred? Are those changes another example of IA's penchant for "riding the waves 
of change" and adding to the chaotic status sketched out in Chapter 2?  
 
The final remarks of the executive summary of the IIA report referred to the "fluid image" of 
internal audit. In some companies the internal auditors acted as team members helping to 
implement Sarbanes-Oxley. In others they were "advisors" to the project team. And yet they 
need to assess and test the controls and act as "the police once again". In other words, even 
with Sarbanes-Oxley there still isn't any solid ground to stand on.  
 
For those who may want to see Sarbanes-Oxley as a toy in the hands of those rule-based 
lunatics on the other side of the pond, the IIA Inc. report mentioned that its real impact 
stretches far beyond the boundaries of the US and listed companies. Companies may be 
headquartered abroad. But as long as they have securities traded in the United States they 
have to be Sarbanes-Oxley compliant. Banks, creditors and government agencies are 
imposing (part of) the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirements on private companies as a condition 
for obtaining loans or government contracts. If in the future a company wants to sell a 
subsidiary to (or be taken over by) a United States listed company, it had better be Sarbanes-
Oxley compliant. After the Ahold and Parmalat disasters, the EU announced a Sarbanes-
Oxley look alike. Time to set sail for European soil. First stop, the UK. 
 
United Kingdom (UK) 
About the time that COSO was delving into the whys of banks and other businesses 
"suddenly" going belly up, and what to do about it in the US, the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance got underway in the UK. It came in the wake of some 
whopping big financial scandals - notably, the collapse of Robert Maxwell's empire and the 
nearly overnight evaporation of the BCCI - and came to be known as the Cadbury 
Commission (1992), after its chairman, Lord Cadbury. 
 
No one was particularly amazed that Cadbury's (1992) conclusions were somewhat similar to 
those arrived at in the US. Namely, that besides the deliberate and massive fraud involved - 
as, apparently, wasn't the case in the US - there was a clear absence of adequate internal 
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control systems, proper oversight and monitoring, and much of the other modern auditing 
technologies that keep companies afloat and on course. In other words, something was rotten 
in the state of UK Corporate Governance. 
 
The Cadbury Report (1992) covered roughly the same subjects as COSO. The biggest 
difference was that while COSO was a reference framework with no binding strings attached, 
Cadbury came complete with rules and regulations that were mandatory. One of the more 
detailed regulations of Cadbury regarding IA's position was: 
 
It is essential that heads of internal audit should have unrestricted access to the 
chairman of the audit committee in order to ensure the independence of their position. 
(Cadbury, 1992, 28) 
 
Cadbury also emphasized the need to have an Audit Committee that can "strengthen the 
position of the internal audit function, by providing a greater degree of independence from 
management" (Cadbury, 67). In companies where IA exists, it is also necessary to "review the 
internal audit program, ensure co-ordination between the internal and external auditors, and 
ensure that the internal audit function is adequately resourced and has appropriate standing 
within the Company". Cadbury is also quite specific about who should attend Audit 
Committee meetings.  
 
The Finance Director, the Head of Internal Audit, and a representative of the external 
auditors shall normally attend meetings. The committee should have a discussion with 
the auditors [both internal and external!], at least once a year, with members present, 
to ensure that there are no unresolved issues of concern. 
 
While Cadbury (1992) won the race with COSO, as far as its recognition of Internal Audit 
was concerned, it was only by a nose. And Internal Audit's status and position within the 
Corporate Governance sphere didn't change as a result of its findings. It didn't change again in 
1995 with the Greenbury Report additions. But it did with Hampel (1998) and Turnbull 
(1999). Hampel stated that companies that "do not already have a separate interna1 audit 
function should from time to time review the need for one". Turnbull repeated that conclusion 
almost word for word.  
 
Turnbull incorporated another important element. It stated that companies are accountable for 
having a "sound system of internal control" in place36 and that they should elaborate on the 
effectiveness of such a system. Provision D.2.1 of the Code says: 
 
The directors should, at least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the 
group's system of internal control and should report to shareholders that they have 
done so. The review should cover all controls, including financial, operational and 
compliance controls and risk management. 
 
This goes far beyond Sarbanes-Oxley since it explicitly focuses on all three elements of 
COSO: financial, operational and compliance controls (and includes risk management as 
well). Risk management was included to acknowledge that control systems have to respond to 
changes in the operating environment.  
                                                 
36 Provision D.2 of the Code stated: "The board should maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard 
shareholders' investment and the company's assets." 
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In 1999, the same year as Turnbull, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and 
Wales (ICAEW, the professional body of external auditors) published its own report, Internal 
Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code, which put together and digested the 
already existing codes. It aimed to assist listed companies in implementing Turnbull's 
Corporate Governance requirements. It defined the elements of a sound system of internal 
control and referred to the COSO report by using its definition of internal control. It should 
reflect its control environment which encompasses its organizational structure and be part of 
its culture. In that respect if companies are to assess the effectiveness of their control system 
the culture (or "control environment" as COSO puts it) must be part of the assessment.  
 
It also mentioned that there might be: the possibility of poor judgment in decision-making; 
human error; control processes being deliberately circumvented by employees and others; 
management overriding controls; and the occurrence of unforeseeable circumstances, which 
pretty much sounds like the PCAOB conclusion. Therefore: 
 
A sound system of internal control provides reasonable, but not absolute, assurance 
that a company will not be hindered in achieving its business objectives, or in the 
orderly and legitimate conduct of its business, by circumstances which may 
reasonably be foreseen. A system of internal control cannot, however, provide 
protection with certainty against a company failing to meet its business objectives or 
all material errors, losses, fraud, or breaches of laws or regulations (1999, 10). 
 
They stated:  
 
The need for an internal audit function will vary depending on company-specific 
factors, including the scale, diversity and complexity of the company's activities and 
the number of employees, as well as cost/benefit considerations. Senior management 
and the Board may desire objective assurance and advice on risk and control. An 
adequately resourced internal audit function (or its equivalent where, for example, a 
third party is contracted to perform some or all of the work concerned) may provide 
such assurance and advice. There may be other functions within the company that also 
provide assurance and advice covering specialist areas such as health and safety, 
regulatory and legal compliance and environmental issues. (1999, 12)  
 
It also addressed the position of IA. When management doesn't have IA online, it needs to use 
other monitoring processes to assure both itself and the one-tier board that the internal control 
system is functioning as intended. "In these circumstances, the board will need to assess 
whether such processes provide sufficient and objective assurance." (1999, 12) According to 
ICAEW, Internal Audit is an important instrument. Listed companies should have access to 
such services.  
 
Regarding Internal Audit's scope of services, ICAEW is consistent with Turnbull and COSO. 
That is, the focus is squarely on the system of internal controls (as defined by COSO). While 
no explicit statements are made about Internal Audit's position in the organization, it might be 
supposed that it would be under the auspices of the (full) Board, because they - and not the 
Audit Committee alone - are the ones who need to ascertain the necessity of such a function 
and "its scope of work, authority and resources". 
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Higgs came out in 2003. Yes, that's right. Higgs was yet another chairman of yet another 
Corporate Governance committee. While Higgs did not pay any special attention to Internal 
Audit, he did refer to a report from Robert Smith, yet another in the long line of chairmen of 
committees that reported in the realm of Corporate Governance. Higgs and Smith reported 
simultaneously. Smith wrote Audit Committees Combined Code Guidance (2003) to provide 
guidance for Audit Committee's about what their position is with regard to the Combined 
Corporate Governance code. According to Smith, the Audit Committee should monitor and 
review Internal Audit. Perhaps even more interestingly, he recommends:  
 
The audit committee should meet with the head of internal audit at least once a year 
without the presence of management. (2003, 12)  
 
And: 
 
There should be arrangements for the audit committee to meet with external and 
internal auditors independently during the year without the presence of management. 
(2003, 8) 
 
Hampel and Turnbull had already indicated that the one-tier board should ascertain if IA is 
necessary, and if so, how it should operate. This is a remarkable shift and more important for 
the future of Internal Audit than most people currently realize. Until Smith no one officially 
emphasized the need for the Audit Committee to meet the Chief Audit Executive, and 
definitely not without the presence of management. In that respect, this is the first time that 
the Chief Audit Executive has been acknowledged as someone the Audit Committee needs to 
meet with. Smith also increases the pressure to have IA, because if there is none, "the audit 
committee should consider annually whether there is a need for an internal audit function and 
make a recommendation to the board, and the reasons for the absence of such a function 
should be explained in the relevant section of the annual report" (2003, 11). Since Higgs went 
along with and mandated Smith's recommendations, they have become part of what in the UK 
is called the "Combined Code" companies have to comply with. Either that, or elaborate in the 
annual report why not.  
 
Smith continues: 
 
The audit committee should review and approve the internal audit function's remit, 
having regard to the complementary roles of the internal and external audit functions. 
The audit committee should ensure that the function has the necessary resources and 
access to information to enable it to fulfill its mandate, and is equipped to perform in 
accordance with appropriate professional standards for internal auditors. (2003, 12) 
 
Although Smith does not specifically refer to the IIA Inc. Standards, this is included in the 
subtext. With regard to the responsibility of the Audit Committee vis-à-vis internal audit, 
Smith also stated that it should: 
 
Ensure that the internal auditor has direct access to the one-tier board chairman and 
the audit committee and is accountable to the audit committee; review and assess the 
annual internal audit work plan; receive on a periodic basis a report on the results of 
the internal auditors' work; review and monitor management's responsiveness to the 
internal auditor's findings and recommendations; meet with the head of internal audit 
at least once a year without the presence of management; and monitor and assess the 
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role and effectiveness of Internal Audit in the context of the company's overall risk 
management system. (2003, 12) 
 
But this isn't the end of the story. According to Smith, the Audit Committee should also 
approve the appointment or termination of the Chief Audit Executive (2003, 12). Further, 
besides attending some Audit Committee meetings, when invited, the Chief Audit Executive 
has the right to request a meeting with the Audit Committee if he considers that to be 
necessary (2003, 29). While Smith didn't say it in so many words, it seems to me that he was 
going beyond implying that the Audit Committee should be largely accountable for IA's 
performance. The Audit Committee should appoint - indirectly - the Chief Audit Executive. 
The Chief Audit Executive reports to it, and also has separate meetings with it.  
 
In his report, Smith compared the situation in the UK with those in other countries. His 
references included the US, France (Bouton report), Australia, Canada, Ireland, and the EU. 
As far as some regulations are concerned, all of the above have much in common, for 
example, the Audit Committee monitoring of Internal Audit.  
 
European Union (EU) 
Compared with the US or the UK, the EU as a whole doesn't have much of a history of 
Corporate Governance codes. Up to now those sorts of issues have been the domain of the 
separate member states. However, following international developments, the EU was nudged 
into group action. Thus in January 2002 the European Commission published a study done by 
Gregory et al (2002) comparing the differences in Company Laws in its (then) 15 member 
states. The law and Corporate Governance initiatives were by no means evenly divided. For 
example, the UK, led the field with 11 Corporate Governance committee reports and the 
number increased with Higgs. Almost none of the Corporate Governance initiatives were 
mandatory. Those that were mandatory were because of stock exchange listing rules, as, for 
example, the UK.  
 
Of the 35 codes, 25 were published after 1997. This demonstrates, as the McKinsey report 
cited at the beginning of this chapter indicated, that Corporate Governance discussions and 
actions have really taken off in the last few years. One of EU's study findings was:  
 
Notwithstanding legal differences among European Union Member States, the trends 
toward convergence in corporate governance practices in European Union Member 
States appear to be both more numerous and more powerful than any trends toward 
differentiation. In this regard, the codes - together with market pressures - appear to 
serve as a converging force, by focusing attention and discussion on governance 
issues, articulating best practiced recommendations and encouraging companies to 
adopt.  
 
At the EU level there have been a number of studies about the position of the external auditor. 
In some cases there were even passing remarks about its relation with the internal auditor. For 
example, in a 1996 EU Green Paper, Internal Audit was positioned as follows:  
 
However, it is likely that companies without a strong internal audit function will be 
unable to provide an audit committee with sufficient information to fulfill its 
responsibilities. The scope of the work of the statutory auditor and the timing of the 
statutory audit are unlikely to be adequate and appropriate for this purpose.… 
91
91
Consequently, recommendations have been made for the appointment in major 
companies of a chief internal auditor [Chief Audit Executive] to lead a strong internal 
audit team that is capable of providing the audit committee with sufficient information 
to fulfill its responsibilities on behalf of the (one-tier) Board.  
 
In the aftermath of the Green Paper the European Confederation of Institutes of Internal 
Auditors (ECIIA) suggested that:  
 
Qualitative appraisals, including recommendations for action to improve internal 
control weaknesses, rectify errors and enhance sound management, can best be 
provided by a professional internal auditing function. The internal auditing function 
should report directly to the Chief Executive Officer, Board of Directors or an Audit 
Committee, in order to ensure necessary status, independence of line management, 
objectivity and response to recommendations. Internal auditing should preferably be 
carried out by a department within the enterprise. If special circumstances warrant the 
use of hired personnel, such services may not be managed by the statutory auditor of the 
enterprise. (1996, 6)  
 
This is, of course, clear Internal Audit lobbying. That is, preaching to the converted. The 
murky remark with regard to the reporting issue is striking. Stating that it should report to the 
Chief Executive Officer, the Board of Directors or an Audit Committee does nothing to 
diminish the confusion that we have been hammering on. 
 
The ECIIA did not take a clear stand on the reporting issue. One can only guess why such a 
professional body left this ambiguous issue unaddressed and thus to a certain extent supported 
the possible conflict of having to serve more than one master. While the ECIIA paper made 
no direct statement about IA's scope of services, when one reads between the lines it becomes 
obvious that the entire internal control system should be included. In a 1996 conference37, 
Jean Pierre Garitte, then the ECIIA's president, explained it as follows: 
 
However, the European Confederation of Institutes of Internal Auditors believes that a 
further step has to be taken. Establishing and maintaining an effective system of 
internal control calls for skills, which can only be provided through a competent and 
professionally qualified internal auditing function. An internal auditing function 
should be made mandatory in all organizations in which size or risk so dictates. (1996, 
183) 
 
With regard to the position of Internal Audit, he repeated the ambiguous point of view 
regarding the reporting issue: "The internal auditing function should report directly to the 
Chief Executive Officer, Board of Directors, or an Audit Committee in order to ensure 
necessary status, independence of line management [defined as management in charge of 
operations and below the Management Board], objectivity, and response to 
recommendations." (1996, 190)  
 
Seven years later, in 2003, the then ECIIA's president, Ulrich Hahn38 repeated the same story 
and added that internal audit should report to the Audit Committee about the entire "control & 
                                                 
37 Act of the Conference on The Role, Position and the Liability of the Statutory Auditor within the European 
Union 
38 European Confederation of Institutes of Internal Auditors Press Release, April 11, 2003, following on a 
presentation of the Committee on Auditing of the European Commission. 
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risk environment". The good news is that the ECIIA was invited to the table and asked to 
participate in an ongoing discussion at the EU level. And while it is difficult to measure how 
much, they were at least listened to. This is demonstrated by what actually appeared in the 
Winter Report.  
 
At the end of 2002 the Winter-report39 came out. Named after its chairman, Jaap Winter, it 
inventoried the state of the art of Company Law throughout the EU and concluded that there 
was no need to come up with a unified initiative that would be binding to companies in 
member states. The report acknowledged the differences from historical perspectives and 
subsequent differences in legal systems. Tying it together into one system was way beyond 
what would be possible and, as Winter noted, there was no need to do so. 
 
Some piddling attention was paid to Internal Audit. Winter stated that "a proper audit depends 
on the role and performance of the external auditor, as well as the internal audit process 
[emphasis added] of the company" (2002, 70). While adding the word "process" was not 
explained, it might be to emphasize that internal auditing does not necessarily lead to a 
separate function. According to Winter, the Audit Committee has the explicit task of 
monitoring Internal Audit procedures and consulting with those responsible for them. And 
that was all there was to it. 
 
The audit committee should also be pivotal in the internal aspects of the audit 
function. To this end, the audit committee should: be responsible for reviewing the 
accounting policies of the company, and changes thereto; monitor the company's 
internal audit procedures and its risk management system; meet regularly with those 
who are responsible for the internal audit procedures and risk management system; 
consider to what extent the findings of the risk management system should be reported 
in the company's financial statements; and have access to all internal information 
relevant to performing its role. (2002, 71) 
 
After Winter had delivered his report the EU promulgated an action plan. In May 2003 Frits 
Bolkesteijn, EU Commissioner for the Internal Market, put forth his recommendations40 about 
what should be done. Listed companies should be required to include in their annual report 
and accounts a coherent and descriptive statement that covers the key elements of their 
Corporate Governance structure and practices. If they don't comply, they should explain why 
they haven't done so. In cases of conflict of interests, the board of directors should be 
modernized by emphasizing the need to have non-executive members on board. Following 
Winter's advice, it did not draft a Corporate Governance code at the EU level. The European 
Economic and Social Committee, a Parliamentary body, underscored this intent41. The 
differences in cultures, laws, and governance systems were believed to be too great, causing a 
lengthy and agonizing process to come to terms with all the member states.  
 
On December 2, 2002 a statement was issued by the European Shadow Financial Regulatory 
Committee – part of the Centre for European Policy Studies, an independent policy research 
                                                 
39 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company 
Law in Europe, 4 November 2002, Brussels 
40 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Modernising Company 
Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward, Commission of 
the European Communities, Brussels, May 21, 2005, COM (2003) 284 final. 
41 Official Journal of the European Union, March 30, 2004, (COM (2003) 284 final), (2004/C 80/05), page 14. 
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institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today. It called for required minimum standards, or "benchmarks", 
rather than a specific Corporate Governance system. This was supposed to be applicable not 
only to the then EU member states, but those coming online. That is in countries where 
Corporate Governance systems were relatively immature. 
 
The European Centre for European Policy Studies set up a Task Force to reform Corporate 
Governance in the EU. It met twice in 2004, on June 17 and September 30, and underscored 
the belief that a principle based approach would suit the EU's needs better than the US' rules 
based approach. It welcomed the OECD code (see above) as a good example. It discussed the 
issue of the cost of compliance since the number of rules and laws increased. During the 
second meeting, Peter Wakkie, a member of the Management Board of Ahold, called upon 
the EU to avoid far reaching and very expensive internal control mechanisms à la Sarbanes-
Oxley. 
 
Paape, Scheffe, and Snoep (2003) surveyed the issue of Corporate Governance and the impact 
on the internal audit community throughout the EU. With regard to reporting, they noted that 
almost half of the responding Chief Audit Executive's reported to the Audit Committee. In 
Belgium, Greece, Ireland, the UK and Spain these percentages ranged between 80 and 100. 
But in the other countries the total was significantly less, and ranged between 25 and 67%. In 
Greece and Luxembourg all respondents reported to the CEO. In Austria and Denmark all 
respondents reported to the Management Board. Considering that auditing has been 
traditionally seen as an essentially financial discipline, it is remarkable that relatively few 
(30%) Chief Audit Executive's reported to the CFO. However, The Netherlands is a striking 
exception. Almost 90% of Chief Audit Executive's there report to the CFO. 
 
In the context of current Corporate Governance concerns, Paape et al (2003) said that direct 
reporting of the Chief Audit Executive's to the Audit Committee should be one of Internal 
Audit's best practices. Nevertheless, they acknowledged that new adjustments might create 
new expectation gaps and tensions. Since the needs of Audit Committees and Boards of 
Management are different, Chief Audit Executive's might discover that serving two masters is 
a difficult, if not impossible, game to play. In this context, Bailey, Gramling and Ramamoorti 
(2003) also provided food for thought.  
 
The recommendation [that internal audit should report to the Audit Committee] may 
create tension with the more traditional role of internal audit as the "eyes and ears" of 
management. We believe the nature of that tension and the impact of such tension on 
both the nature of the internal audit activity and its contribution to the organization 
should be examined. (2003, 32) 
 
More than two thirds of the respondents positioned IA on the corporate level, as a centralized 
function reporting directly to the Management Board. In other cases, even when IA reported 
to the Audit Committee, the administrative line rests squarely with the Management Board. 
This is consistent with the results of a 2003 survey carried out by the IIA Inc. (IIA Inc., 
2003a). 
 
Paape (2003) also paid attention to the issue of the relationships and reporting lines of IA and 
noted: 
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it [the IA] could actually become a crossroads of activities, abuzz with traffic coming 
in and going out in all directions. Internal Audit will need to consider not only the 
requirements of the Management Board, but also those of the Audit Committee and 
the external auditor.  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that with the exception of the UK little can be found in 
European Corporate Governance codes regarding the position, role and rationale, and scope of 
services of Internal Audit. The situation is even worse with listing rules; for example, 
Euronext and Frankfurt. If the proverbial man from Mars used only their codes for his 
education and orientation, then he would never notice the existence of IA on European soil.  
 
In this context, one conclusion of a KPMG Corporate Governance study in the EU is also 
relevant.  
 
Around 85% of respondents from the United Kingdom and Germany reported the 
existence of an internal audit function. This is to be expected as both the Turnbull 
report and KonTraG [Kontrolle und Transparanz Gesetz], a German corporate 
governance code that requires listed companies to report on the existence of a risk 
management system] give a strong steer in this direction. However, many respondents, 
particularly in Belgium, Switzerland and The Netherlands, do not have such a 
function. (KPMG, 2001, 4) 
 
There are no stable reference point studies (benchmarks) to assess whether or not there has 
been an increased percentage of companies with IAF’s in the UK and Germany, let alone how 
quickly that might have happened. Over how many years and in response to what drivers? 
While as far as all organizations are concerned this KPMG figure of 85% figure seems to be 
on the high side, there is no doubt that, as far as IA is concerned, these two countries are far 
ahead of a generally feet dragging pack. While The Netherlands had been in close competition 
among the arrière-garde, over the last few years it has been doing some substantial catching 
up. 
 
The Netherlands  
Specific regulations about Internal Audit have only been established for financial institutions, 
such as banks, which fall under the supervision of De Nederlandsche Bank (the Dutch Central 
Bank). These mandatory rules can be found in the Regeling Organisatie Beheersing (2001) 
(Regulation Organizational Control). In articles 21 and 22, the Dutch Central Bank stated that 
an institution should have a permanent IA to systematically test and evaluate the sufficiency 
of the organizational structure and control mechanisms.  
 
The Dutch Central Bank also wrote about IA's position, role and scope of services, stating that 
the entire internal control system should be in its purview. According to them and remarkably 
enough, IA should also pay attention to the areas of integrity and integrity control. It also 
specifies some of the tasks of the Audit Committee and Supervisory Board and mentions that 
the Audit Committee should have regular meetings with IA and EA to inform them about its 
conclusions about their - that is, Internal Audit and external auditor - activities. The specific 
focus point is organizational structure and the internal control system. The findings of the 
Audit Committee are also discussed in the plenary Supervisory Board. 
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After investigating the views of both the Dutch Central Bank and Autoriteit Financiële 
Markten (see Chapters 1 and 2) it became clear that there are more similarities than 
differences. According to the Dutch Central Bank, IA is mandatory for banks. According to 
AFM, it should be mandatory for all listed companies. They both emphasized the need for the 
Supervisory Board and the Audit Committee to exercise oversight and ensure IA 
independence. As far as organizational position is concerned, it should report directly to the 
Management Board and have access to the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee if and when 
necessary.  
 
Outsourcing of IA is not acceptable if it is economically viable to have one in-house. And, 
according to the Dutch Central Bank, even when the tasks are outsourced, they most assuredly 
should not be awarded to the firm's external auditor. According to AFM, such a course of 
action for all listed companies is "not preferred". The scope of services should be broad and 
take into account financial data and accounting processes. Compliance, integrity and the tone 
at the top should be addressed as well. The relationship with the external auditor is very 
important. The external auditor scrutinizes the work of IA and, at the same time, he need to 
clearly distinguish the differences in their respective scope of services. This is designed to 
prevent gaps and overlaps. 
 
There are no major differences between the vision of the Dutch Central Bank and AFM. Their 
joint perspective on supervision was already laid down in a protocol42. The only visible 
exception to this rule is the hiring and firing of the Chief Audit Executive. AFM believes that 
this should be in the hands of the Supervisory Board instead of the Management Board 
(Koster 2003).  
 
The financial service industry is faced with specific requirements regarding to internal 
auditing. Such is not the case elsewhere. What's more, Corporate Governance codes have only 
a limited history in The Netherlands. It was only in 1997 that the Peters Committee, named 
after its chairman Jaap Peters, developed the first 40 Corporate Governance 
recommendations, which were not mandatory. This was in response to developments in 
surrounding countries, such as the UK, and the perceived need to create Corporate 
Governance codes there as well. As far as Peters was concerned, IA wasn't worth mentioning. 
 
A 1998 study43 attempted to determine the effects of the ‘Commissie Corporate Governance’ 
(named after its chairman Peters, 1997). That is, to what extent were the players out there 
going along with with its views. Both the long and the short answer was, "not at all". 
However, the good news was that large institutional investors and associations of 
stockholders occasionally took the law into their own hands and criticized Supervisory Boards 
and Management Boards for not complying with Peters' recommendations.  
 
It took another few years and some critics, like Moerland (2002, 10) and Van Horn (2003, 
50), who concluded that Corporate Governance in The Netherlands was getting nowhere, 
before the government decided it was high time to get the ball rolling. 
                                                 
42 Nota Handhavingsbeleid van de Autoriteit Financiële Markten, De Nederlandsche Bank en de Pensioen- & 
Verzekeringskamer, November 2003 
43 Commissie Corporate Governance en Economisch Instituut Tilburg, (1998). Monitoring Corporate 
Governance in Nederland, onderzoek en aanbevelingen op het gebied van Corporate Governance in opdracht 
van Amsterdam Exchanges N.V. en Vereniging Effecten Uitgevende Ondernemingen. 
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In 2002, 5 years after the Peters Committee, the Dutch government appointed a new 
Committee – named after its chairman, Morris Tabaksblat – to prepare recommendations that 
would eventually serve as the basis for legislation. Its final report was presented on December 
9, 2003, and was immediately and widely recognized as a landmark in the development of 
Corporate Governance in The Netherlands. With the Tabaksblat Committee Code (2003), The 
Netherlands caught up with the developments in the US and UK and some surrounding 
countries, like Germany and France. This is not surprising, because the Committee decided to 
take a very close look at what was happening outside. For instance, the Code referred to the 
work of Higgs and decided to include a number of its best practices. It mentioned that the 
similarities with the UK Combined Code's best practices is quite high because the UK has a 
longer history in this area than The Netherlands and is thus more advanced.  
 
This also explains why the Code has such a high number of best practices and has a far 
greater "rules-based" portion than many "principle-based" believers would have imagined 
possible. The Committee wrote that a pure "principle-based" approach would have offered too 
little guidance as to the how to implement the Code. In its view, this was one of the reasons 
the Peters Committee recommendations were little so adhered to. The Committee also 
referred to the rules laid out by the NYSE and the OECD. The Code used those examples as 
stepping stones to make large leaps forward.  
 
The Code mentioned the need to restore "checks and balances" and enhance the independence 
of the Supervisory Board. It expressed the need to have a Supervisory Board that can act 
critically and independently of the Management Board. It also stated that an Audit Committee 
should be appointed, and emphasized the joint responsibilities of both the Management Board 
and Supervisory Board in governing the company. Nevertheless, while it addressed the IA's 
position and role, it concluded that IA should remain in the hands of the Management Board.  
 
The internal auditor, who can play an important role in assessing and testing the 
internal risk management and control systems, shall operate under the responsibility of 
the management board. (principle V.3, page 31) 
 
The Supervisory Board/Audit Committee, however, is to supervise what the Management 
Board does with IA. This is an indirect version of supervising IA, and creates a need for the 
former to be more involved with the latter's activities. According to the Code, the Audit 
Committee is entitled to decide whether or not the Chief Audit Executive will attend its 
meetings. In this respect, while the Tabaksblat Code is in step with regulations in the US and 
UK, it is less far reaching.  
 
In the UK and US the Audit Committee is to directly supervise IA activities. Tabaksblat, 
made that supervision rather indirect: "The Audit Committee shall in any event focus on 
supervising the activities of the management board with respect to: … the role and 
functioning of the internal audit department" (page 21). It also didn't make IA mandatory. 
Tabaksblat noted best practices were lacking and pointed at the diversity of IAF's.  
 
Tabaksblat's best practice about the relationship of external audit and the Audit Committee to 
IA reflects somewhat antediluvian thinking. 
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The external auditor and the audit committee shall be involved in drawing up the work 
schedule of the internal auditor. They shall also take cognizance of the findings of the internal 
auditor. (Best practice provision V.3.1, 31) 
  
This statement is not in tune with others quoted above. Audit Committee supervision of IA is 
indirect, because it is supposed to pay attention to how the Management Board deals with it. 
And the responsibility for IA rests with the Management Board. What then is the secret 
magical step that will transform that approach into getting the Audit Committee involved in 
drawing up IA's work schedule? Taking cognizance of the findings of IA is to be done via 
either direct contact or reading reports. In either case, if any questions come up, there should 
be the possibility of discussing those with the Chief Audit Executive. If the Chief Audit 
Executive is not present during Audit Committee meetings, how exactly should this be 
accomplished?  
 
The only viable option would be to invite the Chief Audit Executive to all meetings where his 
findings are at the table. Since this should not be limited to just a few meetings, why not give 
the Chief Audit Executive a season ticket to all meetings, and exempt him from those where 
the items on the agenda don't require his presence? Nevertheless, reading the Code and 
talking to Izeboud - a member of the Tabaksblat Committee - it seems that the Committee 
aimed at enhancing checks and balances by also allowing for the Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee to be in contact with IA. Izeboud specifically mentioned that he believed the Code 
allowed for a greater visibility and orientation of the Audit Committee for IA. He hoped that 
organizations would share their perspectives on IA's role, which might be an inspiration for a 
greater conformity in its role and scope of services for listed companies. 
 
With regard to these risk management and control systems, the Management Board is to 
disclose their adequacy and effectiveness in the annual report. They should also report on 
their operation, describe any significant changes that have been made throughout the year, 
mention planned improvements, and confirm that they have been discussed with the Audit 
Committee and the Supervisory Board (best practice II.1.4, 10, emphasis added). For this 
purposes, again, the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee could rely on IA, because the Code 
also stated that it can play an important role in assessing and testing the company's internal 
risk management and control systems. 
 
During the period that the Code was in draft and open for comments, the IIA The Netherlands 
noted that although there were differences in the Internal Audit community, a number of 
similarities had to be taken into account. IA's in The Netherlands focused primarily on 
internal control systems and were mainly responsible to Management Boards. But there was 
increasingly contact with Audit Committees. It suggested making IA mandatory for listed 
companies. Its scope of services should be defined by the Management Board and it should 
send planning, realization and reports (annotated with comments) of IA to the Audit 
Committee. The Audit Committee should in turn discuss these in a meeting with the 
Management Board and Chief Audit Executive present. In task force meetings discussions 
were held that a formal position more under the jurisdiction of the Audit Committee would be 
preferable. The majority of the task force – certainly not all – felt this was not a good idea. IA 
should be loyal to the Management Board and not report to the Audit Committee. The official 
comments of the IIA The Netherlands send to the Tabaksblat Committee stated that IA should 
report to the Management Board. The IIA The Netherlands vision did not align with the one 
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from the IIA Inc., who responding to the developments that led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
the United States desired for an IAF under the jurisdiction of the Audit Committee44. 
 
In its detailed comments IIA The Netherlands addressed the growing practice of Chief Audit 
Executive's meeting with the Audit Committee and being present during its meetings. But the 
letter specifically stressed the need to remain responsible to the Management Board in order 
to clarify IA's position. The letter also pointed out that the Audit Committee would be able to 
call upon IA for its services, albeit with the required foreknowledge of the Management 
Board. Further, the Chief Audit Executive should have the power to call upon the Audit 
Committee chairman if he deemed that necessary. Although acknowledging the primacy of 
the Management Board the IIA The Netherlands paved the way for closer contacts between 
the Audit Committee and the Chief Audit Executive. 
 
Tabaksblat may also have some impact on the scope of services, following Turnbull, 
KonTraG, and Sarbanes-Oxley Act by having the Management Board report in the annual 
report on the adequacy and effectiveness of the internal risk management and control systems 
and providing clear substantiation of this. Tabaksblat is more attuned with Turnbull than 
Sarbanes-Oxley because it addresses the full range of internal control rather than the part 
dealing only with financial reporting. Bearing in mind the enormous costs and efforts needed 
to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley, one can also ask what it will mean to comply with 
Tabaksblat. 
 
This is a very broad area of interest, most certainly also for the Audit Committee as described 
in the best practices for the Audit Committee. 
 
The Audit Committee shall in any event focus on supervising the activities of the 
Management Board with respect to the operation of the internal risk management and 
control systems, including supervision of the enforcement of the relevant legislation 
and regulations, and supervising the operations of codes of conduct. (Best practice 
III.5.4, 21) 
 
The Tabaksblat Code acknowledged the importance of "codes of conduct", which could be 
included in IA's scope of services when assessing and testing internal risk management and 
control systems on behalf of the Management Board. As we will see in Chapter 5, both 
Management Board and Supervisory Board members have different opinions on that issue.  
 
In March 2004 the Dutch government decided that the Code in its entirety should be adopted 
and put immediately into effect as an ‘Algemene Maatregel van Bestuur’, as close to a law as 
possible. The Tabaksblat Committee also recommended that there should be a permanent 
panel45 that decides, when appropriate, on adjustments to the Code. It is expected that this 
panel will also provide jurisprudence. In other words, this is the beginning of the road, not the 
end. 
 
Undoubtedly, the situation in The Netherlands cannot be studied in vacuo. Capital markets do 
not stop at national borders. They are highly interconnected and intertwined. Numerous 
companies are listed on more than one stock exchange and have to comply simultaneously 
                                                 
44 See the section on Corporate Governance in the United States. 
 
45 The Monitoring Committee was established in December 2004 to keep track of bottlenecks in the provisions 
of the Code and possible areas for improvement. 
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with various laws, codes and regulations. This creates some anxiety - at least from the 
perspective of companies46 - that the differences will create the need to adhere to several (not 
necessarily compatible) systems. Understandably, that is something companies would like to 
avoid. Therefore, they will recommend that regulators converge whenever possible, because, 
unlike heads, one system is always better and cheaper than two. As noted above, the urge to 
converge creates a need to examine more than one set of codes to predict what's going to 
happen next.  
 
3.4 Some further remarks on the Audit Committee and its 
relationship with Internal Audit  
 
Regardless of current or imminent regulations, it is still not a given that the Audit Committee 
will use and supervise IA. As was shown in Chapter 2, Internal Audit has come a long way over 
the years and its relationship with the Audit Committee has been growing. The audit profession 
in general47 and some professionals in particular48 have frequently pledged to improve the 
content and intensity of relations between the Audit Committee and IA, because it would both 
improve the former's understanding of what is happening in an organization and contribute to 
the "independence" and stature of the latter.  
 
Clearly, the Audit Committee has - via Corporate Governance regulations - been assigned an 
important task in monitoring and sometimes even directing IA and its activities. The stream of 
publications with regard to the Audit Committee is large. Sarbanes-Oxley seems to have the 
farthest-reaching consequences for those organizations falling under the supervision of the 
SEC, which supervises all listed companies in the US. But its reach extends far beyond US 
borders. 
This Act requires independence and expertise among Audit Committee members and the 
external auditor. This led The Wall Street Journal to write, "The job of the audit committee 
chairman just got a lot tougher. Will anyone still want it?" 49 
 
In the fall of 2002 the IIA Inc. sponsored a Corporate Governance conference. One issue 
addressed was not the standard fare relationship of the Audit Committee and the external 
auditor with Internal Audit, but something completely different, namely, their relationship 
with management. One external auditor asked with a palpable sense of frustration, "How do I 
keep those lines of communications open with management and at the same time report these 
conversations to the audit committee?" (2003, 29) If this is troubles the external auditor 
wouldn't it be legitimate to assume that it is equally, if not more, difficult for the Chief Audit 
Executive?  
 
Long ago, Bagby, Kintzele and Kintzele (1990) voiced a comparable concern when they 
studied SEC proposals requiring management to publish an annual account regarding its 
responsibilities. Proposals that before Sarbanes-Oxley sat on shelves gathering dust. One of 
their findings was: 
                                                 
46 I discovered at a meeting with a Chief Financial Officer of a company listed on several stock exchanges 
(United States, London, Euronext) that his worst fear was that the EU would impose its idiosyncratic version of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, which would require his company to adhere to yet another system. 
47 IIA Inc., (2002, 2003, 2004), The IIA, The Netherlands (2003), AICPA (2002) 
48 Bishop, Hermanson, Lapides and Rittenberg (2000), Wallage (1995, 2000), Paape (2003)  
49 February 24, 2003 
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The requirement for disclosure of the internal auditor's "significant recommendations" 
could chill the free flow of such recommendations. Further, this could affect the 
written memoranda or formal communications between the internal staff and 
management. (1990, 60) 
 
Returning to the fall 2002 Corporate Governance conference, one participant brought up the 
relationship between external and internal auditors. 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits external auditors from performing internal auditing for their 
clients. This should vastly improve the working relationship between these groups, 
because they will no longer view one another as a potential competitor. (2003, 29) 
 
This belief was confirmed in 2004 in an IIA Inc. study.  
 
Klein (2002) has been only one of many researching the tangled issue of Audit Committee 
independence. He investigated listed organizations and explained the relationship between 
"adjusted abnormal accruals" (AAA: in plain English, "cooking the books") and the 
independence of the members of the Supervisory Board and Audit Committee. He concluded: 
  
In summary, the results indicate that after holding other factors constant, firms with 
boards and/or audit committees composed of less than a majority of independent 
directors are more likely to have larger AAA's than their counterparts.… In contrast, 
there is no evidence of a systematic association between having an all-independent 
audit committee and abnormal accruals. (2002, 390)  
 
In short, an independent Audit Committee is more likely to prevent false presentations of 
annual accounts. Wouldn't it be fair to expect a knock on effect in the right direction when IA 
is also independent? That is, when an independent Audit Committee includes supervising IA 
in its scope of services. 
 
The research of Goodwin and Yeo (2001) supports that conclusion. Independent Audit 
Committees had more direct contact with Chief Audit Executive's, and these meetings 
happened more frequently without the presence of management. In those cases, the Audit 
Committee was more actively involved in hiring and firing of the Chief Audit Executive. In a 
2002 study, Colbert concluded that external and internal audit have specialty areas of focus. 
Therefore, both should have direct relations with the Audit Committee. 
 
Apparently, the existence of the Cadbury Code in the UK led to more companies having 
Audit Committees. And that led to more attention being paid to internal control. The status of 
the internal control systems improved substantially (Klein, 2002), and external audit fees 
decreased. This shows that even though actions were more or less compulsory - the shotgun 
wedding effect - and actually in the short term increased costs, in the long run they paid off. 
This is one of the burning questions raised by Sarbanes-Oxley. Will it pay off?  
 
In the wake of the Cadbury, Spira (1998) attempted to study the effectiveness of Audit 
Committees. But he concluded that while there were more post-Cadbury Audit Committees, 
there was little research about why they existed, how often they met, and communication 
between members. Thus it was impossible to even approach the question of effectiveness, let 
alone answer it in any meaningful way. 
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The value of Audit Committee members being independent of the board is attested to in a 
number of studies. Carcello and Neal (2000) concluded that Audit Committees should be 
comprised of independent members. Imhoff (2003) argues for firewalls between Management 
Boards and Audit Committees. This is very much in tune with Agency Theory.  
 
From the perspective of IA, it is worth noting that in many Corporate Governance codes, 
Audit Committees are supposed to either directly supervise IA activities or indirectly through 
their dealings with Management Boards. Either way, internal audit is getting more and more 
attention from the supervisory level. The downside is that there is some ambiguity that might 
potentially cause problems that need to be addressed to prevent Internal Audit ending up 
between a rock and a hard place. One of the ambiguities is that it is not clear who is pulling 
the strings and calling the shots. Will it be the Audit Committee? The Management Board? Or, 
worse, both?  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
Over the last decade there has been much ado about Corporate Governance in general and 
supervisors and Audit Committees in particular. Audit Committees have been assigned more 
responsibilities, which include supervising directly or indirectly internal audit functions or 
processes.  
 
In the US, internal audit, whether in-house or outsourced, is mandatory for NYSE-listed 
organizations and those falling under the watchful eyes of the FDIC Act. According to current 
regulation and proposals, the Audit Committee should be its supervisor. It should also direct 
its agenda. 
 
In the UK the Combined Code seems to go farther. The Audit Committee has at least some de 
facto responsibility for IA. It should approve the hiring and firing of the Chief Audit 
Executive. But there's a twist, because IA is not yet obligatory there. The EU has not yet had a 
big impact on Corporate Governance issues. The Winter Group took some huge steps forward 
but did not detail many provisions regard IA. Winter did not support the idea that there should 
be Corporate Governance regulation on an EU level.  
 
As far as Corporate Governance regulations were concerned, The Netherlands was until 
recently practically in the Third World. But it made some quick marches forward with 
Tabaksblat and joined the ranks of the front runners. That Code, however, has an ambiguous 
perspective about IA and its relationship with the Audit Committee. On one hand, the Audit 
Committee should indirectly supervise its activities by supervising management's activities 
vis-à-vis it. On the other, it should take some responsibility by having meetings with the Chief 
Audit Executive, taking notice of his findings and discussing the work plan. The ambiguous 
pose may be explained by the predominantly two-tier system of Corporate Governance where 
the Management Board is IA's lord and master, whereas the many one-tier focused reports 
take the stand that IA should report to the Audit Committee.  
 
The trend is obvious. The Audit Committee and IA are being driven closer to each other, 
whether they will it or not. Given those mutual responsibilities, sooner or later the two 
masters' issue will have to be resolved. 
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As shown, Corporate Governance codes have affected not only IA's position, but also its 
relationship with the external auditor and scope of services. The "soundness of the internal 
control system" is to be reported on in annual reports and signed off on by external auditors. 
Internal auditors are an important source of information on the adequacy and effectiveness of 
this system. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404 requirements demonstrate the difficulties 
that lie ahead. Public statements that the system is adequate and effective will increase 
credibility and public trust, especially when signed off on by the external auditor.  
 
The main conclusions about IA from this chapter are: 
 
1. Internal Audit is being called to the fore and will need to measure up to heightened 
expectations. 
2. Audit Committees will be installed in many more organizations. Their independence 
and stature50 will increase. They will become more involved with IA and intensify 
their contact the Chief Audit Executive, whether by hiring and firing process or 
appraisal. Meetings will be more frequent and there might be an increased tensions for 
Chief Audit Executive's caught between the Management Board and the Supervisory 
Board/Audit Committee. 
3. The Supervisory Board/Audit Committee needs to exercise oversight over both 
internal and external auditors. Supervisory Board/Audit Committee oversight might 
impact the principal-agent scheme for IA and the Chief Audit Executive. This might 
have an effect on the performance measurement system, which in turn might impact 
the incentives and rewards scheme for Chief Audit Executive's51. This development 
may have a positive effect on IA's perceived "independence". 
4. There will be an increased demand for assurance services that might affect budget, 
staffing, and scope of services. 
5. Due to a focus on financial reporting controls desired by legislators, regulators and the 
public at large, there could be an increased need for financial audit type of work. On 
the other hand, the Corporate Governance reports tend to emphasize internal control 
systems. This might necessitate broadening the scope of service of IA's not currently 
involved with those tasks. 
6. Due to a shift towards financial auditing and the need for the Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee to oversee the entire audit agenda - both internal and external - the 
relationship with the external auditor could be affected. Active coordination and 
cooperation might be just around the corner. 
7. There could be a perceived need to emphasize quality systems within IA and 
comparable measures. Quality control and bureaucracy will definitely be tightened. 
Being in the spotlight of the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee and even the public 
at large will lead to more stringent scrutinizing by regulators, supervisors, and the 
external auditor.  
 
From the perspective of the auditing profession, both external and internal, there is also a 
tendency towards convergence of perspective, rules and professional standards. The IIA Inc. 
                                                 
50 The IIA Inc. 2004 study revealed that AC's meet more often and longer. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, 
the world has to some extent been turned upside down. Nowadays, AC meetings take longer than those of the 
SB. It used to be the other way around.  
51 The IIA Inc. 2004 study revealed an increase in budgets and payment for internal auditors. If these payments 
were performance related – which Agency Theory recommends – there might be a downside. DeZoort et al 
(2001) experimented, and their results indicated that external auditors would rely less on internal auditors and 
increase their budgeted number of hours.  
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and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) held a conference, 
"Converging Roles: The New Relationship Between Internal and External Auditors", in Lake 
Buena Vista, Florida (November 8–9, 2003), to underline their common goals of emphasizing 
competence, independence, and objectivity and helping restore public trust. The Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) applauded the converging roles approach 
and acknowledged that public trust is a top priority.  
 
Further, Professional Standards travel the globe - via professional programs, such as the 
Certified Internal Audit certificate - and affect the internal audit community. The IIA Inc.52 
has by March 2007 over 140,000 practitioners (with an annual growth rate of about 10% over 
the last three years) and about 64,000 Certified Internal Auditors (with a growth rate 
exceeding 10%). Undoubtedly, such developments will impact the convergence of ideas, 
beliefs and principles.  
 
A final observation is that in all corporate governance codes53 reference is made to the 
"COSO-model" as a best practice for internal control. The COSO report, first published in 
1992 and with a sequel in 2003, has grown to be the global standard for risk and control 
issues in organizations. That in itself also creates a push for convergence thinking on this 
issue. 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 http://www.theiia.org/theiia/about-the-institute 
53 Combined Code in the UK, Tabaksblat in The Netherlands, Cromme in Germany, King in South-Africa, 
Sarbanes-Oxley in the US, just to name a few. 
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Chapter 4 Internal Audit: Theoretical Foundations 
4.1 Introduction 
 
It was argued in Chapter 2 that some solid grounding in theory would help rid the profession 
of some of this unwanted uncertainty. But what theory or theories? Naturally, it would be just 
what the doctor ordered if there were one or two suitable theories already available on the 
shelves, just waiting to fulfill our desires. Unfortunately, that is not the case. As was 
mentioned there, only a few attempts have been made to meet the challenge. Mautz and 
Sharaf (1961), Flint (1988), Wilschut (1994) who repeated the need for a "general auditing 
theory", and Kocks (2003). Up until now no one has picked up the baton. This Chapter 
inspects potentially suitable theories, and even if we can't use them whole and in their current 
form, perhaps we can scrounge together some bits and pieces that could be used in 
constructing a theory that might prove satisfactory in the future. 
 
In other words, at least as far as theory is concerned, this thesis is very much preliminary 
spade work. 
 
We will be focusing on Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics, because they seem 
promising. In Chapter 3 we learned that Corporate Governance has its origin in Agency 
Theory. A further review of the literature showed that when dealing with both a need for, and 
justification of, auditing in general the two theories were the most frequently cited. Further, 
they have been supported through numerous studies, as will be shown in the following 
sections. This chapter will start with New Institutional Economics as an umbrella term for a 
number of theories that are connected and intertwined. For example, contract theory and 
incentive theory. Some also call them New Organizational Theory. These theories all provide 
building blocks to understand the mechanics of how organizations are run. 
 
In Section 3 Agency Theory will be discussed. In Section 4 Transaction Cost Economics. 
Section 5 will take a look at research based upon Agency Theory and Transaction Cost 
Economics and applied to internal auditing. 
 
4.2 New Institutional Economics 
 
New Institutional Economics was developed as a reaction against neoclassical theory. It 
contended that the latter focused too much on efficiently allocating resources and Pareto 
optimality. According to New Institutional Economics, some unrealistic neoclassical 
assumptions were: 
 
 Efficiency and optimization problems can be solved independent of institutional 
variants. 
 Its models are based on the assumption of perfect information and perfect foresight. 
 All information is contained in relative prices, and they are the most important 
instrument for regulating markets.  
 Transaction costs do not exist. 
 The institution can be relegated to, and considered as, a black box. 
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The central tenet of New Institutional Economics is "institutions matter for economic 
performance". Let's now take a closer look at New Institutional Economics assumptions.  
 
 
New Institutional Economics Assumptions 
Furubotn and Richter (1998, 2-8) arranged the central assumptions of New Institutional 
Economics accordingly.  
 
1. Methodological individualism: People are different and have different tastes, preferences, 
goals, intentions, and ideas. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the behaviour of 
individuals to explain existing economic phenomena. 
 
2. The Maximand: Individuals pursue their own interest and try to maximize their utility 
within institutional limits. All choices are based on the maximization of individual utility. 
 
3. Individual rationality: There are two possible approaches - perfect or imperfect individual 
rationality. 
a) In the perfect variety it is assumed that decision-makers have stable 
preferences, which determine their behavioural choices.54 
b) In the imperfect those preferences are variable and not always known. 
(North, 1978, 972).  
 
The latter also assumes that transaction costs are unavoidable (Williamson, 1975, 1993, 
1996). What's more, people are subject to "bounded rationality" (Simon, 1957), which 
makes it impossible to process all available information because much information is 
lacking and due to lack of processing skills. Kahnemann and Smith (2002) - the first a 
Nobel Prize winner in economics - have also shown that in many instances people do not 
behave rationally. They make decisions that they would not have done in a rational mood. 
 
4. Opportunistic behaviour: Williamson55 (1975) indicated that humans pursue their own 
interests and, therefore, tend to demonstrate opportunistic behaviour. If this is so, as he 
and Kreps (1990) contend, then people cannot be trusted56 and, therefore, "complete 
contracts" cannot be written, let alone enforced. 
 
5. Economic society: A society consisting of individuals who share a common set of norms 
and values, awards property rights, and can force these on each member of that society. 
Property rights give people the right to use objects and intellectual property, enjoy the 
advantages of these, and promote specific behaviour in others. These rights are transferable. 
The concept of property rights is necessary to understand the implications of running an 
organization (see Section 4.2.3). They are determined and guaranteed by governance 
structure. 
                                                 
54 "A completely rational individual has the ability to foresee everything that might happen and to evaluate and 
optimally choose among available courses of action, all in the blink of an eye and at no cost." (Kreps, 1990b, 
745). 
55 Williamson (1975, 48): "self-interest seeking with guile" 
56 It is important to note that the concept of trust has not been discussed in connection with this. Williamson 
considers trust irrelevant. But according to others, trust does indeed play a role (Nooteboom, 1999, 2000). "Trust 
is a slippery concept, but it can be rigorously defined, analyzed and tested empirically." (Nooteboom, 1999). The 
trust issue will be dealt with below. 
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5. Governance structure: Set up to run an organization, it is all about authority and making 
sure that decisions can and will be taken, and followed up on. Authority implies the power 
to make and enforce decisions, and applying sanctions when not complied with. By court 
order if necessary.  
 
7. Institutions: It is not easy to define an institution.57 Institutions are established primarily to 
guide the individual behaviour in specific directions, thereby decreasing uncertainty 
(North, 1990, 239). Institutions are the rules of the game without the players themselves, 
and their functioning is dependent on the individual usage. In Popper's view (1957, 66), 
this implies that: "You cannot construct foolproof institutions. Institutions are like 
fortresses. They must be well designed and properly manned". 
 
8. Organizations: Are comprised of institutions plus people (North, 1990). Arrow (1970, 
224) defines a formal organization as "a group of individuals seeking to achieve some 
common goals, or, in different language, to maximize an objective function". He therefore 
calls the problem of "organizational control" as order58. Since this does not happen 
automatically, resources are involved. The use and costs of these resources are called 
"transaction costs".  
 
These New Institutional Economics assumptions show that it is not possible to foresee all 
possible conditions. Therefore, incomplete contracts59 are the rule to which there are no 
exceptions. Under some conditions this creates the need for auditors and arbiters to assess the 
correctness of information provided and assess whether the terms of the contract have been 
met. 
 
The parties (to a contract) will quite rationally leave out many contingencies, taking 
the point of view that it is better to "wait and see what happens" than to try to cover a 
large number of individually unlikely eventualities. Less rationally, the parties will 
leave out other contingencies that they simply do not anticipate. Instead of writing 
very long-term contracts the parties will write limited-term contracts, with the 
intention of renegotiating these when they come to an end. (Hart, 1987, 753) 
 
Given this incompleteness of contracts, enforcement is also conditional. Building in ex ante 
guarantees against ex post opportunism is desirable, but will lead to transaction costs (see 
below). It is important for internal auditors to understand the notions of "incomplete 
contracts" and "bounded rationality". We will address that further in Section 4.6.  
 
                                                 
57 Schmöller (1900, 61) came up with the following definition: "a partial order for community life which serves 
specific purposes and which has the capacity to undergo further evolution independently. It offers a firm basis 
for shaping social actions over long periods of time; as, for example, property, slavery, selfhood, marriage, 
guardianship, market system, coinage system, freedom of trade." 
58 This consists of a set of operating rules "instructing the members of the organization how to act" and a 
corresponding set of enforcement rules "to persuade or compel them to act in accordance with the operating 
rules". 
59 Much use of the word "contract" is metaphorical. Agreements do not necessarily have to be written to be 
contracts. An arrangement between two people to meet for dinner could be deemed a "contract".  
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How can New Institutional Economics be applied? 
New Institutional Economics models institutions and economic behaviour. But how can New 
Institutional Economics be applied and to what extent? Williamson provided the following 
diagram (1998, 26 and 2000, 597): 
 
Embeddedness:
Informal instititutions
customs, traditions,
norms, religion
Institutional
environment:
Formal rules of the
game (polity, judiciary,
bureaucracy)
Governance: play of
the game
esp.contract
Aligning governance
structure with transactions
Resource allocation
and employment
(prices and quantities,
incentive alignment)
Get the institutional
environment right 
1st order economizing
Get the governance
structure right
2nd order economizing
Get the marginal
conditions right
3rd order economizing
Often non-calculative;
spontaneous 
Purpose
100 - 1000
10 to 100
1 to 10
continuous
Frequency
(years)
Level 4
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
 
 
Figure 6: Applicability of New Institutional Economics 
 
These levels are already explained in Chapter 1. According to Williamson, New Institutional 
Economics focuses on levels 3 and 4. Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics are 
theories that slot into New Institutional Economics. While New Institutional Economics sees 
the firm as a nexus of contracts (Furubotn and Richter, 1998, 152) though, Transaction Cost 
Economics sees it as a governance structure.  
  
Property rights 
The concept of property rights is essential for a good understanding of both Agency Theory 
and Transaction Cost Economics. According to Roman law, the most important 
characteristics60 of (absolute) property rights are the rights to use physical goods (ius utendi), 
benefit from the revenues coming from those goods (ius fruendi), and the power to manage 
them and the possibility of alienation (ius abutendi). It is also possible to separate those 
rights: meaning that parts of the above can be alienated. 
 
The way property rights are assigned within an organization influences optimization 
problems: not only the amount of transaction costs and efficiency, but also the distribution of 
                                                 
60 Furbotn, Richter, 1998, 77 
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income and power between contracting parties. Individuals will, therefore, try to set up their 
property rights in a way that maximizes gains from transactions. Thus when individuals are 
pursuing their own interests there is no guarantee that revenue maximization or cost 
minimization for the organization will be achieved61.  
 
Contract Theory 
Since contracts are an important issue in both Agency Theory and Transaction Cost 
Economics, contract theory will be briefly discussed in this section. A contract is influenced 
by transaction costs in relationship with Information Asymmetry and transaction specific 
investments. This creates a mix of contractual and information problems62 that need to be 
solved.  
 
First, information can be incomplete at various stages of the contract. For instance, ex ante, 
before drafting the contract. Crucial information might be missing while executing the 
contract and even ex post, after having the contract has been completed. Further, one party 
might have the information, but is unwilling to share that with the other party or parties 
(Information Asymmetry). Or worse, some distortion and other forms of deceit might be 
afoot. Information that might not be favorable might be distorted to serve the interest of one 
party at the expense of the other (s) (moral hazard, opportunism). These problems are dealt 
with by what is called "incentive theory". How do we create the best incentives to overcome 
Information Asymmetry and moral hazard or opportunism?  
 
Second, even if there is a lack of critical information, one could still try to deal with that 
problem. The easiest solution to the problem is avoidance. Price mechanisms, proverbial 
economic wisdom has it, are one way out. All information is in a way "embedded" in the price 
of goods. Thus one needn't bother about specifics and the costs involved. The price says it all. 
When purchasing a car all one has to do is compare prices, and c'est ça. But, surely, this 
solution is only viable in markets where prices are comparable. Unfortunately, there are many 
where that is not at all the case. That's when specific contracts need to be drafted and 
coordination costs need to be incurred.  
 
There is also the problem of assigning property rights. This was already touched on in the 
section above. Contributors to this issue are Alchian (1969), Demsetz (1967), Klein, Crawford 
and Alchian (1978), and Furubotn and Pejovitch (1972). 
 
Some subsets were developed within contract theory to deal with the above-mentioned 
problems. 
1) Incentive Theory or Agency-contract theory 
2) Incomplete Contract Theory 
3) Transaction Cost Theory 
                                                 
61 The famous example of the problem of the commons whereby a community has a meadow and the issue is 
from a maximization of outputs point of view, whether it is better to make it community owned or split up the 
meadow in small privately owned parts. The solution is that the latter is preferred since every individual within 
the community will add sheep or cows to the meadow as long as his incremental outputs will be positive 
although this might decrease the output of the meadow as a whole. This is one of the explanations why any 
communist or socialist system will fall short compared to the capitalist system. 
62 See Brousseau and Glachant (2001) for an overview. 
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Incentive theory 
Information Asymmetry63 leads to adverse selection ex ante - the less informed party is 
inherently disadvantaged - and moral hazard ex post. It is expected that the more informed 
party will act in his own best interests, and if possible and necessary, to cheat to reach his 
objectives. Especially when he deliberately withholds important information. Therefore, 
contracts are designed in such a way that agents are stimulated to behave according to the best 
interest of principals. The focus is on reward and incentive systems. How do we as principals 
"guide" agents in the direction we want them to go? This is also of interest for internal 
auditors. They need to be aware that reward and incentive systems will be used to influence 
their behaviour and that it drives the efforts of agents. This will focus their efforts on 
assessing the adequacy of information and behaviour in the context of a contract. 
 
Incomplete contract theory  
If it is impossible to determine whether contractual obligations have been lived up to, the 
issue of contract fulfillment becomes yet another negotiation. Because of this, contracts often 
contain a clause giving one of the parties the right to determine ex post what the actual 
achievements were and the other party the right to dissolve the contract if he does not agree 
(Telser, 1980). The focus is on clauses necessary for arranging renegotiations and default. 
Such contracts, which are called self-enforcing (Frank, 1992), and are used in situations 
where the possibilities of inspecting for contract fulfillment are more than usually limited. In 
such cases, obviously, the opportunities for legal redress are nil.  
 
Transaction cost theory  
The assumptions are the same as in incomplete contract theory. In these cases the contract 
allocates decision rights to one party, both parties (negotiation), or a third party (judge). The 
latter may seem a sound idea. But since courts do not have the proper knowledge, expertise 
and skills to absorb all the information (bounded rationality) their ability to assess the 
achievements of the contract is limited. Supervision and coercion are then the mechanisms. 
Williamson speaks of private ordering. In situations of private ordering internal auditors of 
both parties could make important contributions to the process.  
                                                 
63 Information Asymmetry is an often used term within Agency Theory. It describes a state in which someone 
has more information than someone else. In this case the agent more than the principal. In the literature, 
Information Asymmetry is almost always dealt with as the asymmetry of information between insiders (company 
officers) and outsiders (analysts, shareholders, regulators, etc.). This "external" Information Asymmetry has been 
widely researched by many. This Asymmetry is measured by such proxies as R&D expenditures and spreads 
between bid offers. By contrast, "internal" Information Asymmetry - say, between top and lower management - 
has scarcely been dealt with. One exception to the trend is a study by Jaworski and Young (1992) among 
marketing managers. They measured Information Asymmetry by asking marketers to assess on a scale of 1 to 5: 
how well they knew what was expected of them; how familiar they were with their tasks; how much knowledge 
and understanding they had of their jobs; and whether they knew the performance objectives and the most 
important variables to monitor. They were also asked how they thought their bosses would answer the same 
questions. The author concluded that: "more work needs to be done to refine the measures of information 
asymmetries" (1992, 31). Their questions were used – in an adjusted format - in the survey described in Chapter 
6.  
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4.3 Agency Theory 
 
Agency Theory is based on two essential actors: a principal and his agent. In its simplest form 
the principal wants to know whether the agent is acting in the best interests of the principal. 
Or, and not at all necessarily the same, the best interests of the agent. As a somewhat free and 
self interested individual, however, the agent will almost by definition have another agenda. 
He can shirk (free riding) or misstate what he is doing and the results of that behaviour. In 
either case, the principal needs to "monitor" the (reported) outcome (hidden information) or 
the behaviour (hidden action) of the agent. Or both. Surely, if the agent was able to do that 
and satisfy everyone's needs, it wouldn't be necessary to have someone else do the job. 
Unfortunately - or ç'est la vie - that is generally not the case. Especially in a large 
organization. Therefore, the principal needs a third party for the monitoring task. 
 
Agency Theory operates at level 4 - 3rd order economizing (see Figure 5 above) - and deals 
with the problems of marginal conditions. In this section the focus will be on Agency 
Theory's contributions in determining incentives to influence the behaviour of agents in such 
a way that their performance is as efficient as possible and meets to the max the interests of 
the principal.  
 
Agency Theory deals with situations that are quite common when principals and agents sign 
contracts with each other. The principal cannot observe the actions of the agent (hidden 
action; Arrow, 1985b, 38), and/or the agent has information the principal doesn't (hidden 
information). The terms "hidden action" and "hidden information" originate in the concept of 
"moral hazard" (insurance theory). Moral hazard can be described as an ex post situation of 
Information Asymmetry, because the agent knows more than the principal. In cases where 
results are visible the amount of Information Asymmetry can be assessed. But there are huge 
areas where assessment is not an option. 
 
Stockholders are principals, who certainly cannot observe in detail whether the 
management, their agent, is making appropriate decisions. The principal-agent theory 
provides an instrument to discuss the rationale of the "separation of ownership and 
control" problem which Adam Smith (1776) focused on and which Berle and Means 
(1932) popularized 157 years later. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 327) 
 
Thus in principal-agent relationships a need for monitoring arises. In theory, of course, the 
principal himself can do the monitoring. But there are some fairly obvious reasons why that is 
not done. First, it would reduce the distinction between the principal and agent and, 
consequently, the need for an agent. Two, many principals do not wish to spend their time 
monitoring agents. Three, many principals are either partially or totally incapable of 
monitoring their agents. Thus, in many, if not all, cases, principals decide to hire a specialized 
monitor: an auditor. The scheme is complicated further because the monitor himself is an 
"economic agent" (Antle, 1982) who has a contract with the principal and may also be subject 
to shirking or misstating the results or his behaviour. Or both. 
 
There are two variants in the Agency Theory (Jensen, 1983). First, a normative variant, which 
uses the achievements of micro economics and tries to create insights in optimizing problems 
via utility functions (constrained maximization). This theory is by nature predominantly 
mathematical and rarely empirically tested. Second, the positive variant, which focuses 
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mainly on monitoring and bonding of contracts and organizations. This variant is 
predominantly non-mathematical and empirically tested. It tries to model the effects of the 
context in which contracts are designed and detect what organizational form has the most 
chances of survival. 
 
Although the separation between the normative and the positive variant are not always that 
clear (Eisenhardt, 1989a)64, attention will be paid to the positive variant, because of its wider 
applicability for theorizing about internal auditing.  
 
Positive Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) are the most important contributors to positive Agency Theory. 
According to them, the concept of agency costs is very important. 
 
The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate 
incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the 
aberrant activities of the agent. In addition in some situations it will pay the agent to 
expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain actions, 
which would harm the principal or insure that the principal will be compensated if he 
does take such actions…. In most agency relationships the principal and the agent will 
incur positive monitoring and bonding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary). 
And in all there will be some divergence between the agent's decisions and those 
decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal. (1976, 308) 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling, agency costs are the sum of: 
 
 Monitoring costs (e.g., costs of external auditor) 
 Bonding costs (costs agents incur to convince principals of their efforts; e.g., by 
having these efforts measured by internal auditors) 
 So-called residual loss (total other costs that need to be incurred) 
 
Even if it were cheaper to have the agent himself collect and verify information necessary for 
monitoring, it is still better to have a third party do it. This is driven by the need for 
independence and objectivity (see Chapter 2). According to Agency Theory, this is one of the 
reasons audit has a license to operate. 
 
Agency problems within the organization are predominantly the consequence of a classical 
division of capital and labor, and ownership and control. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen 
(1983, 303) have questioned how decisions are made within organizations and distinguished 
four steps: 
 
1. Initiation: ideas and initiatives are generated 
2. Ratification: choices are made 
3. Implementation 
4. Monitoring: measuring results and acknowledging rewards 
 
The first two steps are called decision management and the last two decision control. It is 
important to achieve the most efficient distribution between the first two and the latter two 
                                                 
64 Eisenhardt (1989a, 60) stated that "the important point is that the two streams are complementary". 
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and the residual risks between the agents. This makes the organizational structure relevant. 
The question is whether these first three functions should remain in the hands of one agent. In 
"simple" organizations - law or consultancy firms - it is economically advantageous (more 
efficient) to combine them in the hands of one or a limited number of agents. Why? Because 
transferring the relevant and often extremely detailed information to others can be very 
expensive. 
 
The question of separation of ownership and control is important for large organizations and, 
therefore, internal auditors. Fama and Jensen (1983) have said that in large organizations 
decision management and decision control should be separated. Especially when specific 
knowledge is necessary to reach a good decision it is wise to delegate those decisions to the 
level where the needed information is available. This will reduce information and agency 
costs. Decision control can then be delegated to those who also evaluate performance and 
may decide on appropriate remuneration. From an efficiency point of view, the number of 
residual claimants (residual risk bearers) - those authorized to decide what to do after all costs 
have been paid - should be limited. The residual claimant is the one who can dispose of what's 
left after all costs have been subtracted from revenues.  
 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972), who studied incentive structures and residual claimants and 
analyzed team production, concluded that teams can do much more than individuals. But the 
downside of that is free riding, or shirking. That is, not all the members of the team carry their 
fair share of the weight. This then requires the appointment of a specialized monitor, who has 
the right to change the contract and distribute incentives (decision control). High performing 
team members can expect bonuses. Since opportunism on the side of the monitor might lead 
to biased numbers, this reported information might also be subjected to scrutiny by an auditor.  
 
With regard to the capitalistic entrepreneurial form, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) also 
conclude that there should be one residual claimant, who is the central party to all contracts 
with inputs, entitled to observe behaviour and, if necessary, alter team membership. The latter 
is needed to ensure that when noticed shirking will be punished, and, therefore, increase team 
production. He also has the option to sell these rights.  
 
Some Criticism of Positive Agency Theory 
Criticisms of Positive Agency Theory are predominantly focused on its assumptions about 
human behaviour. Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) demonstrated that the relationship 
between performance and reward is not always straight forward and suggested that "a 
hierarchy that can induce the right kind of cooperation – defined as voluntary deviation from 
self-interest behaviour – will have an important competitive edge over other firms" (1988, 
12). This leads us into the area of trust, which will be elaborated on later in this chapter.  
 
Miller (1992) criticized the attitude of incentives being a cure all. According to him, using 
rewards and punishments to discipline individual behaviour is too mechanical. Using the 
work of Baker et al, he based his criticisms on the "prisoners' dilemma". That is, there are 
situations when following your limited self interests is not totally, or even partially, in your 
best interests. For example, in a leadership position in a modern organization, where conflicts 
are inevitable. It is in the best interest of the leader to put the interests of the group above his 
own. It is his task: 
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to shape expectations among subordinates about cooperation among employees, and 
between employees and their hierarchical superiors. This is done through a set of 
activities that have been in the realm of politics rather than economics: 
communication, exhortation, and symbolic position taking. Most important perhaps, 
the leader has a central role in committing the organization to what is in effect the 
constitution of the hierarchy – the allocation of generally accepted responsibilities, 
rules of the game, and property rights that provide the long-run incentives for 
investment in the firm. (Miller, 1992, 217) 
 
Miller (1992, 2) suggests that there are also other possible approaches, such as "leadership 
that is inspiring a willingness to cooperate and take risks, to innovate, to go beyond the level 
of effort that a narrow, self-interested analysis of incentives would summon". He is convinced 
that conflicts between individuals and group interests are the central characteristic of large 
modern organizations (1992, 236-7). 
 
Positive Agency Theory has had some impact on the debate of mitigating agency problems 
via incentives and rewards. But there is also a serious debate about its adverse effects. What 
might be called "the negatives of positive Agency Theory". Jensen and Murphy (2004) 
thoroughly researched the remuneration issue, and their conclusion is worth pausing over. 
 
In their 1990 study of CEO compensation Jensen and Murphy (1990) had this to say: 
"Are current levels of CEO compensation high enough to attract the best and brightest 
individuals to careers in corporate management? The answer is, probably not." … As 
the reader of this report has undoubtedly surmised, Jensen and Murphy would not give 
that answer today. Indeed, we have emphasized here that while executive 
compensation can be a powerful tool for reducing the agency conflicts between 
managers and the firm, compensation can also be a substantial source of agency costs 
if it is not managed properly. And as we've summarized, there is substantial evidence 
that we can do much better in the future. (2004, 98) 
 
The issue is of course that there may always be dysfunctional behaviour. One of which - 
called "earnings management" - has surfaced in spades inside the corporate scandals of Enron, 
WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Ahold, Parmalat, and many others we know so well from 
reading the newspapers. Incentives, in the form of stock options, induced managers to "cook 
the books" to such high temperatures that a number of them boiled over and melted down. ,A 
number of studies (Bruns and Merchant, 1990; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999) 
showed that "earnings management" has been around for a while. One (Bruns and Merchant, 
1990) concluded that "we have no doubt that short-term earnings are being manipulated in 
many, if not all, companies". 
 
4.4 Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction costs 
Transactions are costly. Some call that the costs of running the economic system (Arrow, 
1969, 48). Some estimate that up to 50-60% of the US Net National Product consists of 
transaction costs (Furubotn, Richter, 1998, 39). Therefore, it is necessary to be as efficient as 
possible in order to be able to economize. Williamson (1985, 1) defines a transaction as: 
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A transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technologically 
separable interface. One stage of activity terminates and another begins. 
 
In an ideal world, there would be a perfect market in which all transactions take place and all 
information would be conveyed in the price of the good or the service rendered. Then one 
only needs to survey the market and make a selection. Unfortunately, that is not at all how 
things work. Many goods are not available on the market. They need to be manufactured 
according to specific requirements of the buyer. Goods and services are in many cases neither 
homogeneous nor transparent.  
 
In order to conclude any transaction a number of activities need to be undertaken. For 
example, searching for parties to contract with, collecting information, performing 
negotiations, drafting contracts, and monitoring the adherence of contractual and other 
obligations. In all circumstances we need to take into account the assumptions promulgated 
by New Institutional Economics, such as bounded rationality and opportunism, which 
increase problems of collecting information, performing negotiations, etc. and create vast 
amounts of difficulties. At the end of the day this will lead to incomplete contracts.  
 
Governance Structures 
Organizations allow for specialization and have to incur costs for drafting contracts with 
employees, buyers, suppliers and the like. Coase (1937) researched why there are 
organizations in different shapes, forms and sizes. He founded Transaction Cost Economics 
and concluded that organizations compete in many ways, one of them being the ability to 
economize on transaction costs. The basic scheme of market versus organizations (the 
hierarchy) needed to be adjusted, because there are many variations - called "hybrid65" - 
falling in the chasm between the two. For example, joint ventures and alliances. Williamson 
(1975) calls them governance structures. Governance structures need to be judged on their 
shortcomings in answering and limiting the ex post risks of opportunism by an ex ante choice 
of governance structure (Williamson, 1996, 14).  
 
Market governance is the simplest form, because it is based on free market competition. Spot 
contracts and long(er) term contracts are closed and adaptation is worked out by negotiating a 
new contract as soon as the former expires. Price is the single mechanism for absorbing all 
information and one needs to know nothing else to make the right choices.  
 
Hierarchy governance uses contracts with explicit clauses concerning the desired outcomes. If 
conditions call for it, such contracts are characterized by high flexibility concerning the scope 
and timing of necessary adjustments. Labor contracts use fixed compensations with little 
space for performance-dependent rewards. In the long term promotions are used that create an 
indirect relation between performance and reward. Further, competent representatives decide 
who can make which decisions. Conflicts are resolved internally, sometimes using internal 
judges or arbitrators, thereby following a "doctrine of forbearance", according to Williamson 
(1996, 97-100). Monitoring, the design and the maintenance of the internal reward systems 
involve substantial costs. 
 
The hybrid variation uses extensive contracts with clauses about necessary or desired 
adaptations based on changes through its duration. While the contracts are extensive about all 
                                                 
65 It is acknowledged in research that many need to be categorized as "hybrid" ("the swollen middle", Hennart, 
1993). 
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sorts of contingencies, they are not complete. Adjustments are mostly made by mutual 
consent. They involve transaction specific investments and, therefore, both parties will 
demand guarantees. This often has the form of "hostages", in which one party, by means of 
correction, is rewarded for possible asymmetric rewards of the other. When differences 
between the parties become irreconcilable, they can choose to go to court, but only when 
sufficient information is available. When it isn't, arbitration is a more plausible adjuster.  
 
Since economizing on transaction costs is the central theme of Transaction Cost Economics, it 
is especially important to be aware of the need to adapt to changing circumstances. Given the 
certainty of uncertainty, bounded rationality, and incomplete contracts, the unexpected is to 
be expected. Both adaptation and the lack thereof - what Williamson (1996, 16) calls 
"maladaptation hazard" - are important themes for every organization. 
 
Normally, adjusting, adapting coordinating takes place through sets of rules and instructions. 
Williamson (1975; 1996, 59) identified three critical attributes that determine governance 
structure, because they facilitate, or hinder, economizing on transaction costs. They are Asset 
Specificity, uncertainty/complexity, and frequency. Asset Specificity happens when 
transactions are characterized by investments that have little or no alternative use. Thus in the 
event of contract breaches and terminations, there will be substantial losses. It can consist of 
location, physical assets and human capital (specific knowledge and capabilities). 
 
All these attributes impact the drafting of any contract. Asset Specificity increases the risks of 
the contract – at least for the one investing in the assets – and the more specific the assets to 
the contract are the more incomplete the information for the ex ante decision making will be 
and, subsequently, the ex post checks of the fulfillment of the contractual obligations.  
 
Uncertainty/complexity of the environment or the conditions increases the problems as does 
frequency. If frequency increases, so does the number of transactions and risks. From the 
perspective of economics Asset Specificity is the most important factor determining the most 
optimal governance structure.  
 
Asset Specificity and opportunism together determine when and why successful adaptation is 
unlikely. The higher the Asset Specificity the more problematic it will be to include all 
variables in the contract. Because of opportunism, a cooperative attitude cannot be assumed. 
The higher the Asset Specificity the larger this risk becomes. As Asset Specificity increases 
so does mutual dependence. In a way this is a classic "Mexican standoff" and further 
complicates contracting and makes full coverage even more impossible.  
 
The final choice between the three basic governance variants: market, hierarchy, or hybrid, is 
dependent on the degree to which contracting parties succeed in reaching alignment and 
contribute to economizing on transaction costs. Williamson (1975) considers these a 
"trichotomy". In other words, a scale in which distinctive variants can be identified, each with 
their own characteristics and, therefore, not fitting into a continuum.  
 
Make or Buy: Limits of Integration 
"Make or buy" decisions are the classic problem for which Transaction Cost Economics is 
used. This issue is described in many ways. The central theme is whether it is feasible to 
integrate crucial steps in the production process into the organization. This is called "vertical 
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integration". But there are limits to what can be absorbed and integrated. If that wasn't the 
case, there would be only one organization ruling the world. 
 
What factors limit the size of an organization? When an organization is capable of replicating 
the characteristics of market success and preventing those of failure (selective intervention) 
the organization is perfect and, conceivably, could keep on growing. But this is not possible. 
Let us take a closer look at this subject. 
 
As already mentioned, markets are frequently unavailable. The hierarchy or organization is an 
option when markets fails (Williamson, 1971, 114). Coase (1988) questioned why all 
transactions don't go through the market and why organizations exist.  
 
The solution to the puzzle was, as it turned out, very simple. All that was needed was 
to recognize that there were costs of carrying out market transactions and to 
incorporate them into the analysis, something that economists have failed to do. A 
firm had therefore a role to play in the economic system if it were possible for the 
transaction to be organized within the firm at less cost than would be incurred if the 
same transactions were carried out through the market. (1988a, 19)  
 
Coase then spoke of the make or buy decision. Organizations expand until the costs of extra 
transactions are equal to the costs of that same transactions through the market (1937, 395). The 
assumption is that markets prevails because, normally, they have lower transaction costs. Coase 
(1991, 59) described this as follows:  
 
There is, however, one misunderstanding that, I fear, is both widespread and serious, 
one that relates to the very heart of my thesis. This concerns the source of the gains, 
which accrue through the existence of the firm. My view is, of course, that they come 
from a reduction in transaction costs. But the main transaction costs that are saved are 
those, which could otherwise have been incurred in market transactions between the 
factors now cooperating within the firm. It is the comparison of these costs with those 
that would have to be incurred to operate a firm which determines whether it would be 
profitable to establish a firm. 
 
Williamson gave three advantages for internalizing transactions within the organization:  
 
First, in relation to autonomous contractors, the parties to an internal exchange are less 
able to appropriate subgroup gains, at the expense of the overall organization (system), 
as a result of opportunistic representations…. Second, and related, internal 
organization can be more effectively audited [emphasis mine]. Finally, when 
differences do arise, internal organization realizes an advantage over market mediated 
exchange in dispute settling respects. (1975, 29) 
 
Grossman and Hart (1986) stated that there are also limits to the integration from the 
perspective of incentives. They considered property rights and incentives to be interrelated. 
It's impossible to change property rights without changing the incentive structure. Maintaining 
the same incentive structure within the organization as outside is very costly and, therefore, 
not always possible.  
 
High powered incentives provided by markets cannot be duplicated by firms without 
substantial added costs. (Furbotn and Richter, 1998, 337) 
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And: 
 
Vertical integration is the purchase of the assets of a supplier (or a purchaser) for the 
purpose of acquiring the residual rights of control…. That is, integration shifts the 
incentives for opportunistic behaviour, but it does not remove these incentives. 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986, 716) 
 
Williamson indicated that a former owner who is now the manager will tend to manage 
myopically, because it is now in his best interests to strive for direct proceeds and leave the 
costs for maintenance and such to his successors. Your headache, not mine. Williamson 
added: 
 
The core arguments are these: (1) internal organization (the large firm) cannot replicate small 
firms (market procurement) in incentive intensity respects, and (2) the agreement to always 
intervene but only for the good cause (selective intervention) is fatuous because it is 
unenforceable. The upshot is that the hypothetical advantages of combining replication with 
selective intervention cannot be realized, on which account the move from market to 
hierarchy (and the reverse) is always attended with a trade-off between the benefits of added 
coordination/cooperation on the one hand and the costs of added bureaucracy on the other. 
(Williamson, 1998, 44)  
 
Kreps (1990) also pointed at limits to integration. He indicated that because of growth there 
will be more contingencies and ex post difficulties in evaluating whether contracts are 
fulfilled and, therefore, it will become more difficult to control the organization. The 
reputation of an organization can be an important enforcement instrument, though only when 
it is clear what is promised and what can be expected and when it is possible to observe if 
someone is, or is not, meeting his obligations. The problem is that especially with relational 
contracts it is impossible to specify beforehand what is promised and what can be expected.  
 
The bigger the organization the bigger this problem, which causes further loss of control. 
Kreps (1990, 130) connects reputation with corporate culture. Corporate culture is a way of 
showing employees how their interests are being dealt with. However, Williamson (1996, 
153-154) denies that reputation is a strong enforcing instrument.  
 
Milgrom and Roberts (1988) indicated that large organizations are characterized by the fact 
that authority and autonomy are more than usually concentrated at the top. The risk of power 
abuse increases and managers tend to unnecessarily interfere with operations and businesses. 
This is known as "exercising influence" and the costs of doing it are, not surprisingly, 
described as "influence costs". 
 
These include (1) a tendency for the authority to intervene excessively, both because 
intervening is that authority's job and because the authority may have a personal 
interest … in certain decisions; (2) increased time devoted to influence activities and 
corresponding reduction in organizational productivity, as interested parties seek to 
have the authority intervene in particular ways or to adopt their favored alternatives; 
(3) poorer decision making resulting from the distortion of information associated 
with influence activities; and (4) a loss of efficiency as the organization adapts its 
structure and policies to control influence activities and their costs. (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1990, 89) 
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Williamson (1996, 17) indicated that the increasing costs of bureaucracy is a barrier to the 
growth of organizations. He (1985, 141 and 142) also pointed at the concept of "causal 
ambiguity". When a division is responsible for the success of research, but encounters 
obstacles sharing their findings with other divisions because of organizational structure, the 
supplier might have less motivation than if they had a direct interest in profiting from 
innovations. He also noticed that even if causal ambiguity can be prevented "general office 
intrusion" can't. Given the separation of power within the organization, "a re-distribution 
away from operating parts in favour of the ownership is apt to be effected by manipulation of 
the transfer pricing and cost accounting rules".  
 
Causal ambiguity and general office intrusion are wonderful phrases, which in plain English 
translate as every man for himself.  
 
Criticism of Transaction Cost Economics 
Three areas of critique are briefly discussed: the definition of transaction costs, the 
assumption of bounded rationality, and the notion of opportunism and trust. 
 
Definition of transaction costs 
One of the most fundamental objections against Transaction Cost Economics is the poorly 
defined transaction costs. Goldberg (1985, 398-400) wrote:  
 
My hostility to transaction costs must strike readers as odd, since the "new 
institutional economics" and "transaction cost economics" are often thought of as 
synonymous …. As far as the economic actors are concerned, transaction costs are the 
same as other costs. The transaction costs are an unobservable residual; they are the 
opportunity cost of the world not being as nice a place as it otherwise might be. In this 
formulation, the transaction cost label is a redundancy.  
 
Perrow (1981, 375) wrote: 
 
Any compelling analysis can be reinterpreted by saying that X or Y is really a 
transaction cost.  
 
The costs of maladaptation are also particularly difficult to define. This is more than mildly 
inconvenient, because Williamson defined adaptation as the central theme of Transaction Cost 
Economics.  
 
While Whyte (1994) did not deny the relation between Asset Specificity and vertical 
integration, he thought the determining factor for that preference was "sunk costs" that 
developed as a result of Asset Specificity. 
 
Bounded rationality  
Much criticism of Transaction Cost Economics, like Agency Theory, has focused on its 
behavioural assumptions. One of those is bounded rationality. Many critics were not prepared to 
admit either its existence or, if it did exist, its significance. Baiman (1990) reflected on the 
concept of bounded rationality and the concomitant circular reasoning. Dow (1987, 27) states: 
"if agents cannot cope with contracts featuring complex contingencies, it is doubtful that they 
119
119
can select in advance an efficient decision making procedure to use in adapting to future 
circumstances". But resistance is waning. 
 
In this survey [Dow's], four reasons are given for incorporating bounded rationality in 
economic models. First, there is abundant empirical evidence that it is important. 
Second, models of bounded rationality have proved themselves in a wide range of 
impressive work. Third, the standard justifications for assuming unbounded rationality 
are unconvincing; their logic cuts both ways. Fourth, deliberation about an economic 
decision is a costly activity, and good economics requires that we entertain all costs. 
(Conlisk, 1996, 669)  
 
Kahneman and Tverski's "prospect theory" (1979, 1996) provided sufficient starting points to 
demonstrate that bounded rationality is a significant phenomenon. They show that decision 
makers use heuristics and perceptions do play a role in decision making. Mental models for 
interpreting situations are important and the attitude of the decision maker influences the 
decision-making. The availability of data is also important. When data is directly available and 
visible a greater value is attached to it than justified. This could be called grasping at straws. 
People also have a loss aversion. The risk of losing weighs more heavily on them than the 
chance of winning. Other anomalies are: 
 
the propensity for people to take out expensive small-scale insurance when buying 
appliances; their willingness to drive to a distant store to save a few dollars on a small 
purchase, but reluctance to make the same trip for an equally large discount on an 
expensive item; their resistance to lowering consumption in response to bad news 
about lifetime income.66 
 
Opportunism and Trust 
The most important criticism seems to focus on the concept of opportunism. Williamson has a 
strong point of view on this subject.  
 
The general effect of presuming the absence of opportunism is that we enter the world 
of what Frank and Fritzie Manuel describe as "utopian fantasies". (Williamson, 1999, 
1099) 
 
By the way, opportunism is worse than self-interest. It goes further because it assumes that 
lying and cheating for the benefit of one's own interests will be the starting point.  
 
Nooteboom (2000) puts forward the concept of trust as a natural counterweight to opportunism. 
 
The preoccupation with opportunism, and the neglect or even rejection of the notion of 
trust, is misguided and theoretically inconsistent.… The passage of time is critical in 
transaction cost economics. (Nooteboom, 2000, 104)  
 
The passage of time will provide both parties insights into the degree of opportunism that the 
other is engaging in. In other words, opportunism "will come out in the wash". Nooteboom also 
argued that if one party believes that because he is being monitored and, therefore, not trusted, 
                                                 
66 Foundations of Behavioral and Experimental Economics: Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith, The Royal 
Swedish Academy of Sciences; Advanced information on the Prize in Economic Science 2002, 17 December 
2002.  
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the other party will then assume that he is also not trusted and start behaving opportunistically. 
And everyone knows that this creates vicious circles. Frey (1993) described this argument as the 
"crowding out" effect.  
 
Ghoshal and Moran (1996) also urged limiting the inclination to use Transaction Cost 
Economics's opportunism as the norm. They based their critique on the fact that Williamson did 
not distinguish between attitude and behaviour. While opportunism might be an inherent 
characteristic of human behaviour and an ongoing attitude, it is not necessarily an ongoing 
activity. That is, while people may constantly dream of taking the money and running, they 
don't actually do it. Opportunism can in that respect be an attitude or a demonstrated behaviour. 
For the analysis this separation would make a difference. They question if opportunism could 
also be a variable and, therefore, developed a model in which this is made endogenous. 
 
They also refer to Ouchi (1980), who introduced the concept of clan control forming a last 
resort as a mean of control based on creating and sustaining a certain culture that will drive 
behaviour. The assumption of Ghoshal and Moran is that social/clan control can influence 
behaviour without changing the attitude of individuals (1996, 25). The clan control situation 
would be a situation in which the environment is constructed in such a way that there is no 
perceived threat of opportunism, even not for opportunists.  
 
That situation is hardly ever the case and thus not likely to form a very solid base for making 
generalizations about anything. Therefore, other controls need to be used. Based on their model, 
in which opportunism is a variable, they argue that guarantees preventing unwanted behaviour 
need to be rooted in rational controls, which create situations that compel compliance.  
 
Goshal and Moran (1996), and Hill (1990), believe that the organization is more capable of 
adapting to the unexpected than the market and that efficiency will be reached earlier. They 
point at two previously mentioned ways of adaptation: the autonomous, based on Hayek (1945), 
and the purposive (Williamson calls this "coordination adaptation"). 
 
In his preoccupation with opportunism, Williamson did not consider that coordination 
can merely be a more efficient means for allocating resources, especially when prices, 
or even markets, are not available, and autonomous adaptation is difficult. (Ghoshal 
and Moran, 1996, 34)  
 
The purposiveness is served with cooperation, which is consistent with Williamson's point of 
view. According to Hill (1990), this mechanism is comparable to price mechanisms in markets. 
Poppo and Zenger (2002) have a similar idea. They consider that formal contracts undermine 
trust and, therefore, promote opportunistic behaviour. They developed a model in which 
relational contracts and formal contracts are considered complementary and tested this using a 
survey. They showed that this indeed seems to be the case. They integrated trust as an 
endogenous element.  
 
Trust is a peculiar belief predicated not on evidence but on the lack of contrary 
evidence – a feature which makes it vulnerable to deliberate destruction. In contrast, 
deep distrust is very difficult to invalidate through experience…. Once distrust has set 
in it soon becomes impossible to know if it was ever in fact justified, for it has the 
capacity to become self-fulfilling, to generate a reality consistent with itself. It then 
becomes individually "rational" to behave accordingly…. Only accident or a third 
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party may set up the right kind of "experiment" to prove distrust unfounded. 
(Gambetta, 1988, 234)  
 
The existence of trust thus seems not easy to be measured, let alone proved. Even Nooteboom –
a true believer in trust - (1999) notes that there is a problem. 
 
Trust is a governance device, in the sense that it helps to reduce transaction costs, and 
has the advantage of low cost and flexibility due to lesser need of detailed contracts. 
However, it cannot be purchased and installed at will…. But indeed: trust should not 
be blind, because there are limits to trustworthiness. (Nooteboom, 10, 13)  
 
This leads to a dead end. If it's not possible to use trust at will - to turn it on at the push of a 
button - it immediately loses its value as a governance instrument. All other Transaction Cost 
Economics instruments can be turned on and off and, therefore, have a higher practical value 
than trust. Thus it seems that trust is not an instrument, but the result of many factors, some 
calculable, others not. Understanding what contributes to it and what diminishes it - through 
experience not only with one particular party, but many - can prevent the self-fulfilling 
prophecies of distrust mentioned by Ghoshal and Moran. To some extent, Nooteboom, Berger, 
and Noorderhaven (1997) agreed with this. 
 
Trust can only be considered an instrument of governance in a limited sense: it 
contributes to risk reduction, but it cannot be instituted instantaneously. (Nooteboom, 
Berger, and Noorderhaven, 1997, 318) 
 
Casadesus-Masanell (2002) also concluded that trust is more a result than an instrument. He 
indicates that legal penalties and existing norms and values in the social exchange can lead to 
information being shared (more) completely, thereby eliminating moral hazard and adverse 
selection. 
 
Williamson (1996) always responded to this criticism by indicating that he does not assume that 
opportunism is always present. Opportunism is a "reasonable" option that needs to be seriously 
taken into account. Nooteboom (1999) stated that if this opportunism is assumed variation 
among individuals will exist. He then does not understand that Transaction Cost Economics 
does not wish to take this variation into account. It could make sense if trust were declared a 
variable in choosing the most optimal governance form. According to Speklé, this is not the 
case. 
 
Unless the opponents come up with a rival explanation for these phenomena – which 
they have not done so far - the assumption of opportunism cannot be dismissed. And 
as for the supposed immorality of the assumption, one may of course not like people 
to behave opportunistically, but that does not change the apparent fact that they often 
do so behave. If one purports to build positive theories, one cannot bluntly ignore 
reality, no matter how unpleasant its manifestation. Moreover, the mere act of 
assuming opportunism does not imply some kind of value judgment. Rather, 
Transaction Cost Economics is amoral: right or wrong, opportunism simply is. 
(Speklé, 2001b, 37)  
 
Thus even though these criticisms have some validity, that does not diminish the fact that 
Transaction Cost Economics has a great deal of explanatory power. That is, a great deal of 
empirical observations can be better grasped and understood using it (Shelanski and Klein, 
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1995, 2). "Taken as a whole, the body of empirical research in Transaction Cost Economics 
shows that a good deal of economic activity aligns with transactions in the manner predicted by 
theory." (1995, 352) Joskow (1991, 47) adds to this: "the growing body of empirical work in 
transaction cost economics is in many ways in much better shape than much of the empirical 
work in industrial organization generally." 
 
4.5 Agency Theory, Transaction Cost Economics and Internal 
Audit 
 
4.5.1 Introduction 
 
From the perspective of this thesis a number of preliminary conclusions might be drawn. Both 
Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics provide evidence that auditing is a 
worthwhile undertaking, both as a bonding and as a monitoring device. The concept of 
Information Asymmetry is one of the explanations for the rationale for audit and may provide 
some clues with respect to the kinds and amount of audit required. Therefore, there might be a 
correlation between the level of Information Asymmetry and the size of an IAF.  
 
Agency Theory focuses heavily on incentives and rewards as a means of aligning the interests 
of both principal and agent. Therefore, there might be a need to take those into account. This 
need may be enhanced due to such behavioural assumptions as opportunism and moral 
hazard, whereby the agent might try to present information and actions that serve his needs. 
Consequently, the principal will need to use an auditor to monitor and assess the reliability of 
the information provided. That is, if he is not in the position to monitor it himself. 
Management within the organization also suffers from this Information Asymmetry about 
lower level managers and will have a similar need. With regard to the issue of the auditor as 
an economic agent, he will need to be rewarded in a way that aligns the interests of both the 
principal(s) and himself. There might be an additional need to monitor the monitor in order to 
prevent "shirking", moral hazard and deliberate distortions of information. If an auditor is to 
give an opinion about information provided by another agent then it would be best not to be in 
a position where that agent is the auditor's principal. That is, his boss. 
 
The importance of incentive and reward structures, reliance on information and metric and 
behavioural constraints and assumptions would surely create a need to assess the data and the 
process and systems in place that account for those incentives and rewards. Recent research 
on such corporate scandals as Enron, Ahold, Tyco, WorldCom (Jensen, Murphy, 2004; 
O'Connor, 2002, 2004; Partnoy, 2003) and corporate governance initiatives (see Chapter 3) 
show that it is almost mandatory that incentives and rewards will be closely monitored. The 
analysis of these authors showed that incentive schemes led top management to "cook the 
books" and that this needs to be monitored more closely.  
 
The US' Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) was drafted in the aftermath of the corporate scandals and 
requires a number of participants to scrutinize the financial accounting processes in 
companies under review of the SEC. The main participants are Board members, Audit 
Committee members, and External Auditors as well as Internal Auditors (see also Chapter 3). 
The main objective of Sarbanes Oxley is to restore public trust and focus on the improvement 
of checks and balances that proved to be flawed in many of the corporations involved in the 
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corporate scams.  As contended by the research of Jensen and Murphy (2004), many of 
scandals may be related to the excessive use of incentive and rewards schemes. Their 38 
recommendations to remediate were also geared towards rebalancing the inappropriate use of 
those very incentive and reward schemes. 
 
All of the corporate governance codes and related rules and regulations use Agency Theory as 
a stepping stone. Since Agency Theory itself is geared towards maximizing efforts of agents 
via the use of incentives and rewards, it may not be too far off to consider the use of the 
External and/or Internal Auditors to review the use of those systems in their organizations. It 
will be interesting to see whether the Scope of Services of the IA has been affected by the 
corporate governance codes that were imposed on companies during the last decade. This 
question will be addressed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
Transaction Cost Economics in general and Asset Specificity in particular might be useful to 
keep in mind when considering IA's role and rationale and size. The greater the Asset 
Specificity the more need there will be to assess the conditions of any contract and the degree 
to which it has, or has not, been met. And, subsequently, the greater the need for audits. This 
is also influenced by the level of Information Asymmetry and behavioural assumptions of 
Transaction Cost Economics. The more problematic it is to draft an ex ante contract the more 
necessary it will become to assess its performance.  
 
Transaction Cost Economics deals with governance structure and might be helpful while 
addressing the make or buy issue for internal audit. On the one hand, one might expect that 
where Agency Theory has a compelling argument to make the internal auditor as independent 
as possible of other agents in the pecking order, thereby creating a need to come to a buy 
decision and hire a third party. Transaction Cost Economics would provide arguments for the 
make decision since an internally positioned internal audit would have best access to internal 
information and the required knowledge to be able to audit is highly Asset specific that 
buying the service might be difficult.  
 
There is a distinct shortage of articles and research in which Agency Theory and Transaction 
Cost Economics are applied to IA. A study by Spaakman (1997) revealed that in comparison 
with external audit the academic literature on internal audit is limited. Boyle (1993) 
researched 6 journals (between 1975 and 1990) and found only 21 articles. Vinten (1996, 99-
100) studied other journals and found some more. But his conclusions were not significantly 
different from Boyle's. From the academic perspective, Internal Audit isn't very thoroughly 
researched (see also Allegrini et al, 2006). In this thesis we surveyed 30 journals over an 11 
year period (January 1994 till April 2005) and found 204 articles (see Appendix 2). About 
76% of those (155) were published in just one journal Managerial Auditing Journal, leaving 
the grand total for the other 29 at no more then 49. Of those 29, 2 journals, International 
Journal of Auditing (containing 19) and Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie 
(MAB, a Dutch journal), had 19 and 10, respectively. Considering that only journals focusing 
on auditing were included, this is a paltry, even pathetic, total.  
 
In the following sections the findings of research using Agency Theory and Transaction Cost 
Economics are applied to explore IA's role (and rationale), position, and Scope of Services.  
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4.5.2 Role 
 
In this section we use the insights provided by Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics 
to further explain IA's role and rationale. Special Attention is paid to the make or buy issue.  
 
The role and rationale of internal audit  
As was shown in section 4.2.1 incomplete contracts are the norm. This implies that there is a 
need for audit services. However, that is hardly the end of the problem. Because it is asking 
too much to ask an auditor to solve problems that are in theory insolvable. The best any 
auditor can do is to unravel and reveal any information that may shed light on the terms of the 
contract, and provide assurance about its correctness.  
 
Beyond that it is difficult to arrive at what is needed to provide the required assurance. 
Auditors need a soll (should) to compare the ist (is) with and conclude whether or not the 
information is correct. If contracts are incomplete, where is this soll supposed to come from? 
There needs to be at least an agreement about what soll all parties should use. This causes an 
impasse of sorts, because if the parties could get that far, there might be little reason for 
calling on an auditor.  
 
Nevertheless, both Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics consider internal audit to 
be either a kind of monitoring (from the perspective of the principal) or a kind of bonding (from 
the perspective of the agent).  In an organization structured according to the two-tier system, the 
Supervisory Board has the primary monitoring responsibility. It is appointed to act on behalf of 
shareholders (principals) to supervise the Management Board. Surely, the Management Board 
needs to monitor their subordinates as well. This is done by monitoring functions. IA is one of 
them. Agency Theory considers internal audit is supposed to monitor costs incurred to 
demonstrate that the agent is serious in serving the principal's interests. This helps securing the 
agent's position and salary. Wallace (1988, 125) argues that the principal's costs for monitoring 
the agent should be reflected in the wages paid. It is in the interest of the agent to perform 
audits, like the internal audit, to reduce the risk that the principal takes negative decisions about 
his compensation. There is, therefore, an "incentive" to have IA, even if that is just for securing 
his compensation. Agency Theory shows that the principal attempts to mitigate Information 
Asymmetry by increasing the level of certainty by requiring assurance. Supervisory Boards 
appoint external auditors to certify the financial information (in most cases the annual report).  
 
Adams (1994) also said that agents gain if they can convince the principal that they are working 
hard in his - the principal's - interests. It is even important to safeguard their salary. This is 
consistent with the results of Holmström (1979), who implied that in cases of teamwork, the 
team-members benefit from a monitor (in this case the principal) who can ascertain their salary 
and change the contract.  
 
Adams questioned why some companies have IA while others do not. He assumed that more 
complex organizations are more likely to have it than the less complex. Studies by Widener and 
Selto (1999), Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) seemed to corroborate that view. Those studies will 
be discussed later.  
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Why do the work approach and scope of internal auditors differ between organizations? His 
assumption is that internal auditors in stock-exchange listed organizations are focused more on 
financial, fraud, and compliance audits. This is consistent with the fact that ownership and 
control are separated, as shown above.  
 
Spaakman (1997) noticed that one of the reasons for the lack of more sustainable research 
results about IA might be that Transaction Cost Economics is not used enough as a research 
terrain. Using Transaction Cost Economics, he conducted an experiment to test IA's 
usefulness in reducing transaction costs. Williamson (1975, 1985) said that internal auditors 
provide managers with information that is more useful in economizing than external auditors, 
because their reports include more than just straight financial numbers. Spaakman indicated 
that internal audit is especially suitable to reduce opportunism and maladaptation (in cases of 
dedicated assets) because in these cases internally verified information is necessary. Internal 
audit can also be important in situations of external uncertainty and a high frequency. 
According to Spaakman, managers obtain two advantages from the use of internal audit 
results. One, identification of deficiencies in the system of internal control. Two, a description 
of the control system. Therefore, if the audit results are objective, those from IA are more 
useful for economizing than external auditors.  
 
Williamson (1975, 1985) provided several advantages of internal audit with regard to 
acquiring information. First, internal audit does not need to adhere to General Accepted 
Auditing Standards (GAAS) to determine if the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) are adhered to. Presumably, they have more options to retrieve crucial information. 
But this is unconvincing, because internal auditors also have standards (IIA Professional 
Standards) to comply with.  
 
Second, since they are colleagues and the relationship is long-term, they can count on more 
cooperation from the employees within the organization.  
 
The auditing advantage of internal organization in relation to inter-firm organization is 
attributable to constitutional and incentive differences which operate in favor of the 
internal mode. An external auditor is typically constrained to review written records 
and documents and in other respects restrict the scope of his investigation to clearly 
pertinent matters. An internal auditor, by contrast, has greater freedom of action, both 
to include less formal evidence and to explore the byways into which his investigation 
leads. (Williamson, 1975, 29-30) 
 
In 1985 he added: 
 
inter-firm auditing cannot be presumed to be as effective as intra-firm auditing.... 
internal auditors can expect to receive greater cooperation, including even hints as to 
where the "dead bodies lie", than can be presumed when auditing across an 
autonomous boundary is attempted. (Williamson, 1985, 154-155) 
 
Penno (1990) contends that it is true that internal audit is able:  
 
to produce near first-best solutions in a principal-agent model with very simple 
contracts that use a small fraction of all available information. The attainment of such 
efficiency, however, depends on the level of management to which the internal 
auditors report. If independence is lost the ability of the internal audit function to 
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provide information for incentives is impaired and the firm must resort to other 
sources of contracting information, such as its financial reports. Because … the 
information attested by the external auditor is more limited than that attested to by the 
internal auditors, first-best solutions may no longer be possible. (1990, 521)  
 
From the perspective of auditing for performance evaluation purposes, that is an important 
conclusion, and may contribute to the contention that it might be worthwhile including 
performance evaluation data in IA's Scope of Services! Further, Penno corroborates the notion 
and importance of independence, although he did not elaborate any further.  
 
Spaakman (1997) hypothesized that the usefulness of internal audit results for economizing 
varies with the degree of Asset Specificity, uncertainty, Scope of Services, and the level in the 
pecking order IA reports to. Evidence for this could also be found in a number of studies, 
especially that of Anderson, Francis and Stokes (1993). They demonstrated that as an 
organization's size increases - measured in terms of total market value - IA costs increase. Not 
only in absolute terms, but also in comparison with the amount spent on external audit. 
Spaakman then set up an experiment in which he used senior executives of Canadian 
governmental organizations. He asked respondents to evaluate the possibilities of using IA 
results to reduce costs. The results supported Transaction Cost Economics's prediction that IA 
results are useful in situations of high Asset Specificity. The uncertainty aspect was not 
supported. In fact, there was even a negative correlation.  
 
This is consistent with the findings of Morril and Morril (2002). They concluded that if due to a 
high degree of Asset Specificity a thorough knowledge of the company is more important, 
external auditors tend to increasingly rely on internal audit. By contrast, they also concluded 
that uncertainty was not associated with increased internal audit participation in external audits.  
 
Spaakman, again, found that size has a positive correlation with a need for internal audit. The 
larger the organization the more internal audit was needed. Therefore, Asset Specificity and size 
are the most determining factors. The limitations of the study are that it was an experiment and, 
therefore, only a limited amount of variables were dealt with.  
 
Last but not least, regulation also had a positive effect on the existence of IA (Moxey, 1979). 
The US's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 confronted managers with the need of having a 
good internal control system, and this increased the importance of IA.  
 
Make or buy internal audit 
Widener and Selto (1999) used Transaction Cost Economics to study the make or buy 
question. Noticing the trend of increased outsourcing (Cox, 1993; Schulz, 1995), they 
conducted a survey to examine possible explanations for it. Based on the Transaction Cost 
Economics literature, they made a number of assumptions related to the criteria of Asset 
Specificity, uncertainty and frequency (as developed by Williamson, 1985). 
 
If internal audit is perceived as an added value, strengthening the competitive advantages of 
the organization by building up organization-specific knowledge, and if employees are trained 
or intellectual property rights are protected, the chances that internal audit will be placed 
within the organization increases. Even though specific knowledge will not immediately 
improve the competitive position, it is clear that audits require company-specific knowledge, 
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which needs to be built up. Outsourcing is then not very likely. By contrast, when that 
knowledge is less specific, outsourcing remains a very viable option. 
 
Other hypotheses link outsourcing with the degree of uncertainty (especially in the 
environment). Increasing uncertainty leads to a decreased pressure to outsource. The 
combination of Asset Specificity and uncertainty even enhanced that effect. The conclusions 
of Widener and Selto were that the higher the Asset Specificity the less outsourcing will be 
chosen. This is consistent with the findings of Williamson (1996). Further, they found that the 
more often internal audit is used, the more often the function is positioned internally. Their 
findings showed that high degrees of uncertainty and frequency did not correspond with an 
increase – or decrease for that matter - in internal audit being outsourced. 
 
The qualitative analysis of the data supported the hypothesis that Asset Specificity is the most 
important driver for in-sourcing.  
 
Agency Theory has also been used to model make or buy decisions for internal audit. Caplan 
and Kirschenheiter (2000) developed an agency model to create the most optimal contract 
with the external and the internal auditor. One of their conclusions was that outsourcing can 
be valuable without even taking into account differences in expertise. Their model assumed 
imperfect audit technology, and that the efforts of auditors are not observable. Given that it 
takes an auditor to assess another auditor, this seems to be a fair assumption. They varied the 
level of risk in their model, having management decide on the acceptable level and matching 
choice for an auditor. It turned out there were conditions in which the internal auditor was 
better rewarded than the external auditor for discovering discrepancies. Further, organizations 
that "make" Internal Audit do this because they expect that it will drive down external auditor 
fees. Their findings are consistent with the claims often made - but not necessarily always true 
- in publications and discussions. That is, internal auditors are cheaper and qualitatively 
inferior, and external auditors are more expensive and qualitatively better. 
 
Remembering, once again, that their model does not necessarily square with all real life 
situations, it is safe to agree with them that external auditors have more to lose than internal 
auditors through errors. Not only in terms of reputation, but also successful liability claims 
(due to their "deep pockets"). Therefore, external auditors tend to do more testing than their 
internal brethren. Whether that is always for the right reasons - improving assurance, for 
example - remains subject debate. It just might be possible that internal auditors are more 
efficient.  
 
Although not part of their model, an often heard argument is that external auditors work 
mainly within big audit firms where an "up or out" culture fosters better qualified staff. 
Caplan and Kirschenheiter included in their model the increased tendency of external auditors 
to focus on delivering internal audit services. This has been provoked by decreased revenues 
stemming from regular assurance services and the increased visibility and appreciation of 
internal audit shops. The latter argument contradicts the above case for the lack of competitive 
environment for internal auditors.  
 
Up until now, internal auditors have been classified as employees and, therefore, have not 
been liable to claims in connection with poor performance. Thus as individuals, they have 
little to lose except their jobs and reputations. As we have seen with, say, Arthur Andersen, 
this is not at all the case with the big accountancy firms. 
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Caplan and Kirschenheiter's model also proved what most internal auditors recognize without 
thinking much about it. That is, since internal auditors are rewarded for finding deficiencies in 
the system and penalized for not finding those that surface later on as huge problems, they 
track down as many deficiencies as they can. While theoretical and pragmatic arguments 
could be made for and against this basic "covering your ass" policy, it is very definitely the 
right policy as far as managers are concerned. Because they assume that by discovering 
shortcomings the auditor is diligently doing his job. And that is exactly what he is getting paid 
to do.  
 
This is consistent with survey data by White and Xander 1984, who find that 40 
percent of internal audit managers report that their staff believed they benefit from 
reporting as many deficiencies as possible. Furthermore, the survey result is consistent 
with our assumption that audit effort is unobservable, and hence is consistent with our 
description of auditing as subject to moral hazard. (Caplan, Kirschenheiter, 2000, 403) 
  
Since it seems to offer explanations for a number of prevailing ideas and hunches, Caplan and 
Kirschenheiter's model deserves to be tested empirically.  
 
4.5.3 Position  
 
Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics provide some clues about IA's position and 
size. Using Agency Theory, Fama, (1980); and Fama and Jensen, (1980, 1983) showed that 
the larger the organization, the more reasons there are for separating ownership and control, 
thus causing a possible increased need to audit. They also demonstrated that by separating 
decision-management and -control this would be the case at all levels in the organization. The 
question then becomes if this would have consequences for IA's position? Is decentralization 
or centralization more preferred or justified?  
 
In this section the following issues are discussed: IA's position, relative size, and how to deal 
with agency problems of the function itself.  
 
Organizational Position  
The organizational position relates to reporting levels. While that might sound trivial to some, 
it is particularly important for internal auditors (as we have already noticed in Chapter 2). 
Agency Theory explains why. IA provides information about the actions and results of agents.  
 
Fama and Jensen argued for the separation of ownership and management, which would lead 
to more incompatibility between the interests. One party would tend to inflate numbers. the 
other to deflate them. The results would fall somewhere between the two, and that would be 
more reliable information. Every student auditor is very familiar with this highly valued 
dogma of segregation of duties. 
 
But this contention only holds water when there is equality between the two positions. If one 
party is "the boss", all bets are off. Therefore, it is necessary to minimize situations where 
overrule is possible. Of course, that is only possible within limits, because top management 
will always be the buck stops here boss. But this inherent pre-eminence can be prevented by 
proper checks and balances. One of those is the external auditor, who is appointed by the 
Supervisory Board and reports to the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee. But even that only 
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works within limits, because those checks and balances were in place with such blue chip 
companies as Enron, WorldCom, Ahold, Parmalat, and Shell, and that didn't prevent disaster.  
 
In order to apply this concept here, IA should be independent of those they report about. As 
long as IA's mandate is focused on managerial levels below the Management Board the 
appropriate reporting level is the Management Board itself. If, however, the mandate is to 
include the Management Board a different position is required. If IA is to fulfill its duties with 
regard to the functioning of the Management Board - for instance in the case of auditing the 
"tone at the top" or the performance measurement system used as incentives for top 
management - this will almost certainly put the CAE under extreme pressure. Following 
Agency Theory, positioning IA under those it is supposed to monitor is a recipe for failure. 
And it should only be tolerated if everyone understands implicitly and explicitly that the 
Management Board will not be included in its auditing jurisdiction. If that is not acceptable to 
the decision makers, IA's preferred positioned should be under the jurisdiction of the 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee (see Figure 1 in Chapter 1).  
 
IA is of course also a "bonding" instrument to "signal" to supervisors that the agent is doing 
his utmost and is subject to audits. IA is also there to monitor the lower level managers 
[agents] on behalf of the Management Board. The external auditor, by contrast, is the monitor 
on behalf of the Supervisory Board. The second best solution, therefore, is to have IA report 
to the Management Board. If Fama and Jensen were followed, IA should be decentralized.  
 
As already noted, Penno (1990) showed that Agency Theory does indeed provide some 
explanation for IA's organizational position. He concluded that it is more efficient if 
independence is optimized. Abdel-khalik, Snowball and Wragge (1983) presented similar 
findings. External auditors base their decision to use IA's work "by far" on the level it reports 
to. This is for them the ultimate proof of its degree of independence. San Miguel and 
Govindarajan (1984) also showed that independence is important. Using Agency Theory, they 
studied the relation betweens controllers and internal auditors. They hypothesized that a larger 
portion of internal and external compliance auditing and financial auditing happens in 
organizations where (divisional) controllers are less independent.  
 
These hypotheses were supported by their research. They noted, somewhat incidentally, that 
they did not find any research about structuring and designing management control and the 
implications for internal audit. 
 
However, none have explored the implications of other internal control systems such 
as the internal audit function.… To achieve better financial control, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and others have recommended that the internal audit function 
report directly to the audit committee of the board of directors, but research on the 
implications of this recommendation is lacking. (San Miguel, Govindarajan, 1984, 
184) 
 
Hopefully, this research will take us at least one small step in that direction. 
 
IA's size 
Research so far has not provided much support for answering the question, "How large should 
my IA be?" No research was found providing sound data about the absolute or even relative 
numbers.  
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) showed that auditing might reduce agency costs. Jones (1995) 
called contracts efficient if the sum of the agency costs is minimized. Consequently, the 
assumption could be that if agency costs are high the need for a higher quality audit is 
enhanced (see also Francis and Wilson, 1988). Whether this will lead to an increased IA size 
is not clear. The research of Francis and Wilson referred to external auditing, as was the case 
for that of Chow (1982). Based on Agency Theory, his research consisted of 165 companies. 
His conclusions, consistent with Jensen and Meckling, were that leverage (debt/equity ratio), 
size of the organization, and the need to use accounting specific information to appraise and 
reward managers indicated an enhanced need for audits. If the manager has a larger stake in 
the company, this need decreases. This is consistent with the expectation that an owner is 
more likely to act in his own best interest and monitor more closely what is happening, 
thereby reducing the need for audits.  
 
Anderson, Francis and Stokes (1993) offered some insight into the relationship between 
internal and external audit. Since they studied corporate governance, they used the monitoring 
mechanisms of internal and external auditing, and boards/directors and sought the relationship 
between them. These monitoring variants should not be seen as substitutes but, rather, as 
complementaries to come up with an efficient mix. They used Agency Theory and 
Transaction Cost Economics and concluded that total monitoring costs increased - with a 
decreasing percentage - as the organization grew larger. They also showed that the greater the 
proportion of Asset Specificity, the greater the relative expenditure on monitoring from 
internal auditing as compared with external auditing 
 
The restrictions of their study and the model make the above findings more suggestive than 
conclusive. The model was dominated by executive directors (in comparison with non-
executives) and excluded rewarding them by means of stock options. Accounting measures 
were used and were, therefore, imperfect. Last and probably not least, the focus was on larger 
Australian organizations.  
 
Nevertheless, Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics provided clues relation to IA 
position and size. The larger the Information Asymmetry and the higher the degree of Asset 
Specificity, the larger IA will be and the more reasons there are to make it in-house (make). 
 
How to deal with IA's agency problem 
There is also a principal-agent relationship between the auditor and the principal hiring his 
services. Antle (1982) described the auditor as another economic agent.  
 
Unless we believe that auditors are somehow qualitatively different from the other 
types of economic agents that we study, it would seem that we should attempt to apply 
the same techniques to modeling auditors that we use to model other economic agents. 
(1982, 503-504)  
 
Antle developed a model in which incentives for the auditor were endogenous and it was the 
auditor's role to provide information used by the principal for his governance task. Included 
among the models he used were those of Harris and Raviv (1979) and Holmström (1979). In the 
former, the agent is risk adverse. In the latter, auditor-provided information contributes to better 
contracting. His conclusion was that the auditor is an economic agent. He verifies the 
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information presented to the principal by the agent, and thereby increasing reliability of the 
data.  
 
The model also proved that risk sharing between the auditor-agent and the principal is 
necessary, expressed by the incentives the principal awards the auditor-agent. The auditor-agent 
can be risk-and work-adverse and shirk chores and choices. The principal therefore offers him a 
contract in which penalties are demanded in cases of errors or insufficient effort. This works 
especially well when the auditor has "deep pockets". Otherwise, it will be more like trying to 
squeeze blood from a stone. Judging from this assumption, it becomes clear that Antle has 
applied his model to the external auditor working for a large public firm and assumed to have 
such deep pockets. The penalties led to risks being transferred from the principal to the auditor-
agent, justifying the assumption that the auditor will do more to ensure reliability on what gets 
his stamp of approval.  
 
His model of a principal dealing with two agents (auditor and manager) is more complicated, 
because these two agents have an agent-principal relationship of their own. The auditor 
performs audits at the behest of the manager. It is possible that the auditor and the manager will 
make agreements together (see also Kofman and Lawarrée, 1993). They can both be risk- and 
work-adverse and wind up - either from the beginning or somewhere along the line - in an "I'll 
scratch your back and you scratch mine" relationship. One may lie and the other will swear to it. 
Manager reports will not be checked by the auditor. This creates considerable problems for the 
principal. While Antle provided some mathematical "solutions" in his model, he admitted that 
they were neither simple nor realistic. 
 
Two possibilities for overcoming the randomized strategy problem were suggested: 
change the rules of the game and/or impose convexity conditions. The former seems 
unjustifiable in an auditing context and the latter promising but difficult to achieve. 
(1982, 526) 
 
Penno (1990) also researched the problem of internal auditor incentives. 
 
Because an internal auditor is another economic agent, capable of self-interested 
behaviour, problems of motivation similar to those of the agent studied here may arise. 
The internal audit function will be designated as effective for incentive purposes … 
when the internal auditor meets with and honestly receives and verifies disclosures 
from the agent. Such a relationship may be possible when the internal auditor is paid a 
wage (by a superior at a level higher than both the internal auditor and employee being 
evaluated) conditional on supplying properly documented reports. (1990, 524-525) 
 
Sharma (1997) took a different approach to the problem of the auditor being an agent. The 
auditor is a "professional", which leads to specific agency problems. Normally, agency 
problems are limited to Information Asymmetry. But in this case knowledge Asymmetry also 
exists. Auditors have specialized knowledge and skills that the principal does not have. This 
creates an extra problem. 
 
Sharma cites Abbott (1988) when he says: "that the key distinguishing characteristic of 
professions is that they are based in abstract bodies of knowledge" (Sharma, 1997, 763). The 
underlying assumption is that clients of their services are not experts and, therefore, can and 
should not interfere with how the service is provided. In cases where opportunism and lack of 
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trust are either known to exist or highly likely, this dependency could lead to the professionals 
exploiting their clients. 
 
A counter-balance to that very real possibility is an assumed degree of "gentlemanly" altruism 
on the part of the professional - his professional pride and honor. This will lead him to doing the 
right thing, consciously and consistently. Another weight on the side of the angels is peer 
review. 
 
According to Sharma, professionals distinguish themselves in three areas: Power Asymmetry, 
Oversight and Co-production. Below those three areas will be briefly discussed. 
 
Power Asymmetry 
The fact that the principal is not capable of creating, monitoring and enforcing a good contract 
is the most important difference with other agents. Walsh and Seward (1990) wrote an essay 
about the efficiency of corporate control mechanisms based on good contracts. In this kind of 
asymmetry, that is fatally flawed. 
 
Principals can of course again invest in information about the professional to gain better 
insights. But this does not solve the problem of having limited possibilities of evaluating the 
results. Sharma distinguished information on "what the agent does" from "how the agent does 
it". This distinction is very important because information concerning the "what" question is for 
sale, but the "how" is not. The latter is changing continuously. This creates not only an ex post 
problem, but also an ex ante one. How much and what exactly should be contracted? This 
question is critical for determining the need for internal audit and its Scope of Services. The 
auditor is often the one determining what tasks are to be performed, and how. Normally, the 
party contracting any service is capable of making up his mind on the what, how and how much 
issue. In the case of specific knowledge intensive services this capability is significantly limited. 
This led Sharma to the following conclusion. 
 
Consequently, the power Asymmetry assumed in agency theory is reversed in 
exchanges involving professional agents who have the power over lay principals 
because they control relevant task-related knowledge and have the expert authority to 
influence greatly (if not drive) the standards of exchange. (1997, 770)  
 
Oversight 
In cases where monitoring and measuring costs are low, Agency Theory offers good solutions 
for agency problems. The problem in this case is that the costs of monitoring and measurement 
are high, because specific knowledge is involved. Behaviour- and outcome-based contracts are 
inadequate. Walsh and Seward (1990) described controls based on internal organizational 
measures or external market oriented variants. But they only offer partial solutions, and 
opportunism cannot be adequately addressed. Sharma proposed supervision by peers within the 
organization or profession-wide measurements, such as codes of conduct and ethics, diplomas 
(licensing) and auditing. 
 
Sharma is convinced that the first option offers more guarantees than the second one. I disagree, 
because intra-organizational supervision lacks the necessary independence that enhances 
credibility. The IIA Inc. made external quality reviews mandatory every five years and the IIA 
the Netherlands developed a quality review scheme that provides peer review by the profession. 
One must keep in mind, however, that professional peer reviews are no longer permitted for the 
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external audit profession. Those tasks are carried out by US' Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) and The Netherlands Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM).  
 
Co-production 
Berle and Means (1932) stated that "most fundamental of all, the position of ownership has 
changed from that of an active to that of a passive agent". Professionals work together with the 
client to create an advantage. It often involves intangibles that demand an ongoing dialogue 
between professional and client to discover their often changing needs and demands. Auditors 
also deliver such services and are in a continuous dialogue with the client to perform the right 
activities to satisfy the client's requirements.  
 
Sharma (1997, 775) developed a model to overcome the obstacles in the way of monitoring any 
professional. He used the following four sorts of controls: community (professional body), self, 
bureaucratic (using policies, procedures, etc. at the organizational level) and client. 
  
Community control presupposes that professionals behaving badly will disciplined by other 
professionals. In other words, there will be clear negative impacts in terms of reputation. 
Williamson, however, stipulated that these sorts of deterrents are only viable if it is clear that 
the principal is not to partially or fully to blame. Otherwise, the agent can counter claim that 
the principal is the problem. (Williamson, 1985, 396). Further, the information about 
suspected wrongdoing needs to be communicated in an efficient way to as many people as 
possible in order to be effective, which is costly.  
 
Of course, many professions, including internal auditors, have professional associations with 
journals where negative verdicts can be published. However, since the larger public is hardly 
likely to be on the subscription list, they won't know anything about it. Therefore, the spread 
of this information will be incomplete. The profession plays an important role in improving 
the functioning of this "reputation" market. The IIA The Netherlands and the VRO67 have 
their own professional and ethical rules and disciplinary powers. In their (relatively short) life 
times there have been no cases where these powers have been invoked.  
 
Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) introduced a third party in the traditional principal-agent model: 
an auditor/supervisor. Just as in Antle (1982) this person is appointed to provide the owners-
principals with information that will help mitigate the problem of Information Asymmetry. 
The advantage of their contribution is that they take into account not only the external auditor, 
but the internal as well and ascertain which combination should be preferred.  
 
Apart from agency problems, Williamson (1985) acknowledged that internal auditors are 
more exposed to collusive pressures. Thus he asked the probing question: "Are the flaws of 
internal auditing remediable?" Alas, he did not offer an answer. Let's "warm" ourselves in the 
idea that it is. 
 
Kofman and Lawarrée attempted to fix the flaws by applying Agency Theory. They 
mentioned that the external auditor could qualify as an internal auditor. That would let the 
principal appoint him to supervise the internal auditor. And vice versa, the internal auditor 
could supervise the external auditor. The extra costs to be carried by the principal. True, it is a 
sound practice to employ the external auditor to supervise on a random basis the internal 
auditor to reduce the risk of conspiracy between internal auditor and agent. But they have 
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assumed that the external auditor himself will never conspire, which is of course a rather 
dubious assumption.  
 
The last option to keep professionals at a certain leash is to have the client do it himself. 
There are several possibilities for that. One of them is "unbundling". Parts of an assignment 
are distributed among other service providers, which creates an incentive for all parties to 
have the other(s) perform well. This leads to mutual monitoring. Another is to hire a 
knowledgeable expert to supervise the auditor.  
 
Therefore, in many regulations it is ruled that when organizations outsource internal audit, 
they are is obliged to have sufficient expertise to supervise the activities. This is called the 
internalization of specific knowledge and expertise, which decreases the tendency of the 
professional to behave opportunistically.  
 
4.5.4 Scope of Services 
 
In this section attention will be paid to the Scope of Services and the relationship with the 
external auditor. 
 
Scope of Services 
From an Agency Theory perspective, principals are many times not able to assess the 
behaviour of their agents and use rewards and incentives to get the best out of them. It is 
therefore, evident that incentives and rewards are a determining factor for the behaviour of 
managers and almost inevitably should be included in IA's Scope of Services.  
 
That this is not easy is shown in the studies of Jensen and Murphy. In 1990 they questioned 
whether top managers were being rewarded as adequately as they deserved. But in 2004 they 
concluded that the system was over compensating - literally! - and listed 38 (!!) 
recommendations to counter possible dysfunctional behaviour by top management. They 
emphasize that the Audit Committee should carefully scrutinize and monitor the use of 
performance metrics and remuneration policies.  
 
Could IA support them in that task? Up until now the only reported case of IA helping to 
uncover the sleaze was WorldCom. Cynthia Cooper, named Woman of the Year in 2002, 
headed the internal audit department of WorldCom and was proclaimed as the one who "blew 
the whistle". Thornburgh (2003), the court examiner of WorldCom, subsequently reported the 
outcomes of his findings. Although he gave full marks to Mrs. Cooper, he criticized the IA. It 
lacked an adequate budget and support form top management, had the wrong Scope of 
Services - there was too much focus on "adding value'" to top management instead of being 
"an internal control police". While Mrs. Cooper is no longer in office, WorldCom's IA now 
has a bigger mandate and more staff. Closing the Information Asymmetry gap as so 
eloquently defined by Agency Theory, IA would need to focus on the reliability of reporting, 
in many cases mainly containing financial data and to some extent non-financial data.  
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Much research in the area of management control uses Agency Theory.68 But Transaction 
Cost Economics is catching up69. In fact, Transaction Cost Economics may be better suited to 
point at which clues to look for when going beyond the traditional reliability of data. The 
most appropriate variant would be auditing the Management Control System. Having said 
that, this area is so broad that one cannot say in advance what is subject to internal auditing 
and what is not. It is necessary to first come up with a more descriptive narrative of what 
should be included in the Scope of Services.  
 
The Transaction Cost Economics debate around the question whether transactions will be 
carried out through the market or within an organization and, consequently, the institutional 
choice for a governance structure becomes relevant. The governance structure and the 
institutional agreements largely determine the behaviour and efficiency of the economic actor 
(Williamson, 1979, 235). This is of particular interest for internal auditors, because they need 
to provide assurance about behaviour and efficiency issues. Internal auditors are expected to 
assess whether agents have acted in the best interest of principals.  
 
Obviously, if property rights are wrongly assigned, the behaviour of agents will be affected 
and their output will be affected negatively. Therefore, internal auditors will need to take into 
account the way "property rights" are assigned. From the perspective of the organization this 
means that proper authority needs to be assigned to any manager. Property rights translated to 
the level of the organization would lead to transferring the right level of authority to managers 
in order to be able to become the central party for assessing team members and deciding who 
is to be on the team and who is not. Some live up to expectations. Others do not. If the 
manager has no authority or right to change team membership, his ability to bring in the best 
team performance is seriously hampered. Internal auditors, therefore, should be required to 
assess the appropriateness of authority at all levels. 
 
The previous sections revealed that Asset Specificity is one of the most important 
determinants for governance structure. Therefore, it is of interest for internal auditors for at 
least three reasons. One, there is a need to understand the mechanics of Transaction Cost 
Economics, because their underlying assumptions will affect any contract and subsequent 
governance structure. Transaction Cost Economics presupposes that the ability to economize 
on transaction costs will be affected by the governance structure. The governance structure is 
part of the Management Control System. Internal auditors, therefore, need to assess the 
quality of the Management Control System. In that respect, awareness of Transaction Cost 
Economics will be needed to be able to define their Scope of Services in general and the 
specifics of any work program for any audit they undertake. Two, the assumptions of 
Transaction Cost Economics will impact their contract and the way they are governed as well. 
The more specific their knowledge, the more difficulties there will be in drafting ex ante 
performance metrics and expected outcomes of their contract. Measurement ex post will also 
be difficult. Three, Transaction Cost Economics is applied mainly in the "make or buy" 
decision, which is also of special interest for internal audit. The latter will be dealt with in 
more detail in section 4.6.2.2.  
                                                 
68 Chua, Lowe, and Puxty, 1989; Fischer, 1995; Langfield-Smith, 1997; Simons, 1990, 1995a, 1995b; Otley 
1994; Otley and Berry, 1994; Flamholtz, 1996a, 1996b; Merchant, 1982, 1997; Merchant and Van der Stede, 
2003; Ouchi, 1977, 1978, 1979; Barney and Ouchi, 1986; Flamholtz, Das, and Tsui, 1985; Goold and Quinn, 
1999 
69 Van der Meer-Kooistra, 1994, Van der Meer-Kooistra (1998) and Vosselman, 2000; Seal, 1993; Speklé, 
2001a, 2001b; Covaleski, Dirsmith, and Samuel, 2003 
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Jensen (1983, 325) came up with a description of three systems important for any 
organization: performance measurement and evaluation; rewards and punishments; and 
exercising and awarding decision rights among players. 
 
Lowe (1971) defined management control as follows: 
 
A system of organizational information seeking and gathering, accountability and 
feedback designed to ensure that the enterprise adapts to changes in its substantive 
environment and that the work behaviour of its employees is measured by reference to 
a set of operational sub-goals (which conform with overall objectives) so that the 
discrepancy between the two can be reconciled and corrected for. (Lowe, 1971, 5) 
 
This follows the need to pay attention to an organization's adaptive capacity. In that sense this 
follows Williamson (1985) who made adaptation a central theme of Transaction Cost 
Economics.  
 
Giglioni and Bedeian (1974) indicated that control in complex organizations consists of two 
types. One involves providing direction for the activities of subordinates by means of 
procedures and standard work regulations. This is realized via the organizational structure, 
culture, human resource policies, etc. Simons (1996) would call this a "belief system" and 
"boundary system". The second type involves cybernetic control. Simons (1996) would call 
this the "diagnostic control system", which aims at measuring results and providing feedback 
with respect to the question, "are we on the right track?". Many other writers70 considered that 
a formal control system should be cybernetic by nature.  
 
A helpful framework for the components of a Management Control System was provided by 
Rotch (1993). He identified five: performance measurement; strategy (in contrast with 
Anthony (1988)); organizational structure; direction; and motivation. 
 
What is interesting is that his model takes into account the human factor via motivation, 
direction and leadership style. It also acknowledges the importance of feedback and the 
rewards and incentives, as was already predicted by Agency Theory. Last but not least, it also 
refers to the area of organizational change, acknowledging that a Management Control 
System is subject to change because of changes in the company, strategy (see Chandlers 
famous quote: "Structure follows Strategy"), or environment. As has already been shown in 
this chapter, rewards and incentives are very important factors to drive the behaviour of 
people in desired directions, especially when objectives need to be reached.  
 
Many researchers had a cybernetic perspective on management control because of the way 
their thinking was influenced by the machine perspective that developed out of the industrial 
revolution (Morgan, 1986). They looked at organizations in a rather technical manner. As 
something that could be reduced to formulas and made to operate at will. If you want it to go 
left, then do this and it will turn left. If you want it to turn right, do that. How this cybernetic 
perspective influenced Management Control System research was demonstrated by Tocher 
(1970, 1976) and Otley and Berry (1980). Others, such as Paape (1999), De Korte and Hartog 
(2005) argued that many internal auditors predominantly use the basic cybernetic perspective 
                                                 
70 Green and Welsh, 1988; Otley and Berry, 1980; Fisher, 1995; and Anthony, 1988 
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as a fundamental starting point for their work. The cybernetic perspective is also dominant in 
many text books used in the curricula of chartered accountants and auditors.  
 
What's more, since organizations are constantly adapting to the environment, models also 
need to adapt accordingly. As already noted on more than one occasion, Williamson made 
adaptation one of the cornerstones of Transaction Cost Economics. Interestingly, both Rotch 
(1993) and Otley and Berry (1982) included producing change in their models. Numerous 
authors (Kloot, 1997, Argyris, 1990, Simons, 1995a) acknowledged the necessity of what 
they call "double loop learning". What's that? Single loop learning ensures that, say, there are 
technicians who can keep the temperature at a pre-ordained level. Double loop learning calls 
for smarter technicians. They must not only master the first trick, but also be able to ask and 
answer such questions as, "is the pre-ordained temperature what we need now?" and "are 
there other ways of getting there?". 
 
Both Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory have been criticized because their 
underlying assumptions about human behaviour do not include trust. This criticism has also 
been directed at the literature on Management Control Systems. "A Management Information 
System that aspires to be foolproof … indicates lack of trust on the part of the user…. 
Subordinates' reactions will tend to be to continuously make management's assertion that they 
must be monitoring and controlling a self-fulfilling prophecy" (Argyris and Schon, 1978).  
 
Goold and Quinn (1990) agreed that trust should be part of Management Control System' 
domain. "Trust and confidence are, indeed, at the heart of any well-functioning control 
system." (1990, 53) But others see this differently and could very well be in Williamson's 
camp. That is, where they see trust, he sees opportunism. "Rather than performing well, 
employees often set low goals that can be easily met, manipulate measures to come out with 
the desired results and actually sabotage the system's information base." (Camman and 
Naddler, 1976, 67)  
 
It is the belief of Goold and Campbell that trust and control are connected. One could say that 
there is no trust without control. A control system can stimulate and boost mutual trust (Goold 
and Campbell, 1987) for three reasons. First, a track record of realized results inspires trust in 
higher management. Second, reactions caused by deviations between plan and realization 
create an image of a strong (or weak) management and their understanding of the business (or 
lack thereof). Third, the control process provides an opportunity for clear personal feedback.  
 
Summarizing the insights obtained up to now, in order to define IA's Scope of Services, we 
have to take as a starting point assessing the quality of an organization's Management Control 
System in a broad sense. Based on that, the following may be included in the Scope of 
Services.  
 
1. The processes and functions that deal with the question of the strategic direction in 
which the organization is moving. Simons (1995b) would call this the "interactive 
control systems", which should provide an answer to the question "are we doing the 
right things", and, therefore, ensure adequate adaptation. 
2. Goal and objective setting and aligning with stakeholders (corporate governance). 
3. Organizational structure 
4. The way in which authority is distributed (property rights, characterized as "decision 
management" and "decision control", as described by Fama and Jensen, 1983,). 
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5. The culture of the organization, characterized by leadership style and values (e.g.,a 
code of conduct). 
6. Planning and control cycles 
7. Feedback mechanisms based on information and reporting. 
8. Performance measurement systems 
9. Reward and incentive systems 
10. How feedback is generated and adjustments take place when processes and systems do 
not function as intended (adaptation and learning capacity). 
11. How adaptation is ensured and required changes are produced, including challenging 
paradigms that are being used. 
 
All of the above can, and should, be taken into account when drafting IA's Scope of Services. 
The problem is that one could come up with countless components of a Management Control 
System. But there is more to it than naming and listing them. The significant question is 
"what components, to what extent, and in what combinations best help cope with existing 
control problems?". That is a matter of effectiveness and efficiency, which will not be 
addressed here.  
  
Relation with the external auditor 
Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics offer explanations for the relationship 
between the internal and the external auditor (see Sharma, 1997; Kofman and Lawarrée; 
1993). Adams (1994) assumed that management sees internal audit as a mechanism to 
supervise external auditors and control costs. Of course this is also possible the other way 
around. Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) made it clear that the external auditor can be asked to 
monitor the internal auditor. 
 
A number of other studies have been carried out on this subject: Brink and Witt, (1982), 
Engle (1999), Felix, Gramling and Maletta (1998), Moore and Hodgson (1993). The IIA 
Professional Standards and the AICPA (Statement on Auditing Standards number 65), point 
at positive effects and the need for coordinating the efforts of both internal and external 
auditor. Engle (1999) points out that a good coordination leads to better audit coverage. The 
advantages of a good coordination are a decrease in audit costs (especially external), 
increased quality of the audit, more security about the correctness of the reports, and the 
external auditor keeping the internal auditor sharp. There is also the danger of too close 
cooperation leading to collusion. 
 
Morris and Morris (2002) used Transaction Cost Economics to gain more insight into the 
decision to use internal auditors for the external audit. Such a decision is comparable to the 
make or buy issue. Felix, Gramling and Maletta (1998) demonstrated that the trend to 
establish closer coordination between internal and external auditor – especially IA's increased 
input in EA's results - is predominantly caused by:  
1. The consequences of the 1992 COSO report (see Chapter 3). 
2. The pressure on external auditor fees, which led them to search for other fields to 
plow, including traditional IA tasks (see also Caplan and Kirschenheiter, 2001). 
3. The quest of IIA Inc. for more status for the internal audit profession. 
 
Transaction Cost Economics might also offer an explanation for the most efficient decision by 
management for the use of external audit. Levinthal (1988), among others, discovered that 
complexity and Asset Specificity had a positive influence on the duration of the external 
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auditor-client relationship. The higher the level of complexity and Asset Specificity, the 
longer the relationship lasted. This makes sense, because it takes time to acquire the necessary 
specialized knowledge to adequately fulfill the tasks. This is also acknowledged by 
Williamson (1985) and Speklé (2001a). 
 
Another other form of uncertainty is behavioural (Williamson, 1985). Williamson indicated 
that if this is high, it is more likely that transactions will be internalized. Such transactions are 
harder to measure and monitor and, therefore, it is more logical to use internal audit. The 
external auditor will then also lean more heavily on the internal auditor. According to Morris 
and Morris (2002), human Asset Specificity is a particularly important determinant for the 
relationship between external auditor and client. In cases of transaction specific investments, 
knowledge of the organization is very important to perform a good audit and assess whether 
the auditor has performed well. This finding is consistent with the findings of Widener and 
Selto (1999). The auditor has to make a decent investment to acquire the specific knowledge. 
Transaction Cost Economics predicts that organizations will probably start using internal 
auditors because they work within the organization and will, therefore, acquire this 
knowledge faster than their external brethren. This is also more cost efficient. Engle (1999, 
67) corroborates Williamson's view: 
 
….internal auditors who are intimately familiar with the organization under review are 
in an ideal position to provide information about the "business" behind the financial 
statements.  
 
The hypothesis is that internal auditors will be used more frequently than external auditors 
when there is a need for significant audit specific knowledge. Morris and Morris concluded 
that specific audit related knowledge is strongly associated with the use of internal audit for 
external audit tasks. This is consistent with the empirical results of Transaction Cost 
Economics. Further, this specific knowledge is more important than measures of uncertainty 
and complexity.  
 
An often-heard argument is that the use of internal auditors can decrease the costs of the 
external audit. Felix, Gramling and Maletta (2001) repeated their 1998 study and concluded 
that the level internal audit contribution to the external auditor's financial audit is an important 
indicator for the external audit fee. This is consistent with the findings of Wallace (1984). If 
management empowers a high quality IAF and emphasizes the need for coordination between 
the internal and the external auditor, there were significant savings - up to 20% - on the 
external audit fees.  
 
 
4.6 Conclusions  
 
Throughout Chapter 2 we described the current state of internal audit and concluded that it was 
in definite need of theory to provide "a place to stand". So it wouldn't go on slipping and sliding 
and be susceptible to the whims of this or that Management Board, Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee, regulator, or fashion. We decided that both Agency Theory and Transaction Cost 
Economics were theories worth exploring to take some steps in the right direction. In this 
chapter we have investigated both their background and applicability to internal audit. Agency 
Theory is essentially about 3rd order economizing, getting right marginal conditions, resource 
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allocation and employment, and providing insight for the continuous process of aligning goals 
and objectives of agents and principals through incentives and rewards. Transaction Cost 
Economics is about 2nd order economizing and focuses on governance structure. How to play 
the game. Which governance structure is best suited to deal with economizing on transaction 
costs and adaptation. 
 
Both theories share a fair amount of common ground. For example, such behavioural 
assumptions as bounded rationality and opportunism. Many studies emphasize that the two are 
complementary, and combining them might pack more punch when it comes to explaining how 
organizations do, and perhaps even should, work. Current research using one or both to tackle 
the topic of audit is based on the notion of the external auditor. Research devoted to the internal 
auditor is limited.  
 
Nevertheless, taking stock of what theory does provide, we see that Agency Theory's 
Information Asymmetry is the dominant factor used to explain the rationale of auditing in 
general. And we are quite confident that it is also valid for explaining the raison d'être of 
internal audit in particular. The higher the level of Information Asymmetry - hidden information 
and hidden actions - the sooner audit in general and internal audit in particular is deemed 
necessary. It might also provide some tantalizing clues to our other issues. That is, IA's position, 
Scope of Services, size, relationship with the external auditor, and the make or buy issue. It also 
sheds light on how to deal with IA's agency problem. 
 
But, unfortunately, there are some challenges. One is that the concepts have been defined and 
researched for the gap between outside and inside organizations. They have hardly ever been 
defined and researched for the intra organizational gap between higher and lower managerial 
levels. This is, of course, an area of particular interest to explain the role and rationale of 
internal audit. If we could define some proxies to measure that level, we would at least be able 
to use that yardstick to find a relationship between the degree of Information Asymmetry and 
the presence of internal audit and perhaps even its size. For example, the bigger the size of the 
organization, the more Information Asymmetry is expected. Thus, perhaps that should also 
mean a larger IAF. What's more, economies of scale would permit - or even compel - an in-
house department. Thus answering the make or buy question in favour of make. 
 
Agency Theory is about principal-agent relationships and how to make sure that what is being 
done by the agent is geared towards the best interest of the principal. It predicts the use of 
monitoring and monitors, and auditing and auditors naturally slot into those needs. But an 
important distinction needs to be made. This activity is called "monitoring" from the perspective 
of the principal. It is called "bonding" from the perspective of the agent, who also has his needs 
vis-à-vis the principal. One of them is to demonstrate that he is doing his job, and doing it well.  
 
One way of doing this is to show the principal his awareness and appreciation of agency 
problems, and the steps he has taken to overcome them. For example, by using auditing - in this 
case, internal auditing - to research and write reports indicating that the principal's interests are 
being looked after. In other words, top management, which is an agent vis-à-vis 
principals - called shareholders - but a principal vis-à-vis IA, also benefits from the existence of 
Internal Audit. 
 
In this respect, IA's organizational position is important. In order to gain credibility as a reliable 
witness in the eyes of the principal - that is the shareholders and their other agents (Supervisory 
Board/Audit Committee) - IA has to be perceived as being both independent and objective. Put 
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negatively and rather bluntly, he can't be seen as being the errand boy of top management. But, 
as we saw in Chapter 2, both independence and objectivity and relative terms, and we should 
not be dazzled by their grammatical simplicity and mistake them for absolutes. 
 
While the organizational position for the IA may solve the Management Board's bonding 
problems, it doesn't effectively address the principal's monitoring concerns. Those are addressed 
- sometimes not that effectively, as many serial scandals have demonstrated all too well - by the 
external auditor, which is hired by the Supervisory Board. But, in theory at least, the "principle 
of the principal" is valid. Thus, in order to really help solve the principal's monitoring problems, 
IA should be working for the true principals. That is, shareholders. Not agents masquerading as 
principals. That is, top management. 
 
The principal's agency problem vis-à-vis the Management Board could be addressed by 
expanding the mandate of IA's Scope of Services to include the operations of the Management 
Board itself. And at first, and perhaps even second, glance, that appears to be a valid option. But 
then a few advantages that Internal Audit has over external auditor would go out the window. 
According to Williamson, one of Transaction Cost Economics's major expounders and 
proponents, one of these advantages is a greater perceptive reach into the organization. Because 
the internal auditor is "one of us", people within trust him more than the external auditor and are 
more prone to open up and even point to where the bodies are buried. 
 
This according to Williamson. Another advantage, according to Williamson, is that the internal 
auditor is more flexible than the external. Since he is not subject to limiting professional 
standards, it is easier for him to "ad lib", "go with the flow" and adjust his investigatory 
approach to suit the needs of the organization. However, while that may have been true where 
and when he conceived that advantage (1985), it is no longer the case now. Or at least not 
always. Because while Internal Audit's standards may not be as rigid as external auditors, they 
are quite high and professional. But, as we have already seen, this might not be true among all 
passing muster under the category of "internal auditor". And it might not even be true for the 
majority of them. 
 
There might be another argument in favour of Internal Audit. External auditors are highly 
subject to scrutiny by regulators. And it doesn't require any stretch of the imagination to picture 
instances where both principals and agents would prefer to keep organization-specific 
knowledge outside of the public domain. In this context it is interesting to note that the Public 
Information Officer (PIO) in many, if not all, governmental departments and agencies, remains 
outside the loop in much of the deniable wheelings and dealings that go on behind the scenes. 
What he doesn't know, he doesn't have to hum, haw or lie about. This aspect might be of some 
interest when deciding whether auditing of the Management Board should be in the hands of 
external auditor or Internal Audit.  
 
Another area of contention is incentives and remuneration, which, according to Agency Theory, 
are the main instruments used to steer behaviour. They are critical for the success of any 
organization, and thus serve everyone's interests, but most especially those of the principal. 
Reviewing these - in the context of assessing Management Control Systems - could, 
conceivably, be placed in the external auditor's mandate. But based on what we have learned so 
far, that suggestion will probably be put on the shelf of bad ideas. This assessment could be 
placed in the hands of the Supervisory Board. But they probably don't have either the time or 
the necessary knowledge to do the job well. Thus the most likely candidate for the task seems to 
be, again, IA. 
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Agency Theory provides evidence that an essential part of good governance is a Management 
Board that functions well. Transaction Cost Economics provides evidence that good governance 
structure is crucial in adapting to environmental changes. And it goes without saying that 
governance is the same as "corporate governance" and is subject to those regulations. Thus 
governance, and the issues swirling around that rather entangled topic, should be subject to 
auditing. But who should do it? Or, taking one step backwards, whose input should be solicited 
before making those sorts of decisions? 
 
Obviously, the arguments that have been presented above are relevant for addressing these sorts 
of issues, even if they can't promise to definitively solve them one way or the other. 
 
Agency Theory has something to bring to the table when the issue of monitoring IA itself is 
on the agenda. As it should. Since internal auditors are also economic agents and as human as 
everyone else, there are no a priori reasons to expect that their morality and resistance to 
temptation is higher than anyone else's. And no a posteriori reasons either.  
 
And there is no shortage of already on the shelf instruments that might, with one catch and 
one exception, adequately deal with this issue. First, the catch. Some, if not all, of them have 
to be taken off that shelf and put to work. These include establishing a code of conduct and 
requiring adherence to it and internal quality control measures. Another is performance-based 
remuneration of the internal auditor, where performance is determined by finding 
shortcomings in the organizations control mechanisms, and, possibly, penalizing auditors that 
don't detect these shortcomings in time. Other instruments are: ad random checks by external 
auditor on the functioning of Internal Audit; giving preference to qualified auditors; credible 
disciplinary rules; and adherence to the professional standards of the IIA Inc.  
 
Now the exception. Implementing all of the above makes perfect sense to any contemporary 
professional internal auditor worth his salt. Except for one that sticks out like a sore thumb. 
That is the performance-based remuneration bit. To some extent this was already addressed in 
Chapter 2. But at this point I would like to foreshadow something that will be dealt with in 
more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
Agency Theory is unmistakably clear about steering the behaviour of agents through 
incentives and remuneration. However, while the IIA Inc.'s Standards of Professional Practice 
do not prohibit such carrots, many internal auditors are uneasy about having them waved in 
front of their noses. Many strongly believe, and to some extent rightly so, that these will 
further affect their ability to both be and be perceived as being independent and objective. 
While there is no denying that danger, it can be circumvented if the metrics do not touch those 
areas that the auditor is assessing. For example, the organization's financial results and stock 
option plans. They should be connected with achieving specific, pre-agreed upon goals and 
provide the CAE and IA with opportunities to earn pay out bonuses. This will raise not only 
their standards of living, but those of the profession as well. It will help internal audit to both 
attract and retain the best and the brightest. 
 
Regarding the make or buy issue, Transaction Cost Economics has a lot to contribute to flesh 
out the discussion, if not to actually provide some conclusive answers. The key words in this 
context are "Asset Specificity". According to Transaction Cost Economics, the higher the 
Asset Specificity, the better the argument is for make. One of the elements of Asset 
Specificity is knowledge. In the Internal Audit context, it is well known that highly 
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organization-specific knowledge is required to perform the audits included in its Scope of 
Services. However, there is another catch. That is the boundary issue. As the incomplete list 
of audits mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 1 indicates, a lot of highly specific 
knowledge is required to adequately perform IA's duties. But at a certain point the bubble will 
burst, and it will be more economic to outsource some of its activities. Thus, in some cases 
the answer to the question, "make or buy?" will be, "make and buy".  
 
We can say that Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics have created at least some 
inroads into all of our main questions. And some of them, especially in the area of the IA's role 
and rationale, are much more useful. In Appendix 1 the gains we've got from both Agency 
Theory and Transaction Cost Economics are shown. One has to keep in mind that these findings 
are presented as revealed by the research. It shows that not all research (sub)questions are 
equally adressed (if at all). As such, this underscores the fact that the available theory is not 
comprehensive and conclusive. Therfore, it was decided to further investigate real life via case 
studies and research whether these results would hold or even can be extended. Chapter 5 
elaborates the results of the case studies.  
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 Chapter 5 Case Studies 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2 I attempted to demonstrate the confused and chaotic state of affairs of the 
Internal Audit profession. In Chapter 3 I investigated the developments around Corporate 
Governance (Corporate Governance) and learned that these impact IA. In Chapter 4 I 
examined two theories - Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics - which at first and 
second glance seemed to offer - in the words of Archimedes' famous ancient saying - "a place 
to stand".  
 
And, indeed, Agency Theory does provide evidence for the rationale of IA. It has a role to 
play in limiting Information Asymmetry. The higher the degree of Information Asymmetry 
within an organization, the more likely there will be an IAF. And as the organization 
increases in size, the more likely it will be internalized. Does it say anything about absolute 
numbers? For example, for x number of employees there will be y number of IA staff 
members. Unfortunately not. But it has something to contribute regarding where to position 
IA. It is best to have it as close as possible to the principal. The issue then becomes who is 
IA's principal? In other words, who should it be the agent for? It is my contention that the 
natural choice is the Supervisory Board, which monitors the Management Board on behalf of 
shareholders. This will enhance its independence. But there is an external auditor, which is 
already in the hands of the Supervisory Board. Wouldn't it then be better to expand the 
external auditor's mandate to include IA tasks?  
 
Transaction Cost Economics has a few things to say about that. The higher the degree of 
Asset Specificity, the more likely it will be that capabilities will be internalized. It is fair to 
say that IA, especially in cases of high Asset Specificity, needs highly specialized knowledge. 
Knowledge that is more easily acquired inside the organization. Further, since contracts are 
incomplete by nature Transaction Cost Economics has more to offer. Information about 
whether provisions of contracts are being lived up needs to be obtained. Williamson said this 
would be easier for insiders than outsiders because they are perceived as "being one of us". 
Plus, according to Williamson, internalized staff have more flexibility than external. The 
combination of high degrees of Information Asymmetry and Asset Specificity would more 
likely create an increased need to have an internalized IA. Its scale will then be larger for 
three reasons. One, the need for IA services in general will be bigger. Two, the specialized 
knowledge is easier acquired internally. Three, the scope of services in those particular 
circumstances will be broader because the need for information on various aspects will be 
larger. This might also drive IA's size. 
 
Agency Theory also produced overwhelming evidence that demonstrates that reward and 
incentive systems are widely used to steer the behaviour of agents toward the best interests of 
principals. Thus when assessing the adequacy of Management Control Systems, one cannot 
exclude this from IA's scope of services. In that respect, Transaction Cost Economics offered 
some insights in the variety of the management control system that also includes such 
elements as leadership style and – as some call it – "culture". Thus monitoring the way the 
organization is governed and the activities of the Management Board would best be included 
within IA's scope of services. Transaction Cost Economics had previously claimed that it is 
wise to broaden IA's scope beyond the traditional financial audit anyway, since this offers 
more opportunities to add value to the organization.  
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Agency Theory has also demonstrated in more than one way the value of performance based 
rewards and incentives. The internal auditor, being an economic agent, should also be subject 
to that. If carefully chosen, performance based metrics and appropriate rewards and incentives 
offer solutions to the risks of moral hazard and opportunism, which also affect the internal 
auditor. Thus Agency Theory also offers ideas on how to monitor him and limit those risks. 
One of them is having him monitored by a knowledgeable expert: the nearest one being the 
external auditor. This and the need for EA and IA to combine efforts also explains the need to 
have a sound coordination between the two.  
 
Have Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics provided enough to deal with all our 
main issues? Again the answer is unfortunately not. Most of the research using these theories 
up to now has been devoted to external audit. And even a lot of that is rough and tumble at 
best. Research on IA is still in its infancy.  Nevertheless, when both Agency Theory and 
Transaction Cost Economics are stripped of their come hither allure - to provide one- or two-
stop shopping answers for our concerns - they remain as reasonably good starting point for 
some of them. As far as theory is concerned, there is room for improvement. As such, that's a 
perfect opportunity for designing, developing, carrying out and analyzing case studies. The 
results of the case studies that were done are dealt with in this Chapter.   
 
This chapter begins where the last one left off. I begin with research methodology, proceed to 
the case studies themselves and follow through with discussion and some conclusions.  
 
5.2 Research Methodology: Case Studies: Theoretical and 
Practical Considerations 
 
Introduction 
According to Yin (1994, 2003), a case study approach is particularly valuable when little is 
known about a phenomenon and when asking how and why questions about a set of unfurling 
events that investigators have little or no control over. Harrington (2002) seconds this motion 
and takes it a step further. Case studies are what the doctor ordered when theory and/or the 
empirical evidence base are weak, and new perspectives and serendipitous findings are 
necessary. In short, when working in a "messy" environment. As has been more than 
reasonably demonstrated, the situation in our specific work terrain more than justifies this 
approach. 
 
Using units called "cases"(Swanborn, 1996), this approach focuses on understanding the 
dynamics within single settings. But it can also include multiple cases and numerous levels - 
micro, meso, and/or macro – of analysis (Yin, 1994). It typically combines such data 
collection methods as archives, interviews, questionnaires, and observations. The evidence 
may be qualitative (words) or quantitative (numbers), or both. Case study research aims at one 
or more of three targets: providing descriptions, testing theory, and/or generating theory. 
  
Generating theory out of case studies has some definite advantages. According to Eisenhardt 
(1989b), the important strengths are: testability, the empirical validity that arises from 
intimate linkage with raw data, and the likelihood of generating novel theory. But there are 
also some definite disadvantages. One is that intensive use of empirical evidence can yield 
theory that is overly complex. A "stop confusing me with the facts syndrome". Another is that 
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results could be too pinpointed and narrow - highly asset specific – and not sufficiently 
general. 
 
Despite avowed disadvantages, Verschuren and Doorewaard ( 2001) support case studies for 
several reasons. One is that it is applicable in almost any conceivable situation, from 
explorative research to hypothesis testing. Nevertheless, if one wants to avoid being 
overwhelmed by data, the research questions in pioneering work should be couched in the 
broadest possible terms. It is also important to be flexible. Because start up questions and 
constructs are subject to changes during the course of the research.  
 
But flexibility – what some may call go with the flow spontaneity – shouldn't be allowed to 
get out of hand. It must be kept on a short leash to maximize the four aspects of a good 
design: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability (Section 5.3). 
Eisenhardt (1989b) recommends that a good balance can be achieved by both specifying ex 
ante some potentially important variables and avoiding premature (even rough) relationship- 
and conclusion-formulation. 
 
Regarding the multiple case study approach, which is used here, the following can be said. 
The evidence from multiple cases is often more compelling, and the overall study is, 
therefore, considered more robust (Herriot and Firestone, 1983). But it also has drawbacks. It 
often requires time and resources far beyond the means of a single student or unsubsidized 
investigator. 
 
My approach to this multiple-case study is illustrated in Figure 6 (slightly adapted from Yin, 
1994, 49, and Hin, Bateman, and Moore, 1983). 
Develop 
theory
Design data
Collection
protocol
Select cases
4th Case study
2nd Case study
1st Case study Write case
report
Modify
Theory 
Draw cross-case
conclusions
Define & Desing Prepare, Collect & Analyze Analyze & 
Conclude
Write case
report
Write case
report
Write case
report3rd Case study
 
 
Figure 7: Multiple-case study method for this thesis 
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One remark needs to be made about this scheme. Although the four case studies were carried 
out in the same time frame (from March 2003 till April 2004) I was not completely able to 
eliminate the influence of any one or more interviews on the others. So there probably is some 
cross-breeding. Subsequent interviews and the study of documentation also could have had 
impacts. Therefore, the scheme is not as neat and straight forward as it appears in the 
diagram. 
 
The four case study reports have been reviewed by the organizations and the promoters of this 
thesis. While they are not included in this chapter, they are available on request to interested 
professional readers. This chapter presents the results of the cross-case analysis. 
 
Analyzing qualitative data within the context of – in this case – multiple case studies is a 
tough nut to crack. Miles and Huberman (1994, 2) eloquently stated: 
 
Yet, in the flurry of this activity, we should be mindful of some pervasive issues that 
have not gone away. These issues include the labor-intensiveness (and extensiveness 
over months or years) of data collection, frequent data overload, the distinct possibility 
of researcher bias, the time demands of processing and coding data, the adequacy of 
sampling when only a few cases can be managed, the generalizability of findings, the 
credibility and quality of conclusions, and their utility in the world of policy and 
action. 
 
Harrison (Eds: Partington, 2002) noted that whether data is hard or soft, qualitative or 
quantitative, the case study researcher is faced with the challenge of dealing with complexity. 
Thus the general belief that case studies are easy to do is far from true. The most persuasive 
argument I can think of to convince those with lingering doubts on this subject is, "Try it 
yourself". The interpretation of results is more subject to the subjective arbitrariness of the 
researcher - "researcher bias" - than numerical analysis (Swanborn, 1996). 
 
Eisenhardt (1989b) recommends what she calls "within-case analysis". While there is no 
standard format for such an analysis, this step is critical. It helps researchers to cope better 
with the huge and frequently unmanageable amounts of data involved in cross-case studies. 
By writing up a detailed case study, the researcher is forced to become intimately familiar 
with it as a stand-alone entity. Unique patterns begin to emerge, which in turn might help to 
accelerate cross-case comparisons. The overall tactics push researchers beyond initial 
impressions by using diverse, but structured, lenses on data. This improves the likeliness of 
accurate and reliable theory building, and increases the probability that the investigators will 
capture novel findings. I tend to agree with Eisenhardt. Patterns do emerge while analyzing 
cross-cases. But driving enriched theory from this analysis is yet another story.  
 
Which case studies? 
Eisenhardt (1989b) also advised the use of extreme or polar cases. "The goal of theoretical 
sampling is to choose cases that are likely to replicate or extend emergent theory. Theoretical 
sampling is most common, therefore choose diverse organizations." She also highlighted the 
importance of "population", because it defines the set of entities that the research sample is to 
be drawn from. According to her, random selection of cases is neither necessary nor desirable. 
Based on the notion of opposites and diversity I developed the following two by two 
framework. This created a need to do four case studies.  
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Table 5-1 Two by two framework used for selecting the case studies 
A B N  A M R O  N VB a n k  N e d e r la n d s e  
G e m e e n t e n  ( B N G )
F in a n c ia l
T P G  N VIn f o r m a t ie  B e h e e r  
G r o e p   ( I B  G r o e p )
N o n  
f in a n c ia l
P r iv a t e  
c o m p a n ie s
P u b l ic  e n t i t ie s
 
 
From the perspective of Corporate Governance regulations, there is a clear distinction to be 
made between public and private entities. For the latter the codes discussed in Chapter 3 are 
not applicable. Further, the distinction between financial and non financial is also critical. The 
former operate in a far more regulated environment. Many laws, rules and codes apply to 
them and them alone, and they are more scrutinized by more regulators and supervisory 
bodies. 
 
The choice of these four specific organizations was first and foremost based on their 
willingness to cooperate. This was supported by the Management Board and thus ensured 
positive assistance - "buy in" - at the highest levels. It also opened the doors to the archives – 
the historical record going back at least 10 years – which helped me see how things had 
changed over an, admittedly short, period. What's more, there were no visible constraints and 
pressures that would hamper the free flow of information and skew the results.  
 
Other important selection criteria that were operative in all or some of the cases were: 
  
 They should have an IAF, either in-house or outsourced. 
 The private organizations should be operating in an environment where Corporate 
Governance regulations are applicable. 
 I should have some prior knowledge of both the company and its environment so I 
could understand more rapidly the information coming in and be able to analyze it 
more thoroughly and sophisticatedly. 
 A size large enough so it was likely to "suffer" from agency problems - Information 
Asymmetry - and, therefore, have supervisory bodies. For private companies this 
meant they had to be listed on the stock exchange. For semi-public entities – situated 
somewhere on the sometimes long and winding road between government and private 
enterprise – they had to be a Zelfstandig Bestuursorgaan (ZBO, an independent, self-
supporting organization that used to be part of government) and have an independent 
Supervisory Board. 
 I preferred "extreme" cases – opposites – in order to arrive at a better insight 
producing dynamic. 
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These criteria enabled me to delimit the domain (Swanborn, 1996). The next step was to 
select the organizations. The focus for the private companies was those listed on both the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange (AEX) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) because the 
latter would also be subject to more stringent American Corporate Governance regulations. 
The focus for public entities was considerably more limited, especially in the financial sector.  
 
I approached 10 Dutch companies: 4 agreed to participate. But due to a chain reaction of 
external events and a pileup of bad and then worse news, which were expected to unduly 
muddy the waters, one of the private companies had to be dropped. This led to a successful 
search for another subject. 
 
The number of case studies  
There has been much debate among scholars regarding the appropriate number of case 
studies. On one side, there are those who say the more the merrier, as long as the benefits of 
an additional case - in terms of generalizability generation - outweigh the burdens of actually 
doing it (Swanborn, 1996). On the other, there is more than a whiff of scepticism about this 
more pain, more gain doctrine. "With multiple-case studies, does the issue of generalizability 
change? Essentially, no. We are generalizing from one case to the next on the basis of a match 
to the underlying theory, not to a larger universe." (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 29)  
 
If I am reading this debate correctly, it hinges on the possibility - or lack thereof - of 
generalizing from cases. If the emphasis falls on the improbability of generalizing, we are 
immediately in scalding hot water. Because, as I noted at the beginning of this chapter, a 
major part of the justification for doing cases studies in the first place is to use them to 
generate new material, which can then be used to develop generalizations and theory.  
 
Without pretending to have resolved this extremely interesting debate, I have opted to go with 
Horse # 1 and those who stress the advantages of multiple cases (Yin, 1994, 2003; Swanborn, 
1996; Harrison, 2002; Eisenhardt, 1989b). Based on Swanborn's ideas (1996), looking for 
opposite poles is especially applicable for an explorative research study. In a later stage of the 
process, when the model is relatively fixed and predictions can be made about what will hold 
under what sorts of circumstances, predicted results can be set next to actual ones, compared 
and discussed. Yin (1994) calls this kind of tests "theoretical replication". 
 
When was enough enough? Generally speaking, when to add more was trying to squeeze 
blood from stones and very few extra insights were gleaned from the exercise. Quantitatively 
speaking, four to ten cases usually works well. With less than four there is insufficient 
complexity for generating theory. Having to do ten is by no means something a single 
researcher can do within a reasonable time frame. So I decided on four.  
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Data collection 
There is a link between case study choice and data collection methods and instruments. 
 
Table 5-2 Design versus data collection: different units of analysis (Yin, 1994, 72) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study focused mainly on the lower left quadrant - about an organization, from an 
individual - and to some extent on the lower right - about an organization, from an 
organization. I used Yin's (1994) preferred approach and developed some tentative 
propositions about IA based on Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics. Those 
tentative propositions were used to guide the case studies and supported the development of 
questions and analysis. 
 
I relied on the following sources. 
a. Interviews with selected individuals (see below). In order to chart what had 
happened in the last decade, retired staff were interviewed in some cases. 
b. Archival records, such as internet and intranet. 
c. Documentation (see below): such public sources as annual reports, brochures, 
books, newspapers, and company documentation.  
 
These choices were based on the fact that my research topics did not require any direct 
observations. The use of that would have caused me a considerable amount of pain without 
appreciable gain. For example, it could take up to two years to learn something that I could 
find out in a 20 minute interview.  
 
For case studies, the most important use of documents is to corroborate and augment evidence 
from other sources. But while reviewing any document it is important to remember that it was 
written for some specific purpose and audience other than those of the case study.  
Case study questions and interviews 
With regard to case study questions, the following should be taken into account: 
1) The questions are posed to the investigator, not the respondent. 
2) Each question should be accompanied by a list of probable sources of evidence. 
 
I developed a matrix that included the issues and questions and inventoried possible sources 
of evidence (interviews, archival records, etc.). I interviewed the following participants: 
 From an individual From an organization 
About an 
individual, if 
case study is an 
individual  
 
- Individual behaviour 
- Individual attitudes 
- Individual perceptions
- Archival records 
 
About an 
organization, if 
case study is an 
organization 
 
 
- How organization 
operates 
- Why organization 
works 
- Personnel policies 
- Organization 
outcomes 
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- I focused on Board Members of some regulators, mainly those involved with 
implementing regulations and recommendations in the financial services sector. For 
example, De Nederlandsche Bank, (DNB, The Dutch Central Bank), the Autoriteit 
Financiële Markten (AFM, the Dutch version of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission), and De Pensioen- en Verzekeringskamer (PVK, the regulator that 
supervises pension funds and insurance companies71). 
- Some experts in the field of IA and Corporate Governance, both in the public and 
private domain, and a number of Supervisory Board/Audit Committee members not 
connected to the case study organizations. 
- Within the case studies I interviewed: 
o The Chief Audit Executive (multiple times). 
o Board Members, mainly the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) as being direct responsible for IAF. In some cases I also 
interviewed other members of the Management Board. 
o Supervisory Board members, in most cases the chairman of the Audit 
Committee and one or more other members of the Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee. 
o The organization's external auditor. 
o The Corporate Controller or a similar functionary.  
o The Secretary to the Managing and Supervisory Board or the Legal Council. In 
many cases these functions are combined. 
o In a few exceptional cases I also interviewed managers below the Management 
Board level. 
 
The aim of the interviews was to gather information pertaining to IA during the last 10 years. 
In order to facilitate preparation I drafted the issues I wanted to discuss - derived from the 
tentative propositions - and sent those to the interviewee together with an outline of my 
research. I also sent a short questionnaire to speed up the process of data gathering. Further, 
the preliminary questionnaire aimed at gathering information rather quickly and testing the 
usefulness and applicability of the survey. In some cases this questionnaire was returned prior 
to the interview. In many cases this was done afterwards. This format is much like the one 
described by Walsham and Waema (1993).  
 
Respondents were interviewed for a short period of time - in many cases an hour, sometimes a 
little longer. The interviews were conducted in a conversational but semi-structured format, 
following the questions presented in Appendix 3. The scheme developed in Figure 2 (see 
Chapter 1) was used as a reference model to visualize the environment in which IA operates. 
 
                                                 
71 At the time of finalizing this study, the DNB and PVK were merged into one regulator; DNB.  
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A summary of the interviews is listed below. 
 
Table 5-3: Overview of interviews held 
 
Organization Number of 
interviews72 
Functions of interviewees  
ABN AMRO 11 Supervisory Board/Audit Committee members, Chief 
Financial Officer, Secretary to the Management Board, 
Chief Audit Executive and former Chief Audit Executive, 
external auditor, Senior Executive Vice President Finance 
 
BNG 11 Supervisory Board/Audit Committee members, Executive 
Board members, Head and member of Organization and 
Information Management and Compliance, Acting Chief 
Audit Executive and newly appointed Chief Audit 
Executive, external auditor  
 
IBG 11 Supervisory Board/Audit Committee member, Management 
Board, Secretary to the Management Board, Secretary to 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee, Corporate Controller, 
Chief Audit Executive and former Chief Audit Executive, 
external auditor, Member Audit Department Ministry of 
OC&W, Head of Client Services Organization  
 
TPG 9 Secretary to the Management Board, Secretary to the 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee, Chief Audit 
Executive, external auditor, Corporate Controller, Chairman 
Disclosure Committee 
 
Regulators  2 Board Members73 
 
Total 44 
 
 
 
A major purpose of the interviews was to corroborate certain facts that were already 
established (not to ask about other topics of broader, open-ended nature) via documentation 
and archival records. Interviews in general should be considered verbal reports only. As such, 
they are subject to the common problems of bias, poor recall, and poor and inaccurate 
articulation. A reasonable approach is to corroborate interview data with information from 
other sources. 
 
The interviews were recorded digitally and transcribed shortly after by an assistant. The 
transcripts were reviewed by me using the recordings before being sent on to the 
interviewees. They were asked to correct for errors or adjust whenever necessary. The final 
versions, after correction, were also sent to interviewees. In one or two cases, certain remarks 
were excluded from the historical record due to strict confidentiality, always on specific 
                                                 
72 Some interviewees were interviewed more than once, especially the Chief Audit Executive.  
73 Those two interviewees were questioned around developments with regard to Internal Audit in general and not 
related to the case studies themselves. 
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request of the interviewee. The recordings were available for review by the promoters and 
include the excluded remarks. Last but not least, the final version of Chapter 5 was also 
presented to the case study organizations for their approval.  
 
There are three principles for data collection (Yin, 1994) that were taken into account. 
1. Multiple sources of evidence; 
2. Creating a case study data base; and 
3. Maintaining a chain of evidence. 
 
With regard to those three principles I used multiple sources of evidence. This so-called 
triangulation, discussed by Patton (1987), includes:  
1) Data sources (data triangulation);  
2) Different evaluators (investigator triangulation); 
3) Perspectives on the same data set (theory triangulation); and 
4) Methods (methodological triangulation).  
 
Denzin (1978, 291) broadly defined triangulation as the "combination of methodologies in the 
study of the same phenomenon". Jick (1979, 604) wrote:  
 
In all the various triangulation designs one basic assumption is buried. The effectiveness of 
triangulation rests on the premise that the weaknesses in each single method will be 
compensated by the counter–balancing strengths of another.  
 
The case studies in my research were developed in such a way that data triangulation is 
secured. Investigator triangulation is not. However, the promoters have pushed the 
investigator by both questioning his material and also taking a closer look at it 
themselves.Theory triangulation is possible only to a limited extent because but the data has 
been analyzed using different theories. Methodological triangulation has been provided for, 
using not only the case study approach but also a survey (in that order). Jick noted (1979, 
606):  
 
It should be underscored that the quantitative results were used largely to supplement 
the qualitative data, rather than the reverse…. Triangulation in this respect can lead to 
a prominent role for qualitative evidence (just as it should assure a continuing role for 
quantitative data). 
 
Jick (1979, 610) hastened to say that triangulation may very well be a strategy that is not 
suitable for all research projects. Eisenhardt (1989) also pointed out that multiple data 
collection methods are essential for triangulation. This provides a stronger substantiation of 
constructs and hypotheses.  
 
According to Yin (1994), every case study project should have a formal database so that, in 
principle, other investigators can directly review the evidence and not be limited to written 
reports. A case study database increases the reliability of the entire case study. 
 
For my research I used the database possibilities provided by Lotus Notes. This platform 
enabled easy access and retrieval via search engines as well as predefined access trees. A back 
up copy of the material is available on my own personal computer. The only problem is that 
hard copies are not to be found in the database. Although much of the material is available in 
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electronic versions and accessible via Lotus Notes, some of it remains in hard copy files, kept 
in my office. Access is possible because a bibliography is drafted for each case study. 
 
This principle of maintaining a chain of evidence is followed to increase reliability. It allows 
external observers – for example, readers of the case studies - to follow the trajectory of any 
evidence from initial research questions to the ultimate case study conclusions. 
 
During the case studies many documents were gathered and analyzed. Those included: 
articles of association; charters of the IA and Audit Committee; minutes of meetings of the 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee, Management Board, IA, and Disclosure Committee; 
manuals; audit reports; audit planning; codes of conduct; agendas; intranet and internet 
websites; annual reports; management letters from the external auditor; correspondence with 
the Tabaksblat Committee; memos and letters pertaining to IA; correspondence with 
supervisory bodies, such as DNB and PVK; risk profiles; training programs; benchmark data, 
e.g., the Global Auditor Information Network (GAIN) from the IIA Inc.; study reports; 
compliance reports; papers by staff members; articles and bylaws; quality reviews; 
correspondence with Parliament; minutes of meetings of Parliament; reports of the Court of 
Auditors; reports of external auditors; financial reports; business plans; Corporate Governance 
reports; auditor independence policies; visitation reports; SWOT analyses; and mission 
statements. 
 
Secondary sources were articles in journals or newspapers and publicly available data, such as 
information gathered through the Chamber of Commerce. 
 
The reason for studying the archival materials was to triangulate the data. That is to check and 
corroborate information stemming from interviews and other sources. 
 
Case study protocol 
According to Yin (1994), this is essential to have when using a multiple case study design. 
The protocol is a major tactic in increasing the reliability of the case study. It should contain: 
 
 An overview of the case study project: project objectives and auspices, study issues 
and relevant readings about the topic being investigated. 
 Field procedures: credentials and access to the case study sites, general sources of 
information, and procedural reminders. 
 Case study questions: specific questions that the investigator must keep in mind when 
collecting data and potential sources of information answering each question. 
 A guide for the case study report: outline, format for the narrative, and the 
specification of any bibliographical information and other documentation.  
 
The case study objectives were aimed at: 
 
 Exploring whether the tentative propositions were validated and theoretical 
implications were justified in practice by relating the findings of the case study to the 
theories studied. 
 Providing supportive data for developing the survey. 
 Enriching theory with regard to Internal Audit. 
 Getting a clear picture of the IAF in each case study, its development and current 
status. 
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 Providing data for analyzing the relationship between Corporate Governance 
recommendations and regulations and changes in IA over the past decade. 
 Getting access to the views of the different participants and their opinions about this 
relationship in order to be able to triangulate and cross analyze the data within a single 
case study. 
 Using a format that enables cross analysis among the different case studies. 
 
A case study protocol was drafted and each case study was finalized with a case study report 
that was sent to the organizations to be approved and – if necessary – corrected. The case 
studies were held between April 2003 and March 2004 and covered the developments during 
the last decade prior to 2003.  
 
The case study reports had the following content: 
1. Introduction to the case study and company 
2. Brief history of the company 
3. Company strategy  
4. Organizational context and structure 
5. Culture and guiding principles 
6. Its IA 
7. Addressing the research questions 
8. Conclusions 
9. Appendices 
i. Organizational data 
ii. Organizational structure 
iii. List of interviewees 
iv. Documentation 
v. Used Questionnaires Used 
vi. Other 
 
The results of the case studies were compared with the tentative conclusions drafted after 
researching the relevant literature (see Chapter 4).  
Criteria for judging the quality of research design  
There are four logical tests that are commonly used to establish the quality of any empirical 
social research. These, which are also relevant to case study research, are shown in the 
following table (Yin, 1994). 
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 Table 5-4 Criteria for assessing the quality of the research design (Yin, 1994) 
 
Tests Case study tactic Phase in research in 
which tactic occurs 
Construct validity 
 
 
- use of multiple sources of 
evidence 
- establish chain of evidence 
- have key informants review 
draft case study report 
 
- data collection 
 
- data collection 
- composition 
Internal validity - do pattern-matching 
- do explanation building 
- do time-series analysis 
  
- data analysis 
- data analysis 
- data analysis 
External validity - use replication logic in 
multiple-case studies 
 
- research design 
Reliability - use case study protocol 
- develop case study database 
 
- data collection 
- data collection 
 
 
Construct validity 
Construct validity is needed to establish correct operational measures for the concepts being 
studied. This test is especially problematic in case study research. Critics point out that many 
case study investigators fail to develop a sufficiently operational set of measures and that 
"subjective" measures are used to collect data. Churchill (1979, 66) developed a framework 
for developing better measures and constructs. The purpose of his framework is to enhance 
both construct validity and reliability. One should keep in mind that Churchill developed this 
framework in the realm of marketing research where large quantities of data are gathered via a 
survey methodology. In my approach, I started with the case studies and statistical measures, 
such as coefficient alpha. While factor analysis did not apply here, it was used in the survey 
(see Chapter 6).  
 
I focused on the following tactics: using multiple sources of evidence; establishing chains of 
evidence; and having key informants review the draft case study report. 
 
Internal validity 
Internal validity is only relevant for explanatory and causal studies and not for descriptive and 
exploratory studies. Since this research is descriptive and exploratory, it does not apply here. 
 
External validity 
External validity establishes the domain to which the studies findings can be generalized. This 
test deals with the problem of knowing whether the study findings could become 
generalizations beyond the immediate case study. Generalization is not automatic and, 
therefore, the theory must be tested through replications of the findings in a second or even a 
third case, where theory has predicted that the same results should occur. Then there is at least 
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a prima facie case for accepting them in a much larger number of similar cases. Or at least 
considering them as a worthwhile point de départ to either test or refute. This is called 
replication logic. I used the multiple case study approach described above to foster external 
validity.  
 
Reliability 
Reliability demonstrates that the way a study was conducted - for example, data collection 
procedures - can be repeated and will produce approximately the same results and 
conclusions. The role of reliability is to minimize errors and biases in a study. I developed a 
case study protocol and used the case study database approach to meet the needs for 
reliability. 
 
5.3 Short description of case study companies 
ABN AMRO 
ABN AMRO is the stock exchange listed banking organization of ABN AMRO Holding 
N.V., which operates almost exclusively through ABN AMRO Bank N.V., or one of the 
numerous subsidiaries of ABN AMRO Bank. Measured by key capital, it is the 8th largest 
European bank and 13th in the world rankings. At the end of 2003 it had over 3,000 offices in 
67 countries and territories and approximately 112,000 employees. The balance total 
amounted to EUR (€) 560 billion. Its main activities are banking, investment management, 
and leasing. It distinguishes three broad customer segments.  
 
 Consumer & Commercial Clients: the daily banking of about 15 million private clients 
and relations with small- and medium-sized businesses. The home markets are The 
Netherlands, the United States (Midwest), and Brazil. 
 Wholesale Clients: large international organizations and institutions. With about 
10,000 clients, 20,200 employees, and activities in more than 45 countries, this unit is 
among the largest in Europe. 
 Private Clients and Asset Management: for wealthy private clients and institutional 
investors. This fast growing division of the organization has a strong position in 
numerous markets.  
 
ABN AMRO has an 11 member Supervisory Board, 6 of whom constitute the Audit 
Committee. As already mentioned in Chapter 3, organizations in the financial sector in The 
Netherlands are required to have an Audit Committee. Audit Committee meetings include 
other participants, such as the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and, if deemed necessary, 
others, like the Chief Audit Executive (Chief Audit Executive) and/or the external auditor.  
 
In a memorandum dated March 24, 200374, the bank re-drafted its governance structure and 
elaborated on the Audit Committee's mandate. One of its duties is to regularly review and 
discuss "the internal auditor function, the Company's group audit charter, and the organization 
+ control mechanisms". The Audit Committee may authorize or conduct investigations into 
any matter falling under the scope of its responsibilities.  
                                                 
74 Memorandum on the Governance of the Supervisory Board of ABN AMRO Holding NV, March 24, 2003.  
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Informatie Beheer Groep (IB Groep) 
The Informatie Beheer Groep (IB Groep) is a Zelfstandig Bestuursorgaan (ZBO) based in 
Groningen. A ZBO is an independent, self-supporting organization that used to be part of 
government. In this case it was semi-privatized in 1994. In other words, it is kept at arm's 
length from government and to some extent subject to market conditions. IB Groep employs 
about 1500 people. 
 
IB Groep operates at the behest of the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science and 
is responsible for the processes of application, selection, and placement of higher education. It 
collects tuitions, issues study loans, grants and student public transportation cards, and 
controls numerous education-related registrations. It is also responsible for the organization of 
state and school exams. The 2003 annual budget for these programs was about € 3.7 billion. 
Its annual turnover was about € 130 million. 
 
The Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science directs the IB Groep - at arm's length 
of course. The Minister appoints the 7-members of its Raad van Toezicht (Oversight 
Committee). It meets four times per year and functions as both its Supervisory Board and 
Audit Committee. As a monopolist active in a publicly sensitive function, the IB Groep is also 
subject to numerous other external supervisors. The most important ones are the Algemene 
Rekenkamer (the government's Court of Auditors) and the audit departments of both its 
"house" Ministry and the Ministry of Finance.  
 
A performance contract is renegotiated each year between the Ministry and IB Groep. It 
stipulates the goals to be achieved and the resources necessary to accomplish that. There is a 
meeting every 4 months to review the agreed-on indicators, and a situation update report is 
issued. This report also includes all the recommendations and actions from audit reports of the 
external accountant (not auditor), the internal accountant, the Ministry, and sometimes from 
other sources as well.  
 
N.V. Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten (BNG) 
N.V. Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten (BNG), located in The Hague, has about 400 employees. 
It was founded in 1914 on the initiative of the Association of Dutch Municipalities. Its raison 
d'être was primarily to supply the public sector with the most advantageous loans. Since 
1922, it has become a fully government-owned enterprise (50% Dutch central government, 
50% local governments). It acts as the principal Dutch public sector financial agency by, for 
example, handling monetary transactions between the central government and municipalities. 
 
BNG's main clients are government and institutions that are active in such areas as housing 
(associations), health care, education, and public utilities. But lending is limited to central and 
local governments, state-owned entities and state-guaranteed institutions. Lending to 
borrowers outside BNG's core Dutch public sector business is further restricted by the articles 
of association. Profit maximization is not the main driver.  
 
At the time of the case studies BNG had an 11-member Supervisory Board (decreased to 10 in 
2005) and a 4-member Audit Committee (decreased to 3 in 2005). The latter's meetings 
include members of its Management Board (which it calls its Executive Board), the Chief 
Audit Executive, and external auditor. Since BNG is a bank and under the jurisdiction of 
DNB, the Audit Committee is obligatory.  
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TPG 
TPG is the holding company of Koninklijke TPG Post (the Royal Mail) and TNT. It takes 
care of the strategic vision and finances that those two companies require to maintain and 
extend their market positions within mail, express, and logistics. TPG operates worldwide, 
and at the end of 2003 had 160,000 employees in about 70 countries, providing services in 
about 200 countries. It is the world's first fully privatized company originating from the public 
mail sector. In 2003 it ranked third for the fourth year in a row in the category mail, packet, 
and transport industry of the Fortune 500's "World's most admired organizations".  
 
Koninklijke TPG Post (nowadays called TNT) is the main mail service provider in The 
Netherlands and a market leader in international business mail. It has three divisions: Mail, 
Express and Logistics. The Mail division collects, sorts, transports and delivers letters, printed 
matter and packages, addressed and non-addressed mail, domestically and internationally. It 
also offers services in data- and document-management - such as direct and interactive 
marketing - and for managing physical and electronic information flows.  
 
The Express division takes care of the door-to-door transport of documents, packages and 
freight with guaranteed delivery at a very specific time and day, and provides regional, 
national and worldwide express services (mainly under the brand name TNT).  
The Logistics division goes further than transport and storage. It also designs, implements, 
and monitors complex delivery chains, and uses the most advanced technologies to guarantee 
optimal transparency and full integration of the complete logistical process. The delivered 
services depend on specific customer needs. In other words, they are custom-designed.TNT is 
a major logistics provider in the automobile, electronics and pharmaceutical sectors. 
 
TPG's Supervisory Board has a minimum of 7 and a maximum of 12 members (8 at the time 
of the study). In December 2003 the Supervisory Board approved the revision of the Audit 
Committee Charter, which was adjusted to be in compliance with the US' Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. The Audit Committee meets at least once per quarter and more than that when they deem 
it necessary. The Audit Committee decides if and when the CEO, CFO, external auditor 
and/or Chief Audit Executive attend these meetings.  
 
5.4 Case study results75 
 
The following scheme was introduced in Chapter 1 and will be followed to facilitate 
comprehension of the case study results.  
 
1. Role: This includes IA's contribution to the organization – why it was established and 
its license to operate - and how this is fulfilled. What people work there? Staff or 
outside workers? Or a combination of both? Make or buy is included in this section as 
well.  
2. Position: This includes IA's organizational position and size. In other words, who is it 
responsible to – who calls the shots. Who hires and fires, rewards and punishes it. 
How IA is monitored and controlled. 
3. Scope of services: This includes what is included in IA's scope of services and its 
relationship with the external auditor. 
                                                 
75 The case studies were executed from March 2003 till April 2004. Changes after finalizing the case studies 
were not taken into account. 
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5.4.1 Role 
 
In all of the case studies and among everyone interviewed - Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee and Management Board members, company officers and, Chief Audit Executives 
- there is a strong belief that there should be an IAF. This is not surprising for at least three 
reasons. One, each organization has a long history with IA. Two, if they didn't feel that way, it 
is hardly likely that they would have agreed to participate in this research. Three, I wouldn't 
be interested in them either. Thus bias has to be assumed. 
 
In the eyes of all interviewees, IA adds real value. The next obvious questions are: what 
exactly is this added value? What is it made of? Where is it located? What is gained by it 
being there? What would be missed if it weren't? And how much - even an approximation - 
value is added? And if not all of those questioned have been answered - and might not even 
be answerable - why is the belief so unanimous and strong?  
 
When asking why an in-house IA was necessary, I received a number of responses listed in 
the table below. I've added columns Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics and 
added X's where those responses seem to be aligned with the research results found in those 
theories. If an ? is added the alignment is rather weak and inconclusive. If it is Not 
Applicable, NA is added.  
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Table 5-5 Why Have IA?: Case Study Results Compared With Tentative Conclusions From Theory 
(Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics) 
 
Nr Response  Agency 
Theory 
Transaction 
Cost 
Economics 
1 The complexity of the organization makes it difficult 
to break in fast. 
 
X? X 
2 In order to understand the culture of the organization, 
it is essential to be there and "one of us".  
 
NA X 
3 Knowledge of the company is crucial and an in-house 
staff is better able to generate the necessary 
information. 
 
X X 
4 The organization needs to have IA available on a 
permanent basis. 
 
NA NA 
5 The frequency of audits is high. 
 
X? X 
6 An in-house IA contributes to the robustness of the 
organization. 
 
NA X? 
7 An in-house IA makes it possible to transfer 
knowledge and best practices throughout the 
organization. 
 
NA X 
8 IA is a management breeding ground option. 
 
NA NA 
9 In cases of malpractice, the possibility of issuing a 
liability claim (against third parties) is not an issue. 
Neither the Management Board or the Supervisory 
Board/Audit Committee regards this as an essential 
criterion. 
 
X? NA 
10 An outsourced IA would be more expensive. 
 
X NA 
11 Regulations in the financial sector prohibit an 
outsourced IA as long as it is economically feasible 
to have it in-house. 
 
NA NA 
 
 
Before elaborating on these responses in relation to theory it needs to be made clear that these 
responses are only those expressed by the interviewees in the case studies and, therefore, far 
from complete. It is evident that if the number of interviewees had been larger other responses 
would probably have come up. Nevertheless, it provides some insight into the matter of IA's 
license to operate in at least four distinct organizations.  
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Now let us take a closer look at the list. Response 1 seems to be aligned with both theories. 
But some interpretation is needed. From an Agency Theory perspective one might conclude 
that a slow uptake of relevant information might be due to a high level of Information 
Asymmetry, which the auditor himself is also subject to. I've added a question mark because I 
doubt whether this conclusion is justified. From a Transaction Cost Economics perspective it's 
more conclusive, because complexity is linked Asset Specificity. The higher the degree of 
Asset Specificity the more difficult it will be to break in fast and understand what is 
happening.  
 
Response 2 is even more related to Transaction Cost Economics. It is the by now classic "one-
of-us" notion, which perfectly mirrors Williamson's remarks in Chapter 4. No relation can be 
found with Agency Theory.  
 
Response 3 is consonant with both Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics. It is 
about Information Asymmetry (Agency Theory) and being one of us and might also relate to 
Asset Specificity (Transaction Cost Economics).  
 
Response 4 is not correlated with either of the two theories. The response shows a general 
belief that IA is necessary. If delved into, which I didn't, it could very well get attached to one 
of more of the other responses. 
 
Response 5 (frequency) is also related to Transaction Cost Economics – as one of the 
founding attributes. The need for audits will lead to an increased frequency of audits. In this 
particular case study it was used as an argument to have IA in-house. As the number of audits 
increases outsourcing tends to equal and exceed the costs of having it in-house and, so to 
speak, on tap. In some respect it might also be related to the Agency Theory's Information 
Asymmetry. If this is high. there might be a need to increase the number of audits.  
 
Responses 6 and 7 are about the possibilities of using audits to transfer knowledge and best 
practices throughout the organization. Williamson also made an argument about Asset 
Specificity in the sense of specific knowledge needed to conclude transactions. The higher the 
level of Asset Specificity the more difficult it will be for auditors and managers to assess what 
is going on and come to grips with what needs to be done. Thus audits can support and sustain 
the spreading of best practices and thereby contribute to the robustness of the organization. 
 
Response 8 (breeding ground concept) does not easily tie into either Agency Theory or 
Transaction Cost Economics. 
 
Response 9 contradicts what Agency Theory predicts, at least according to Caplan and 
Kirschenheiter (see Chapter 4).Their model predicted that if risks of not discovering control 
errors in a timely fashion increased, outsourcing would be preferable. Because it would then 
be possible to shift blame and financial responsibility to third parties when liability claims 
started hitting the fan. 
 
By contrast, response 10, an outsourced IA is more expensive, is supported by the research of 
Caplan and Kirschenheiter. Although they used a model – and not empirical data – they've 
demonstrated that the general preconception that an in-sourced IA is cheaper (and 
consequently an outsourced IA being more expensive) is supported.  
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Response 11, regulators requiring financial organizations to have an in-sourced IA is not 
directly related to either Agency Theory or Transaction Cost Economics.  
 
Occasionally, it is the strong belief of the man at the top that heavily affects the issue of IA's 
rationale. Although all four companies had a long history with IA - an embedded IA, so to 
speak - IB Groep acknowledged that IA's rationale and role was heavily impacted by a newly 
appointed Chairman of the Management Board after a severe case of fraud.  
 
The following scores were derived from the answers to the questionnaire in Appendix 4. 
Scoring was done on a scale of one to five, from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). 
The numbers were added up and divided by the number of respondents, providing the 
percentages shown in the table (e.g., five questions have a maximum score of 25 (5 times 5) 
and if the score of 4 respondents was 20 in total, then the percentage was 20/25 = 80%). For 
example, the higher the number the higher the degree of Asset Specificity and or Information 
Asymmetry will be.  
 
Table 5-6 Scores on Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory Attributes 
 
Scores on Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory in percentage of 
maximum possible score 
 ABN AMRO BNG TPG IB GROEP 
Transaction Cost Economics     
 
Asset Specificity 82 62 73 67 
 
Uncertainty 64 49 55 67 
 
Frequency 68 65 60 68 
     
Agency Theory     
 
Information Asymmetry 43 45 53 48 
 
 
This table demonstrates, more or less as a byproduct, that Asset Specificity shows more 
distinct and conclusive evidence than Uncertainty (most certainly) and to a lesser extent 
Frequency. Much research – as shown in Chapter 4 – has already acknowledged that Asset 
Specificity is indeed the most telling attribute of Transaction Cost Economics.  
 
Taking a closer look at the Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics scores the 
following results were gathered. None of the case studies showed a high degree of 
Information Asymmetry. The scores were: ABN AMRO 43; BNG 45; TPG 53; and IB Groep 
48 (out of a possible total of 100%). 
 
This is odd for at least two reasons. One, because the significant differences in company sizes 
– number of employees ranging from 400 to 160,000 - seems to warrant that there would be 
substantial variations in Information Asymmetry ("hidden information"). Two, because 
according to Agency Theory, larger companies operating globally and with such diversified 
services (ABN AMRO and TPG) should suffer more from it than smaller ones (IB Groep and 
BNG). So why didn't they? 
164
164 
 
The simple explanation might be that all those interviewed were high ranking officers with a 
long history within their respective organizations, who had worked their way up the ranks. 
Thus they were particularly well placed to have a panoramic view of what was happening, no 
matter where they were located now. Further, they were at the center of the information flow 
within the organization and quite heavily involved in business planning, decision-making and 
reporting and might, therefore, have developed a thorough understanding of the business and 
lower level management. Another reason might be that, while they may be aware of the 
pitfalls of Information Asymmetry, they don't believe they suffer from it.  
 
From a Transaction Cost Economics perspective the data was more compelling and 
predictive. All four case studies showed high scores on Asset Specificity. The scores were: 
ABN AMRO 82; IB Groep 67; BNG 62; and TPG 73. Thus it might not be surprising that 
they all consider an in-house IA essential. All of the companies have been long time 
committed to having an IA and none had ever even considered the make or buy question, let 
alone pondered deeply over it. While Corporate Governance regulations are not the main 
drivers for having IA, all parties do acknowledge that the rationale is at least strengthened by 
them. 
 
But a number of caveats should be taken into account regarding all these scores. First, the 
number of respondents was deliberately limited (three per company). Second, as already 
mentioned, they were all high ranked officers with a long time career in the companies and a 
good panoramic view. Third, while the questionnaire was developed using prior 
questionnaires from Widener and Selto (1999), one might, nevertheless, challenge the 
"accuracy" of the questions posed. Transaction Cost Economics elements are not easily 
captured in plain terminology, and interpretations of whether or not they are decisive factors 
might be just that. Interpretations based on the bias of either the interviewer (myself) or the 
interviewees. Or both. 
 
The degree of Information Asymmetry (Paape et al, 2005, 283) is even more difficult to grasp 
via a questionnaire76. One of the reasons for this is that little research has been done to 
actually measure it within organizations. Thus how to do it and what Information Asymmetry 
does and does not consist of and entail is a hit and miss affair, and subjective in the extreme. 
Since there has been little quantitative research on this topic, there are no established 
yardsticks - even approximate ranges - to help us determine what is high, low or normal. 
Three, Information Asymmetry is almost by definition a hazy area. In order to begin to 
approach it, you have to ask at least two separate people the same sets of questions. For 
example, the principal and the agent about, say, what the agent is supposed to do, and what he 
is actually doing. Then you would have to work out a separate methodology for comparing 
the results and calculating the asymmetry, which sounds to me like a whole separate thesis. 
How these kinds of issues have been approximately dealt with in this thesis will be discussed 
in the next Chapter.  
 
On the positive, more hopeful side, however, it was noted that the scores were very similar 
among the different respondents within the companies. The spread was very low, not only 
                                                 
76 Information asymmetry in theory is normally defined via the perspective 'outsider' versus 'insider' using 
proxies such as R&D expenditures, 'bid-spread' at the stock exchange, etc. Defining it from the perspective of the 
Board versus lower level management in organizations has never been done. Appendix 3 shows the questions 
that were used to come up with a measure for Information Asymmetry.  
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between the companies, but also among respondents. Further, there was some circumstantial 
evidence about the applicability of Information Asymmetry, because questions along those 
lines did not raise eyebrows and elicit questions as to what was meant by certain questions. 
 
A last remark needs to be made regarding the make or buy issue. Among my respondents and 
elsewhere as well, there is a general belief that an external party is an occasional 
inconvenience, someone to be suffered rather than preferred. And the most obvious candidate 
for that reference has always been the external auditor. Nowadays, Corporate Governance 
regulations, like Sarbanes-Oxley, prevent the external auditor from providing IA services. 
And while Sarbanes-Oxley is not applicable to all organizations, there is a tendency to adopt 
it in companies that fall outside its jurisdiction. 
 
If presented with the possibility that a third party could become semi-permanent fixture or 
even be organized as a dedicated team, the response was even less than enthusiastic. For one 
thing, the respondents thought, the costs would be too high. For another, the outsider could 
not acquire an intimate understanding of the culture, which, the respondents thought essential 
for a proper functioning. 
 
5.4.2 IA's Position 
Centralization is the prevailing theme 
With regard to IA's organizational position, three out of the four cases have a history of 
significant changes. Those are IB Groep, TPG and ABN AMRO. Essentially, the before story 
was IA, or parts of it, was decentralized and subject to lower, division-level management. The 
after story was centralization and being brought under the umbrella of top management.  
 
The changes were most profound within IB Groep. Between 1995 and 2001 both the 
Supervisory Board and Management Board uniquely demonstrated limited interest in its 
activities and did not place it high on their agendas. IA was a decentralized function focusing 
on assuring the reliability of financial data and ascertaining compliance with relevant 
regulations. Then a fraud, which had been on going for several years, was discovered in 2002. 
That and the appointment of a new managing director in 2001 were responsible for some 
major changes. The IA was shifted from the Corporate Control Function, where it had been 
placed in 1997, and centralized under Corporate Staff. It was made a separately positioned 
department. A new Chief Audit Executive was appointed in October 2002.  
 
Part of the decentralized before story was the belief that IA assignments could be best 
performed close to the operations. The 1997 shift to Control was based on trying to achieve 
synergy between audit and control. But those synergies were never realized. In cases of 
conflicting interests in Control and Audit, Control, not surprisingly, always won. And then, 
with the fraud, everything changed dramatically. 
 
According to those interviewed, maximizing IA independence and impartiality were among 
the reasons for separating it from Controlling and centralizing it. Since then, the IA's position 
has been strengthened. This can be deduced from the appointment of a new Chief Audit 
Executive and the establishment of an Audit Committee as part of the Supervisory Board. 
Previously, the Audit Committee was staffed with internal officers only. What's more, the 
number of Internal Audit staff increased from 8 to 11.  
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Within TPG the IA story is considerably more confusing. The before story was there were 
two separate IA's. One, a 10-member staff at headquarters, which reported to the CFO. 
Another 40-member staff at KPN, which reported to the Divisional Finance Director. The 
scope of services was focused mainly on financial and compliance audits. Some quality 
assessments (ISO/EFQM) were covered. Among the Management Board and the Supervisory 
Board/Audit Committee there was no perceived value added, and the primary aim was to save 
money on external auditor (which was provided by PricewaterhouseCoopers). The average 
age of auditors was over 40 and the educational standards were not up to contemporary speed. 
Many were long time career auditors without professional qualifications. There was no link 
with the Audit Committee. 
 
After its de-merger from KPN in 1998, TPG became a separately listed company. In 2000 the 
company created the three divisions mentioned earlier - Mail, Express, and Logistics - and its 
Corporate Audit Services (CAS) inventoried its own structure and position. The new Chief 
Audit Executive, appointed in 1999, decided it was time for a major transformation. The IA 
was decentralized and each main division was supposed to have its own. CAS was to have 
functional responsibility for the decentralized IA's. But the administrative side was to be 
handled by Divisional Management. While the Mail Division, which already had an IA, 
bought in pretty quickly, the other two did not. In fact, they didn't have an IA and it took a lot 
of persuasion to convince them that they actually needed such a thing. Once that happened, 
Express turned around fairly rapidly - they aren't called "Express" for nothing – and 
welcomed IA. For Logistics the same process took about two years.  
 
This decentralized structure had a few downsides. One was that divisional management not 
only picked up the tab for IA, but also controlled it. The Chief Audit Executive needed to 
make sure that audit plans were executed and, if altered, that it was in the best interest of TPG 
as a whole. Fierce discussions ensued when it was necessary to redirect audit resources to 
other divisions. The divisional management's reasoning was pretty basic, and comprehensible 
within its strictly limited context. "We have our own interests and needs. Why should we cut 
back on them? After all, we're footing the bills." This situation quite often created conflicts of 
loyalty.  
 
The argument for decentralization, which was based partially on the Management Board 
wanting a lean and mean headquarters, was becoming increasingly wobblier. At the same 
time the argument for centralization was becoming stronger. Part of the logic was driven by 
efficiency concerns within the organization. Centralization was the best way to unify 
operations, optimize resources and maximize the coordination and performance of approved 
audit plans. Transparency would go up a notch. Another driver was the tightening noose of 
Corporate Governance regulations and "strong" recommendations in the US and Europe, 
which required TPG to demonstrate the adequacy of its internal control system and sign off 
on that.  
 
Thus the divisional IA's were integrated into the central CAS system by the end of 2003. CAS 
now has two distinct subsets. One for the national and another for the international side of the 
business.  
 
The story for ABN AMRO is less jarring. Group Audit was centralized from the start in 1992. 
In 2000 three Strategic Business Units (Supervisory BoardU's) were created. Each 
Supervisory BoardU would be self-supporting and have its own IA. While the Chief Audit 
Executive did not support this move and the Audit Committee positively objected to it, the 
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decision makers rammed it through. Supervisory BoardU's got their own IA. Provisions and 
constraints were drafted. One of those was that the quality of the work and the actual audit 
planning should not be hampered by local management, and if that happened, Group Audit 
would re-perform some of the work.  
 
The Chief Audit Executive concluded within 6 months that due to breaches of the provisions 
he was becoming a trouble-shooter, constantly overlooking the actions of local audit staff. 
Soon thereafter it was decided that decentralized audit functions would once again be 
hierarchically subjected to Group Audit. Yet due to difference of opinion between the Head of 
Audit Inspection of Business Unit The Netherlands and the Chief Audit Executive one stand 
alone IA remained. At the end of 2003 a new initiative was taken to integrate this last separate 
audit unit with Group Audit.  
 
The number of staff was 300 for Audit Inspection. This number had to drop by 33% to 200. 
The grand total for Group Audit by then is some 750.  
 
The independence issue rears its head: who's in charge? 
IA's position inside the organization is deeply entangled with independence and objectivity 
issues. Independence is defined as freedom from material conflicts that threaten objectivity 
and objectivity is defined as freedom from bias (IIA Inc., 2001b). The stand of the IIA Inc. is 
that organizational position is a determining factor for independence, which in turn fosters 
objectivity. As shown in Chapter 2, external auditors tend to judge the level of IA 
independence based on organizational position and reporting lines. 
 
In that same chapter, we discovered that independence and objectivity are relative in nature. 
But while the degree of independence may be enhanced by IA's organizational position, it 
does not guarantee it. And it certainly doesn't guarantee it to the extent that we can use the 
word "independence" as a stand alone semi-noun. The Chief Audit Executive's I interviewed 
are within the organization and are currently responsible to, and compensated by, the 
Management Board. But things don't change all that much even when he is outsourced. The 
Management Board pays his fees in those cases as well. And as I have had more than one 
occasion to note, he who pays the piper calls the tune. Thus, as long at IA is in the hands of 
the Management Board, it can never be independent of it and objective about it. 
 
The question then arises whether IA's overall independence and objectivity will be enhanced 
if its organizational position is altered. If so, what will be the best level to report to? In 
Agency Theory terms, IA is bound to be the agent of some principal. The question is, which 
one? And that is also the question for us here. At what reporting level in the organization is 
IA independence and objectivity maximized? 
 
While the tendency in Corporate Governance regulations is to place the responsibility for 
supervising both Internal Audit and external auditor in the hands of the Audit Committee – in 
the one-tier environment and to some extent also in the two-tier - this is not at all subscribed 
to in the four case study companies. While there was general agreement (with one exception) 
that IA independence would be greatly benefited by the Chief Audit Executive reporting to 
the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee and be present at Audit Committee meetings when 
audit issues were being discussed, it was considered not done to even suggest that IA would 
not remain subject to the Management Board. 
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When asked whether this might create a "serving two masters" scenario, the answers varied. 
The bottom line was that the answers very much depended on who was being asked. Not 
surprisingly, all the Chief Audit Executive's recognized the slipperiness of the situation. One, 
who for obvious reasons wishes to remain anonymous, described his approach to the 
"challenge" with graphic eloquence. 
 
Whenever I am directly addressed by the Audit Committee in a meeting I 
constantly look while answering from the corner of my eyes to see the reaction of 
the Management Board members present. 
 
Having said that, it is important to add that many of the Chief Audit Executive's noted it was a 
"doable" dilemma. For example, the Chief Audit Executive at TPG said he always reports 
first to the Management Board, and wouldn't dream of bypassing it. He said that if and when 
the Audit Committee became responsible for CAS, TPG's version of IA, it would enhance 
independence. But it would do so at the cost of being internal. As far as the rest of the 
company was concerned, CAS would become a de facto external auditor. Since he believes 
this wouldn't benefit anyone – including CAS itself – it should be avoided. 
 
Other interviewees, equally unsurprisingly, tended to minimize the "challenge". Yes, to a 
certain extent, there might be some cause for discomfort and concern. But they certainly 
weren't grave, and any well educated Chief Audit Executive could easily juggle any possible 
embarrassments. By delegating the responsibility – passing the buck – for the problem to the 
Chief Audit Executive, they are effectively trying to wash their hands of it and, as we say in 
Dutch, think it away (wegdenken).  
 
Within the IB Groep, all parties agree that the Chief Audit Executive should be present in 
Supervisory Board and Audit Committee meetings when IA reports and plans are being 
discussed. That promotes direct contact between IA and supervisors and contributes to the 
assurance the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee need. But up until now there have not 
been any direct meetings between the Chief Audit Executive and the Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee. This might be explained by the fact that the Audit Committee only recently 
(2003) came into existence. 
 
At ABN AMRO, independence and objectivity are, according to its Audit Charter, essential to 
IA's effectiveness. How is this achieved? Even though the Charter indicates knowledge of 
"contemporary opinions of authoritative supervisory bodies and commissions throughout the 
world [that] also dictate the highest possible independence of the IAF as well as the Audit 
Committee", their answer is not by subjecting it to the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee, 
but, rather, to the Management Board. The Chief Audit Executive has a primary responsibility 
to two chairmen: that of the Management Board and the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee. 
He must report his findings to the former "with discretion". It doesn't say how he is supposed 
to report to the latter. 
 
ABN AMRO'S Chief Audit Executive is fully responsible for an adequate, organization-wide 
execution of the IA. For managerial issues he reports to the corporate CFO, who is himself a 
manager. The same CFO, who in consultation with the CEO, appraises and pays him. It is 
clear that this situation might somehow affect his independence and objectivity.  
 
To somehow offset the imbalance and help assert the authority of Group Audit, the Charter 
allows IA to initiate an escalation procedure. The extent of the escalation is determined by the 
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seriousness of the case. Since the Charter does not specify how to determine the level of the 
case's seriousness, this is left to the Chief Audit Executive's discretion. At first glance, that 
seems to be highly empowering. It is. But it comes with some downsides. When initiating 
escalation procedures he might be in danger of being perceived as overreacting.  
 
The Audit Committee members feel the need to oversee the proper functioning of IA, and 
require that they are involved in a number of areas. Such as planning, scope of services, 
hiring, firing and appraising the Chief Audit Executive, and highlights of audit reports. One 
special area of interest was breaches by top management of the code of conduct. This will be 
dealt with further below.  
 
There are, however, some distinctions among individual Audit Committee members. Being an 
American, the new chairman of ABN AMRO's Audit Committee (as of January 1, 2004) has 
experience in the one-tier system and described the Audit Committee's notable rise in 
importance since Sarbanes-Oxley went into effect. Before that, it was more or less a breeding 
ground for less senior non-executive members. But due to its enhanced status this has 
changed significantly. He is now convinced that it should become more deeply involved with 
setting IA's agenda, and in that respect at least it is one of IA's masters. But he does not 
believe this creates the problem of "serving two masters" for the Chief Audit Executive. He 
contends that any professional should be able to deal with that.  
 
Being experienced in the two-tier environment, the other members of the Audit Committee 
are of another persuasion. They acknowledge that the Management Board is the "master" and 
not the Audit Committee. Although the Charter allows the Audit Committee to require the 
execution of certain investigations by IA, which the two other interviewed members also 
acknowledged, they strongly agree that this does not imply "mastership". This is also 
supported by the Chief Audit Executive, who is, however, highly aware of the potential 
conflict of interests between the Audit Committee and the Management Board. He also stated 
that the Audit Committee's becoming more "probing" is probable cause to believe that this 
issue is becoming more important. The Audit Committee and the Management Board agree 
that due to changes in Corporate Governance regulations and discussions the Audit 
Committee is becoming more probing.  
 
The CFO was somewhat reluctant to talk about conflicts. He preferred to describe the 
relationships between the Management Board, Audit Committee and IA as "interplay". 
Although the Supervisory Board sometimes meets with the Chief Audit Executive without the 
presence of the Management Board, the Audit Committee does not as a rule have separate 
meetings with him. He strongly supports the premise that the Chief Audit Executive should be 
able to speak freely and independently, and his professionalism should provide sufficient 
basis to do so. Since IA is traditionally an instrument in the hands of the Management Board, 
he opposes the idea that responsibility for it should be transferred to the Audit Committee. 
The former Chairman of the Audit Committee did occasionally confer with the Chief Audit 
Executive, either via phone or in person. Both reported these meetings to the Management 
Board in advance, and issues addressed were reported after. 
 
The Audit Committee’s rise in importance is notable. As described by the CFO and the 
secretary of the Management Board, meetings with the Supervisory Board in the past, took 
longer than meetings with the Audit Committee. Nowadays, this has been reversed. The main 
issues around financial reporting, risk and control, are first addressed in the Audit Committee 
and then prepared for decision-making by the Supervisory Board. 
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As will be shown in Chapter 6, the general issue of the "mastership" of IA is reflected by the 
responses to the survey. There was some reluctance to score such questions as, "The IAF will 
be supervised by the Audit Committee due to the corporate governance regulation". This 
reluctance was especially true for members of the Audit Committee. The preference was for 
verbal discussions in detail.  
 
In all the case study companies Audit Committee members are highly aware of the need to 
maximize IA independence. They supported the idea that that independence is increased when 
it does the supervising. Internal and external auditors also believe that direct reporting to the 
Audit Committee would maximize independence. What is remarkable, however, is the 
seemingly hard and fast position in all the companies that if the Audit Committee actually 
made a bid to take charge of IA, the Management Board would create a new, separate IA, 
which would report only to them!  
 
BNG's Audit Committee has both the Chief Audit Executive and external auditor present in 
its meetings. IA submits its planning for review by the Audit Committee. Formally, the 
approval of the planning itself is reserved for the Executive Board. But they may ask the 
Executive Board to adjust it based upon their recommendations. IA reports high-level 
findings to the Audit Committee as well. The Audit Committee is involved in hiring the Chief 
Audit Executive and his resignation. Although these decisions belong to the Executive Board, 
commitment at the level of the Audit Committee is implicitly required and consultation 
preferred. One of the Audit Committee members expressed the view on hiring as follows: 
"The Audit Committee should have the right of refusal."  
 
IA's position has always been at the highest level of the company. Until May 2003, it reported 
to the President of the Executive Board. That responsibility was transferred to another 
member of the Executive Board more familiar with the auditing profession, but that was only 
due to changes that took place within the Executive Board itself. But the Chief Audit 
Executive has unlimited access to the Chairman of the Supervisory Board and the President of 
the Executive Board. The Chief Audit Executive also has periodic meetings with the full 
Executive Board.  
 
Two out of four Chief Audit Executive of the case study companies report to the CFO. One 
reports to another member of the Management Board. But all three are allowed to call upon 
the CEO and the Chairman of the Audit Committee when necessary. Only the Chief Audit 
Executive of IB Groep reports to the CEO.  
 
Most of the external auditors of the case study companies have a clear vision about IA's 
independence. According to them, IA is part of the organization and by nature not 
independent.  
 
Size and staffing of IA: rather stable numbers over the years 
While theory does not directly provide clues regarding IA's size, it does so indirectly. These 
circle around the by now familiar themes of the level of Asset Specificity (Transaction Cost 
Economics), frequency of audits (Transaction Cost Economics), and Information Asymmetry 
(Agency Theory). These might lead to a greater need for audits - not only more of them, but 
also a greater variety in the scope of services - and thus a need for a larger IA. While the case 
studies corroborate this to some extent, there are some significant differences. ABN AMRO, 
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for instance, has an IA of 750. TPG has only 49. In other words, in terms of staff the IA in 
one is more than 15 times larger than the other. 
 
The explanation cannot be found in either the size of the companies - again, in terms of staff - 
or the spread of operations. ABN AMRO has 112,000 employees, TPG 160,000. The former's 
reach of operations is 67 countries, the latter's 62. Thus it must probably be sought in the 
industries they are operating in - financial versus mail/logistics - and, perhaps, their product 
portfolios. In that respect it might be true that once again Asset Specificity has more 
predictive power than Information Asymmetry since the complexities of the industry are more 
related to Asset Specificity than to Information Asymmetry. The scores for both Asset 
Specificity (ABN AMRO 82 versus TPG 73) and Information Asymmetry (ABN AMRO 43 
versus TPG 53) do not differ much, which does not provide any ground for a conclusive 
conclusion as to the why of the huge difference in audit staff.  
 
From the perspective of the size of the company, one might regard BNG's IA (7 out of a total 
staff of 400) and IB Groep (11 out of 1500), oversized. However, since there is a minimum 
limit to the size of their IAF's, especially when one takes into account the need to have several 
disciplines available, it seems to me that there is no possibility for them to gain in economies 
of scale.  
 
In many cases IA staff numbers have done everything except decrease (see table below). TPG 
audit staff dropped from 50 to 49, but in 2005 rose to 55. BNG remained steady at 7. IB 
Groep inched from 8 to 11. At ABN AMRO, IA staff numbers over the years went up and 
down. But that was mainly due to repositioning of internal control staff to Group Audit. The 
actual number was by then 750. 
 
Table 5-7 Staffing of IA in case study organizations 
 
 
Staff level ABN AMRO BNG TPG IB GROEP 
Total number 750   7 49 11 
Years of experience    7 22   5   5 
Budget (€ million) 105     0.7   6 not specified 
Average age staff   33 48 35 not specified 
Turnover rate per year   15  0 15   5 
 
 
Based on the case studies, the educational level (see table below) went up during the last 
decade. Between 70-85% of the staff of ABN AMRO, TPG, and BNG are now chartered in 
Accountancy, EDP auditing, Operational Auditing, or other academic studies. Only IB Groep 
has a significantly higher percentage of higher vocational education trained staff: 63%. 
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Table 5-8 Educational level of IA staff in % in case study organizations 
 
 
Education level in % ABN AMRO BNG TPG IB GROEP 
CPA/RA 20 57 43 9 
RE 15 43 12 18 
RC 10 0 0 0 
RO 10 0 7 9 
CIA 15 0 9 9 
Other academic 20 15 0 0 
Higher vocational  10 0 17 63 
Support staff 15 15 12 9 
Other  0 0 0 0 
Total 115 130 100 117 
 
Totals may exceed 100% due to some overlaps 
 
 
Some remarks were made regarding the level of IA's multidisciplinary knowledge of the 
business. Some point out that in that respect the quality of IA should increase. One 
interviewee pointed out that this could very well be realized by creating a two-way street 
breeding ground policy. However, the same interviewee questioned whether that would be 
feasible, because many managers might not see IA as a promotion. Although, interviewees 
had doubts about the quality of IA staffing, they did not have a simple solution to the problem 
and all companies seem to have accepted that. Based on the interviews, it seems that the level 
of the paycheck may be one explanation, which is, incidentally, consistent with Agency 
Theory. Chief Audit Executive's were not always paid the same amount as their peers in the 
company.  
 
How to control IA  
In almost all companies this is a less well-discussed and developed area. It is not easy to find 
measures that capture IA's performance level in achieving its objectives. A major obstacle to 
pushing ahead in this area is the difficulty in quantifying what those objectives are. 
 
In this respect Internal Audit is not much different than other services: more difficult to 
measure and monitor than physical goods. In other words, despite the old jokes, it's no longer 
about counting the number of beans in the jar. This was already discussed in Chapter 2. First, 
it is difficult to find suitable performance metrics. Second, it is yet another issue of how to 
reward the Chief Audit Executive. If it is difficult to find the right metrics to assess the 
performance of the Chief Audit Executive, then it will be equally difficult to assess the right 
level of incentives and rewards.  
 
173
173
For the latter, Agency Theory offers some ideas. There are three main areas to explore. First, 
it is possible to link performance metrics for the Chief Audit Executive to the overall financial 
results of the organization. Many consider this undesirable, because it could hamper the Chief 
Audit Executive's objectivity. In order to protect and even bump up his own interests he might 
be tempted to go with the flow instead of reporting unbiased what is going on in the 
organization. Second, it is also possible to create incentives that are linked to non-financial 
results of the company. Although many think those are preferable, there is no inherent reason 
to consider them better. Because they too might hamper his objectivity. The third option is the 
setting specific, predefined specific goals for the IAF/Chief Audit Executive. But as we have 
already seen that is extremely difficult. So let's see how these issues are tackled in our case 
study companies.  
 
A seeming exception to the rule was the well-defined and objective goals found at TPG. A 
total of 25 performance indicators were established. Examples are: percentage of audits 
completed (versus plan); percentage of Control Risk Self Assessments (versus plan); 
employee satisfaction survey results; timeliness of staff performance appraisals; training days 
per employee, and internal customer survey results. One might argue that there are a few that 
are hard to measure. Such as: staff quality indicator. This is calculated using such metrics as 
diplomas and turnover, which, if actually used, probably leads to complex numbers that 
conceal more than they reveal. Management succession plan in place is another. The existence 
of such a plan all by itself is not scored positively. It is the quality of the plan that counts. But 
how do you measure that? Against what framework and background? What is the norm?  
 
Within TPG, however, those objectives are connected to a performance based pay of the 
Chief Audit Executive. There is a relation between his annual pay and whether or not he met 
his goals. Thus real incentive is built into his contract, which is what Agency Theory 
recommends. 
 
Within ABN AMRO, each year clear objectives are drafted in advance to guide IA operations. 
IA provides on a regular basis the Management Board and the Audit Committee with reports 
that state the status and progress of its audits. The process seems to be both objective as well 
as subjective by nature. Unlike the other Chief Audit Executive's interviewed, this one is 
rewarded according to a performance-based contract. These performance criteria do not 
include the financial outcome of the Bank as a whole, but specific goals for the IAF/Chief 
Audit Executive. ABN AMRO's practices seem to be in alignment with Agency Theory, 
because it views performance-based rewards as a tool – incentive – to steer behaviour.  
 
By contrast, the questionnaire among the other case studies showed significant conformity in 
the opposite direction. That is, among the Management Board, Audit Committee or Chief 
Audit Executive, no one really favors performance-based rewards for the Chief Audit 
Executive. Interviewees said this might lead to behaviour that does not contribute to IA 
objectivity.  
 
One possible other explanation might be that both ABN AMRO and TPG are large 
organizations that use performance based incentive schemes all the time and across the board 
and are, therefore, quite at home with them. This is not the case for both IB Groep and BNG. 
It should be mentioned that BNG has performance based incentive schemes but on a much 
smaller scale than ABN AMRO and TPG.  
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Another equally, if not more, substantial problem is that any appraiser would need highly 
specific knowledge to be able to adequately assess the indicators. They say that it takes a thief 
to catch a thief. And the same could be said - with the necessary changes, of course - in the 
field of auditing. One of the solutions for overcoming these problems is to make use of the 
external auditor. With the exception of TPG, the external auditor performs ad random checks 
on the quality of IA.  
 
In many respects, using external auditor to "audit" Internal Audit is a highly commendable 
approach. But there are downsides as well, especially when the Chief Audit Executive is 
supposed to monitor external auditor's performance. This hand in glove circularity might lead 
to situations of unwished for intimacies. Unwished for on the part of both the Audit 
Committee and Management Board, not the auditors themselves. They might quite easily fall 
into the trap of "I'll scratch your back if you scratch mine" and cut each other all too much 
slack. As already noted by Antle (1982), the Chief Audit Executive is just as human and an 
self interested economic agent as everyone else.  
 
Monitoring IA is quite often done by regulators, other supervisory bodies, or professional 
bodies. ABN AMRO and BNG are also monitored by De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB). In the 
case of ABN AMRO there are quite a few other regulators and supervisors, mainly abroad, 
assessing the quality of its IA. Supervision of IA by such professional bodies as the 
Nederlands Instituut van Register Accountants (NIVRA, Dutch Institute of Registered 
Accountants) and IIA The Netherlands is still so minimal that a good case could be made for 
its non-existence. The IIA The Netherlands issued a Quality Assurance standard to be adopted 
by members. This standard was accepted by them in a June 2004 meeting. It recommends 
monitoring members and their adherence to the Standards of the IIA Inc. This is done every 
four years by assessing IAF's.  
 
In terms of the numbers, it is much easier to assess whole departments than individuals. There 
are simply less of them. But that doesn't make the problem go away, because the assessing 
will be done by the members themselves. One can almost hear the backs being scratched from 
here. In other words, independence and objectivity might be issues. The IIA The Netherlands 
announced that it would review the policy in a number of years to see whether these problem 
have in fact come up. How they plan to discover and assess whether when and how often that 
occurs remains a mystery. 
 
The policy is not aligned with the one of the IIA Inc., which states that an external (my 
emphasis) party should review every IAF every five years. External in this respect is certainly 
not a member of the IIA Inc. Up till now, no "external party" has formally reviewed any IAF 
of the case study companies. 
 
Such measures as client and employee satisfaction surveys are used inside all the case study 
IA's. In addition, all have a quality assurance process, which uses an audit manual and, in 
many cases, software tools to demonstrate the proficiency of its operations.  
 
During the interviews I asked whether measures applied to the external auditor - peer reviews, 
external oversight, quality and risk management systems, and rotation on partner level every 7 
years - should also be used with internal auditors. A number of respondents, especially at the 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee level, said that there might be some value in that. Others 
said that this would create too much of a burden on IA without significant gain. As far as 
rotation is concerned, some see a definite dynamic - and a need to find the exact balance - 
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between experience with one particular company and myopia. Some state that in-depth 
experience is an essential element of any good Chief Audit Executive and at the heart of his 
value added. Others contend that staying in the same position for too long - 5 to 10 years77 - 
can lead to staleness and missing the bigger pictures.  
 
All the respondents agreed with the statement that IA will be subject to more reviews, and 
will increasingly have to account for its actions. All interviewees recognized that the 
increased regulation emphasizes the need for quality assurance and the effect it will have on 
the operations of IA. This will ultimately create a need to document all actions and will 
inhibit informal communication, so treasured by many internal auditors. In other words, while 
contributing to more transparence in the companies they work for, they will have to become 
more transparent themselves. It is envisioned by most of he interviewees that such measures 
could drive up IA's quality. But one Management Board member was concerned that it might 
be too much to chew on and there could be overkill. 
 
Another side effect of enhanced focus on Corporate Governance regulations is that it will 
foster a more compliance-oriented approach by IA. What, when and how IA brings issues to 
the attention of those concerned will be more in writing and more formally documented. If 
something goes wrong, terribly or otherwise, IA will need to demonstrate where it was at the 
time and what it was doing. 
 
In the current environment, IA might on occasion be able to act informally, enabling a 
smooth, good old days process while achieving the same, or better results than formal and in 
writing. But that approach is fast on its way to becoming ancient history. Most regretted the 
increased orientation of a compliance-oriented approach. Some said it might be counter-
productive. All said it was inevitable. 
 
5.4.3 Scope of services  
There is a trend regarding the scope of services. It is not described, nor even mentioned in the 
literature. But it becomes rather clear to those who have been around in the profession for a 
while and have surveyed the data. That is, to make yourself as indispensable as possible by 
offering whatever services are being clamored for at any given moment. I already discussed in 
Chapter 2 the "unbundling" framework provided by Matthyssens et al. to provide some 
explanation for this contention. Their framework gives rise to at least two questions.  
 
One, why is there a need to become a jack of all trades and to promise probably a lot more 
than you can deliver? Unlike most other things in this tangled tale, that's quite simple. 
Because up till now there is nothing self-evident and obvious about Internal Audit. And on the 
whole - that is, in most sectors and most countries - it has not been mandatory. Thus in order 
to justify its continued existence it has to keep on proving itself. 
 
Two, what is the market? Or to be more precise, who is the market? The answer to that is 
equally simple. Up until now, it has been first and foremost some level of management, either 
at the lower levels of the various lines, or in the executive suite on the top floor. Staying alive 
meant doing management's bidding, and doing it well. 
 
                                                 
77 There have been some studies that revealed that the average number of years of Chief Executive Officers 
being in office is declining. Although there hasn't similar studies for Chief Audit Executives there is at least 
some anecdotal information that this might be true for them as well.  
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Starting off with its focus on financial audit, closely working together with the external 
auditor and providing assurance on the financial data, IA sought to expand its empire of 
services to other areas. The financial audit became a commodity, which was also provided by 
the external auditor. This competitive force led the profession down the path of differentiation 
and finding new services. For example, operational audit, IT audit, compliance audit, and the 
like. With consulting services the bag of tricks swelled out even more. 
 
Some might ask whether this was market pull - management demanding more services and IA 
rising to the occasion - or push - the profession inventing "diseases" and then serving up the 
"cure". That might be another of those unanswerable chicken or egg question. However that 
may be, the results are the same. For an overview of the current data take a look at the table 
below.  
 
Table 5-9 Time spend by IA in % 
 
 
Time spend by IA in % ABN AMRO BNG TPG IB Groep 
Financial Audit     7.5   2 44   5 
Operational Audit 55 30 14 65 
Compliance Audit not specified 15   8     2.5 
IT/EDP Audit 30 30 14 20 
Fraud/investigations 10   0   4     2.5 
Consulting   0 10   5 not specified 
Other   0 13 26    5 
Total 102.5 100 115 100 
 
Totals may exceed 100% due to some overlaps 
 
 
The version of the questionnaire used in the case study companies (see Appendix 5) also 
surveyed the need for certain specific audits. It turned out that among those surveyed there is 
a widespread belief that IA's scope should be even further broadened and include such areas 
as the tone at the top/ethics, reliability of non-financial data, risk management, effectiveness 
and efficiency of operations, and change processes. The data also shows that it is not just a 
broadening. More audits with higher budgets are also foreseen. This in itself might cause 
further diversification instead of a turning back the clock towards plain vanilla financial audit 
as some predict as a consequence of Sarbanes-Oxley. Time will tell who is right.  
 
While Supervisory Board/Audit Committee members don't formally and specifically call upon 
IA to report about the "tone at the top", they do expect them to do so when there's probable 
cause. Probable cause in this case being somewhere in the neighborhood of possible breaches 
of codes of conduct by senior officers, which, following the charter, should be reported to the 
CEO. If the CEO himself is involved, it should go to the chairman of the Supervisory Board. 
This might remind some attentive readers of the high risks involved with the "escalation 
procedure" discussed above. Clearly, this is a hyper-sensitive area where just rolling out of 
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bed in the morning could place the Chief Audit Executive squarely between a rock and a hard 
place. In other words, it's a trap easier to fall into than avoid or climb out of. 
 
The issue of performance measurements and incentive systems is not only highly sensitive, 
but also murky. Agency Theory emphasizes that behaviour is geared towards objectives via 
performance measurements and incentives. Thus from a theoretical perspective, excluding 
this area from internal audit seems ill advised. The offense is compounded when we consider 
that audit outcomes are actually used to appraise managers.  
 
IA is expected to assess the application of performance measurement and incentive systems 
below the level of the Management Board. But when it comes to the Management Board or 
the level just below, this seems to become more ambiguous, to put it mildly. Neither the 
Management Board nor the Supervisory Board call upon IA to make this part of their scope of 
services. Since management control is all about influencing the behaviour of people - as we 
have seen in Chapter 4 - and Agency Theory alerted us to the fact that incentives are one of 
the best instruments to do just that, this is strange. Many of the scandals we have witnessed 
lately are, at least allegedly, caused by the dysfunctional use of incentive schemes. Thus if 
this is not included in IA's scope of services, it will hamper the effectiveness of the 
assessment of the Management Control System. Call it a three wheeled car. 
 
The advisory/consulting area presents a surprising score. All parties, except IA itself, seem to 
be rather indifferent about advisory services. The consulting part of the scope is prominently 
written down in many IA Charters, and the case studies as well. What is surprising though is 
that management and supervisors hold a more reticent position and do not overwhelmingly 
support the need for more advising. Members of the Audit Committee explicitly stated that 
assurance is their primary concern, and they expect that service primarily being rendered by 
IA. The external auditor emphasizes that they look upon IA as an assurance provider, 
regardless of the stress on the consulting/advisory services in other utterances. Management 
Boards are more demanding for advisory services. But they too tend to focus mainly on 
assurance services. As is demonstrated by the definition of Internal Audit by IIA Inc., the IA 
profession itself has made a special case for advisory/consulting services. Internal auditors in 
general and the ones in the case studies in particular firmly believe that providing "added 
value" is what is needed and that advisory services is a unique opportunity to do just that.  
 
Looking at the confusing, and perhaps even contradictory, array of opinions, we could think 
that we have landed in another important morass. However, when one confronts the actual 
time spent on consulting services (0-5%), then the issue looks more like a tempest in a teapot. 
Like the make or buy hot topic. 
 
Some specific observations for the case studies 
ABN AMRO shifted their main focus towards operational auditing in 1993, IB Groep in 
1994, and BNG in 2000. They all handed over the financial audit work to the external auditor. 
TPG, as was often the case, was the exception to the rule. They more or less stuck to financial 
audit during the last decade. If one slotted IT/EDP auditing under "operational auditing" – 
which from a professional perspective can be easily defended – the numbers are as follows. 
ABN AMRO and IB Groep spend 85% of their time on operational audits and BNG 60%. For 
TPG the number is a mere 22%.  
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Having studied developments in a broader sense, one is tempted to say this is true for the 
internal audit community in The Netherlands. The numbers were as follows: 
 
Table 5-10 Average time spend in % by IA's in The Netherlands 
 
 
Average time spend 
 by IA in % 
 
Financial 
audit  
Operational 
audit 
Compliance 
audit 
Other 
1991 46% 32% ** 22%* 
1998*** 30% 51% 9% 10% 
2000**** 22% 45% 9% 24%**** 
 
* IT accounted for 12% 
** not specified 
*** no IT included  
**** IT accounted for 16% 
 
 
The percentage of time spent on operational auditing (including IT auditing) in 2000 was 61. 
Taking into account the upward trend, this number might now be even higher. Chief Audit 
Executive's in all case studies acknowledge that due to such initiatives as Sarbanes-Oxley a 
turning back the clock towards financial audit is looming. 
 
This seems to be the case for ABN AMRO. In March 2003 a new strategy for Group Audit 
ABN AMRO was drafted.78 What is striking in the strategy document is that it states: "a more 
balanced audit focus between operational and financial audits is preferred". The document 
stresses the need to "pursue a situation of well-aligned coexistence of internal and external 
audit and that this should lead to frequent, transparent cooperation, based on mutual 
recognition of professionalism". The document also elaborates on "the need to play a 
balancing act of being auditor and business consultant without crossing the borderline of 
conflict of interest". The data shows that it is expected that the amount of financial audit, now 
about 5-10%, will increase.  
 
Once again, TPG is an exception to the rule. The focus was shifted towards a combination of 
not only financial audits, but also operational, compliance, and risk-based audits. Today the 
aim is to provide so-called "integrated audits". Its vision states: "Corporate Audit Services 
will function as independent professional partners of TPG management. We will add value by 
developing and providing global 'best in class' internal audit services, covering the full 
spectrum of financial and operational risk faced by the group." 
 
The Audit Committee asked to put some emphasis on fraud investigations, and this is now 
mentioned in the scope of services in the CAS Charter. CAS is involved not only in the risk 
management process, but also the Sarbanes-Oxley 302 and 404-compliance process. The 
Chief Audit Executive expects that this will foster compliance auditing. There is a huge 
emphasis on adhering to policies and procedures within TPG. CAS audits adherence. 
                                                 
78 Group Audit 2003-2008 Strategy Document, March 2003 
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Compliance officers and the legal department take care of aligning policies with applicable 
laws.  
 
Interestingly enough, the survey showed that almost all tasks performed will either remain at 
the same level or increase. In some cases, the breadth of services is also expected to rise. For 
example, the IB Groep. The Chief Audit Executive expects an increase in financial audit and, 
consequently, he will probably become more involved with the External Auditor. In addition, 
he foresees a rise in IT/EDP, compliance, and quality audits. He also anticipates a larger 
involvement in change processes. According to his expectations, only the current tasks in the 
area of operational audit will decrease.  
 
At BNG the Audit Committee also mentioned that they will expect IA to address issues with 
respect to culture and the adherence to the values and principles of BNG. The so-called tone 
at the top is highly valued by the Audit Committee members and should, therefore, be taken 
into account by IA in the course of fulfilling its duties. Although in agreement with the 
importance of this aspect of the business, Executive Board members doubted whether they 
themselves would specifically request any formal audits focused on tone at the top issues. 
They questioned the possibility of coming up with a framework that could be used as a 
normative set that could be properly tested. Of course each and everyone was clear that if 
management fraud was obvious, this should always be addressed by IA at the highest level: in 
casu extremae necessitatis, the Audit Committee.  
 
With regard to the reliability of financial information one Executive Board member noted that 
there is an increasing amount of financial data that is not included in the traditional financial 
statements but, nevertheless, is vital for controlling the organization. This is similar to 
conversations in the aviation industry. Namely, that what is recorded in the black box doesn't 
tell you everything you need to know about crashes. Since this information is not included in 
the external auditor's scope of services, he wanted it to be included in IA's. Already in 2004 
BNG's IA said it would focus more on the reliability of financial data and management 
information and reporting than they had done in the recent past.  
 
These results are remarkable. Because if bigger, better and more audits are being called for 
there are only two ways to accomplish that. One, increase staff and budget. Two, improve in 
efficiency. No one has chosen the first option. In fact, quite often the reverse is the case. Thus, 
obviously the gap will have to be filled by increased efficiency.  
 
The relationship with the external auditor: increased need for coordination 
Officially, the relationship between the external and internal auditor is fine. And if it ain't 
broke, don't fix it. But just below the for publication image, a quite different story is playing 
out. As is all too often the case. External auditors tend to look down their noses at internal 
auditors the way most men - "in the good old days, when men were men" - used to look at 
women: as failed or at least flawed versions of themselves. From the other side of the divide, 
external auditors are seen as "city slickers". Despite their smooth talk and high fees, they don't 
really understand the business. Sometimes these underlying prejudices surfaced during the 
interviews. 
 
Typically, the relationship between IA and the external auditor is that at least planning and 
reports are shared. In a limited number of cases internal audit time is spent supporting 
external auditors in their task to provide assurance on the reliability of financial data. Another 
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example is the joint drafting of the management letter. As noted above, the external auditor is 
– except for TPG - monitored by the internal, and vice versa. In some cases the budget for the 
external auditor is in the hands of the internal auditor.  
 
If that wasn't bad enough, there is every indication that it could soon become worse. Why? 
Because, as all respondents agree, in the near future the level of interaction between external 
and internal auditors is expected to increase. The main driver for this will be Corporate 
Governance regulations, such as Sarbanes-Oxley and Tabaksblat, and the predicted turning 
back the clock toward financial audit. There will be more contact between them, and that 
contact will become more intense, as they discuss, plan and, yes, compete in their quest to 
provide the best product at the best price. That is, in part, by avoiding gaps and overlaps. 
 
For ABN AMRO, TPG and IB Groep cost containment of the external auditor is one of IA's 
goals. For ABN AMRO and TPG, which do business in the US and, therefore, have to adhere 
to Sarbanes-Oxley, IA is further tasked with monitoring adherence to the Auditor 
Independence Policy.  
 
The Charter of ABN AMRO includes the liaison with the External Auditor. It says: "In this 
respect, the external auditor must be able to rely to a very large degree on the opinions of 
Group Audit." As stated by the former Chief Audit Executive, the main objective of the 
bank's external auditor, Ernst &Young (E&Y), is to supervise and oversee the work being 
done by Group Audit. The Charter notes that the goal is to realize an integrated audit 
approach by coordinating and harmonizing the work performed by Group Audit and the 
External Auditors. "This should result in few, if any, overlaps and duplications, while at the 
same time there is certainty that no areas remain uncovered and that the audit as a whole is 
cost effective."  
 
It was noted in several interviews that the external auditor should be kept at "arms' length". 
And "Group Audit's work should significantly reduce the amount of work to be performed by 
the External Auditor". The external auditor should oversee the work performed by Group 
Audit and make sure IA is adhering to professional standards. In this respect, the Charter 
refers to the Code of Conduct and the Standards of NIVRA, the International Federation of 
Auditors, and relevant local Audit Associations elsewhere in the world. The Charter also 
mentions that they should meet the requirements/standards of Supervisory Bodies worldwide. 
It is noteworthy that the IIA Inc. is not among those mentioned.  
 
The relationship between Group Audit and the external auditor has not much changed since 
1993. There is a clear distinction between their scope of services. Insofar as EA is expected to 
build on work done by IA, it also monitors its quality. A management letter is drafted per 
Strategic Business Unit (Supervisory BoardU), discussed in the "local Audit Committee", and 
then condensed into a "top-letter" presented to the Audit Committee of ABN AMRO Holding 
NV. The top-Letter is predominantly a product of Group Audit, not of their external auditor. 
 
The Chief Audit Executive of IB Groep maintains relationships with other supervisors, such 
as the external auditor, the auditing departments from the Ministries of Finance and 
Education, Culture and Science, and the General Auditor's office. It is his intention to 
establish a larger degree of alignment and coordination between the activities of these 
officials, even though their roles will remain autonomous. That in itself creates difficulties. 
The external auditor applauds the Audit Committee's increased independence and sees that as 
an opportunity to enhance the independence of the internal auditor. He also believes that the 
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appointment of the new Chief Audit Executive (with his professional background) will mean 
frequent discussions between, which will improve the services provided by both.  
 
At BNG, IA's relationship with the external auditor has changed since 2000. The shift away 
from financial audit and towards operational audit has created a whole new situation. Before 
that the external auditor audited the financial accounts and relied to some extent on IA's work. 
But by the end of 2003 the level of cooperation was limited, and the acting Chief Audit 
Executive did not foresee that the relationship would alter significantly. But with the arrival 
of the new Chief Audit Executive at the beginning 2004, this changed significantly. The idea 
now is that the two should cooperate far more intensively. 
 
At TPG, IA's relationship with the external auditor has not changed much since 1993. There is 
a clear distinction between their respective scope of services. Since the external auditor builds 
only partially on the work done by CAS, it does not monitor the quality of the latter's work. 
CAS, on the other hand, does review on an ad hoc basis the quality of the external auditor's 
work and its adherence to the Auditor Independence Policy. Reports are shared. But CAS 
does not present the final scores they express at the end of an audit to the external auditor. Up 
until 2003, CAS was responsible for the budget for the external auditor. This created room for 
potential friction and conflicts of interest. Because if the external auditor ever became 
responsible for monitoring the quality of CAS' work, this might backfire on them through the 
budget. This has now been changed. The budget is in the hands of the Corporate Controller, 
which is a more preferable situation. It helps prevent any potential "I'll scratch your back if 
you scratch mine" situation between the Chief Audit Executive and the external auditor. 
 
5.5 Discussion and Conclusions  
 
We started off this chapter by reviewing both the condition we left IA in at the end of Chapter 2 
and how Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics (discussed in Chapter 4) might help 
alleviate some of the issues. Since there was a need for some enhanced theory we set our course 
straight for case studies. It is now time to take stock of the progress made. 
 
Let's start by looking at the findings of the case studies, briefly discussing them and trying to 
reach some conclusions. Below is an overview of the findings of the case studies plotted against 
the tentative conclusions drawn at the end of Chapter 4. They are grouped around the three 
elements: Role, Position, and Scope of Services.  
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Discussion on Role 
 
Table 5-11 IA's Role: Case Study Results Compared With Tentative Conclusions From Theory79 
 
Conclusions derived from Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics 
 
No. Role IBG BNG TPG AA
 
1 
 
Internal Audit is an instrument to reduce agency problems 
arising from Information Asymmetry.  + 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
2a Asset specificity explains the rationale of IA. 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
2b Asset specificity is an explanatory factor for IA's size. + + 
 
0 
 
++ 
 
3 Internal Audit is cheaper and External Audit is better. - - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
4 If risks are high, outsourcing IA is preferable.  -- -- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
5 
Increased levels of Information Asymmetry create the need 
for IA. + 0 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
6 
 
Asset Specificity (knowledge of the organization) is a 
contributing factor for IA's size. + ++ 
 
 
0/+ 
 
 
++ 
 
7 
 
In cases of outsourcing a qualified staff member is required 
to supervise the IAF. 
 
NA NA 
 
 
NA 
 
 
NA
 
8 
 
In cases of outsourcing it is preferable to split audits into 
phases and among competing parties. 
 
NA NA 
 
 
NA 
 
 
NA
 
9 If highly specific knowledge is needed to conduct audits, IA 
will be in-house. ++ ++ 
 
 
++ 
 
 
++ 
 
10 
 
The larger the size of the organization the sooner economies 
of scale foster in-sourcing IA. + 0 
 
 
++ 
 
 
++ 
 
 
Let's now take a closer look at the results of the case studies. We will discuss them in the 
order of the table above.  
 
 
 
                                                 
79 The scale that is used varies from ++ (very much so, strongly supported) to -- (not supported at all). 0 means 
that they are more or less indifferent. NA is not applicable, meaning that in this particular case this was not an 
issue.  
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(1) Internal Audit is an instrument to reduce agency problems arising from Information 
Asymmetry.  
(5) Increased levels of Information Asymmetry create the need for IA. 
 
In the companies studied the degree of Information Asymmetry didn't vary much. Large or 
small, it seemed uniformly low. That finding might be attributable to the fact that the people I 
interviewed were high level and very seasoned officials in the companies and both knew where 
to look for information and how to assess its quality. It might equally be due to them not being 
aware of the complexities of Information Asymmetry and the issues revolving around the 
reliability (or lack thereof) of written and oral reports. There is no way of deciding where we 
should throw our weight. Which all by itself might tell us something about the usefulness of 
Information Asymmetry as a say something theoretical metric. The measured information is 
equal to perceived Information Asymmetry. Further, not having any already tested and 
validated proxies available, it might be that the ones I selected were not the most suitable.  
 
Some evidence for that might be found in area of the scope of services. During the last decade 
that has changed dramatically: from mainly financial auditing to other auditing forms and 
mutations (with a focus on operational auditing). The assurance about the reliability of fiscal 
reports was relegated to the task pile of the external auditor. While I used questions about the 
reliability of financial information to assess the level of Information Asymmetry, this might 
barking up the wrong tree. Since these days that is more the bailiwick of the external auditor, 
not the internal. Further research under semi- stable conditions might come up with better 
indicators for Information Asymmetry. 
 
Nevertheless, and despite the above caveats, Information Asymmetry definitely exists, and it is 
our strong belief that that is a factor for having internal auditing. What makes this more than 
"expert opinion" is the fact that it is shared by those interviewed. There is a clear perceived 
belief that IA helps provide the assurance all board members need to check the pulse of the 
organization and test its health. This belief is corroborated by the putting your money where 
your mouth is long range history of IA in the companies and the fact that its size held steady 
during a decade of nearly continuous cost cutting and downsizing. Another, perhaps quirky, 
example was the surprising revelation in one company that if the Audit Committee were to take 
charge of IA, the Management Board would calve off and create another one for itself. 
 
All in all, Information Asymmetry is present and contributes to the perceived need to have IA. 
This contention is based more on the qualitative and corroborating findings of the case studies 
and the answers provided by the interviewees than quantitative data. And it is exceedingly 
improbable that we can tweak the limited and inconclusive Information Asymmetry numbers 
we got from these case studies to come up with even soft and loose relationships between it and 
IA size. I will be studying that issue in more depth in the next chapter. 
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(2a) Asset specificity explains the rationale of IA.  
(2b) Asset specificity is an explanatory factor for IA's size.  
(6) Asset specificity (knowledge the organization) is a contributing factor for IA's size.  
(9) If highly specific knowledge is needed to conduct audits, IA will be in-house.  
(10) The larger the size of the organization the sooner economies of scale foster in-
sourcing IA. 
 
Asset specificity does seem to be an explaining factor for the existence and the size of internal 
audit, and when it increases it very probably leads sooner to a "make" decision. It - especially 
the specialized knowledge needed for performing good audits - is the factor most underscored 
as the reason for having IA. However, "make or buy" has not been an issue in any of the case 
studies. It is simply not an option. One might wonder whether this is due to high Asset 
Specificity or the lack of thorough decision making process that places all the possibilities on 
the table and then picks one or two. It might be that those organizations have a prejudice in 
favour of IA. Therefore, based on these studies alone, there is no evidence for the Asset 
Specificity argument. But the bigger the organization, the sooner economies of scale foster in-
sourcing IA is supported by the case studies. 
 
It is more difficult to use Agency Theory or Transaction Cost Economics to detect a relationship 
between the size of the company and the size of IA. Although size contributes to tendency to in-
source, there is no way to tell how large it should be. While the absolute numbers in our case 
studies differ dramatically (ranging from 7 to 750), the relative numbers tell a less enlightening 
tale. ABN AMRO has one auditor for every 150 employees. BNG, the other financial services 
company, which is considerably smaller, has one for every 60. For the non financial services 
organizations the numbers are even more say nothing. The giant TPG has one auditor per 3,000 
employees. The midget IB Groep one per 140. 
 
Comparing those numbers with the scores on Asset Specificity did not provide any further 
clues. But since there is probably a limit to just how small (or large, for that matter) an IAF can 
be, it seems that smaller companies will have a higher ratio of auditors per employees. Using 
the ABN AMRO ratio for BNG would lead to a mere 2.6 auditors. Using the TPG ratio for IB 
Groep would lead to 0.5 auditors in total. Those are not sustainable numbers. The economies of 
scale argument seem to be backed up by those numbers. Hopefully, the survey, providing more 
data, might be able to support any conclusions in this space. It might also be possible to see 
whether there is any threshold for IA size to make it sustainable.  
 
(3) Internal Audit is cheaper and External Audit is better.  
 
As shown in Chapter 4 this tentative conclusion was the outcome of the model used by 
Caplan and Kirschenheiter (2000). Although saving on audit costs play a role in having IA, 
the bigger factors are Asset Specificity and Information Asymmetry. None of the interviewees 
said that audit costs all by themselves led them to even consider the buy position. The same is 
true for the argument that the external auditor does a better job. In fact, there was a 
widespread belief that the opposite was the case. The external auditor would do distinctly 
worse than his internal colleague because of his lack of understanding of the internal 
dynamics of the organization: its culture, people, ways of doing things, and other vague 
variables. Even suggesting that external audit shops could provide specialized teams that 
would operate within the organization was not at all welcomed. They would still be seen as 
outsiders and, therefore, not as "one of us".  
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(4) If risks are high, outsourcing IA is preferable.  
 
Theory and models used by Caplan and Kirschenheiter (2000) support the idea that outsourcing 
is sooner an option in situations where there are high risks. One looks for the best auditor - 
allegedly, the external auditor - with the deepest pockets, because of the threat of irate 
stakeholders claiming damages when shortcomings in management control system are not 
detected on time. However, this is contradicted by the case studies. This argument never came 
up during interviews. Even when it was pointed out as a possibility to consider, everyone waved 
it away. Liability claims are never taken into account in connection with the make or buy 
decision. But then again, the make or buy decision itself is also not taken into account. 
 
(7) In cases of outsourcing a qualified staff member is required to supervise the IAF. (8) 
In cases of outsourcing it is preferable to split audits into phases and among competing 
parties.  
 
Since outsourcing was not a viable option in any of the case study organizations, these issues 
did not apply. Thus no evidence could be found to tilt the argument one way or the other.  
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Discussion on Position 
 
Table 5-12 IA's Position: Case Study Results Compared With Tentative Conclusions From Theory80 
 
Conclusions derived from Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics 
 
 Position IBG BNG TPG AA
 
11 
 
Reporting to the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee is the 
preferred option - - 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
12 IA's size is dependent on the:   
  
 
12a Size of the organization 0 - 
 
+ 
 
++ 
 
12b 
 
Use of subjective and objective incentives schemes and 
performance based contracts 0 0 
 
 
0 
 
 
+ 
 
12c Trade offs between internal and external auditors 0 0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
12d Level of risk management is willing to take 0 0 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
13 IA's agency problem is addressed by:   
  
 
13a A code of conduct ++ ++ 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
13b Internal quality measures  
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
13c Performance based appraisal of the Chief Audit Executive -- -- ++ ++ 
 
13d Ad random checks of IA by the external auditor  
 
+ 
 
+ + 
 
+ 
 
13e Hiring qualified auditors  
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
13f Applying credible disciplinary powers 0 0 0 0 
 
13g Adhering to Professional Standards  
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
 
We will discuss them in the order of the table above. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
80 The scale that is used varies from ++ (very much so, strongly supported) to -- (not supported at all). 0 means 
that they are more or less indifferent. 
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(11) Reporting to the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee is the preferred option 
 
Based on Agency Theory, IA's organizational position needs to be as independent as possible. 
Thus it predicts that it should be positioned close to the principal. And this is definitely the case 
with the external auditor. However, in our case studies (and elsewhere) IA is positioned under 
the jurisdiction of the Management Board and is, therefore, a "bonding" instrument. From the 
perspective of the principals, or their representatives (e.g., the Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee), does such a bonding instrument have any value? Yes. This is based on two factors: 
one positive, one negative. One, IA's reports to Supervisory Board/Audit Committee members 
helps provide them with the necessary assurance. And two, their reluctance to assume full, or 
even major responsibility for IA. 
 
Nevertheless, Corporate Governance regulations are urging Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee's to exercise oversight over IA in order to enhance its independence. And the 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee members interviewed acknowledged that having IA report 
to them would achieve just that. The reluctance, however, might be based on a completely 
different issue. Namely, the belief - not only among them, but also Management Board 
members - that too close a relationship with IA might not be in the best interests of the latter 
and, ultimately, the company. Especially if that relationship eventually replaced the more 
traditional close and direct relationship with the Management Board. 
 
The case studies demonstrated that over the years there was an increase not only in direct 
contacts between Supervisory Board/Audit Committee and IA, but also in meetings without the 
presence of Management Board members. Whether or not this will eventually lead to the 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee becoming fully responsible for IA remains to be seen. 
Based on current trends and the evidence gathered here, that is highly unlikely. 
 
(12) IA's size is dependent on the: (a) size of the company; (b) use of subjective and 
objective incentive schemes and performance based contracts; (c) trade offs between 
external and internal auditors; and (d) level of risk management is willing to take.  
 
As shown in section 5.5.1, there is some evidence that there is some sort of relationship 
between the size of the organization and the size of IA. Economies of scale (as with ABN 
AMRO and TPG) allow for a larger IA. But that doesn't tell the whole story. Because we also 
have to consider ratios (number of IA staff per number of employees company wide). In terms 
of relative size, TPG has the smallest. BNG and IB Groep, by contrast, have relatively large 
IA's. This might be explained by the how low can you go principle. In other words, there 
might be a strict minimum number of IA staff. Below that it is no longer a working 
proposition.  
 
Very little has been found in the case studies to demonstrate that the use of subjective and 
objective incentive schemes and performance based contracts, the trade offs between the 
external and internal auditors, and/or the level of risk management is willing to take have 
significantly impacted IA size. The exception to that trend was ABN AMRO, where 
subjective incentive schemes and the level of risk management is willing to take contributed 
somewhat to the need to have IA and, therefore, (very) indirectly to its 
size.  
 
188
188 
As was already shown in Chapter 4, theory provides no clues about how large any particular 
IAF should be. My case studies also don't bring anything to the table. Hopefully, the survey, 
which will be discussed in Chapter 6, will be more helpful.  
 
(13) IA's agency problem 
 
Theory provided a number of clues about what elements are needed to address IA's agency 
problem. The case studies showed that many of them are being applied. Codes of conduct 
exist in all four. Internal quality control measures were taken in all of them, and there were 
also specific requirements regarding the qualifications and level of proficiency of auditors. 
Professional standards were applied and adhered to, enforced by the quality management 
systems in place. For the most part this could not have been otherwise, because the 
Professional Standards require adherence to them as well as having a code of ethics and 
maintaining some kind of quality control system. Hiring qualified auditors seem so obvious 
that it hardly seems worth mentioning. 
 
However, there were a few elements that were only partially supported by the case studies. 
The most visible being the performance based remuneration of the Chief Audit Executive, 
based on finding shortcomings in the control measures of the organization. Or demanding 
penalties when shortcomings have not been discovered in a timely fashion. Performance 
based appraisal and subsequent pay are applied in the two large organizations (ABN AMRO 
and TPG) but not in the smaller (BNG and IB Groep). Since larger listed companies like the 
first two have a long history of using such systems, it is not surprising that our case study 
companies in the same bracket follow suit. It also shouldn't raise too many eyebrows when 
discovering that IB Groep does not use these metrics, because it is a public entity and they 
have only limited application elsewhere in the organization. 
 
It is worth noting that the Chief Audit Executive's of both BNG and IB Groep were reluctant 
to get paid according to those metrics, because they thought it might hamper their 
independence. Surely, connecting the performance metrics to the performance of (parts of) the 
organization that needs to be audited seems unwise. However, there are specific targets that 
do not hamper independence. For example, finding shortcomings in the control systems. The 
reason why this was not applied might be due to the "added value" image Internal Audit was 
striving to create over the last decade - being a management tool and consultants to the 
company. In short, anything but the traditional policeman - the much feared and resented 
"hatchet man". And while such metrics are completely appropriate for the latter, they are far 
below the dignity of the former. 
 
While all companies used appraisal systems for the Chief Audit Executive none of them 
included the amount of shortcomings in the control systems revealed by the Chief Audit 
Executive/IA. It also turned out that performance metrics varied considerably. TPG had over 
20. Thus while Agency Theory has much merit in the area of performance related incentives, 
they are not uniformly applied to Chief Audit Executive's. 
 
Second, a somewhat reversed situation is noted regarding the use of the external auditor for ad 
random checks of IA. This is used for the smaller organizations (IB Groep and BNG) and 
TPG, but not for ABN AMRO. For ABN AMRO the rationale could be that Group Audit is 
subject to supervision by many supervisors and regulators and predominantly focuses on 
operational audits whereas the external auditor is meant to focus on the financial audit, thus, 
creating a situation of less interdependence. The external auditor also might not be best fitted 
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to scrutinize Group Audit's work because of its completely different nature. TPG's CAS, by 
contrast, still focuses on financial audits - the external auditor's playing field - and being 
scrutinized by the latter seems perfectly natural. 
 
The last one not being applied is the credible disciplinary powers for internal auditors. 
Although there are disciplinary powers within the organization, external ones predicted by 
theory and applied by the profession and are not "credible". The very fact that there are next 
to no cases of IA's having being subjected to disciplinary powers by the profession clearly 
demonstrates the lack of enforcement. Surely, one cannot hold the respective IA's or Chief 
Audit Executive's accountable for that.  
 
Disciplinary powers, which should be promulgated by the profession, presuppose that at some 
point someone will file a complaint. In The Netherlands this can be done by any number of 
people and organizations. The Chief Audit Executive, other IA personnel, the external auditor 
the company, professional bodies, or the public at large. Except for the last item on the list, all 
of the above have, in theory at least, the requisite expertise to know what to look for and how 
to make the charges stick. With that in mind, let's examine who the most likely 
"whistleblowers" will be. Or, more precisely, who they won't be. 
 
The Chief Audit Executive, because he is hardly likely to report himself and colleagues (who 
he is responsible for). Those colleagues. Not only because they might not be aware of 
everything the Chief Audit Executive is doing, but also because of the esprit de corps - we're 
all in this together - and the desire not to be seen by friends and colleagues as a "rat", a 
"traitor" to the team. A well founded concern. For as history shows, the life span of 
whistleblowers have is extremely short.  
 
The external auditor also might not jump at the opportunity to report something not so nice 
about his colleagues. Because of all the above. Because it would negatively impact his 
relationship with the Chief Audit Executive. And because the Chief Audit Executive might 
play tit for tat and say something nasty about him. It could wind up as a lot of inconclusive 
squabbling with the word of one professional confronting that of another. Why bother? 
 
The company also won't be hot to trot. Because if it presses charges, the ensuing court case - 
if it is contested - might open cans of worms they would rather keep shut. The most likely 
solution will be a hushed internal handling. Thus the most likely candidate - some may call it 
the last resort - to file a complaint is the profession. It has the power, knowledge and 
motivation. To protect and enhance the credibility of the profession as a whole. With that 
triple punch, it hardly seems possible to go wrong. But think again. For up to now the IA 
profession in The Netherlands has done nearly nothing to enforce its rules and regulations. 
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Discussion on Scope of Services 
 
Table 5-13 IA's Scope of Services: Case Study Results Compared With Tentative Conclusions from 
Theory81 
 
Conclusions derived from Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics 
 
 Scope of Services IBG BNG TPG AA
 
14 Transaction Cost Economics predicts that it is preferable to 
broaden IA's scope of services.  
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
0 
 
++ 
 
15 
 
IA's scope of services is broader than just Financial Audit, 
which provides a unique selling point when compared with 
the external auditor. 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
0 
 
++ 
 
16 The way the Management Board operates should be within 
IA's scope of services. 0/+ --/+ -/+ --/+
 
17 The incentives/appraisal system is part of IA's scope of 
services. -/0 -/0 -/0 -/0 
 
18 
 
The higher the need for specialized knowledge of the 
organization the sooner IA will be involved in the external 
audit. 
 
 
-/0 
 
 
- 
 
 
+ 
 
 
-- 
 
19a IA can be used as an instrument to reduce the cost of the 
external audit. 
 
0 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
19b IA can be used as an instrument to support management 
control. 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
20 From a cost efficiency perspective, coordination with the 
external auditor is needed. 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
21 Due to Corporate Governance developments, the need for 
coordination with the external auditor will increase. 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
 
We will discuss them in the order of the table above. 
 
                                                 
81 The scale that is used varies from ++ (very much so, strongly supported) to -- (not supported at all). 0 means 
that they are more or less indifferent and ? means that no conclusion can be drawn based upon the findings in the 
case study. NA is not applicable, meaning that in this particular case this was not an issue. 
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(14) Transaction Cost Economics predicts that it is preferable to broaden IA's scope of 
services. (15) IA's scope of services is broader than just Financial Audit, which provides 
a unique selling point when compared with the external auditor 
 
Transaction Cost Economics indicates that it is best to expand internal audit into a broader 
function than merely financial audit, because more value can then be created. This prediction 
is very much supported by the case studies. Over the last decade - with the exception of TPG - 
the traditional financial audit was made the sole responsibility of the external auditor, 
Meanwhile, IA focused on operational audits and other consultative areas. Other services 
were included in its scope, such as risk management services, quality initiatives, and 
environmental auditing.  
 
What was the driver for this development? Part of it was certainly the profession's urge to 
profile itself as adding more and more value. Being perceived as "management aids" etc. But 
there might be other factors at work as well. For example, high Asset Specificity might have 
promoted - or at least supported - the bundling of more and more knowledge and skills among 
auditors in particular and IAF's in general. Another interesting and, indeed, exciting, question 
is whether IA bit off more than it can chew. If like a company expanding too quickly it has 
promised more than it can deliver. 
 
Although there is a certain turning back of the clock towards financial auditing, no one 
thought this would be totally reverse the developments of the last decade. Yes, Sarbanes-
Oxley and similar Corporate Governance initiatives require more focus on the reliability of 
financial reporting. And that impacts both IA and the external auditor. Nonetheless, board 
members as well as Chief Audit Executive's indicated - not only in the interviews, but also via 
the survey questions - that they needed of other assurance services as well. Such as audits 
focused on fraud, ethics, risk management, quality, change management, and compliance.  
 
(16) The way the Management Board operates should be within IA's scope of services. 
(17) The incentives/appraisal system is part of IA's scope of services. 
 
Although "tone at the top" is a crucial element of an organization's management control 
system (see Chapter 4), and, therefore, should be included in IA's scope of services, the top 
itself has other ideas. Management Board members not only do not relish the impertinence of 
IA scrutinizing them, they are absolutely opposed to it. Some Audit Committee members sort 
of support the broad notion. But when it gets down to the brass tacks of how to make it a 
reality, the logic rather quickly gets a lot fuzzier. Thus they 
expect Chief Audit Executive's to report to them any "undesirable behaviour" and breaches 
against codes of conducts on the part of top management, but resist having such 
responsibilities and powers written into the Audit Charter. It is up to the Chief Audit 
Executive himself to draw up protocols that will empower him to operate in this minefield. 
 
You don't have to be the Delphic oracle to imagine the following scenario. If the Chief Audit 
Executive detects some unsavory management behaviour and that is latter vindicated by the 
company, stockholders, press and public at large, then the Audit Committee members will 
claim they were behind him all the way. If, on the other hand, things go otherwise - or not as 
sensationally quick as it happens in the movies - then they might cut him loose to struggle and 
go down on his own. Which reminds me of Napoleon's famous saying. "Success has many 
fathers. Failure is an orphan." 
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The area of the incentives and rewards - essential elements in any management control system 
and ways of steering behaviour - is also murky. Some interviewees were rather indifferent 
about having this included in IA's scope of services. Others were more or less opposed. For 
the Management Board, this might be a question of IA breathing too close to its neck. 
Besides, it's not necessary. This is something Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory 
Board is perfectly capable of taking care of. How they will make sure that incentives and 
rewards are applied correctly is not elaborated. Theory in this area is not (yet) corroborated 
with what is happening in real life.  
 
(18) The higher the need for specialized knowledge of the organization the sooner IA will 
be involved in the external audit. 
 
This is another area where theory and practice differ. We already noted in section 5.5.1 that 
specialized knowledge on the part of the audit staff was one of the reasons to have an in-
sourced IA. Nevertheless, high scores on Asset Specificity pertaining to ‘specialized 
knowledge82’ do not corroborate with an involvement in the external audit, again the 
exception being TPG. 
 
(19b) IA can be used as an instrument to support management control. 
 
All case study organizations acknowledged that IA is an important instrument to foster 
management control. 
 
(19a) IA can be used as an instrument to reduce the cost of the external audit. (20) From 
a cost efficiency perspective, coordination with the external auditor is needed. (21) Due 
to Corporate Governance developments, the need for coordination with the external 
auditor will increase 
 
The use of IA to reduce the cost is supported by TPG and IB Groep. But not by ABN AMRO 
and BNG.  
 
During the major shift in IA's scope of services over the last decade, its relationship with the 
external auditor changed. IA focused mainly on operational audits and the external auditor 
focused on the financial audit. The clear distinctions between those types of translated into a 
better idea of who was doing what. The results were a less competitive and easier - if 
somewhat remoter - relationship. A love/hate relationship - or possibly a hate/tolerate one - 
smoldering under the surface. But with the increased need for the financial audit to be the best 
it can be, there is a renewed blurring of the boundaries between internal and external audit. 
And something more is called for than "peaceful coexistence". In other words, intensified 
contacts, sound coordination and frequent alignment. These sorts of developments are 
envisioned by all interviewees. 
 
5.6 Overall conclusions 
 
The case study scores on Transaction Cost Economics's Asset Specificity are more 
compelling than those on Agency Theory's Information Asymmetry, and thus the rationale to 
have an IAF - specifically an in-house one - appears to be better supported by one than the 
                                                 
82 ‘Specialized knowledge’ is one of the attributes of Asset Specificity as was shown in Chapter 4.  
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other. Asset Specificity also plays a role when it comes to increasing the scope of services 
and, therefore, the number of IA staff. But the latter conclusion can't be stretched too far. 
Because all the case study organizations came complete with an in-house IA - by definition. 
That's why I studied them. What is surprising, however, is that none of them have considered, 
or are considering, the possibility of not having IA or outsourcing it (see also Paape 2005a, 
and Paape et al, 2005b). 
 
Theory and practice also line up as far as how to monitor IA. Almost without exception, the 
instruments recommended by the former are present in practice. One of the exceptions to that 
rule is performance based incentives for the Chief Audit Executive. The reason for that is the 
perceived negative impact on Chief Audit Executive independence. This downside, which has 
a great deal of merit to it, could be limited by using metrics linked to specific IA targets rather 
than the performance of the company as a whole. In that respect I would say that theory is 
valid and practice is lagging behind.  
 
Another exception is credible disciplinary powers enforced by professional bodies. 
True, such disciplinary powers and procedures are written into the guidebooks. But they are 
very rarely applied. In other words, they are shooting with blanks and thus lack all credibility. 
 
The coordination between theory and practice about organizational position is at best dubious. 
Agency Theory favors a position for IA as close as possible to the principal. Thus in our case 
studies, the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee, or their equivalent. However, what we find 
on the ground is a completely different reality. That is, IA remaining in its traditional role as 
agent of the Management Board - itself an agent - and not likely to budge from that behind the 
8-ball position in the near future. In fact, in one of our case studies, it was clearly stated that 
should IA become the tool of the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee, then top management 
would create its own separate IA.  
 
True, there is movement in the direction of Supervisory Board/Audit Committee members 
becoming increasing and more directly involved in the care, feeding and grooming of IA. 
They have contact with the Chief Audit Executive. In many cases without the Management 
Board being present. They also need to be involved in planning and discussing the outcome of 
IA reports (see Chapter 4), and expect to participate in the hiring, firing, and appraising of the 
Chief Audit Executive. However, at the end of the day one wonders how much of these 
changes are driven by circumstances and how much by Corporate Governance regulations. In 
other words, the perceived needs of the players in the real world and the perceived needs of 
investors, regulators and the public at large.  
 
What about the perceived rationale of IA? How much of it is positive? We need IA to help us, 
say, increase efficiency and reduce fraud. It is an instrument that has more than once 
demonstrated its value and has become part of the woodwork. And how much is negative and 
defensive? We need IA to at least demonstrate to the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee, 
investors, regulators and the public at large that we did everything we could when things go 
terribly wrong. An insurance premium against potential blame and claims. 
 
While no one was directly asked these sorts of questions and no one brought them up 
voluntarily, there were some hints of nervousness among Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee members. Namely, that they might be subject to law suits and worse if disaster 
struck and, therefore, they needed all the assurance they could get. Audit Committee members 
tend to expect that IA should and will report to them any cases of observed dysfunctional 
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behaviour and breaches against applicable codes of conduct by top management. In other 
words, the so-called tone at the top audit should be part of its scope of services. However, 
Management Board members don't see themselves as falling under IA's purview. 
 
Intriguingly, the results shown above were rather consistent over the case studies. There were 
differences in size and industry; nevertheless that did not make a lot of difference. Based upon 
this research my answer would be that an IAF is often taken for granted and almost self-
evident in the eyes of Management Board and Supervisory Board members. An IAF is valued 
in different circumstances, apparently having demonstrated its rationale to such an extent that 
no one is disputing its existence and value. 
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 Chapter 6 Survey; Method and Results 
6.1.  Introduction 
 
This research started off with a tour de horizon of the status of Internal Audit. Internal Audit 
was positioned in Chapter 2. The next Chapter studied what happened during the last decade 
with regard to Corporate Governance and with special attention looked for areas where 
Internal Audit was addressed. It turned out that Internal Audit was called to the fore and needs 
to step up to live up to the expectations and to claim their rightful place in the Corporate 
Governance space. To be able to have some firm ground to stand on and be able to withstand 
the whims of those in charge or the waves of change, theory was deemed needed.  Therefore, 
we turned to more widely known and often used Agency Theory and Transaction Cost 
Economics to search for clues and, if possible, building blocks; they were summarized at the 
end of Chapter 4. And yes, there were quite a few building blocks although not as conclusive 
as hoped for.  
 
To strengthen theory, a number of case studies were done to get a better grip at real life of 
Internal Audit during the last decade. The results were elaborated in the previous Chapter. 
The comparison of available ideas from theory and the conclusions of the case studies led to 
conclude that there were a number of results which underpinned a number of building blocks 
and clues of theory.  
 
To delve deeper into the generalizability of our findings and test some hypotheses a survey 
was developed. The survey aimed at acquiring deeper insight in the whereabouts of Internal 
Audit and directions it is heading. Methodological triangulation between case study and 
survey methods is assessed by Modell (2005). He welcomes triangulation of case study and 
survey methods to find a more balanced fashion within coherent research programs to enable 
a broader range validity threats to be addressed.  
 
This chapter consists of three distinct parts: The first part deals with testing a number of 
hypotheses; the second part provides a number of descriptive statistics. The last part shows 
the results in the perspective of the Corporate Governance issue so widely elaborated in the 
previous chapters and the starting point of this thesis.  
 
This chapter starts off with an elaboration on the set up, the what, and the how of the survey. 
 
6.2  Survey: Approach and Application 
6.2.1  Why a survey? 
The diversity of the phenomenon Internal Audit and the IAF’s in practice, underscored by the 
findings of the case studies, combined with the lack of sustainable and clear cut theory, 
created the need to get some quantitative data to back up the findings and to enhance theory 
building. To this end the preferred solution is a survey. The survey was mainly explorative 
and descriptive in nature, aimed at gaining deeper insight in developments of IAF’s due to 
changes in Corporate Governance regulations during the last decade and obtaining some hints 
about the near future of Internal Audit in general and the IAF in particular.  The results would 
at least show the current situation of Internal Audit and IAF’s in the Netherlands in general. It 
also provides some clues for decision makers when being confronted with a perceived need to 
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have an IAF or being forced to think about an IAF in the realm of the Corporate Governance 
regulations. In some cases it might even be pressure from Supervisory Board members, or 
parent companies, and sometimes even colleagues and competitors asking: “Don’t you have 
an IAF? Why not, if I may ask?”  
 
6.2.2 What is the survey about? 
Widener and Selto (1999) surveyed 600 randomly selected Compustat firms with more than 
500 employees in the United States. They hypothesized that the Transaction Cost Economic 
factors Asset Specificity, Uncertainty, and Frequency83 would impact the ‘Make or Buy’ 
decision of internal audit in organizations. Their study claimed that firms with high Asset 
Specificity scores for Internal Audit activities indeed internalize Internal Audit sooner than 
others. As to Uncertainty, their hypothesis was not supported meaning that Uncertainty was 
not an explanatory factor for the ‘Make or Buy’ decision. Frequency on the other hand, had 
some merits explaining the Make or Buy issue. However, the qualitative part of their study 
showed that Asset Specificity was by far the most contributing reason for having an IAF 
internally. Also (Behavioural) Uncertainty and strategic needs were determinants of 
outsourcing. Frequency on the other hand was then rarely cited as the basis for Internal Audit 
sourcing. Frequency was found to be related to archival measures of size and how often 
Internal Audit Services were demanded. Widener and Selto (1999, p 66) concluded that: “It is 
plausible that Asset Specificity is a major driver of the decision to outsource Internal Audit, 
both from out-of-pocket and opportunity cost perspectives.” Frequency, especially when 
interacting with high Asset Specificity also seemed to be a plausible driver. Their regression 
model explained 53% (adjusted R2=0.46) of the variation in outsourced internal auditing.  
 
There were a few limitations to their research. First, their survey was geared towards 
measuring Asset Specificity of the Internal Audit activities predominantly. This seems a 
major limitation because their survey showed that indeed Internal Audit activities had a high 
level of Asset Specificity but that in itself doesn’t tell the whole story. It is my conjecture that 
because the organization has high levels of Asset Specificity, Internal Audit activities will 
consequently show high levels of Asset Specificity as well. Furthermore, it may very well be 
that Internal Audit activities do have an inherent high level of Asset Specificity due to the fact 
that specialized training and knowledge is required, the use of proprietary information (as 
shown in Widener and Selto (1999)), and therefore already contain a high degree of what is 
called ‘human Asset Specificity’.  It is the well-known chicken-and-the-egg problem. 
Measuring Asset Specificity of Internal Audit activities may be less contributing to the 
explanation of the ‘Make or Buy’ issue than measuring the Asset Specificity and Information 
Asymmetry of the organization it is part of. In this survey we aimed at measuring Asset 
Specificity of the organization as a whole. Section 6.2.3 discusses this issue.   
 
A second limitation of the Widener and Selto (1999) survey was the quality of their measures. 
They also doubted the reliability of the Uncertainty measures. The third limitation is the 
relatively small sample size. A response rate of 14% (83 out of 600) may not have been 
convincing. They could not find any major industry effect with the exception of Wholesalers 
but there were only 3 represented in their usable sample. And last but not least, their study 
was limited in geography because it was based in the United States and therefore might not be 
applicable in other territories. In this context note that the United States has a prevailing one-
tier system as opposed to the two-tier environment in The Netherlands. Last but not least, 
                                                 
83 See Chapter 4 for an explanation of these three concepts.  
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their data originated in 1996 and by the time of my research some 8 years old. During this 
period, significant changes occurred in the Corporate Governance landscape as shown in 
Chapter 3, which of course might have had their effect.  
 
In the present study only parts of the Widener and Selto (1999) study were used to investigate 
whether their findings are corroborated by the Dutch Internal Audit environment and are still 
valid some 8 years later. Several adjustments were made. First, as shown in Chapter 4, Asset 
Specificity has indeed been shown to be the most powerful indicator of the Make or Buy 
decision. Widener and Selto contributed to that conclusion on the part of Internal Audit. 
Uncertainty and Frequency were excluded for two reasons. One of them is that Uncertainty 
did not deliver any support in the Widener and Selto study and they were not sure about the 
reliability of their measures. Furthermore, the case studies of Chapter 5 showed more 
promising numbers for Asset Specificity then they did for Uncertainty and Frequency. The 
decision to exclude Uncertainty and Frequency were backed up after drafting and execution of 
the survey by three other studies. One study was done by David and Han (2004), one by 
Carter and Hodgson (2006), and the last one by Boerner and Macher (2006). Their specific 
findings will be discussed in section 6.2.3.  The study done by Van Elten (2005) using the 
Widener and Selto questionnaire also concluded that Uncertainty did not provide support for 
their hypothesis that Uncertainty explained the make or buy issue. Frequency however – 
though less convincing – provided some support. Therefore, it was decided to focus on Asset 
Specificity solely and to research whether the Widener and Selto findings hold 8 years later 
and in a different territory and culture and not the least also in a two-tier environment as 
opposed to the one-tier environment in the United States. Finally I intended to take a look at 
industry effects as well. Since Widener and Selto were not able to find any it would be nice to 
be able to further our knowledge if we could get some clue as to the existence of these effects.  
 
A high degree of Asset Specificity requires Internal Audit to acquire deep knowledge of the 
organization and therefore to in-source an IAF. This knowledge is best acquired via learning-
by-doing and being part of the organization. Furthermore, an external provider would need to 
bear significant costs for training and sustaining firm specific auditor knowledge which would 
only be acceptable if the contract has a longer term horizon to enable to recover the 
investments. Not only would any organization be reluctant to underwrite such a contract 
because it would be difficult to specify the terms of the services rendered and foremost, it 
would also be difficult to ascertain whether those investments were made. Who is going to 
exercise oversight on behalf of the organization? One needs to be a professional to be able to 
assess the proper execution of the contract anyway. If such a contract would be ‘incomplete’ 
by nature the possibilities to be subject to opportunistic behaviour would be manifold. On the 
part of the outside provider such a contract would lead to significant opportunity losses if it 
was ended before initial costs would have been recouped.   
 
Hypothesis 1 therefore is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
If Asset Specificity of an organization is high, this will be positively associated with an in-
sourced IAF and negatively with outsourcing. 
 
Secondly, since the Widener and Selto (1999)  study – and others (see below) - already 
indicated that Asset Specificity explained the Make or Buy decision, it was decided to study 
whether their conclusion held in the Netherlands in some more detail. To that end we 
investigated whether there is a relation between the degree of Asset Specificity of the 
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organization and the size of the IAF and the breadth of the Scope of Services. Therefore, we 
needed to get as much participating organizations in this survey that do have an IAF rather 
than sending it to a sample of all organizations. The next sections elaborate on how this goal 
was achieved.  
 
As shown in the previous Chapters, there are no conclusive clues as how large the IAF should 
be. There is some understanding that the size of the organization will impact the numbers of 
the IAF. The same is supposedly true for the industry; Financial Services companies do have 
large IAF’s. But, would Asset Specificity also tell us how large the IAF would be? Would the 
degree of Asset Specificity be associated to the staffing of the IAF and thereby provide some 
kind of metrics that would allow for organizations to ‘calculate’ how large the to-be 
internalized IAF should be or at least benchmark the size of their existing IAF? Based upon 
the earlier findings of this research study it was assumed that increasing degrees of Asset 
Specificity will also lead to increasing staff numbers for the IAF. Due to idiosyncrasy, 
organizations that do have high degrees of Asset Specificity will most likely need not only 
more specialized skilled auditors and this knowledge will need to be contained not only 
within the IAF but also within the organization, but foremost this idiosyncrasy might have an 
increasing effect on staff numbers as well. More specialized and skilled auditors maybe less 
easily brought in for other audits for two reasons; first of all their expertise needs to be 
exploited to their full potential and therefore need to be geared towards their main area of 
expertise; secondly, they might be rather useless for other purposes due to the lack of 
specialized knowledge in other areas. These factors might drive staff numbers. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
If Asset Specificity of an organization increases, staff numbers of the IAF increases as well.  
 
As Widener and Selto (1999) pointed out that the Scope of Services of the IAF might be 
related to the: 
1. Highly specialized knowledge (and therefore Asset Specificity) needed to perform 
internal audits; and 
2. Strategic demand for their services.  
 
The idiosyncratic use of Internal Audit is also demonstrated quite clearly in Chapter 5. The 
abundant number of different audit types might also be explained by the degree of Asset 
Specificity of the organization they are part of. The almost perfect split between Internal 
Audit and the external auditor in 3 out of the 4 case study companies, whereby the external 
auditor focused on the financial audit and the IAF on other audits, predominantly operational 
and IT audits, is exemplary in this respect. The, at least supposedly, commodity financial 
audit type is done by the outsider and the rest by the insider.  
 
This shift during the last decade may have had an impact on the possibility of the IAF to gain 
stature and deepen their knowledge of the business and thereby becoming increasingly 
involved in the strategic realm of the organization thus supporting the conjecture of Widener 
and Selto (1999, p 67) ‘….that if Internal Audit personnel wants to stay within the firm they 
should become more central to the management and day-to-day control of strategic assets and 
less concerned with more generalized services that can be outsourced easily’. That argument 
was already made by Ratliff and Beckstead (1994). This development might have fostered the 
need for their services, not only increase their numbers, but foremost impacting the number of 
different audit types and thereby the breadth and reach of the IAF services. In other words, 
might the degree of Asset Specificity also be related to the Scope of Services of the IAF?  
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The previous paragraph elaborates on the need to have specific knowledge of the 
organization, creating more specialized auditors that need to be exploited to their full potential 
and might be – perhaps in some way – be rather useless for other types of audits. This effect 
might reiterate in the way described in Chapter 2 where we applied the ‘unbundling’ model 
(Matthyssens et al, 1998). This model was then used to offer some explanation why internal 
audit sought to expand its services beyond standardized audits such as financial audits. This 
model might also offer some clues to the breadth of services.  
 
If Asset Specificity is high and deep knowledge and expertise is called for, specialized 
auditors will be recruited and predominantly in-sourced. Outsiders are not only more 
expensive but their knowledge will be lost as soon as they no longer render their service to the 
organization. Furthermore, the availability of their services will allow the ‘buyer/user’ to 
become experienced and – taking that the services are rendered to the satisfaction of the 
Management and the Supervisory Board – create a buy impulse which may also foster the 
need to explore other areas as well. If this ‘pull’ wouldn’t be spontaneously, a specialized and 
skilled audit force may very well be able to apply a ‘push’ strategy (see Chapter 4). This 
situation might explain what Power (1996, p 312) once called the ‘reproducing’ of all kinds of 
audits.   
 
Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
If Asset Specificity of an organization increases, the Scope of Services of the IAF will be 
broader.   
 
Until now we have build solely on Transaction Cost Economics and the dominance of Asset 
Specificity. Now let us take another look at Agency Theory. As shown in Chapter 4, the 
dominant idea behind Agency Theory is Information Asymmetry. Information Asymmetry 
founded either on ‘hidden information’ or ‘hidden action’.  In any case, principals are in need 
of a monitor to exercise some kind of oversight over their agents. In this respect, there might 
be some similarity with the Asset Specificity case made above that if Information Asymmetry 
is high or increased similar effects might occur.  
 
Higher levels of Information Asymmetry might induce more anxiety on the part of the 
principal and mutatis mutandis lead to an increased need to have an Internal Auditor at hand 
to close the information gap. Now, the question would be does that need to be an in- or an 
outsourced IAF? Clearly, there might not be an easy answer. It is my conjecture that if 
Information Asymmetry is high, there will be a need on the part of the principals to be 
informed on a more frequent basis to close the gap. The higher the level of Information 
Asymmetry the higher the frequency of using an auditor will be. Although we did not include 
Frequency as a contributing factor of the Transaction Cost Economic perspective, Frequency 
in relation to Information Asymmetry (and thus Agency Theory) might still be of importance.  
 
As discussed above, Widener and Selto (1999) showed that Frequency did have an effect on 
the outsourcing issue, especially in conjunction with Asset Specificity. The very same could 
be true for Information Asymmetry in conjunction with Frequency. In this study there is some 
belief that there is a relation between Information Asymmetry and Frequency. The higher 
Information Asymmetry, the more likely it will be that there is a more frequent need for audit 
services. And, if there is a more frequent need due to Information Asymmetry, the more likely 
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it will be that the internal audit activities are going to be in-sourced. Economies of scale are 
also applicable for internal audit services. Furthermore, the case studies revealed that in these 
organizations outsourcing had not been an issue at all. Foremost, this was due to lack of 
knowledge of the organization and the culture and people on the part of outside providers. 
Cost was not really an issue, availability far more. Apparently there was a high perceived 
need to have an in-sourced IAF in the first place.  
 
The above line of reasoning might hinge around the Frequency issue that for this part might 
also be closely intertwined with Information Asymmetry. What comes first? Might it be that 
Information Asymmetry is in some way connected to Asset Specificity as well? If there is a 
high degree of Asset Specificity will that create also Information Asymmetry, or vice versa? 
If assets are highly specialized Transaction Cost Economics will conclude that the 
information needed to conclude any contract will be more difficult to get. Bounded rationality 
is even more bounded and contracts are definitely be more complex and thus by definition 
‘incomplete’. Speklé (2001b) pointed out that in case of high Asset Specificity together with a 
high level of what he calls ‘ex post information impactedness’ – synonym for Information 
Asymmetry – ‘Boundary Control’ is the last resort. Boundary Control is a least desired corner 
of the play ground84 from a control perspective. What remains are prescriptive codes of 
conduct and boundary systems, strict budgets, and tie in of agents through ‘hostages’. He then 
provides another indicative characteristic of the Management Control archetype including 
‘external audit’.  Now, if external audit might be some kind of solution to this problem from 
the perspective of the outside principal, then we can very well envision Internal Audit being 
some kind of solution from the perspective of the inside principal overlooking managers 
below him. In the remainder of this research Asset Specificity and Information Asymmetry 
will be treated as two distinct factors that do not interrelate and are measured differently. 
Below the way they are measured is explained. 
 
Concluding, stepping on the Asset Specificity argument and the argument made above: 
 
Hypothesis 4: 
If Information Asymmetry within an organization is high, then in-sourcing of the IAF is 
higher and outsourcing of the IAF lower. 
 
And, mutatis mutandis; 
 
Hypothesis 5: 
If Information Asymmetry of an organization increases, staff numbers of the IAF increases as 
well.  
 
As to the Scope of Services, Information Asymmetry could have the following effect. If there 
is a high degree of Information Asymmetry the ‘principal’ is in need of Internal Audit. If this 
is the case, the IAF will be in-sourced and bigger sized if Information Asymmetry increases. 
However, the breadth of the Scope of Services will be more depending on the level of Asset 
Specificity as described above, due to the specific knowledge to execute the audits. 
Information Asymmetry as such may not necessarily have an effect on the breadth of the 
Scope of Services. On the contrary, the principal-agent Information Asymmetry calls for 
reliable information aimed at unveiling both hidden information and hidden action. This 
closing-the-gap will predominantly be done using all kinds of reports. Those reports need to 
                                                 
84 “This condition implies a seriously limited possibility to define and evaluate performance, even after the 
contribution has been made” (Speklé, 2001, 90) 
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be audited and predominantly contain (financial) data. This would require financial audits, 
creating a narrower Scope of Services. Therefore, 
 
Hypothesis 6: 
If Information Asymmetry of an organization increases, the Scope of Services of the IAF is 
narrower.   
 
Although, Asset Specificity and Information Asymmetry are dealt with separately, it is 
obvious that their effects show congruence as to the Make or Buy issue and the size of the 
IAF. Since it was already noted that there may be some kind of reinforcement effect: 
 
Hypothesis 7: 
Combined high scores of Asset Specificity and Information Asymmetry yields more in-
sourcing of the IAF.  
 
And 
 
Hypothesis 8: 
Combined high scores of Asset Specificity and Information Asymmetry increases the size of 
the IAF.  
 
6.2.3 How the survey was conducted 
Surveyed organizations and response 
The present study aimed at inventorying 100% of organizations in The Netherlands having an 
IAF. Although it is hard to guarantee the 100% mark has been achieved it must be pretty 
close. The process depicted below will demonstrate the basis of this conjecture.  
 
The process was as follows: 
1. Membership lists of the IIA The Netherlands, the Royal Dutch Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (NIVRA), the ‘Vereniging van Operational Auditors’ (VRO), and the 
‘Nederlandse Organisatie van EDP Auditors’(NOREA; the IT auditors association)  
were obtained. Those registers contain all members having either a qualification of 
RA (NIVRA) or RO (VRO) or RE (NOREA) or associated members (CIA’s or 
otherwise qualified as internal auditor); 
2. The data of all listed companies (224 by the end of 2003) in The Netherlands was 
gathered via Euronext, the stock exchange in Amsterdam and all Chief Audit 
Executives of those companies were gathered via Step 1 or by calling upon the 
company or using publicly available data via the internet; 
3. A list of all companies having revenues exceeding € 100 million – approximately 
1700 – according to the data provided by the joint ‘Chamber of Commerce’ was 
obtained. The list was shortened by excluding companies that were subsidiaries of 
Dutch companies, or subsidiaries of foreign listed companies (like Texaco for 
instance, that have their Chief Audit Executive abroad) or just ‘special purpose 
vehicles’ of parent companies. Furthermore, all companies that were merely 
‘holding companies’ based in The Netherlands for mere fiscal reasons were 
excluded as well since they do not have any personnel and most surely no IAF 
either. The remaining companies were compared with the companies obtained in 
Step 1 and 2; 
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4. Companies for which it was not yet known whether or not an IAF was present were 
checked via websites and the internet. If that was not possible or did not provide 
sufficient evidence they were contacted via phone. If it was not possible to get a 
conclusive answer the company was included in the list. The number of 
organizations that was included in the survey via steps 1 to 4 was 228; 
5. Data of Public Services organizations was gathered via public registers supplied by 
Governmental agencies or organizations and contained: 
a. Ministries and their Departmental Audit Services; in this case 12 Ministries were 
selected; 
b. Large municipalities exceeding 100.000 inhabitants that might have an IAF; 
selected by using public available data from the government. In this case 15 were 
selected; 
c. Provinces and their Audit Services. In this case all 12; 
d. University hospitals. In this case all 8; 
e. Universities and ‘Higher Educational Schools’. In this case 20; 
f. ‘Zelfstandige Bestuurs Organen’ (autonomous administrative authorities which 
perform a public task without falling directly under a Minister); and 
‘Agentschappen’ (agencies) of the government. In this case 24 were selected. 
Whether or not they had an IAF was checked via the available data as well and if 
no conclusive answer was obtained called upon or included as well;  
6. Using my extensive network, the available data of the Erasmus University, 
colleagues and competitors – if available - , holding data of students, staff, 
employers, and Chief Audit Executives was used as well to check whether any 
names or addresses were missing. On two occasions addresses ‘popped up’ via ads 
in the newspaper, via executive searchers searching for internal auditors.  
 
The end result was a list containing 320 addresses of organizations and their Chief Audit 
Executives or internal auditor(s). Out of this 320 a total of 144 responded. Organizations that 
did not respond were contacted again to make sure that their reason for not responding was 
that they did not have an IAF. Through this process it was revealed that 90 of those 176 did 
indeed not have an IAF.  
 
For calculating the response percentage these 90 was subtracted from the 320 leading to 230 
organizations that could have an IAF. We now know that out of these 230 a total of 144 
responded; leaving maximum 86 for which we were not able to ascertain whether they had an 
IAF. Based on Manski’s (1990) bounds the response rate will be between 66.6% (see Table 6-
2) and 39.7% (see Table 6-3).  
 
 
Table 6-1: Response rate 
 
 Responded  
 Yes No Total  
IAF    
Yes 127  Less than or equal to 86  
No   17 Equal to or more than 90  
Total 144 176 320 
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Table 6-2: Response rate extreme situation 1 
 
 Responded  
 Yes No Total  
IAF    
Yes 127   86 213 
No   17   90 107 
Total 144 176 320 
 
In this case the response rate would be 66.6% (213/320).  
 
Table 6-3: Response rate extreme situation 2 
 
 Responded  
 Yes No Total  
IAF    
Yes 127     0 127 
No   17 176 193 
Total 144 176 320 
 
In this case the response rate would be 39.7% (127/320).  
 
Furthermore, an abridged version of the survey was send to Management Board Members as 
well as Supervisory Board members (see below). Of the 203 organizations that did have an 
IAF 93 Management Board members responded (46%) and 30 Supervisory Board members 
(15%). For five surveys, no value was provided for the question whether the respondent was 
either a Management Board or Supervisory Board member and were excluded from the data 
set.   
 
To reach high response rates the following measures were taken (Van Engeldorp Gastelaars, 
1998). The time to complete the survey was kept as limited as possible. The survey for Chief 
Audit Executives contained 67 questions (see Appendix 6) that would take approximately 30 
minutes to complete it. An abridged part of the survey – 17 questions out of the 67 - was also 
addressed to the Managing and Supervisory Board members (see appendix 7).  This would 
allow comparison of their answers with those of the Chief Audit Executives to see whether 
there are any discordant opinions. The limited part of the survey would take approximately 5 
to 10 minutes.  
 
The two surveys were sent to the Chief Audit Executive (if known), the Officer known to bear 
responsibility for the audit function, or the Chief Financial Officer or comparable officer. The 
Chief Audit Executive or comparable officer was asked to pass through the survey to 
Managing and Supervisory Board members. It was expected that the willingness to cooperate 
would be increased if a familiar staff member would present it.  
 
Surveys that were not delivered and sent back due to lacking or wrong addresses were 
followed up and resend. Within three weeks, a reminder was sent to the organizations via 
email. Incorrect email addresses were sorted out and reminders were sent. This was repeated 
three times whereby the last two reminders were sent to the respondents personally and not 
via an undisclosed list of addresses. The latter was done by me or my assistant but in any case 
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using my email box in order to emphasize my personal interest and call upon their 
commitment to participate. It was hoped for that personal ties and familiarity between many 
Chief Audit Executives and me would enhance their willingness to cooperate. 
 
At the end of this extensive process a few remaining organizations were called upon 
personally via telephone to participate in order to even further demonstrate the personal 
interest of the researcher. Last but not least during occasional personal meetings the personal 
interest in their response on this survey was underscored. 
 
More important than the non-response rate between 33.4% and 60.4% the systematic bias that 
can arise as a consequence of non-response (Van Engeldorp Gastelaars, 1998). It was ensured 
that the non-response was not selective by keeping track of the responses and thereby 
enabling tracking non-respondents who subsequently were surveyed why they did not 
complete the survey to make sure that non-response was indeed not selective. 38 
Organizations (50% of the total of 76 (203 minus 127)) provided a reason why not. Results 
were as follows: 
- No time (28); 
- No interest (3); 
- Company policy not to reply (2); 
- Reorganization at hand (2); 
- Other reasons (3). 
 
Based upon the above it was concluded that the respondents were representative and non-
response was not in any way selective.   
 
For the survey analysis only organizations were included that had an IAF. Organizations that 
did no have an IAF were excluded from the analysis. Therefore, no comparisons were made 
between those respondents that did and those that did not have an IAF.  
 
First of all an overview of the responding branches of the organizations is shown in table 6-4. 
 
Table 6-4: Overview of branches of respondents 
 
 Industry Number % responding
Trade, Transport, Logistics 18 16 
Production, Energy, Utilities 15 13 
Telecom, IT, Media & Entertainment 10   9 
Professional Services   5   4 
Financial Services 35 30 
Public Sector 33 28 
Total 116 100 
 
From the 144 responding organizations 116 usable surveys remained; some 11 missed 
relevant data. From a Chi-square test it turned out that the over- and under representation of 
some industries in the survey response is statistically significant. However, this was not 
considered as a major problem, since the main goal of the survey was to test the 
aforementioned hypotheses and not to measure population characteristics. 
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The size of the companies is presented in Tables 6-5 and 6-6.  
 
Table 6-5: Size of responding organizations in turn over 
  
 Size in turn over in €  Frequency
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Less than 50 million 6 4.3 4.3 
  Between 51 and 100 million 4 2.9 7.2 
  Between 101 and 500 million 32 23.0 30.2 
  Between 501 million and 1 billion 29 20.9 51.1 
  More than 1 billion 68 48.9 100.0 
  Total 139 100.0   
Missing  5    
Total 144    
 
 
 
Table 6-6: Size of responding organizations in total staff numbers  
  
 Size in number of staff Frequency 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Less than 500 20 14.0 14.0 
  Between 501 and 1,000 11 7.7 21.7 
  Between 1,001 and 2,500 27 18.9 40.6 
  Between 2,501 and 10,000 49 34.3 74.8 
  More than 10,000 36 25.2 100.0 
  Total 143 100.0   
Missing  1    
Total 144    
 
 
From the perspective of staff numbers, the results can be detailed as follows; 14% has less 
than 500 staff. Not surprisingly, those 20 organizations are to be found in Financial Services 
industry (11) and Public Sector industry (5) predominantly. The majority of the population 
has staff between 2,501 and 10,000 (34%) and 25% having staff in excess of 10,000.   
Survey design 
The respondents had the right to know the objective of the survey and in which setting it took 
place and what would be done with the results. Therefore, the survey was accompanied by 
two introduction letters (see Appendix 8), one for the Chief Audit Executive, and one for the 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee and Management Board members. This letter explained 
the objective of the survey, the amount of time it would take and the possibility to call for 
assistance either via email or via the phone. During the course of the survey two people called 
for assistance and requested elaboration on the content of the survey.  
 
If needed it was also possible to receive a Dutch version of the survey, 10 requested a Dutch 
version. The introduction letter also emphasized the confidentiality of data and respondent. It 
was also possible to ask for a summary of the results. The survey was sent out in hardcopy 
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format with the possibility to receive yet another copy via email. The survey was sent out mid 
October 2004 and finally the closing date was set at February 28, 2005. 
 
A pilot version of the survey was designed, based upon prior known surveys used by other 
researchers (Widener and Selto, 1999; see below) and institutes (IIA, 2000). This pilot version 
was used alongside the case studies and send to members of their Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committees, Management Boards, and Chief Audit Executives. This version was used to test 
the design and the applicability of and easiness to understand the questions, unclear or 
muddled wordings and sentences.   
 
The survey was redesigned and laid out before two experts very familiar with surveys. Upon 
their comments the draft survey was further adjusted and then piloted with 4 Chief Audit 
Executives of 4 different organizations. Upon their comments the survey was again – though 
slightly - adjusted. The survey was also corrected by a native English/American writer and 
teacher.  
 
To establish the validity of this survey, we consider four kinds of validity (Churchill, 1979; 
Yin, 1994, 2003; Korzilius, 2000; Johnson and Duberley, 2000; Verschuren and Doorewaard, 
2001). Content validity tries to ascertain if all aspects of an idea are measured correctly. 
Construct validity is about measuring the variables correctly (see below). Internal validity 
refers to the quality of the conclusions from the research. External validity is aimed at the 
(possible) generalization of the conclusions for other populations or conditions. The tactics to 
deal with the validity of the case studies were already discussed in Chapter 5. Above it was 
already pointed at the triangulation between case study and survey methods and their 
implications for validity (Modell, 2005). With regard to the survey a number of steps were 
taken to enhance the validity of the survey even further.  
 
With regard to content validity existing prior research and surveys were used extensively 
(Chapter 4 and below). A list of all relevant variables that could be taken into account and the 
process to select those that were included in the final survey has been elaborated in Section 
6.2.2.   
 
Construct validity requires correct operational measures for the variables studied. For many of 
the variables used in the survey this was easy. Size of the company for instance was measured 
in three ways: turnover/revenues per 2003, total assets per end of 2003, and staff numbers 
also per end of 2003. The latter was later adjusted for the absolute numbers per end of 2004.  
This was done via a desk research were annual reports and websites were researched. In cases 
that those sources did not provide the required number, the organizations were approached via 
the phone and/or email and kindly requested to provide the staff number per the end of 2004.  
 
External validity is a strong point of any survey. Surveys are renowned for their ability to 
provide generalizability of the conclusions. The main attribute of a survey though is that the 
sample should be random. In that respect, this survey has every right to acclaim that external 
validity is high. The surveyed companies make up for nearly 100% of the total population 
since all organizations that do have an IAF were included. The steps taken to warrant that 
100% score have been described above as well as the response rate and the way non-response 
was taken care of.  
 
The questionnaire was presented to the Chief Audit Executive who has access to the relevant 
data of the organization.  
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Important variables and their definition are given in Table 6-7. 
 
Table 6-7: Variables used in the survey 
 
Variable 
name 
Description Type Min Max Operationalization 
AS Asset Specificity 
indicator 
Binary 0 1 Constructed out of 12 
ordinal 1-5 survey scores 
 
IA Information Asymmetry 
score 
Continuous 1 4.5 Factor analysis on 5 ordinal 
1-5 survey scores 
 
FTE IAD Size Internal Audit 
Department 2004 ( in 
FTE's) 
Continuous 0.5 800 Survey: Q48 (2004) 
 
PERC 
OUTS 
Percentage Outsourcing 
IAF 2004 
Continuous 0 1 Survey: Q50 / (Q48 + v50) 
(all for 2004) 
AUDIT 
SCOPE 
Scope of Audit Services 
2004 
Ordinal 1 8 Constructed out of survey 
Q55 to Q62 (for 2004); 
(Number of different audit 
types needed to count for 
80% of the total) 
FTE 
TOTAL 
Size of organization 2004 
(in FTE’s) 
Continuous 37 350,000 Desk research 
NR 
SUPERV 
Number of  external 
supervisors other than the 
external auditor 
Ordinal 1 10 Desk research 
 
The last variable ‘total number of supervisors other than the external auditor’ requires some 
elaboration. During the execution of the survey, the researcher was requested to be part of a 
global team of a service provider that was requested by a large financial services organisation 
to tender for a proposal in which they called for an overhaul of their global IAF. It turned out 
that – amongst others - one of their regulators criticized the IAF, which set off the idea of the 
restructuring effort. During the tendering process, the team had a meeting with the CEO, the 
CFO, and the Chief Audit Executive to discuss the details of the bid. Once more it came to the 
attention that the uttering of any regulator matters, especially in a highly regulated 
environment subject to much compliance drives during the last decade in particular. The CFO 
asked: “How long will it take to get this overhaul done?” Upon the estimate provided he 
exclaimed: “And during that lengthy process I will still get those imperative letters by the 
regulator and discussions at Supervisory Board and Audit Committee meetings! Can’t we 
speed it up a little?”  
 
It then dawned that the possible impact of Supervisors/Regulators in this research should be 
taken into account. Perhaps the size of the IAF is also influenced by Supervisors/Regulators 
and the sheer number of them that any global organization might be subject to? Surely their 
position is influenced by Supervisors/Regulators since they expect the IAF to be as 
independent as possible. Even the Scope of Services might in some way be impacted by their 
views. It was then decided to include the number of Regulators and Supervisory bodies in the 
analysis as envisioned that the more there would be the more this might impact the IAF.  
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That number was revealed via desk research. Annual reports were analyzed and, if needed, the 
Chief Audit Executive was called to provide with the number. In some cases it turned out that 
there could be dozens, especially in Financial Services organizations operating on a global 
scale. The number of Supervisors was topped at 10. The impact of regulators might be more 
profound and as such should be researched more in-depth in subsequent studies.   
 
Operationalizing the independent variables 
 
Asset Specificity 
Although Asset Specificity is described rather well in literature (Williamson, 1987; Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992; Furubotn, 2001; Speklé, 2001b, to name just a few), measuring the degree 
of Asset Specificity of an organization is not easily done. Asset Specificity is described by 
Williamson (1996, p59-60) as follows: 
 
‘Without purporting to be exhaustive, Asset Specificity distinctions of six kinds have 
been made: 
1) Site specificity, as where successive stations are located in a cheek-by-jowl 
relation to each other so as to economize on inventory and transportation expenses; 
2) Physical Asset Specificity, such as specialized dies that are required to produce a 
component; 
3) Human Asset Specificity that arises in a learning-by-doing fashion; 
4) Dedicated assets, which are discrete investments in general purpose plant that are 
made at the behest of a particular customer, to which; 
5) Brand name capital and; 
6) Temporal specificity having been added.’ 
 
Although this description may seem rather self-explanatory, translating that to measurable 
units is not that easy. Some measured Asset Specificity directly through a five-item scale 
capturing specific equipment (Mitthas, Jones, and Mitchell, (2003)), others use inter-firm co-
specialization (Dyer, 1997; Mudambi et al., 1998; Poppo and Zenger, 1998), labor skills 
(Walker et al. 1991), business processes (Zaheer et al. 1994), JIT requirements, and product 
customization (Bensaou et al. 1999). Shelanski and Klein (1995) asked a manager on a scale 
of 1-5 or 1-7 the degree to which an asset has value in outside uses.  As Klein (2004) noted as 
Asset Specificity cannot be easily measured, some other proxies have been applied such as 
concentration in single-industry studies to capture situations where small-numbers bargaining 
situations are likely to appear.  
 
A limitation of these measures is that they are likely to be subjective. For example, for the 
same objective measure of specificity, a more risk adverse person could report a higher 
cardinal measure. 
 
David and Han (2004) provided a systematic assessment of the empirical support for 
Transaction Cost Economics. They selected 63 articles containing 308 statistical test of core 
Transaction Cost Economics relationships. The Widener and Selto (1999) study by the way 
was not included in their analysis. Their overall score for the different attributes of Asset 
Specificity as an independent variable is as follows: 
- Human Assets (divided in 9 sub-attributes) scored an average support of 57%; 
- Physical Assets (divided in 5 sub-attributes) scored an average support of 55%; 
- Human and Physical Assets (as a composite measure) scored an average support of 65%; 
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- Product (divided in 6 sub-attributes) scored an average support of 91%; 
- Site (divided in 2 sub-attributes) scored an average support of 20%; 
- Firm (divided in 4 sub-attributes; among them brand scoring 100%) scored an average 
support of 60%.  
 
The total average support for Asset Specificity was 60% and countered in just 4%. 
Uncertainty was supported in just 24% and countered in 16%. Frequency, peculiarly, was 
only researched very little and therefore excluded in their study.  Again, their research 
underpins the choice for focussing on Asset Specificity solely. “As an independent variable, 
Asset Specificity fared best”. (David and Han, 2004, p52)  
 
One of David and Hans (2004, p52) surprises was that overall support for Transaction Cost 
Economics was found only to be 47%: “In the meantime, however, our results keep us from 
unreservedly agreeing that the theory is an ‘empirical success story’ (as acclaimed by 
Williamson, 1996, p55)”. Again, also in the much acclaimed Transaction Cost Economics 
theory seems to be room for improvement.  
 
Carter and Hodgson (2006) concluded accordingly:  
 
‘This overall picture of partial and qualified consistency with Williamson’s framework 
contrasts with more upbeat and categorical claims found in some previous surveys of 
TCE empirical work’.  
 
Boerner and Macher (2006, p38) added even further issues: 
 
‘In addition to the problems associated with the use and measurement of transaction 
cost proxies, a second important gap in the existing empirical literature concerns the 
endogeneity of transaction cost variables, most notably Asset Specificity. Virtually all 
of the studies examined in this paper treat the specificity of assets and the level of a 
firm’s investment in those assets as exogenous’.  
 
Taken all of the above into account 12 questions were developed (survey questions 7 to 15, 
19, 20 and 66). Although the survey of Widener and Selto (1999) provided some footing, only 
one question was copied due to their measuring of the Asset Specificity of the internal audit 
activities itself instead of that of the organization. Some five questions were applied though 
slightly adjusted.  
 
The one that was copied was 19 (number 66 in my survey; ‘How long does it take before an 
internal auditor can perform audits independently?’). The ones that were slightly adjusted 
were: 
- 1 and 23 (number 23 in my survey; ‘Do you have an IAF?’); 
- 4 and 5 (number 50 in my survey; ‘Total in-sourced fte’s on an annual basis’.); 
- 30 (number 55 to 63; ‘Total time spend on different activities by the IAF’.). 
 
For the full details of the survey questions see Appendix 6.  
 
To measure the degree of Asset Specificity not just the total score of the 12 questions was 
averaged. An organization may be very well Asset Specific if a number of questions are 
scored 5 (on a scale from 1 to 5, 5 being strongly agree) and a number of others are scored 1 
(being strongly disagree). It was concluded that it would be very much debatable to assess 
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whether an organization would or would not be highly Asset Specific based upon an average 
score of those 12 questions. Supposedly there could be a few questions out of those 12 that 
would provide high scores while others might provide very low scores. The average could 
then lead to the conclusion that the organization would not be Asset Specific whereas there 
would be distinct reasons that might conclude otherwise. It was decided to use a threshold of 
at least 3 questions that needed to score the maximum score of 5 to allow for the conclusion 
that the organization is Asset Specific. 
 
Information Asymmetry 
Information Asymmetry is an even more difficult to operationalize. In literature, a lot has 
been said about Information Asymmetry in the context of difference between the information 
known to the organization versus the information known to the outside world. Many studies 
use proxies like the expenditures on R&D, the bid-spread for trading stock, etc. to reveal the 
level of Information Asymmetry.  
 
This study aimed at Information Asymmetry between top management (Management Board) 
and lower level management. There were hardly any validated surveys or research available 
that could be used. Seidmann and Sundararajan (1997) researched Information Asymmetry in 
relation to business process redesign without providing measures of Information Asymmetry. 
Jaworski and Young (1992) studied dysfunctional behaviour and management control and 
related Information Asymmetry to job tension and role-conflict.  
 
They used a 5 point-scale and included the following questions:  
1. My manager know exactly how to accomplish the work I normally encounter; 
2. My manager is intimately familiar with the day-to-day decisions related to my work; 
3. My manager has developed an excellent working knowledge of my job; 
4. My manager can quantitatively assess my performance after I complete my 
activities; 
5. My manager is able to adequately assess my performance after I complete my 
activities; 
6. My manager can specify the most important variables to monitor in my work; 
7. My manager can specify performance objectives to cover the range of activities I 
perform. 
 
Fisher et al (2002) studied the effect of Information Asymmetry on negotiated budgets but 
came up with a kind of dichotomy; they assumed Information Asymmetry was present or 
lacked in an experiment where superiors did or didn’t knew the subordinates’ performance 
capabilities.  
 
Dunk (1993) also relied on a six-item scale to measure the extent of Information Asymmetry 
between a respondent and his superior. All items use a seven-point anchored Likert scale (1 = 
I have no information advantage, 7 = I have a very significant information advantage). 
Bouwens and Van Lent (2006) provided further evidence on the convergent validity of the 
Information Asymmetry measure by correlating their measure with characteristics of 
respondents that reflect their accumulated experience and knowledge. As a manager’s 
experience grows, the likelihood that he knows more than his superior increases. 
 
Their questions were: 
1. How much better informed are you about the type of activities undertaken in your 
unit? 
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2. How much more familiar are you with the type of input output relations inherent in the 
internal operations of your unit? 
3. How much more certain are you about the performance potential of your unit? 
4. How much more familiar are you with the technical aspects of the work in your unit? 
5. How much better are you able to assess the potential impact on your activities of 
factors internal to your unit? 
6. How much better do you understand what can be achieved in your unit? 
 
The problem with all of the above questions is that they measure the Information Asymmetry 
on the level of a superior and his ‘agent’ but not on the level of the organization as a whole.  
 
For this survey five questions were developed that could enable some measure of Information 
Asymmetry. This lead to a continuum of five ordinal questions (questions 16 to 18, 21 and 
22). Because Information Asymmetry was less developed in literature I used a factor analysis. 
The results of the Principal Component Factor Analysis of the Information Asymmetry 
questions (114 cases used 2 cases contain missing values) is shown below. 
 
Table 6-8: Components loadings for questions measuring Information Asymmetry 
 
Variable  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Q16 -0.797       0.197 0.195 -0.357 -0.400 
Q17 -0.807 -0.122 0.325 -0.165 0.449 
Q18 -0.758 -0.111 0.052 0.630 -0.119 
Q21 -0.517 0.435 -0.726 -0.046 0.123 
Q22 0.225 0.887 0.364 0.158 0.076 
      
Variance 2.1781 1.0418 0.8051 0.5789 0.3961 
% Var 0.436 0.208 0.161 0.116 0.079 
 
 
The factor analysis shows that those five questions point at one dominant factor including the 
questions 16, 17, 18, and 21. Question 22 was excluded from the analysis. This question 
asked for the number of levels between the Management Board and the shop floor; allowing 
for the following answers; one, two, three, four, and five or more. By nature, this question 
was a very different one than the rest of the survey. The degree of Information Asymmetry 
was measured by the average score of those four questions. 
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6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Testing the Hypotheses 
Regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses. To study the impact of Information 
Asymmetry and Asset Specificity on several response variables, one could in principle 
compute simple correlation coefficients. However, in this case one needs to control for other 
factors that play a role in explaining the response variables. Therefore, second order partial 
correlation coefficients are used, because the models formulated in this section make use of 
two control variables. Although this approach is very similar to multivariate regression, it is 
important to stress that the focus has not been on building models that forecast the response 
variables but on analyzing dependencies between variables. This focus is also logical given 
the fact that the survey is of a limited scope and does not contain enough questions to give a 
large enough set of variables to build a solid prediction model. 
 
I will use this approach to test the eight statements given in the previous section, using the 
variables given in Table 6-9. 
 
Table 6-9: Variables used for testing the hypotheses 
 
Variable name Definition 
Outs Percentage Outsourced Internal Accountancy 
Audit_scope Scope of Services provided by the internal audit function 
Fte_iad Full time equivalents of the Internal Audit Function 
Fte_tot Total Full time equivalents 
Superv Number of External Supervisors 
AS Asset Specificity 
 
 
Analysis Hypothesis 1 
The negative relationship between Asset Specificity and the percentage of the IAF that is 
outsourced is tested with the following linear regression model: 
 
(1) iiiii ASSupervFtecOuts εβββ ++++= *** 321 , 
 
In this analysis 101 cases could be used because the other cases contained missing values and 
where therefore excluded. The R2 value was 2.5% and the adjusted R2 0.0%. This indicates 
the absence of any relationship between the percentage of outsourced internal accountancy 
and the independent variables and therefore between Asset Specificity and the percentage of 
outsourcing. This makes it unnecessary to look at a further interpretation of the coefficients.  
Hypothesis 1 is strongly rejected. 
 
 
Analysis Hypothesis 2 
The analysis of a possible positive relationship between Asset Specificity and the number of 
IAF staff is performed with the following linear regression model: 
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(2)  iiiii ASSupervtotFteciadFte εβββ ++++= **_*_ 321  
 
In this analysis 108 cases were available; all other cases contained missing values. The R2 
value was 67.6% and the adjusted R2 66.7%. Furthermore the analysis of variance shows an 
F-value of 72.33 (P-value = 0.000), which indicates that the combined explaining power of 
the independent variables is significant more than zero. The following table shows the results 
of this analysis. 
 
Table 6-10: Results Regression 2 
 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
Constant -75.00 (9.862) 0.000 
Total Fte (x 1000) 0.7712 (0.1411) 0.000 
Number of External Supervisors 40.211 (3.463) 0.000 
Asset Specificity 24.74 (12.49) 0.050 
 
 
All three independent variables have a positive influence on the number of IAF staff and are 
significant at a 5% level. If an organization is Asset Specific (AS indicator is equal to 1) we 
are expecting the size of the IAF to be about 25 FTE larger compared to a non Asset Specific 
organization (AS indicator 0).  
 
From the adjusted R2 statistic we learn that 66.7% of the variation within the size of the IAF 
can be explained by this regression. Although this number might not be viewed as a very high 
number, Anderson et al85 (2005, 237) stated: 
  
“In contrast, (to hard sciences that is) in the social sciences, where information is 
often less precise, it is not uncommon for the analyst to consider a solution that 
accounts for 60 percent of the total variance (and in some instances even less) as a 
satisfactory solution”. 
 
An investigation of the heteroscedasticity revealed that for the small number of institutions 
with large IAF’s, the residuals tend to be larger than for the other institutions. Traditional 
methods to overcome heteroscedasticity, such as using transformations, relative values and/or 
additional control variables, did not work in this case because of the unbalance in the sizes of 
IAF’s considered in the sample and the anonymity of the respondents, which complicates 
adding other control variables to the model. However, given the fact that the regressions 
models have only been used as means to compute the second order partial correlation 
coefficients between the size of the IAF and Asset Specificity and/or Information Asymmetry, 
heteroscedasticity is not considered a major issue here, because, even in the case of 
heteroscedasticity, the estimated coefficients, the so-called sample statistics, in the regression 
model (in this case the partial correlation coefficients) are still unbiased and consistent86. 
 
                                                 
85 Anderson, R.E., Babin, B., Black, B., Hair, J.F., and Tatham, R.L., (2005); Multivariate Data Analysis, 6th 
Edition, New York, Prentice Hall 
86 A sample statistic used to estimate a population parameter is unbiased if the mean of the sampling distribution 
of the statistic is equal to the true value of the parameter being estimated. A sample statistic is consistent if for 
larger sample sizes the statistic converges to the true parameters. 
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The conclusion is that Hypothesis 2 is supported by the regression results. The null hypothesis 
that the coefficient of the AS indicator is smaller than or equal to zero can be rejected at a five 
percent significance level. The type I error (the probability that this hypothesis is wrongfully 
rejected) is equal to 0.025. 
 
 
Analysis Hypothesis 3 
The possible positive relationship between the Scope of Services of the IAF is tested in the 
following linear regression model: 
 
(3) iiiii ASSupervtotFtecScopeAudit εβββ ++++= **_*_ 321  
 
In this analysis 105 cases were available; other cases contained missing values. The R2 value 
was 3.9% and the adjusted R2 1.1%. This indicates the absence of any relationship between 
the Scope of services of the IAF and the independent variables, including the Asset 
Specificity. From these results one can conclude that hypothesis 3 should be rejected. 
 
 
Analysis Hypothesis 4 
To test the negative relationship between the Information Asymmetry within an organisation and 
the percentage of the IAF that is outsourced the following linear regression model is used:  
 
(4) iiiii IASupervtotFtecOuts εβββ ++++= **_* 321  
 
In this analysis 106 cases were available; other cases contained missing values.  
The R2 value was 3.3% and the adjusted R2 0.5%. This indicates that there is no relationship 
between the percentage outsourced and the independent variables, which leads to the rejection 
of hypothesis 4. 
 
 
Analysis Hypothesis 5  
In order to test on the presence of a positive relationship between Information Asymmetry and 
the number of staff of the IAF, the following linear regression model is used: 
 
(5) iiiii IASupervtotFteciadFte εβββ ++++= **_*_ 321  
 
In this analysis 113 cases were available; other cases contained missing values. The R2 value 
was 67.2% and the adjusted R2 66.3%. Furthermore the analysis of variance shows an F-
value of 74.50 (P-value = 0.000), which indicates that the combined explaining power of the 
independent variables is significant more than zero. The following table shows the results of 
this analysis. 
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Table 6-11: Results Regression 5 
 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
Constant -105.01 (22.95) 0.000 
Total Fte (x 1000) 0.7759 (0.1388) 0.000 
Number of External Supervisors 40.619 (3.399) 0.000 
Information Asymmetry 12.975 (7.729) 0.096 
 
All three independent variables have a positive influence on the number of IAF staff members 
and are significant at the 5% level, except for Information Asymmetry. Information 
Asymmetry is significant at a 10% level. If an organization has an increasing degree of 
Information Asymmetry we are expecting the size of the IAF to be about 13 FTE larger 
compared to a low degree Information Asymmetry organization.  
From the adjusted R2 statistic we learn that 66.3% of the variation within the size of the IAF 
can be explained by this regression.  
 
Heteroscedasticity was also an issue in this case. However, given the fact that the regressions 
models have only been used as means to compute the second order partial correlation 
coefficients between the size of the IAD and Asset Specificity and/or Information 
Asymmetry, heteroscedasticity is not considered a major issue here, because, even in the case 
of heteroscedasticity, the estimated coefficients, the so-called sample statistics, in the 
regression model (in this case the partial correlation coefficients) are still unbiased and 
consistent87. 
 
 
Analysis Hypothesis 6 
The negative relationship between Information Asymmetry and the Scope of Services is 
tested with the following linear regression model: 
 
 (6) iiiii IASupervtotFtecscopeAudit εβββ ++++= **_*_ 321  
 
The R2 value was 1.7% and the adjusted R2 0.0%. This indicates the absence of any 
relationship between Information Asymmetry and the used independent variables (including 
the Scope of Services), and therefore leads to the rejection of hypothesis 6. 
 
 
Analysis Hypothesis 7 
Hypothesis 7 states that a combination of high scores on both Asset Specificity and 
Information Asymmetry yields an extra effect on the percentage of insourcing of the IAF, 
besides the individual effects of both variables. Because both variables do not have a 
significant influence on the percentage of insourcing, there will not be an extra combined 
effect. This means hypothesis 7 is rejected. 
 
 
                                                 
87 A sample statistic used to estimate a population parameter is unbiased if the mean of the sampling distribution 
of the statistic is equal to the true value of the parameter being estimated. A sample statistic is consistent if for 
larger sample sizes the statistic converges to the true parameters. 
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Analysis Hypothesis 8 
The positive relationship between combined high scores of Asset Specificity and Information 
Asymmetry and the number of staff of the IAF is tested by the following linear regression 
model: 
 
 (8) iiiiiiii IAASIAASSupervtotFteciadFte εβββββ ++++++= *****_*_ 54321  
 
In this model an interaction term between information asymmetry and asset specificity is 
included to measure the extra effect of a combination of high scores on both variables. The 
relationship between Asset Specificity and the size of the Internal Audit Function now becomes: 
 
i
i
i IA
AS
iadFte
*
_
53 ββ +=∂
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This means the relationship will not be constant as before, but will partly depend on the 
Information Asymmetry score. Therefore a high score on Information Asymmetry also means 
a higher positive (or negative) relationship between Asset Specificity and the size of the 
internal audit function. The same logic applies for information asymmetry. This way the extra 
effect of high scores on both variables is measured by β5. 
 
In this analysis 108 cases were available; other cases contained missing values. The R2 value 
was 68.7% and the adjusted R2 67.1%. Furthermore the analysis of variance shows an F-value 
of 44.74 (P-value = 0.000), which indicates that the combined explaining power of the 
independent variables is significant more than zero.  
 
Table 6-12: Results Regression 8 
 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
Constant -107.19 (23.66) 0.011 
Total FTE (x 1000) 0.7782 (0.1404) 0.000 
Number of External Supervisors 40.104 (3.443) 0.000 
Asset Specificity 22.96 (12.48) 0.550 
Information Asymmetry 11.965 (8.005) 0.761 
Interaction of Asset Specificity and  
Information Asymmetry 
18.358 (16.197) 0.260 
 
Except for the Total FTE and the Number of External Supervisors none of the variables is 
significant. This means there is no proof of an interaction effect between Asset Specificity 
and Information Asymmetry. Therefore there is no extra effect when a company scores high 
on Information Asymmetry as well as Asset Specificity, which means hypothesis 8 is 
rejected. 
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6.3.2 Discussion and conclusions of testing the Hypotheses 
In this section the results of the tested hypotheses are discussed.   
 
The results of the tests of Hypothesis 2 and 5 show clearly that there is support for the 
prediction that Asset Specificity and Information Asymmetry do have predictive power when 
it comes to the size of an IAF. Such was not demonstrated by previous research and enriches 
our knowledge about Internal Audit in general and IAF’s in particular. These results allow us 
to help out on the issue of how large an IAF should be. This clearly depends on whether the 
organization can be qualified as being Asset Specific; to determine that a number of questions 
have been used that used prior research but may yet need further refining.  
 
Measuring Asset Specificity as such is a tricky endeavour, as shown by prior research, even 
more so at the level of the organisation. Nevertheless, it is now upon further research to prove 
the above wrong or to come up with more refined measures.  
 
Regarding measures of Information Asymmetry that are useful within the boundaries of an 
organization has till now never been developed and no reference to prior research was 
available. Again, the tests showed that the expected correlation between higher levels of 
Information Asymmetry and the size of an IAF hold the test. Hopefully, these results will 
encourage other researchers to use them and bring them further down the road of scientific 
value.  
 
Although both Asset Specificity and Information Asymmetry have predictive power as to the 
size of an IAF, Asset Specificity may have more to offer, at least than was previously known. 
If organizations are Asset Specific this increases the size of the IAF with some 25 staff as 
opposed to those that are not. This number is almost twice as high as the increase predicted by 
higher degrees of Information Asymmetry (some 13) and thereby offering a more compelling 
story, albeit that this research had no continuum to offer to measure Asset Specificity.  
 
No support was found for either the Make or Buy debate or the Scope of Services issue. This 
is especially disappointing for the Make or Buy debate. Although already compelling 
conclusions were drawn by Widener and Selto (1999) and Speklé et al (2005), this research 
did not corroborate their findings albeit that they measured the Asset Specificity of the IA 
activities.   
 
If trying to come up with some explanations, the first guess would be that their research 
aimed at measuring Asset Specificity of the Internal Audit activities whereas my conjecture is 
that no proof is needed since these activities may be inherently Asset Specific. We need to 
establish a possible relationship between the Asset Specificity of the organisation instead of 
the IAF. Opponents might state that if an organization has an IAF this is because they are 
Asset Specific or suffering high degrees of Information Asymmetry. The way out for this 
would be to survey organizations that do not have an IAF and compare the results with this 
one. Anyway, if the above results would hold the Make or Buy debate would be prolonged 
and we might need to look for other clues.  
 
The case studies described in Chapter 5 already showed that the Make or Buy issue never was 
on the agenda anyway. It seems that there was a widespread need for an IAF and that if this 
need was present then no question about it: Let’s have it on board! The data showed that the 
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mean of the percentage outsourcing was 9.8%; meaning that on average the percentage that 
used outsourcing was a little below 10% and thereby not an impressive number anyway.   
 
Reasons to outsource some of the Internal Audit activities are to be found in: 
- A (temporary) peak in the demand; 
- Specific skills that are not available; 
- A very limited overall need that would create only a very small audit shop which 
might not be sustainable on the longer term and would be best met via outsourcing it 
totally, enabling a situation of ‘call if and when needed’.  
 
Looking at the data of my survey there were no organizations that outsourced more than 75% 
of their Internal Audit activities and just 3 that outsourced more than 50%. The vast majority 
(34) that used outsourcing did so for far less than 25%. These data supports the idea that once 
needed the Internal Audit activities are predominantly in-sourced.  
 
An attempt to find a relationship between the percentage outsourcing versus the size of the 
organization was to no avail; the R2 was a very low 0.5%; and the adjusted R2 0.0%. 
There was also no significant difference between the percentage of outsourcing and the 
industry; the R2 was 3.11%.  
 
The results did not provide any clues for the broadness of the Scope of Services.  Apparently, 
the breadth of the Scope of Services is in no way related to Asset Specificity or Information 
Asymmetry. Looking back, the rather massive growth of Operational Auditing, Consulting 
Services, and other audit types in the nineties (see Chapter 2) may be best explained by the 
tide of the times and the whims of those in charge of the IAF back then. It is hard to envision 
that those changes could be ascribed to major changes in either Asset Specificity or 
Information Asymmetry. The framework provided by Matthyssens et al (1998, see Chapter 2) 
might be even more powerful.  
 
The Scope of Services might also be more affected by regulators; Sarbanes Oxley is believed 
to foster the return of Financial Auditing as a more dominant audit type for the IAF. The latter 
is, however, not demonstrated by this survey as will be shown in the next section.  
 
Concluding this section we found support for the predictive power of both Asset Specificity 
and Information Asymmetry for staff numbers of the IAF; Asset Specificity providing even 
more provocative numbers than Information Asymmetry. The R2 values are 67.6% (adjusted 
66.7%) and 67.3% (adjusted 66.3%) respectively; indeed convincing data. For the Scope of 
Services this research doesn’t provide any usable clues whatsoever.  
 
6.3.3 Some other notable findings 
A survey like this would allow for many tables, graphs, and details. There is a limit and this 
limit is to be found in what is indeed ‘notable’ in the realm of this thesis. Below you will find 
the ones that were considered most notable and sometimes surprising.  
 
80% of the respondents have a two-tier structure; and 80% have an Audit Committee 
installed. Looking at the composition, only 44% has independent members exclusively and 
almost 16% has an Audit Committee consisting entirely of members from within the 
organization. Many of the latter are to be found in the Public Services organizations. 
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The average years of the existence of the Audit Committee demonstrated the fact that an 
Audit Committee is on the rise only recently. The minimum was 0 years and the maximum 31 
with an average of a little over 6 years. Comparing these numbers with the existence of the 
IAF the results are even more striking. The IAF exist an average of almost 14 years. Out of 
the 112 that reported the number of years their IAF existed, 45 (40%) had it for 5 years or less 
and just 22 reported that their IAF existed for more than 20 years, one of them existed for 180 
years! It is difficult if not impossible to conclude that IAF’s are on the rise but 45 having an 
IAF for less than 5 years might point in that direction. Repeating this survey over a number of 
years might reveal more detail and conclusive answers.  
 
The effects of Corporate Governance regulations coming into effect 
As already elaborated one of the reasons for this research was the issue of Corporate 
Governance regulations coming into effect and the desire to research the effect on the IAF. A 
number of questions were surveyed to see the development. In this section several results are 
discussed. For the confidence intervals a finite population correction was applied:  
 
Table 6-13: What has happened to the IAF during the last three years (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree) 
 
 Question N Min Max Mean
Std. 
Deviation 
 
Lower-
bound 
 
Upper-
bound 
 
24. Shrinking in size 
 
114 1 5 2.19 1.36 
 
2.10 
 
2.29 
 
25. More consultations with   
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee 
 
112 1 5 3.65 1.16 
 
3.57 
 
3.74 
26. Received less assignments from 
Management Board 
 
113 1 5 1.94 .864 
 
1.87 
 
2.00 
27. Received more assignments from 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee 
 
111 1 5 3.23 1.18 
 
3.14 
 
3.31 
28. Cooperating less with External 
Auditor 
 
112 1 4 2.10 .932 
 
2.03 
 
2.17 
29. Received a bigger budget (10% 
or more) 
 
113 1 5 3.03 1.3 
 
2.93 
 
3.12 
30. More Internal Audit activities 
were outsourced 
 
113 1 5 1.89 1.0 
 
1.81 
 
1.96 
 
31. IAF has been  decentralized 
 
112 1 5 3.32 1.42 
 
3.22 
 
3.43 
 
Lower- and Upperbound are at a 95% confidence interval.  
 
It is clear that the IAF during the last 3 years has received more meetings with and 
assignments from both the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee and the Management Board, 
demonstrating an increased need for their services. This increased need is underpinned with 
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the fact that the IAF got an increase in budget and did not – although less convincing – shrink 
in size. It seems that the increase in budget is more significant than the increase in size (staff). 
Apparently the increased need for their services led to a more efficient but better resourced 
(due to the increase in budget either in tools or higher qualified people) IAF.  
 
It shows that they were cooperating more with the External Auditor as might be expected due 
to the developments described in Chapter 3. Also interesting is the score on the 
decentralization question. It shows that there must have been a trend towards centralization of 
the IAF. This trend was already noted in the realm of the case studies and it will be elaborated 
further in subsequent sections.   
 
Also the expectations for the upcoming three years based upon the Corporate Governance 
regulations coming into effect were surveyed.  The increase in communication between the 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee is expectedly to be enhanced even further (4.22 on a 
scale of 1-5), as well as the number of assignments (3.95). This will increase their 
independence as well (1.93 when asked whether this would decrease it) as well as the quality 
of their services (4.02).  The downside is that many Chief Audit Executives do expect that this 
might create more tension because he/she hast to serve more than one master (3.24). And yes, 
outsourcing is even less likely (3.36, when asked whether outsourcing will be increased).  
 
The same questions were asked to Management Board and Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee members and the comparison between the scores of the Chief Audit Executive and 
theirs is shown in Table 6-14. Again, a finite population correction has been applied. 
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Table 6-14: Comparing expectations of Chief Audit Executive (CAE), Management Board (MB), and 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee (SB/AC) upon Corporate Governance regulations coming into effect 
for the next three years 
 
 
Question 
 
CAE
 
MB 
 
SB/AC 
Overall 
mean 
ANOVA 
P-value 
37. More communication between Internal Audit and 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee 
 
4.21 3.85 3.93  0.002 
38. Chief Audit Executive receives assignments not 
only from Management Board but also Supervisory 
Board/Audit Committee 
 
3.95 3.34 3.67  0.000 
39. Greater distance between Internal Audit and the 
organization 
 
2.36 2.53 2.90  0.039 
40. Internal Audit will become less independent 
 
1.93 1.96 1.93 1.94 0.982 
41. A higher quality of Internal Audit services 
 
4.03 3.88 3.90 3.95 0.347 
42. More tension for the Chief Audit Executive (more 
masters need to be served) 
 
3.22 3.13 2.93 3.14 0.436 
43. Less conferencing with the External Audit 
 
2.10 2.38 2.17 2.22 0.064 
44. Internal Audit budget will be cut back (10% or 
more) 
 
2.03 1.99 2.07 2.02 0.916 
45. Tension between External Audit and Internal 
Audit will increase 
 
2.61 2.50 2.83 2.60 0.330 
46. Less outsourcing of Internal Audit activities to 
third parties 
 
3.37 3.23 3.31 3.30 0.650 
 
P-values less than 0.05 show up for questions 37, 38 and 39. The significant differences in 
opinion for the questions 37 and 38 are corroborated with the results of the case studies shown 
in Chapter 5.  
 
As shown in Chapter 3 the IAF has begotten a more prominent role in the Corporate 
Governance regulations. What is more is that the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee is 
expected to oversee – congruent with the Tabaksblat provisions (see Chapter 3) - what the 
Management Board is doing with the IAF. The effect of having more contact with both the 
Management Board and the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee has also become clear in the 
case studies in Chapter 5. Questions 25 and 26 (see Table 6) also showed that there have been 
more consultations and more assignments by the Management Board over the previous three 
years. Therefore, it is no surprise that there is consensus among the Chief Audit Executives, 
the Management Board, and the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee that there will be more 
communication between them as well as assignments for the Chief Audit Executive. 
 
Having more contacts with the Management Board as well as the Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee may in itself be good news for the stature of the IAF. This also fosters greater 
attention to the work of the IAF by those bodies. The downside is that the IAF may be seen by 
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the rest of the organization as ‘spy’ of both the Management Board and Supervisory 
Board/Audit Committee. The findings of the IAF were already reported to the Management 
Board in the past, but now they will also be visible for the Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee. The Management Board is part of the organization. Although lower level 
management would in many instances prefer – especially negative – audit findings not to be 
reported to the Management Board, they know such is inevitable. Such may be viewed 
differently when results are reported to the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee. They are 
representatives of the shareholders and therefore considered to be more outsiders than 
insiders.  
 
It seems that the Supervisory Board is slightly more convinced than the Management Board 
and the Chief Audit Executive that some alienation between the IAF and the rest of the 
organization may occur. Although the scores show that there is no real perceived danger of 
alienation although the numbers do not denote there is no danger at all. Based upon the 
findings of the case studies (see Chapter 5) this score is reassuring because the Chief Audit 
Executives in the case studies saw some danger of alienation.  
 
The much debated issue of independence shows the highest congruence of opinion among 
Chief Audit Executives, Management Board, and Supervisory Board/Audit Committee 
members. Not only are scores congruent, there is also ‘communis opinio’ that the Corporate 
Governance era will enhance the independence of the IAF. If the Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee is becoming more and more probing and also more involved with the internal 
audit activities this will foster the independence. The Supervisory Board/Audit Committee is 
representing the ‘principals’ of the Management Board as the ‘agents’. In the triangle between 
with the Chief Audit Executive this will strengthen their position. This will also be 
underscored by the scores on the questions 32 to 36 which will be discussed below.  
 
There is common ground that the quality of the services of the IAF will be increased by the 
Corporate Governance regulations. The Chief Audit Executive is very convinced (4.03) that 
such will the case. This was also corroborated by the case studies of Chapter 5. The rationale 
behind that might be that if pressure is increased the need to deliver high quality services will 
be increased as well. There is more at stake and more powerful oversight is exercised, e.g. via 
the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee. Furthermore, regulators are becoming more probing 
as well, further increasing the need to deliver high quality services. Surely the question will 
be at what cost this quality will be increased? Will the number of hours of training and 
education be increased? Will there be a focus on more experienced audit staff and a 
subsequent increase of budgets to pay for that? 
 
The latter consequence seems to be supported by the scores on question 44. A high consensus 
number is achieved (2.03) that the budget of the IAF will not be cut back with 10% or more, 
meaning that it is expected that the budget will be increased rather than decreased.  
 
Although there is not much consensus around the question of the Chief Audit Executive being 
more subject to tension as a result of the need to serve more than one master (question 42), 
the trend is that the new era will indeed increase tension. Not surprisingly the Chief Audit 
Executive scores the highest (3.22); the Supervisory Board is less convinced that tension will 
increase (2.93), leaving the Management Board in the middle (3.13). This increase in tension 
will foremost be experienced by the Chief Audit Executive. As described in Chapter 2 he 
might end up in a situation best described as ‘between a rock and a hard place’. The case 
studies in Chapter 5 already provided anecdotal evidence of this tension.  
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Just missing the mark of a P-value smaller than 0.05 is the score on question 43 about 
conferencing with the External Auditor (P-value 0.064). The scores show that there is much 
agreement that conferencing with the External Auditor will be more. Again, this is no surprise 
as it is corroborated by the case studies. Also the need for Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committees to exercise oversight of the services of the External Auditors as well as the IAF 
will enforce their need to have a coherent and comprehensive overview of audit services 
irrespective to who is the provider. The data shown in Table 14 (see below) will underpin this 
expectation. The question whether this will increase tension between External and Internal 
Auditor is somewhat ambiguous. Scores are well in the middle of the 1 to 5 scale with an 
average of 2.65.  
 
There is also some consensus (P-value of 0.650) that outsourcing will be less (score of 3.30 
on the question whether there will be less outsourcing to third parties; question 46). This is 
aligned with the above findings of the expectation that there will be more demand for services 
of the IAF, more budget, more conferencing with the main players in the governance arena (as 
depicted in Chapter 1 in Figure 2), and a higher quality of IAF services. The case studies 
already showed that outsourcing was never really considered to be a viable option. If you 
need it, better have it in-house seems to be the overwhelming idea.  
 
Who should the Chief Audit Executive be responsible to? 
First of all the survey questioned the perspective who the IAF/Chief Audit Executive should 
report to, meaning whom should he be responsible to. In Chapter 2 much was said about 
independence, the view of the Standards of the profession, and the responsibility for the IAF. 
In Chapter 3 the results of the Corporate Governance developments was described and it was 
shown that there had been a shift in the perspective and that the Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee was increasingly required to take the helm instead of the Management Board. The 
results of research applying Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics were debated in 
Chapter 4. Agency Theory positions the IAF in the agent – principal perspective and auditors 
would be best ‘in the hands of the principal’. In this respect having the Chief Audit 
Executive/IAF report to the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee would be favoured.  
 
In the case studies it became clear that there were some differing views. In The Netherlands 
the IAF has been firmly in the hands of the Management Board and this was acknowledged 
by the Tabaksblat Committee (see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, it became evident that 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee members were increasingly aware of the importance of 
the IAF and its possibilities to support them in their supervisory tasks. In Table 6-15 the 
results are shown whereby the question was to score the favoured position of the IAF without 
taking into account the actual situation within the organization. A finite population correction 
has been applied. 
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Table 6-15: Responsibility for the IAF in the eyes of the Chief Audit Executive, the Management Board, 
and the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee 
 
Question CAE MB SB/AC 
Overall 
mean 
ANOVA 
P-value 
32. Chief Audit Executive should be responsible 
to CEO 
 
4.04 3.80 4.07 
 
3.95 
 
0.355 
33. Chief Audit Executive should report to the 
CFO 
 
1.83 2.40 1.73 
  
0.002 
34. Chief Audit Executive should report to 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee 
 
3.70 2.76 2.87 
  
0.000 
35. Chief Audit Executive should have meetings 
with Supervisory Board/Audit Committee 
independent of Management Board 
 
4.19 3.20 3.50 
  
0.000 
36. Hiring, firing, appraising Chief Audit 
Executive should be done with approval of 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee 
 
4.12 3.09 4.17 
  
0.000 
 
P-values less than 0.05 show up for all questions but one (32). All respondents agree that the 
CAE should report to the CEO and not the CFO. That is a promising conclusion since this is 
the position of many Corporate Governance regulations and the position of the IIA Inc.  Less 
promising are the significant differences in opinion that the CAE should not report to the 
CFO. As shown in Chapter 2, the CFO was still the most common function to be responsible 
to in 2001 (59%). Surprisingly, the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee are most outspoken 
that the CAE should not report to the CFO (1.73).  
 
The CAE should report to and have meetings with the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee 
independent of the Management Board; and that their hiring and firing should be done with 
the approval of the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee. The Management Board seems to be 
more reluctant to ask the approval of the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee for the hiring, 
firing, and appraising of the Chief Audit Executive than the Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee would like them to.   
 
Concluding the position issue it is clear that shifts take place and that the Chief Audit 
Executive/IAF is more and more within the hands of the CEO and the Supervisory 
Board/Audit Committee than used to be the case. This is a trend that is aligned with the 
expectation based upon the Corporate Governance regulations (Chapter 3), the developments 
shown in Chapter 2 as well as the expectations based upon Agency Theory predominantly 
(Chapter 4), and the results of the case studies (Chapter 5). Nevertheless, the issue will be on 
the front page of the Chief Audit Executives newspaper for the next few years and consensus 
is not yet reached. Some ambiguity is still going on. 
 
Comparing the results of the expectations of the Chief Audit Executive and the historical and 
actual situation shows some differences. In 2001 the Chief Audit Executive was responsible 
to the CEO predominantly (56%) and the next in line was the CFO (35%). In almost 4% they 
were responsible to the Controller and just in 1.9% the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee.  
In 2004 numbers were already shifting.  
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By 2004, being responsible to the CEO went slightly up to a little more than 57% and to the 
CFO geared down to a little more than 28%. The Supervisory Board/Audit Committee 
number went up to almost 9%. For the next three years expectations are that the speed of 
change will increase even more.  
 
By 2007, the CEO as responsible party is expected to go up to 61.5% and the CFO will be cut 
in half to close to 14%. The Supervisory Board/Audit Committee will in the expectations of 
the Chief Audit Executive go up from almost 9 percent to 20.5%. Surely these numbers are 
aligned with the expectations of the Chief Audit Executives as already shown above. It will be 
interesting to survey this issue again in the future to see what has happened in the meantime. 
But, if those expectations are to be fulfilled it is clear that a major shift is going to take place 
over the next few years. By then the Tabaksblat report may need to be adjusted since they 
position the Management Board as being the one responsible for the IAF.  
 
Chief Audit Executives are of the opinion that they should have meetings with the 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee independent of the Management Board and that their 
hiring, firing, and appraising should be approved by the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee. 
Although this may be true as an expectation it is far from common practice. In almost 55% 
the Chief Audit Executive currently never meets with the Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee without the Management Board being present. Apparently there is a big gap 
between the desired and actual situation, although the expectation is that this gap will be 
closed.  
 
Size of the IAF 
With regard to the size the following data is gathered. Table 6-16 shows the average size of 
the IAF, their average budget and the total number of in-sourced full time equivalents. 
 
Table 6-16: Size and budget in 2004 
 
 Question N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
48b. Staff in 2004 
 90 1 800 35 112 
49b. Budget in 2004 
 72 € 12,000 € 80,000,000 € 4,811,944 € 13,870,492 
50b. In-sourced fte’s 2004 
 83 0 43 3 6.512 
 
 
Although a boxplot and a histogram were explored to provide further insight in the data, 
outliers caused those graphics to be less revealing. The standard deviation already points at 
the large differences in the population. In other words, those numbers don’t tell a lot.  
 
A further analysis and comparison of the numbers for 2001 and 2007 versus 2004 revealed 
that there were no statistical significant changes. Although absolute numbers showed a slight 
increase over the years, maybe due to inflation, numbers were rather stable over the years.   
 
In Table 6-17 the average expenditure per staff (including in-sourced numbers as well) in € 
per annum in 2004 is shown, split by industry sector.  
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Table 6-17: Average expenditure per staff in € in 2004 
 
Industry mean staff* mean budget 
average € per staff 
per annum 
    
Trade, Transport, Logistics 18 2,500,818 138,934 
Production, Energy, Utilities 23 1,719,923   74,779 
Telecom, IT, Media & Entertainment 7    911,888 130,270 
Professional Services 6 1,091,666 181,944 
Financial Services 66 8,404,657 127,343 
Public Services 29 2,814,423   97,049 
    
Total population 35 4,811,944 137,484 
    
* in-sourced numbers included    
 
 
The Production, Energy, and Utilities industry has by far the lowest average, followed by the 
Public Services industry. Trade, Transport, and Logistics, as well as Telecom, IT, Media & 
Entertainment, and Financial Services are not that far of from the average of the total 
population. The exception to the rule is the Professional Services industry. The reason why is 
not investigated, although the low number of 6 staff on average may have biased the average 
expenditure.  
 
How to control the IAF? 
This topic is dealt with by looking at the issue of performance based incentives as well as the 
instruments used to control the IAF as an entity. 
 
Performance based incentives are used as follows. In 26% of the organizations there is a 
performance related pay based upon the financial results of the organization. In just over 6% 
of the cases the performance related pay is based on non-financial results. The majority is 
based on up front agreed upon milestones for the Chief Audit Executive/IAF (46%). In four 
cases, (3%), other performance related items are taken into account. In 19% of the cases, no 
performance related pay is used at all, meaning that 81% of the organizations used some form 
of performance based pay. The 81% that uses performance based pay is in line with what to 
be expected based upon Agency Theory. The use of performance based pay is best developed 
in the Telecom, IT, Entertainment and Media industry (80%) and least developed in the 
Public Services (16%). For details see Table 6-18 below.   
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Table 6-18: Performance related incentives for the Chief Audit Executive per industry 
 
 
Industry 
 
Performance criteria 
 
Trade, 
Transport, 
Logistics 
 
Produc-
tion, 
Energy, 
Utilities 
 
 
 
Telecom, 
IT, E&M 
 
Prof. 
Services 
 
Financial 
Services 
 
Public 
Services 
 
None  6  7 2 4 11 31 
Financial results   7  8 5 4 19  6 
Non financial results  4  2 3 1  8  0 
Internal Audit Milestones  3  2 0 0  2  0 
Other  0  0 0 0  1  0 
Total number using 
performance criteria 14 12 8 5 31  6 
 
Percentage using 
performance criteria 
70% 
(14/20) 
63% 
(12/19) 
80% 
(8/10) 
56%  
(5/9) 
74% 
(31/42) 
16% 
(6/37) 
  
 
There is one other caveat that needs to be pointed at. Poppo and Zenger (1998) tested 
alternative Theories of the Firm and used – besides Transaction Cost Economics – knowledge 
based, and measurement explanations for Make or Buy decisions and found that: “…. 
Managers are more likely to choose hierarchy when performance measurement is difficult”. 
(1998, 873-874). In Chapter 4, some comments were made about performance based pay for 
internal auditors and the results described in Chapter 5 pointed at the difficulty to find 
appropriate measures to provide a sound basis for the appraisal and incentives for the Chief 
Audit Executive. The finding of Poppo and Zenger may provide another compelling argument 
to internalize an IAF.  Another finding of their study was that imprecise measurement of 
performance constrains the incentive intensity of rewards and – in return – low-powered 
rewards limit performance. Again, keeping the results of the case studies and the above 
survey results in mind, it may be true that whilst measuring the performance of the Chief 
Audit Executive and the IAF is difficult and therefore constrained, this might temper the use 
of performance based incentives altogether.   
 
Now let us take a look at the control of the IAF as a whole. Question 65 dealt with that and 
the results are: 
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Table 6-19: Applied control measures for the IAF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the perspective of the Professional Standards of the IIA Inc a few remarks can be made. 
First, having an Ethical Code, being subject to an Independent review by a Third Party every 
5 years and, therefore, having a quality system in place, and being compliant with the 
Professional Standards are mandatory. Scores should have been 100%, the only exception to 
the rule being an IAF not led by a qualified Chief Audit Executive who is not a member of the 
IIA the Netherlands and, thereby, of the IIA Inc as well. It may be that the IIA the 
Netherlands has a relatively short history thereby limiting the adherence to the Professional 
Standards. Nevertheless, history is not that short that scores should fail to match 100% by this 
far.  
 
Others are recommended and not used to the full to say the least. All in all these findings 
contribute to the conclusion already stated in Chapter 2 that the issue of control of the IAF is 
not yet dealt with adequately enough. If the profession is called to the fore it most certainly 
will need to step in respect to the Standards and the way the IAF is controlled to be able to 
live up to the enhanced expectations and requirements. 
 
Question 65: Which of the following instruments does your organization have for 
Internal Audit (multiple answers were possible)? % 
Ethical code  38 
Audit Charter 76 
Quality system in place (file review, working methods, etc.) 74 
Ad random checks by External Auditor 38 
Independent review by Third Party 30 
Appraisal based on measurable criteria 40 
Credentials and qualifications requirements (diplomas, etc.) 73 
Internal sanctions in case of poor performance 34 
Compliance with Professional Standards 64 
If needed complaints are filed to professional bodies (disciplinary powers) 13 
Other   2 
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Scope of services 
The results of the survey with regard to the time spend by the IAF’s is shown in Table 6-20. 
 
Table 6-20: Time spend per audit type as a % of total 
 
 Year 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
2007 
 
Financial Audit 31 25 23 
Operational Audit 34 36 35 
IT/EDP Audit 15 13 14 
Fraud Audit 2 2 3 
Compliance Audit 8 10 12 
Ethical audit/tone at the top  0 1 2 
Audits of incentive and reward systems 1 2 2 
Consulting 8 10 8 
Other 1 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Using general MANOVA with Wilks’ criterion, the P-value is 2.8% meaning that there is a 
statistically significant difference over the years. Based upon the P-values of single 
ANOVA’s per audit type, the percentages of time spent on Financial Audit and Ethical Audit 
are the only ones that vary statistically significant over time. 
 
A number of remarks can be made.  
 
First of all, despite the expectations expressed in Chapter 5 that Financial Audit will be on the 
rise again due to developments like the Sarbanes Oxley Act, after many years of decline, is 
not supported by this survey. Though limited, the number is expected to decline even further 
in 2007. The trend so clearly visible in the last decade continues and apparently IAF’s do not 
foresee to either wish or be able to recover that was once put in the hands of the External 
Auditor.  
 
Secondly, numbers are rather stable –the exception being Financial Audit of course - over the 
years. There is however, a noticeable increase for Compliance Audit. This may also not really 
be a surprise. As shown in Chapter 3, the number of rules and regulations with regard to 
Corporate Governance has been increasingly rapidly over the last decade, Sarbanes Oxley 
being the latest fad. One might therefore expect that the IAF will also spend more time on 
Compliance and this might very well explain the increase from 8% in 2001 to 10% in 2004 up 
to 12% in 2007.  
 
Thirdly, Agency Theory would proclaim that time would be spend on the issue of ethics and 
incentive and rewards systems. As discussed in previous Chapters, the IAF is not really 
allowed in that area. The data supports that reluctance very clearly.  
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In the fourth place, Financial, Operational, IT/EDP, Compliance, and Consulting make up for 
95% of all audit activities of IAF’s, the rest is very limited. Fraud is apparently not a big 
issue. Despite all the debate going on about fraud and the suggested relationship with the 
incentive and reward systems neither of them is on the top of the agenda of IAF’s from the 
time spend perspective. Ethics may be important but not from the perspective of spending 
audit time. 
  
Last but not least, the much debated issue of consulting is a fairly limited time consuming 
effort for IAF’s: 8.3% for 2001; 10.6% for 2004, and 9.0% 2007 (at the 95% reliability level). 
 
Some specific observations with regard to the Public Services industry need to be made. 
Financial Audit is their biggest time consuming activity but there is a vast decrease going on; 
numbers decline from 50% (2001) to 39% (2004) to 33% in 2007. This development is highly 
caused by the decision that the IAF’s of the Ministries all are heading to create Operational 
Audit functions within their departments. Therefore the increase in Operational Audit is also 
explained (from 24 to 28%). Consulting is also showing a significant increase (from 6 to 
12%).  
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The relationship with the External Auditor 
The results of the questions pertaining to the relationship with the External Auditor are shown 
in Table 6-21.  
  
Table 6-21: The relationship between the Internal Audit Function and the External Auditor 
 
 
Year 
  
 
Relationship with the External Audit (in %) 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
2007 
 
P-value 
 
 
64a. No relation 17   8   5  3% 
 
64b. Sharing plans 51 69 67  2% 
 
64c. Joint planning 23 29 44  0% 
 
64d. External Auditor monitors Internal Audit 48 54 60 25% 
 
64e. Internal Audit monitors External Auditor 10 18 26  1% 
 
64f. Reports are shared between the two 62 76 78  4% 
 
64g. Management Letter is a joint effort 20 18 24 58% 
 
64h. Internal Audit has to work according to External 
Auditor requirements 21 29 29 50% 
 
64i. Internal Audit controls budget of the External Auditor 19 24 29 37% 
 
64j. Audits are done together 19 24 32 22% 
 
64k. Other   3   3   3 98% 
 
Based upon the P-values significant differences exist for the questions 64a, 64b, 64c, 64e, and 
64f.  
 
The Table shows that ‘no relationship’ is declining rapidly and that all other options are 
almost without exception on the rise. The conclusions from Chapter 2, 3, and 5 are 
corroborated by the findings of this survey. Sharing reports always has been a standard 
practice according to the numbers. Next the sharing of plans was quite common and will 
become increasingly so. That doesn’t mean that planning is a joint effort. Although this 
number is expected to increase to 44% by 2007, in 2004 this was done just in 29% of the 
cases.  
 
Chief Audit Executives expect that they are going to be monitored by the External Auditor 
more and more. On the other hand they also expect that they will in their turn monitor the 
External Auditor increasingly. There is however, a huge discrepancy between those two 
numbers. One might expect that organizations would call upon their Chief Audit Executive to 
help them scrutinizing the work being done by the External Auditor more than they are 
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actually doing. After all, they are experts that have the knowledge. Agency Theory would also 
favour mutual monitoring. This may become more important if the expectation is true that 
Internal Audit is controlling the budget of the External Audit. As has already being contended 
in Chapter 5 it would be recommendable to refrain from having the budget being controlled 
by the Chief Audit Executive to prevent a possible bias due to mutual dependency.  
 
Given the fact that External Audit focuses on Financial Audit only and the fact that from the 
perspective of the Scope of Services of the IAF the percentage of Financial Audit is still on 
the decline, it is noteworthy that the execution of joint audits is rising to 32% in 2007. Either, 
the External Auditor is going to be involved in other types of audits, or Internal Audit should 
become more heavily focused on Financial Audits, the latter is not backed up by the data 
though. There seems to be at least some contradiction in the numbers.  
 
6.4 Conclusions 
 
Summarizing this Chapter and concluding the main findings of the survey is dealt with in this 
section.  
 
It was decided that a survey would be contributing to this research and the first objective of 
the survey was explorative. To support theory building eight hypotheses were added. The 
results would enable generalization - if not corroborating - of the findings of the case studies 
and enrich the knowledge of IAF’s and point out avenues for further research.  
 
The eight hypotheses were tested and there is only support for the relation between the size of 
the IAF and being an Asset Specific organization or having higher degrees of Information 
Asymmetry. If an organization is Asset Specific, this increases the number of staff by some 
25 compared to non Asset Specific organizations; for Information Asymmetry the increase is 
some 13. The tests provided some support for the conclusion that Asset Specificity is an even 
stronger predictor for the size of the IAF.  
 
This survey didn’t provide any further support for the much debated issue of Make or Buy. 
The hypotheses dealing with Make or Buy were not supported. On the contrary, findings may 
contradict prior research like the ones of Widener and Selto (1996) and Speklé et al (2005), 
acknowledging that both Widener and Selto, and Speklé et al had a different set up of their 
survey and focussed on the Asset Specificity of the IAF itself instead of the organization.  
Already in the case studies Make or Buy seemed to be driven by other attributes than Asset 
Specificity and Information Asymmetry per se. Further research might need to drill down into 
this issue. Maybe resource based research might be worthwhile (Carter and Hodgson; 2006).  
 
Furthermore, on average the overall number for outsourced Internal Audit activities is a little 
less than 10% and rather stable over the years. 
 
It became clear that many IAF shops are rather new; some 40% exists less than 5 years. To 
judge this on its own merit, we have to acknowledge that it may not be very likely that levels 
of Asset Specificity and Information Asymmetry did change that much over time in the 
respective organizations. Therefore, this might also underscore that the decision of Make or 
Buy may be based upon other factors than Asset Specificity and Information Asymmetry per 
se. This may indeed point to the fact that having an IAF is heavily influenced by the 
regulatory landscape in general and Corporate Governance in particular. Although there is no 
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regulation – other than the New York Stock Exchange Listing Rules and those applicable for 
a number of Financial Services organizations – that makes an IAF mandatory, corporate 
scandals and subsequent regulatory drives, combined with public uproar and liability claims, 
may very well have been a force on its own. As shown in Chapter 3, the number of Corporate 
Governance initiatives during the last decade has been notable. Furthermore, in many of these 
publications Internal Audit has got at least some attention.  
 
With respect to the Scope of Services no support was found to relate that in any way to Asset 
Specificity and Information Asymmetry. In the future, other directions are needed to get some 
insights and clues where to find the drivers for defining the Scope of Services of the IAF.  
There is at least some circumstantial evidence in this survey that there is also a relation with 
the Corporate Governance regulations as well. Time spend on Compliance Audit has risen 
from 8% in 2001 to 10% in 2004 and is expected to increase further to 12% in 2007.  
 
To substantiate the developments due to Corporate Governance during the last three years a 
number of findings are relevant. Chief Audit Executives consulted more often with the 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee and received more assignments of both Supervisory 
Board and Management Board. Outsourcing decreased and the cooperation with the External 
Audit was enhanced. Chief Audit Executives also received more funding and their IAF was in 
staff rather increased than decreased. Another clear trend was the centralization of the IAF. If 
we have one, let us make sure that it reports to the highest levels and thereby enhance its 
position and independence, seems to be the overarching idea.  
 
Asked upon their expectations for the next three years Chief Audit Executives proclaimed that 
trends described above will continue to have their effect. They expect that these developments 
will further enhance their independence and foster the quality of their services. The counter 
side is that they expect more tension as they have to live up to the expectations of not only the 
Management Board but also the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee and thereby may have 
more than one boss. Those expectations are more or less shared among Chief Audit 
Executives, Supervisory Board/Audit Committee, and Management Board members although 
the Chief Audit Executive is in many cases more outspoken. The scores for Chief Audit 
Executives on the one hand and Management Board and Supervisory Board members on the 
other hand for the increase in communication between Internal Audit and the Supervisory 
Board/Audit Committee and receiving assignments by the Supervisory Board were 
statistically significant controversial. Whether there would be an increase in the distance 
between Internal Audit and the rest of the organization also led to some controversy.  
 
Although all respondents agreed that Chief Audit Executives should report to the CEO; just 
57% does. The statistical significant and most controversial themes were around the issues of: 
- whether or not to report to the CFO (in 2004 28% does);  
- whether the Chief Audit Executive should have meetings with the Supervisory 
Board/Audit Committee separated from the Management Board; and  
- whether hiring, firing, and appraising of the Chief Audit Executive should need the 
involvement of the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee.  
 
Although the Chief Audit Executives overwhelmingly (score of 4.18 on a scale from 1 to 5) 
plea to have separate meetings with the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee without the 
Management Board being present, only 54% never does.  
 
234
234 
Instruments to gain control over the IAF are an area of concern. Performance based incentives 
are applied reasonably widely; some 55% uses them. Agency Theory nevertheless, would call 
for more. Quality measures for the IAF are in need of enhancement. Disciplinary powers are 
exercised the least (13%) which may be a surprise for a professional community reigned by 
codes of conduct and such powers in place. They most certainly are one of the most deterring 
instruments and this may also be the reason not to apply them on a broad scale.  
 
IAF’s in many cases officially adhere to the Professional Standards in 64% of the cases; 
ethical codes are applied in merely 38%, and external independent reviews are in use by just 
30% (although the latter has been coming into effect very recently). Highest scoring 
instruments are the Audit Charter (76%), a Quality System (74%), and Credentials and 
Qualifications (73%). It seems to be an understatement that there is some room for 
improvement, especially from the perspective that the Chief Audit Executives envision the 
quality of their IAF will be enhanced due to the Corporate Governance developments. 
Furthermore, a number of these instruments are mandatory by the IIA Professional Standards. 
 
Some major shifts in the Scope of Services are to be noted. Most noteworthy is that Financial 
Audit is decreasing from 31% in 2001 to 23% in 2007 and Compliance Audit is increasing 
from 8% in 2001 to 12% in 2007. All others are fairly stable over the years. Ethical audits and 
Audits of Incentive and Reward systems hardly exist (2-3%). The same is true for Fraud 
Audit (2-3%). The expectations based upon Agency Theory not only were not met based upon 
the findings of the case studies; the survey again underpins the lack of those audit types. In 
the light of the many corporate scandals, which in its turn led to the flow of Corporate 
Governance reports did not affect that part of the Scope of Services of IAF’s significantly. 
Consulting Services scores some 10% and is – like the outsourcing issue much debated in the 
profession - just a relative limited service offering. The number is also very stable over time, 
industries and countries as was already demonstrated in Chapter 2.  
 
The relationship with External Auditor is becoming more intimate and it is fair to say that 
External and Internal Auditor are to be ‘condemned’ to one another, especially true in the 
realm of the Corporate Governance regulations.  
 
This survey has several limitations that should be recognized when interpreting the evidence 
in this Chapter. Although the survey has been thoroughly developed and tested, there is no 
guarantee that some questions might be misinterpreted. Defining what the different audit 
types are is not that easy and there might be some mix up. Furthermore, several data, 
especially those pertaining to hard numbers may be best guesses since this data may not have 
been readily available upon filing the survey.  
 
Furthermore, this survey aimed at organizations that do have an IAF. It intentionally did not 
include does that did not have an IAF, to be able to find more conclusive answers to the 
questions raised in this research. Nevertheless, this route does not allow to corroborate, 
contradict, or any else, the data with data from organizations that do not have IAF.  
 
This research has been executed in the Netherlands, a small country in a vast global 
community. There may be some biases affecting the generalizability of the findings. We have 
found somewhat contradicting results with research done by Widener and Selto (1996) in the 
US. Though this might be due to the difference in territory, it also does not corroborate with 
research done in the Netherlands as well by Speklé, et al (2005).  
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Last but not least, the issue of the ‘chicken or the egg’ is relevant. What we saw as being 
Asset Specificity or suffering high levels of Information Asymmetry may be a consequence 
rather than an antecedent of having an IAF and its sourcing decision; this might in itself cause 
a preference for in-sourcing Internal Audit. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and Recommendations for 
Future Research 
7.1 Introduction 
 
I have researched the changes brought about in Internal Audit (IA) due to Corporate 
Governance (Corporate Governance) regulations that have been coming into effect for more 
than a decade. My research questions were specifically focused on IA's role, position, and 
scope of services. Which led to the following: 
 
 What is the role of IA? Why does IA exist? What is its raison d'être, or, as some 
would put it, its "license to operate"? 
 What are the considerations for the "make or buy" issue for IA (in-source or 
outsource)? 
 What position can it have within the company? That is, what can its relationship be 
with the Management Board and Supervisory Board/Audit Committee? And in a 
conflict between those two, which relationship could have precedence? 
 How large can it be?  
 How can IA be controlled? 
 What can it do? In other words, what is its scope of services? 
 What is the relationship with the External Auditor? 
 
I will start with a brief synopsis of the results of the research presented in the previous 
chapters. I will then discuss contextual and methodological limitations of this thesis. And will 
conclude with some recommendations for further research. 
 
7.2 Summary and Conclusions 
 
In Chapter 2 we learned that (internal) auditing goes back a long way. But theory is still in its 
infancy. The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) developed a framework for 
understanding what auditing is. It aims at providing assurance about specific subject matter, 
which is based on comparing the current state of affairs with a predefined "ideal" state, called 
"the norm" or "criteria". This is achieved through an assurance process and carried out by an 
assessor (called an "auditor"). The auditor verifies data through evidence and reports his 
results orally or in writing.  
 
Notable efforts to define auditing have been made by Mautz and Sharaf (1961), Flint (1988) 
and Wilschut (1994). Others, such as Kamp-Roelands (2002), have followed in their 
footsteps. Mautz and Sharaf emphasized the need for a philosophy of auditing that draws on 
other theories and disciplines. Otherwise, "it will not only lose stature in the eyes of the 
world, but it will forfeit the best method of solving its most perplexing problems." (1961,17)  
 
On the flip side of that are audit's detractors. Critics like Power (1997) and Pentland (2000) 
have accused it of obscurity and questioned its validity. And those are issues that are 
definitely worth taking in and pondering. However, one way around a deeply troubling issue 
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is to take shelter under that great umbrella of "general scientific research". Say that auditing is 
an offshoot of that. I would argue for adopting the basic principles of scientific research.  
 
Focusing on the auditor revealed that his main characteristics are knowledge, expertise and 
independence. Independence is a much debated issue. Does it have value in and of itself? Or 
is it the resultant of other things? Like objectivity and integrity. Some say it is all about 
professionalism, due diligence, competence, objectivity, probity of character, integrity and 
other high minded words. Is that a matter of what used to be called obscurum per obscurius 
(explaining the obscure by the more obscure) and is known these days as "fog displacement"? 
 
Some believe independence is the cornerstone of the profession. Some contend it its Achilles' 
heel. I myself am extremely reluctant to invoke the subject in IA domain. Why? Because 
internal auditors are inherently dependent on whomever they work for. Be it the Management 
Board or the Supervisory Board. The same could be said about the external auditor as well. 
But to pass judgment on that point is beyond my experiential and investigative competence. 
Perhaps the best compromise is to conclude that IA is dependent, but there are limits on that 
dependence and some excursions into the realm of independence are possible. 
 
The bottom line is that the issue is limited to who the Chief Audit Executive reports to. 
Traditionally, at least in the recent past, IA has been an instrument in the hands of the 
Management Board. But due to changes in the Corporate Governance environment, the 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee has been getting more involved in its activities. The 
two-tier environment increases the risks of IA ending up even less independent than it already 
is. That is, in being dependent on and having to serve two masters: the Management Board 
and the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee. 
 
Others try to solve the independence issue by outsourcing IA. Having it done by an 
"outsider", who, it is believed, is more independent. But this is also not the answer. Because 
all of most of IA's benefits - namely, being close to the Management Board and/or 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee, being seen as an insider, "one of us", and an intimate 
working knowledge of the organization, its culture, people and ways of doing business - then 
go out the window. Cost is another obstacle in the way of a knee jerk "buy" solution.  
 
While there is no way of telling whether the corporate scandals of recent years were any 
worse than what has always happened in history, there are strong indications that more noise 
was made about them. At least in the media. In any case, that has led to flurries and more 
flurries of reports, studies, committees, commissions and new Corporate Governance 
recommendations and regulations. Caught in the updraft of those initiatives, IA has become 
almost mandatory for the first time in its history. In the US, IA - whether in-house or 
outsourced - is mandatory for New York Stock Exchange listed companies and those falling 
under the Federal Deposit and Insurance Companies Act. 
 
Chapter 3 outlined some of the major national and international Corporate Governance 
regulations that have been coming into effect for more than a decade, which have impacted IA 
and contributed to its increased status and prestige. According to current regulations and 
proposals in the one-tier environment, Audit Committees have been assigned more 
responsibilities regarding IA. Which includes helping to supervise, directly or indirectly, its 
agenda and activities.  
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The Combined Code in the UK seemed to go even farther than US legislation. There the 
Audit Committee has total responsibility for IA. But the catch is that IA is not yet a 
mandatory function. The European Union (EU) lagged behind. The Winter Group made a 
concerted effort, but hardly even mentioned the existence of IA, let alone detail significant 
provisions about it. Because of a potpourri of national judicial systems Winter decided, 
probably wisely, against single Corporate Governance standards for the entire EU. 
 
The Netherlands was, until recently, one of the least developed countries with respect to 
Corporate Governance regulation. But then along came Tabaksblat and there was an almost 
overnight overhaul. Nevertheless, it fosters a blatantly ambiguous perspective about the Audit 
Committee's relationship with IA. On the one hand, it should maintain a decent distance. 
Indirectly supervise its activities through its relationship with the Management Board. On the 
other, it should take some direct responsibility by having meetings with the Chief Audit 
Executive, noticing its findings and discussing its work plan.  
 
But the global trend is obvious. Increasingly, the Audit Committee is becoming an important 
player for IA. With that given one would expect that the serving two masters issue - 
particularly glaring in The Netherlands' two-tier environment - would at least be recognized 
and acknowledged, if not necessarily immediately confronted and resolved. What then? Even 
if it is resolved, will that solve all problems, especially around the issue of independence? I 
wouldn't put any money on it. But it will at least eliminate murky distinctions, such as 
between administrative and functional reporting lines, which in a system that brags about 
transparency conceal more than they reveal. 
 
Corporate Governance codes that insist on companies reporting on the soundness of their 
internal control systems - also known as Management Control System) - have affected and 
will continue to affect IA's scope of services. 
 
If one's goal is to raise IA's stature and importance, the good news is it is very much in 
demand. With that new found success, however, has come hazards, moral and otherwise. One 
is the possibility of putting too many - and not always compatible - services in the picnic 
basket. Raising expectations among members of Management Board and Supervisory Boards 
beyond the point of possible delivery. Another is in a profession still not well grounded in 
theory - again, what and why it is, and what it should, and should not be doing - getting 
kidnapped and being held hostage by the whims of whoever at any given moment owns it. 
 
In Chapter 4 I discovered that theories and research specifically devoted to IA is extremely 
limited. But I latched on to and focused on two theories that seemed to provide at least some of 
the desired grounding for IA: Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics. Agency Theory 
is essentially about getting the marginal conditions right, resource allocation and employment, 
and providing insight into the continuous process of aligning the goals and objectives of 
principals and agents through incentives and rewards. Transaction Cost Economics focuses on 
governance structures. Which governance structure is best suited to deal with economizing on 
transaction costs and adapting to changing market conditions?  
 
Agency Theory's Information Asymmetry – though difficult to measure and only through 
proxies that are as yet not well tested - is the dominant factor used to explain the rationale of 
auditing in general. It is also valid for explaining IA's raison d'être. The higher the level of 
Information Asymmetry the sooner auditing in general and IA in particular is deemed 
necessary. Agency Theory also stresses the importance of the independence issue. In order to 
239
239
gain credibility as a reliable witness in the eyes of the principal - that is, the shareholders and 
their other agents (Supervisory Board/Audit Committee) - IA has to be perceived as being both 
independent and objective. In this context, we obviously have to keep in mind the severe 
constraints gone into above. 
 
Deeply rooted in the belief that incentives and remuneration are needed to get the best out of 
agents, Agency Theory also proclaims that IA's scope of services should include not only the 
Management Boards activities, but also its incentives and rewards schemes. It also has 
something to bring to the table when the issue of monitoring IA is on the agenda. These include: 
 
 A code of conduct 
 Internal quality control measures 
 Performance-based remuneration 
 Ad random checks by external auditor on IA's functioning  
 Hiring qualified auditors 
 Credible disciplinary rules  
 Adherence to the Professional Standards of the IIA Inc.  
 
Transaction Cost Economics main applicability is about "make or buy". According to it, the 
higher the Asset Specificity, the better the argument is for "make". It also provides evidence 
that governance structures, adaptation (change) processes, and an organization's Management 
Control System should be subjected to auditing. Therefore, they should be included in IA's 
scope of services.  
 
Both Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics have relevance and significant added 
value for IA. At the end of Chapter 4 I summarized some tentative conclusions drawn from 
studying them. I concluded that they weren't enough to get me to where I wanted to go. 
Therefore, I decided to beef them up with four case studies (described in detail in Chapter 5). 
Those showed that a number of those theories' tentative conclusions were supported in the 
Dutch environment. But some weren't. 
 
Transaction Cost Economics Asset Specificity was shown to have merit to explain IA's 
rationale, size and the "make" choice. All case studies showed high Asset Specificity scores. 
Especially in such factors as the highly specific knowledge needed to be able to conduct audits - 
a deep, day to day understanding of the culture, people, complexity of the organization and 
business, and "how we do things around here - were factors referred to many times to 
internalize IA. In that respect the arguments not inconsistent with IA's major benefit (according 
to Williamson): it is "one of us".  
 
Agency Theory’s Information Asymmetry wasn't supported. In fact, most of those interviewed 
hardly seemed to be aware of it as an issue. At least as far as they and their companies were 
concerned. Caplan and Kirschenheiter's (2000) research (see Chapter 4) - based on Agency 
Theory - was flatly contradicted. According to them, "make or buy" decisions are, or should be, 
based on conditions and the proverbial wisdom. Namely, IA is cheaper but external audit is 
better. When potential risks high, outsourcing IA will happen sooner.  
 
All interviewees were convinced that IA is needed to provide assurance. They were so 
convinced of this being IA's task that none even considered expanding the mandate of the 
external auditor. This might have been - and, in fact, probably was - due to their frame of 
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reference. IA was part of their woodwork, and the idea of not having it probably didn't even 
crop up.  
 
Regarding IA's position there was a rather clear cut conclusion that it should remain in the 
hands of the Management Board. Although Agency Theory recommends that it report as close 
as possible to the principal - in this case, the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee - those 
members saw things rather differently. They are more than a little reluctant to take over the 
helm. Nevertheless, Corporate Governance regulations urge them to exercise oversight in 
order to enhance IA's independence. They acknowledged that having the Chief Audit 
Executive report to them accomplish that.  
 
However, while all companies had at least a protocol enabling the Chief Audit Executive to 
call on the Audit Committee when it was deemed necessary - deemed necessary by who, 
under what specific circumstances and with what consequences? - many Chief Audit 
Executives felt some tension as a result of having to serve both the Management Board and 
the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee. In the eyes of both Management Board and 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee members, however, this tension however, is something 
that any "well groomed" Chief Audit Executive should be able to master. I would be hard 
pressed to find a better example of buck passing. 
 
Using either Agency Theory or Transaction Cost Economics arguments, it proved difficult to 
find a clear relationship between the size of the company and IA's absolute size. Although size 
definitely contributes to the attractiveness of in-sourcing, there was no way of determining how 
large (or small) it should be.  
 
Regarding ways of dealing with IA's agency problem, almost all recommendations stemming 
from theory were present in all four companies. Codes of conduct, internal quality control 
measures, and requirements about qualifications and proficiency of auditors. Professional 
standards were applied and adhered to. IA was monitored through ad random checks by the 
external auditor. However, there were a few that were not fully supported. The most obvious 
being the performance based remuneration of the Chief Audit Executive. The main reason 
was the perceived negative impact on IA's - here it comes again - "independence". But as we 
noticed in Chapter 5, getting that right might just be a matter of selecting the proper metrics.  
 
The other instrument not being applied was credible disciplinary powers. Although those exist 
inside the organization, external ones applied by the profession are not "credible". One cannot 
hold individual Chief Audit Executives accountable for this glaring gap. That is a matter for 
the profession to tackle together. One of the major obstacles to anyone walking down that 
road in the near future is that there needs to be someone on the inside telling them that there 
might at least be probable cause to investigate. That can happen only if companies shed some 
of their traditional reluctance to blow the whistle on themselves. 
 
The following conclusions were drawn about IA's scope of services. Transaction Cost 
Economics prediction - that it is best to expand beyond the plain vanilla financial audit - 
seems to be borne out by all but one of the case studies. Due to the demands of boards - or at 
least someone telling them they should demand it - other types of audits were included. Such 
as fraud, ethics, risk management, quality, change management, compliance, and quality 
initiatives, consulting, and environmental auditing.  
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There are two areas that both theories say should be included in IA's scope of services, 
because they are considered crucial for the proper functioning of an organization's 
Management Control System (see Chapter 4). They are the tone-at-the-top (functioning of the 
Management Board) and its incentives and rewards systems. But they are not even on the 
wish list of many interviewed (especially Management Board members), let alone at the top 
of it. They believe that internal auditors lack both the knowledge and accepted standards that 
behaviour should be measured against. Supervisory Board/Audit Committee members, by 
contrast, are more than willing to hear from the Chief Audit Executive if "undesirable 
behaviour" and breaches against code of conducts are observed. As for IA reviewing the 
Management Board's incentives and rewards systems, they were decidedly against the very 
idea.  
 
The case studies showed very mixed results for the prediction that if highly specialized 
knowledge of the organization was needed to do a proper audit IA would be involved in the 
external audit. The scores for IA being used to reduce external audit costs were rather 
indifferent. 
 
Clear support was provided for IA to be a tool supporting and fostering management control 
and the need to coordinate with the external auditor to be cost efficient. The need for this 
coordination will be furthered even more due to Corporate Governance developments. This 
will need attention because all but one of the case studies showed that during the last decade a 
clear cut had been made between IA focusing on audits other than financial and the external 
auditor whose sole task was the financial audit.  
 
The 8 hypotheses that were tested via the survey (Chapter 6) showed that that there is support 
for the relation between IA's size and being an Asset Specific organization or having higher 
degrees of Information Asymmetry.  
 
It became clear that 40% of the IA's included in the survey have existed for less than 5 years.  
Since generally speaking organizations' characteristics do not change much over such short 
periods of time, it is highly unlikely that Asset Specificity or Information Asymmetry, or a 
combination of the both, were the drivers for these changes. The more likely explanatory 
factors are corporate scandals, public uproar, a rise in liability claims as a result of 
shareholders activism and Corporate Governance initiatives. 
 
The much debated issue of make or buy seems, again, to be much ado about nothing. The 
hypotheses dealing with that topic were not supported. On the contrary, my findings 
contradict prior research. For example, Widener and Selto (1996) and Speklé et al (2005). On 
average the overall number of outsourced IA activities is a little less than 10%. Combined 
with the findings of my case studies - outsourcing being never really considered as a viable 
option - it may mean that where IA exists there is a tendency to exploit IA to the max. 
Perhaps the latter also concurs with the finding that neither Asset Specificity nor Information 
Asymmetry provided any clues as to the direction of the scope of services.  
 
The survey was consonant with a number of findings of the case studies. The most relevant 
alignments were: 
 
 Chief Audit Executives meet more often with and receive assignments from both the 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee and Management Board. 
 The cooperation and relationship with the external auditor was enhanced. 
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 Chief Audit Executives had larger budgets and their IA's were sooner increased than 
decreased. 
 IA's were increasingly centralized, which enhanced its position and independence. 
 Chief Audit Executives prefer to report to the CEO but would also like to have the 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee involved in their hiring, firing and appraising. 
The Supervisory Board/Audit Committee concurs. But the Management Board is more 
reluctant.  
 Chief Audit Executives note that they feel more tension when having to serve multiple 
bosses. But they believe this will eventually improve the quality of their services. 
This, however, is not as straightforward as it sounds. Because in order to realize those 
improvements a number of quality controls are needed. Predominantly, adherence to 
the Professional Standards of the IIA Inc.  
 
Some major shifts in the scope of services were noted. Financial audit decreased from 31% 
(of time spend) in 2001 to 23% in 2007. Compliance audit increased from 8% to 12% over the 
same period. All others were fairly stable.  
 
Agency Theory focuses heavily on incentives and rewards to align the interest of principals 
and agents. Corporate Governance is geared towards enforcing necessary checks and balances 
to prevent what is called "dysfunctional behaviour". Tone-at-the-top and integrity are often 
promoted as the foundation of any control system. Thus it is all the more surprising that 
ethical audits and audits of incentive and reward systems are all but non-existent (2-3%). The 
same is true for fraud audit (2-3%). The latter might suggest that fraud is a rare phenomenon. 
Or, if it occurs, organizations prefer someone other than IA to investigate the matter. Given 
the complexities and entanglements of working in the same offices - and, so to speak, 
sleeping in the same beds - there is no way of telling in advance who is, and who isn't 
involved in any particular case of fraud, and how wide and deep it goes. 
 
As already noticed in the case study companies, Supervisory Board/Audit Committee 
members want to hear from IA if there are any observed breaches of codes of conduct. But 
this is not yet in any Audit Charter. This reluctance was even more compelling at 
Management Board level. Thus one could conclude without any fear of contradiction that 
tone-at-the-top audits and audits of incentive and reward systems remain no-go areas for IA. 
As those Benedictine circatores (see Chapter 2) reported on the activities of fellow monks, 
but not those who had assigned them those tasks. 
 
Like the make or buy issue consulting services is much debated in the profession. But it also 
seems to be a tempest in a teapot. Scoring just 10% of time spend - stable over time and in 
various industries and countries - it remains a marginal service. 
 
Theorizing about IA is very much in its infancy. 
Auditing has been around for thousands of years. But the internal branch achieved 
professional status only after the establishment of the IIA Inc. in 1941. A lot remains to be 
done to get an even moderately firm footing in the areas of generalizable insights and 
overview. And in order to achieve that much vigorous and rigorous research is needed. One of 
my first ideas for this research was concentrating on IA's added value. But I soon realized that 
would be a slippery slope and got off that mountain.  
 
Nevertheless, "what is IA's added value?" remains one of the FAQ's of board members. It 
may have been one of the drivers that led the profession in the 1990's to favour operational 
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above financial auditing, promote consulting services, and, eventually, to redefine the term 
"internal auditing" in 1999. Adding value and consulting were prominent in this revisionist 
definition. In 2002, the IIA Inc. presented a research report, Adding Value: Seven Roads to 
Success. The first page of the executive summary has the following quote: 
 
If there is no universal answer to what adds most value, then the way to answer that question 
for yourself seems obvious: "Ask your stakeholders!" (2002c, xiii) 
  
The report went on to acknowledge that this is only part of the answer. Stakeholders often 
have no idea what can be expected of specialists like internal auditors. "Its up to us to raise 
their expectations by telling them – or better, showing them – how much value we can add." 
That sounds good on paper. It will sound even better in practice. But in order to make it 
happen - to walk the walk as well as talking the talk - something more is called for. Namely, 
encouraging and supporting schools, and increasing the number of academically trained 
professionals, PhD's, and rigorous and convincing scientific research.  
 
As it is, however, theory around IA is lagging behind that around external audit. It may be due 
to lower numbers of internal auditors, lower visibility, or even the mistaken belief that IA is 
an offshoot of external audit. Whatever. The important thing is show not tell. And up until 
now IA has not shown itself particularly helpful in detecting and preventing corporate scams.  
 
Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics are two theories I applied in this research, 
which resulted in partial answers to a few pressing questions. Fortunately, there might be 
other theories that could be applicable to provide us with more telling answers that will 
convince more people to make bigger and better use of a new and continually improving IA 
(see below).  
 
IA has gained from the Corporate Governance drive of the recent past. But most 
shakers and movers still haven't caught on to the idea that reward and incentive systems 
are the most important instruments to align the interests of principals and agents. 
The case studies and the survey provided enough evidence of those gains. Nevertheless, while 
Corporate Governance codes are an offshoot of Agency Theory - and, therefore, all about 
aligning the interests of principals and agents through reward and incentive schemes - this 
area is not in internal audit charters. Even worse, it is not even on the agenda! Worst of all, 
that exclusion is deliberate, not accidental. Although Supervisory Board/Audit Committee 
members want to have breaches of corporate codes of conduct reported, they steadfastly 
refuse to endorse having it included it in the ground rules of the game. Jensen and Murphy 
(2004, 98) concluded delicately: 
 
While our ability to characterize the phenomenon underlying recent problems in executive 
remuneration is not perfect, we are confident that the causes are systemic. The creation of a 
new regime in compensation practice will entail considerable thought. Otherwise, one risks 
re-creating the type of systems failure we have witnessed unfold in many major companies 
over the last few years. 
  
While I was writing these lines another scandal rocked the media. A lot more will 
undoubtedly follow before you read them. In my case, the would you believe it was the 
backdating of stock options. In the July 17, 2006 edition of The New York Times more than 
2,000 companies were reported to have used backdated stock options. Further analysis 
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revealed that about 30% of all listed companies manipulated stock options. Needless to say, to 
the benefit of their board members - agents - and detriment of shareholders - principals.  
 
While it is pitching too high to contend that IA in its current manifestation will prevent all or 
any of that, including a review of Management Board reward and incentive schemes in its 
scope of services isn't. Backdating stock options shouldn't be too hard to assess. Should it? 
 
Applying Agency Theory to IA would call for using improved performance measurement, 
incentives schemes for Chief Audit Executive, and applying quality measures the profession 
already has on the books. According to Burns et al (1994) IA became a profession in 1978 
when it adopted the Professional Standards. The least it can do is apply and adhere to those 
Standards.  
 
Performance measurements and the subsequent rewarding of auditors are sticky wickets. 
Because coming up with the right metrics that truly capture what internal auditors do, and 
how well, are subjective and often multi interpretable (see Chapter 2 for a more in depth 
discussion). Nevertheless, the difficulties must be faced and overcome. Because it is 
extremely important to be able to assess and guarantee auditor quality. Using the infamous 
definition of former US Attorney General Edwin Meese III about pornography - "I know it 
when I see it." - isn't good enough. One good source to look for solutions could be Agency 
Theory itself.  
 
Make or Buy of IA is not determined by either Asset Specificity or Information 
Asymmetry nor does it determine the broadness of its Scope of Services. 
While make or buy for IA has been researched often I located only two studies that did so 
using Transaction Cost Economics: Widener and Selto (1996), Van Elten (2005), and Speklé 
et al (2006). They showed that outsourcing was related to Asset Specificity. Using Widener 
and Selto as a starting point, Van Elten and Speklé et al showed that their results were valid in 
the Dutch environment. But my survey tells another tale. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, 
research using Transaction Cost Economics is not undisputed, and is not yet as promising as 
was assumed and claimed by Williamson.  
 
It is my contention that if you measure Asset Specificity of Internal Audit activities that this 
will surely lead to high scores on Asset Specificity due to the inherent Asset Specific nature 
of these activities. They require specialized knowledge and skills, the use of proprietary 
information and, therefore, are Asset Specific. Therefore, measuring Asset Specificity should 
be done at the level of the organization they are part of. Then the question is why some 
companies have IA while others do not? And what is the rationale for those that have it? Is it 
due to being an Asset Specific organization? What then drives the issue of how many staff are 
needed and how it is going to be organized and developed? Is the company going to rely 
mainly on external resources? Or is it going to build its own staff? Widener and Selto (1996), 
Van Elten (2005), and Speklé et al (2006) showed that make or buy of IA is driven by Asset 
Specificity. But even though I started off expecting - and even hoping that their research 
would be substantiated - I am not convinced yet . 
 
One significant difference between our surveys was their sample population included 
companies that did not have IA and mine didn't. This enabled a comparison between those 
two populations. But they did not measure Asset Specificity on the level of the organization 
and could therefore not distinguish whether the presence of IA was based upon that. In my 
survey differences between organizations that did outsource and those that did not were still 
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very significant. Some outsourced very little of their IA services and others outsourced almost 
all of them. Even with those differences taken into account, however, it was clear that neither 
Asset Specificity nor Information Asymmetry were related to make or buy, but only to the 
degree of outsourcing. I also looked at significant differences in organization size and 
outsourcing. But that did not provide any conclusive answers either. The results call for 
finding other avenues for research. One of them might be Resource Based View Theory, also 
known as Resource Based Theory (see more below in Further Research section). 
 
The broadness of IA's scope of services was not related to either Asset Specificity or 
Information Asymmetry. Looking at the data provided by the survey, the scope of services 
didn't show many significant changes. Financial audit has been gradually decreasing over the 
years and operational auditing has been on the rise during the last decade. But that condition 
has been rather stable since 2001 (as were all the others). The only exception was the 
compliance audit, which went up from 8% in 2001 to 10% in 2004 and is expected to increase 
further to 12% in 2007. The most likely candidate to explain that trend is the changing 
regulatory landscape. On this side of "the pond" we tend to favour the "principle based" 
approach. On the other, the "rule based". But since the dominance of US regulations are being 
felt more strongly everywhere88, pretty soon it's not going to make much difference which 
side of the pond you're on. Thus compliance auditing is bound to increase even more. 
 
During the case studies it became apparent that IA's scope of services is mostly a matter of the 
Management Board's choice (in conjunction with the Chief Audit Executive and, ultimately, 
the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee). Maybe part of the rise of operational audit at the 
cost of financial - the operational audit "frenzy", so to speak - was more due to market push 
than pull. Internal auditors beating the value added drum for all they were worth and being 
both persistent and persuasive about it. The whole subject is well worth pursuing in future 
research. The framework provided by Matthyssens et al (1998) (see Chapter 2) would 
probably be a good point de départ.  
 
In any case, further research is definitely needed to make rational decisions about IA's scope 
of services instead of just going with the mood of the moment. 
 
Both Asset Specificity and Information Asymmetry drive IA size, but Asset Specificity is 
more compelling. 
The most compelling outcome of my research is that both Asset Specificity and Information 
Asymmetry are predictive factors for IA's size. Previously, only rules of thumb were 
available. They depended, of course, on very specific thumbs. In this case, the IIA Inc. and its 
research from 1976. They found that in very labor intensive production companies the norm 
was 1 auditor per 2,000 employees (audit costs as .1% of total revenue. In production oriented 
organizations, the standard was 1 auditor per 1,000 employees. In financial services 
organizations the ratio was 2 auditors per 1,000 employees. 
 
Those numbers have withstood the tests of time until today. I myself have used them 
extensively in the past during discussions and presentations. But now we can use Asset 
Specificity and Information Asymmetry to get a more precise grip on the sizing issue. The 
difference between an Asset Specific and a non-Asset Specific organization accounts for an 
increase of 25 audit staff FTE. A high degree of Information Asymmetry accounts for an 
increase of 13 audit staff FTE. But those numbers do not permit simple permutations. A 
                                                 
88 As mentioned by professor Arnoud Boot in his column in the Dutch journal ESB, October 7, 2005.  
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highly Asset Specific small organization will most likely not have an IA consisting of 25 
employees. Further research is needed to refine the calculation and perhaps somewhere along 
the line some kind of a usable formula will emerge.  
 
The number of people breathing down the necks of all board members - Management and 
Supervisory - might influence the make or buy issue and IA size. The more outside 
supervisors and regulators the sooner make will be the right choice and the larger IA will be. 
Because no one wants to be caught with their pants down. But more research is needed on this 
hypothesis. 
 
What is also new is that while Agency Theory has always been considered as the most 
important rationale for the existence of any audit instrument, Transaction Cost Economics has 
more predictive power to determine IA's size. Which is contrary to my belief at the beginning. 
Namely, that Agency Theory was the more likely to supply clues. 
 
7.3 Management Implications  
 
As I said in the Introduction (see Chapter 1) I am a man astride two worlds: business and 
academic. Having pushed the scientific aspect throughout this thesis, I would now like to 
point at some implications for the business world. In this context I simultaneously address 
myself to all participants depicted in Figure 1 (Chapter 1): Chief Audit Executives, members 
of Management Board and Supervisory Board/Audit Committee, regulators and supervisors.  
 
First, take a close look at the IA Charter and make sure it includes everything it needs to. 
Next, ensure that IA is of the highest quality. I would like to draw your attention to the 
following items: 
 
 In order to enhance "independence" the Chief Audit Executive should report to the 
CEO and have access to the Supervisory Board; 
 However, in order to prevent any misunderstandings and expectations gaps, the Chief 
Audit Executive should be encouraged to discuss the limits of that "independence"; 
 The conditions should be as transparent as possible to allow proper assessment of the 
necessities and difficulties that lay ahead, especially the tricky prospect of serving 
multiple bosses and the ensuing tension; also 
 Regulatory and supervisory bodies, such as Central Banks or Securities and Exchange 
Commissions and their colleagues, are kindly requested to refrain from imposing too 
high expectations on IA and trying to make the Chief Audit Executive like the external 
auditor only different. He isn't and never will be. He is part of the organization and 
should be treated as he is - constrained by the rules of his position - not as you would 
like him to be. Do not expect him to send you draft reports. In any case, that won't 
solve your need to know about possible unethical behaviour; 
 Because the Chief Audit Executive will often find himself in a hot spot he will need 
some slack, room for maneuvering. This should improve his diligence and 
effectiveness and be beneficial not only to his organization, but also the environment it 
operates in; 
 Chief Audit Executives should realize that they are an essential part of the Corporate 
Governance system and do their utmost to be professionals as is set forth in the IIA 
Inc. Professional. If they don't, they will fail to measure up to their duties and be 
247
247
subject to scrutiny and punishment. This will tarnish not only their ideals, IA and staff, 
but also the company and profession; 
 Management Boards will reap the fruits of new and improving IA's. Information gaps 
will be closed. There will be warnings of dangers ahead and recommendations about 
changes that are needed; 
 Questions? How many IA staff should I have? What should they be doing? To 
paraphrase the IIA Inc. quote above, "Ask your Chief Audit Executive." Efficiency 
issues. Your IA might be able to do more more efficiently. Therefore, keep the 
pressure on and have it scrutinized every now and then by external assessors that 
know what to look for. Make minor changes now instead of major overhauls later. 
That will be a waste of money, energy, and human talent;  
 Management Boards will be better off playing by the same rules everyone else is 
subject to instead of pleading for special treatment. Therefore, its members should also 
subject to tone-at-the-top auditing. Their reward and incentives schemes should be 
transparent. Why shouldn't they be? ; 
 Supervisory Board/Audit Committee members should honor their commitments and 
use IA to do. Thus they too should push to have the kind of audits just mentioned 
included in the Audit Charter. Even if Management Board members find that 
inconvenient. Because at the end of the day they are the last resort for detecting and 
preventing corporate scams. 
 
7.4 Limitations 
Contextual limitations 
Any research - mine included - has more limitations than its author or authors would readily 
admit at the beginning. Conceding them at the end isn't much fun either. From a contextual 
point of view, the main limitation of my research is its being entirely based in the Dutch 
domain (case studies and survey). Although one could argue that two of the four case studies 
were multinationals with a truly global reach, their home market remains The Netherlands. In 
my survey I also included numerous internationally oriented multinationals. Nevertheless, 
there could be probable cause to doubt whether all or any of the results and conclusions are 
generalizable to the global IA community. That external validity question is worth further 
research. 
 
Another possible drawback is its almost exclusively two-tier organization orientation. As 
shown, 80% of the companies in The Netherlands have such a structure. Would the results 
have been any different in a one-tier environment? I don't think so for four major reasons. 
One, much of the data, especially that resulting from studies carried out by the IIA Inc. - 
which does have a global reach - show similar results. Two, global perspectives make the 
rounds rather rapidly in IA circles. Through national professional organizations - linked to 
international ones - and international conferences. These perspectives permeate the 
boardrooms of listed and unlisted companies, as well hospitals, universities, vocational 
schools, the public sector and municipalities. 
 
Three, Corporate Governance developments show a tendency toward convergence (see 
Chapter 3). Tabaksblat draws heavily from Anglo-Saxon predecessors. In The Netherlands 
there are already some "well founded rumors" about how the dominant two-tier structure will 
develop into a one-and-half-tier one. Tabaksblat opened up the discussion about the 
structuurvennootschap. Within a ‘structuurvennootschap’ the Supervisory Board –  next to 
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the Management Board and thus creating a two tier structure - is appointed by the 
shareholders and has the authority to supervise the Management Board on their behalf. 
Clearly, this hybrid will contain more one-tier elements than the strictly two-tier one. In the 
past Audit Committees were only mandatory within the one tier system. They were not 
included in the one tier system. Nowadays, Audit Committees are mandatory for listed 
companies. They are still not mandatory for non listed organizations. But, today more than 
80% of the surveyed organizations – including the non listed organizations - have established 
them.  
 
Four, previous research stemming from predominantly one-tier environments - referred to 
extensively in this thesis - is not inconsistent with my findings. Nevertheless, this is worth 
further research. 
 
As already noted, I focused on organizations that have IA, not those that didn't.  
 
Methodological limitations 
From a methodological perspective a number of limitations need to be made explicit. One is 
the proxies I used to calculate the level of intra-organizational Information Asymmetry. The 
external Information Asymmetry proxies are found in prior research and have been 
adequately tested. Little or nothing was found in the literature about Information Asymmetry 
from the perspective of top level management vis-à-vis the rest of the organization. Requests 
sent by email to top researchers in this field netted no other useful feedback. Therefore, I 
developed my own proxies. Those proxies are described in Chapter 4 and applied in the 
survey. Further research should be aimed at substantiating whether they are indeed a valid 
starting point for further research.  
 
With regard to the survey a few (minor) limitations should also be mentioned. First, the point 
of entry in all cases was the Chief Audit Executive. He was asked to fill in the questionnaire. 
Although he most certainly is able to have the quantitative data available pertaining to the size 
of the organization, etc, he might lack the ability to correctly assess the questions geared 
towards Information Asymmetry and Asset Specificity. Since no questions were asked as to 
the number of years of experience they had in the organization, it is possible that a number of 
them lacked the insight and experience to judge those questions correctly. Although the 
questionnaire was sufficiently tested and the questions themselves may have been interpreted 
correctly, providing answers might still have been difficult.  
 
One solution to that problem would have been to query other company officials to enable 
cross testing. I deliberately decided not to do that for several reasons. Given the difficulty in 
coming up with sufficient addresses of those other company officials, this would have led to 
an extension of my research that outweighed the advantages of this extra data. Pain without 
gain. That assumption stems from my experience with the case studies, where I used a 
preliminary version of the survey. Scores there about Information Asymmetry and Asset 
Specificity were highly similar across the board. But due to the limited number of 
respondents, this is not a statement that can be backed up in any quantitative sense. 
 
Second, the Chief Audit Executive being the point of entry to Management Board and 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee members might have created some bias. If the Chief 
Audit Executive did not have a good working relationship with them, he might have withheld 
the survey. If he submitted it to them and was the intermediary on its way back to me, a 
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further bias might have occurred. Taking that into account might have tainted their answers. 
In other words, they might have given significantly different response if it had been a more 
direct, entre nous communication. However, the risks of that prejudice are minimal. Board 
members are high ranked officers - superior to each and every Chief Audit Executive - and 
are not known to be shy about expressing clear opinions. 
 
The reliability of survey data is always an issue. Did Chief Audit Executives and board 
members take the time needed to complete it? Or did they just jot down some off the cuff 
answers? Did the respondents themselves complete the survey or did they delegate it to 
subordinates? Would that make a difference? Probably not.  
 
Other caveats are Chief Audit Executives, or their assistants, might have used estimates 
instead of set in stone statistics. Questions might have been misinterpreted. I did not send a 
list of definitions or examples of various audit forms because of my belief that this is common 
knowledge throughout the profession. But I could be wrong and some distortion could have 
occurred. 
 
7.5  Future Research: Three Possible Routes  
 
I will present three possible routes for future research:  
1. Exploit Resource Based View Theory for the Make or Buy issue 
Resource Based View Theory examines companies as a collection of capabilities and asks 
decision makers to find the best fit between that and the markets in which they operate. Put 
simply - and perhaps simplistically - it says, first look at what you have and then decide what 
you can and should do with it. It is normally used in the area of setting business strategy. But 
some researchers - notably Poppo and Zenger (1998) and Carter and Hodgson (2006) - have 
linked it to the make or buy issue. Poppo and Zenger (1998, 873-874) noted that managers are 
more likely to choose hierarchy (that is, in-sourcing) when performance measurement is 
difficult. Another remark of theirs is quoted at length because I believe it's a story worth 
telling. 
 
Hierarchies are largely unstoppable engines of co-specialization yielding increasingly firm-
specific language and routines. To the extent that co-specialization generates language and 
routines that prevent the acquisition of new knowledge sources, then internalizing activities 
can destroy value for the firm.… When valuable knowledge can be generated by the 
formation of firm-specific language and routines, hierarchy is preferred. When firm-specific 
routines and language generate impediments to the creation of valuable knowledge, markets 
are preferred.… Groups of individuals governed by markets are more likely to directly benefit 
from the formation of new knowledge. 
 
This will sound familiar to those acquainted with the framework of Matthyssens et al (1998, 
see Chapter 2) and may explain – at least to some extent – why IA has been expanding its 
services so rapidly. That opened my eyes to the possibility that internalizing IA could, and 
possibly does, prevent the acquisition of new and valuable knowledge and actually subtract 
value.  
 
When this project officially began in February 2003, I was heartened, though not 
surprised, to find that Paul O'Neill [Secretary of the Treasury] had a striking view of 
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the value of secrecy – that it had almost no value. We both happened to have read a 
1998 book by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a friend and mentor to O'Neill, who wrote 
that twenty years on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence had taught him a 
single, sterling lesson: The threat to our national security is not from secrets revealed, 
it's from bad analysis. O'Neill, with his affinity for assessing how process leads to 
outcome, often cited the separation of information into silos – guarded as core assets 
by self-interested players – as one of the great obstacles to managing the huge, 
unwieldy American government. It has created an acute need for particularly skillful 
integrators – those who can move freely among silos, pick and choose, and form 
connections to create a fabric of shared purpose. (Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty, 
vii) 
 
It reminded me of multiple Management Board members feeling that IA had fallen behind 
and no longer lived up to their expectations. And an overhaul was needed.89 Could there be an 
inherent "empire building" danger in internalizing a specialized function? Could (partial) 
outsourcing be a palliative for that risk? Another quote from Poppo and Zenger (1998, 873). 
 
Imprecise measurement constrains the incentive intensity of rewards and low-powered 
rewards limit performance.  
 
Even if Resource Based View theory can't conclusively solve the make or buy issue, it will 
certainly give the discussions about it a kick in the right direction. As Carter and Hodgson 
(2006, 473) concluded: "Crucially, however, it is possible to reinterpret the empirical results 
(of Transaction Cost Economics). In particular, measures of human Asset Specificity fit 
readily into both a Transaction Cost Economics and a competence90 approach."  
2. Compare Companies that have IA with those that don't 
I did my best to come up with a complete list of organizations in The Netherlands with IA, 
and counted about 230 candidates. Of the 144 that responded, 16 said they did not have IA. If 
this percentage was representative of the total, that would mean that about 26 did not have IA. 
This would leave a total of 204 with. While this figure is probably not 100% accurate it is 
more than close enough. In Chapter 6 I referred to about 1700 companies that have revenues 
exceeding € 100 million. That total needs to be lowered, because a number were merely 
holding companies, subsidiaries of Dutch or foreign listed companies, or special purpose 
vehicles of parent companies. But the net total needs to be increased by other means. Namely, 
adding other entities - such as public organizations - that would be ideal candidates to have IA 
(either now or in the future). The bottom line is that the number of organizations in The 
Netherlands that do or might fit into the IA profile might be about 2,000.  
 
One question emerging from that research is: "Don't those need to have some kind of internal 
auditing done?" If the answer is yes, the next obvious question has to be: "Who does it?" Do 
they have some other functions inside the organization - such as quality controllers - to meet 
their needs? Do they have comptrollers to fill the gap? Have they expanded the mandate of 
the external auditor? 
 
If the answer is no, the next question becomes even more provocative. Why not? Are they 
managed differently? Do their Mangement Control Systems have a totally different set up? Is 
                                                 
89 Remember the discussion (mentioned in Chapter 6) between the CEO and CFO and a team of consultants 
about the overhaul of their IA.  
90 Another term for Resource Based View theory.  
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the level of "trust" so high that top management and stakeholders are convinced that they can 
do without such a function? This could be explored in a study explicitly examining IA as part 
of the Management Control System. Research like that may greatly enhance our 
understanding of the role of IA in organizations. 
 
In any case, it is necessary to delve deeper into the issue of why some organizations have IA 
while others do not. Perhaps it is just a matter of top management's opinions. Karel 
Vuursteen, former CEO of Heineken, once stated that he did not believe in IA. "That would 
make my managers lazy." There is at least some element of truth in that contention. We teach 
our students at Erasmus University that organizations should be able to get by swimmingly 
without IA. Because IA is first and foremost a "second opinion function", which is meant to 
check, control and clarify the "first impressions" of management. In broad, is the 
Management Control System up to snuff or not? 
3. IA's effectiveness  
Another totally unexplored area is IA's effectiveness. What does it contribute? What reasons 
are there to sustain it over many years? Is it just a matter of opinion? My chapters and verses 
versus yours. Or are there solider measures that could make its contributions more visible and 
provable? For example, do companies with IA outperform those without? From the 
perspective of those in the profession it is imperative to bundle evidence and firm things up 
under the feet so IA can take a stand and say with conviction, "This is what we do. This is 
how we do it. And this is why." Otherwise, it will continue to be subject to the whims of not 
only whoever runs it, but also its own. 
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 1 and again above, I started off with the idea of researching 
"added value". But I rejected it because of what I perceived as grave, possibly even fatal, 
difficulties. Perhaps stouter hearts will not be deterred so easily. It will be tough going and at 
times seem impossible. But just think of the great glory and rewards if you succeed. 
 
Apart from IA's contributions to the greater perspective of the organization's performance, 
there is the issue of measuring its effectiveness and efficiency. How can board members - 
Management and Supervisory - be sure that they are squeezing the most out of the function? 
As already shown in this thesis, there is room for improvement. As a professional I have had 
the privilege of being asked to investigate this matter, and have always found myself feeling 
my way in the dark. It is my sincere wish and hope that with further research about some of 
the questions raised in this thesis that I and people in similar situations will have something 
more substantial and substantiated to back up their convictions and arguments than "I think 
so" and "I believe". 
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Nederlandse Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
 
Financiële schandalen zijn van alle tijden. Vanwege de groeiende economie en de 
schaalgrootte van veel organisaties zijn de bedragen die gemoeid waren met die schandalen 
alleen maar groter geworden. Velen zullen zich de bekende namen herinneren: Enron, 
Worldcom, Adelphia, Tyco, Ahold, Parmalat, Shell. En de lijst kan nog pagina's lang 
doorgaan. Aandeelhouders in die bedrijven hebben zeer aanzienlijke bedragen verloren. De 
overheid heeft initiatieven genomen om de beheersing en transparantie van ondernemingen te 
verbeteren.  
 
Vanaf het laatste decennium van de vorige eeuw tot op heden zijn er in vele landen dan ook 
rapporten verschenen inzake het thema Corporate Governance. Corporate Governance is te 
duiden als 'goed bestuur', waarbij het oogmerk is om te zorgen dat organisaties goed bestuurd 
worden en dat daarover verantwoording wordt afgelegd aan belanghebbenden. In aanvang 
was het merendeel van die rapporten bedoeld voor beursgenoteerde ondernemingen, waarbij 
de verhoudingen tussen aandeelhouders en de organisatie en haar toezichthoudende organen, 
zoals de Raad van Commissarissen, werden beschreven. Inmiddels hebben in veel andere 
sectoren, ook in de publieke sfeer, vergelijkbare rapporten het licht gezien.  
 
Eén van de beheersingsinstrumenten, die de Raad van Bestuur/Directie in veel organisaties ter 
beschikking staat, is de Internal Audit Functie (IAF) IAF's voeren namens het hoogste 
management onderzoeken uit gericht op diverse objecten zoals: financiële verantwoordingen, 
processen, naleving van wet- en regelgeving, fraude, informatiesystemen, etc. Het oogmerk 
daarbij is vaststellen of alles gaat zoals het behoort te gaan. Uiteraard is het management daar 
zelf verantwoordelijk voor. Maar deze functie dient daarbij als een extra waarborg om hen 
zekerheid te geven dat alles op orde is.  
 
Mijn interesse gaat al jaren uit naar het functioneren van beheersingsinstrumenten in het 
algemeen en Internal Audit in het bijzonder, zowel professioneel als theoretisch. In dat laatste 
geval als eindverantwoordelijke voor de postinitële opleiding Internal/Operational Auditing 
aan de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. Op zoek naar een geschikt onderwerp voor 
promotieonderzoek was dan ook al snel duidelijk dat de combinatie van Corporate 
Governance en Internal Audit het thema zou worden. Het vraagstuk van mijn onderzoek was 
dan ook de vraag wat de invloed is van de ontwikkelingen op het terrein van Corporate 
Governance op de rol, positie en taakopdracht van Internal Audit. Vragen die zich aandienden 
waren onder andere: heeft de functie aan belang gewonnen; is ze andere onderwerpen ter hand 
gaan nemen; zijn de verhoudingen met het hoogste management en de toezichthouders 
veranderd: is ze in omvang toegenomen? 
 
Het is van belang op te merken dat dit onderzoek is uitgevoerd binnen de context van het 
Rijnlandse governance model dat uitgaat van een strikte scheiding tussen Raad van 
Bestuur/Directie en de toezichthouders in de Raad van Commissarissen. Dit model wordt ook 
wel 'two-tier' (twee lagen) model genoemd, dit in tegenstelling tot het Angelsaksische model, 
waarbij bestuurders en toezichthouders in één gezamenlijke vergadering bij elkaar komen en 
besluiten nemen. Dit model wordt ook wel 'one-tier' (één laag) genoemd. 
 
In hoofdstuk 1 wordt het onderzoek ingeleid. Een onderzoek noopt tot het maken van keuzes 
met welke bril gekeken zal gaan worden. De praktijk die waargenomen zal gaan worden moet 
beoordeeld worden aan de hand van een normatief kader, een kader waarmee de 
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waarnemingen geduid kunnen worden en op grond waarvan verdere theorievorming mogelijk 
is. Besloten werd om te kiezen voor twee bekende theorieën, die ten grondslag liggen aan het 
denken over organisatiebesturing en Corporate Governance; dit zijn Agency Theory en 
Transaction Cost Economics. 
 
Agency Theory gaat uit van de scheiding tussen kapitaal en arbeid, waarbij aandeelhouders 
het kapitaal aan de onderneming ter beschikking stelt en aan de managers vraagt hun 
investering te laten bloeien en groeien. De aandeelhouder heet de principaal en de manager de 
agent. De principaal heeft vervolgens tenminste twee problemen: hoe weet ik dat de agent 
geen dingen doet die mij niet welgevallig zijn (hidden action). En hoe weet ik of de agent mij 
de juiste dingen vertelt over de uitkomsten van zijn inspanningen (hidden information). Beide 
problemen worden aangeduid onder de verzamelnaam 'Information Asymmetry', ongelijkheid 
van informatie. De agent weet meer dan de principaal. Informatie Asymmetrie leidt tot de 
behoefte bij de principaal om gerust gesteld te worden door middel van controleurs. Wij 
noemen die controleurs in het jargon 'auditors'. Auditors zijn er ruwweg in twee soorten: een 
externe auditor, die wordt aangesteld door de Raad van Commissarissen en die tot taak heeft 
de financiële verantwoording op haar betrouwbaarheid te toetsen. De andere is de internal 
auditor, die namens de leiding van de organisatie tot taak heeft na te gaan of het lagere 
management zich houdt aan de afspraken en de juiste dingen doet en een juiste 
verantwoording aflegt. Daarmee is dan op haar beurt de leiding weer in staat aan de 
toezichthoudende organen zoals de Raad van Commissarissen verantwoording af te leggen.  
 
Transaction Cost Economics is een theorie die een verklaring wil bieden voor de relatie tussen 
de activiteiten van de organisatie en de gekozen organisatievorm en bijbehorende 
beheersingsinstrumenten. Kortweg: welke organisatievorm en beheersingsinstrumentarium 
past het best in welke omstandigheden? Onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat voor dat 
keuzevraagstuk drie kenmerken van de activiteiten – ook wel transacties genoemd – bepalend 
zijn: 1. de mate waarin de productiemiddelen en de daarmee gepaard gaande investeringen 
specifiek zijn voor het uitvoeren van die transacties (Asset Specificity); 2. de onzekerheid 
waarmee die activiteiten zijn omgeven (Uncertainty); en 3. de frequentie waarmee de 
transactie wordt herhaald (Frequency). Van deze drie kenmerken heeft de eerste, 'Asset 
Specificity", de meest voorspellende waarde.  
 
In het vervolg van het onderzoek zijn die twee theorieën gehanteerd als referentiekader en is 
getracht met Information Asymmetry en Asset Specificity gepoogd de theorievorming 
rondom Internal Auditing te verrijken.  
 
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een overzicht van de status van Internal Auditing op dit moment. Daar 
wordt aangegeven wat internal audit is en wat de kenmerken van een auditor zijn. Auditing is 
het toetsen van een werkelijkheid aan een vooraf gedefinieerde norm. Een auditor beschikt 
over kennis en expertise om een audit zo'n toets uit te voeren. Hij is dan ook een professional. 
Een belangrijk kenmerk van een auditor is dat hij onafhankelijk hoort te zijn van hetgeen hij 
onderzoekt. Onafhankelijkheid wordt gezien als een belangrijke hoeksteen van de professie. 
Maar sinds het niet eenvoudig te definiëren is, noemen sommigen het de achilleshiel van het 
beroep. De kenmerken waarmee onafhankelijkheid wordt omschreven omvatten begrippen als 
objectiviteit, integriteit, rechte rug, zorgvuldigheid, competent, etc. Alle begrippen zijn 
vervolgens ook op hun beurt niet eenvoudig te definiëren.  
 
Voor Internal Audit wordt het van groot belang geacht dat ze verantwoording verschuldigd 
zijn aan de hoogste leiding zodat de organisatorische positie een groot gewicht krijgt bij het 
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zekerstellen van onafhankelijkheid. Van oudsher is de functie een instrument in de handen 
van de Raad van Bestuur/Directie en niet in de handen van de Raad van Commissarissen. 
Onder druk van de Corporate Governance rapporten, met name die uit de one- tier omgeving, 
wordt in toenemende mate van toezichthouders verwacht dat zij zich rekenschap geven van en 
bemoeienis hebben met Internal Audit. Hiermee dreigt een zeker rolconflict te ontstaan voor 
internal auditors. Wie is nu precies de baas? Sommige externe toezichthouders, zoals de 
Autoriteit Financiële Markten, willen ook inzicht hebben in het werk van Internal Audit, 
waarmee het aantal potentiële 'bazen' tot drie dreigt uit te groeien. Internal auditors kunnen 
zich in ieder geval verheugen in meer belangstelling voor hun functioneren.  
 
Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt de meest relevante Corporate Governance rapporten. Inmiddels is een 
Internal Audit Functie verplicht geworden voor ondernemingen die genoteerd zijn aan de 
New York Stock Exchange, al of niet intern dan wel in uitbestede vorm. Ook verzekeraars in 
de US die vallen onder het toezicht van de Federal Deposit Insurance Companies Act dienen 
daarover te beschikken. In de UK dient een beursgenoteerde onderneming die zo'n functie niet 
heeft jaarlijks te evalueren of dat terecht is. In Nederland is in de Tabaksblat code ook 
aandacht besteedt aan Internal Audit, waarbij de Raad van Commissarissen dient toe te zien 
op welke wijze de Raad van Bestuur daarmee omgaat. Financiële instellingen onder toezicht 
van De Nederlansche Bank dienen ook een dergelijke functie te hebben.  
 
In alle rapporten wordt een belangrijke functie toegedicht aan het Audit Committee. Het 
Audit Committee is een deelverzameling van de Raad van Commissarissen (in de two-tier 
omgeving) of de non-executives (toezichthouders in een one-tier omgeving). Dit Audit 
Committee heeft speciaal tot taak toe te zien op de betrouwbaarheid van de financiële 
verantwoording en de relatie met de externe auditor te onderhouden. In alle rapporten is 
inmiddels, direct of indirect, zoals bij Tabaksblat, bepaald dat het Audit Committee ook 
toeziet op het functioneren van Internal Audit. Dit draagt naar verwachting zeker bij tot de 
onafhankelijkheid van de functioneren maar creëert in een two-tier omgeving dus een 
potentieel rolconflict. Het is dan ook te verwachten dat de relatie met diverse partijen - zoals 
de Raad van Bestuur, de Raad van Commissarissen, de externe accountant en externe 
regelgevers - zal veranderen. Het is ook te verwachten dat de toegenomen aandacht zal leiden 
tot meer beroepsregels en een verhoogde druk om die strikt na te leven. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt Agency Theory en Transaction Cost Economics en de toepassing 
daarvan in onderzoek op het terrein van Internal Auditing. Agency Theory maakt duidelijk dat 
beloningssystemen een belangrijk instrument zijn om het gedrag van mensen te beïnvloeden. 
Transaction Cost Economics maakt duidelijk dat het streven naar efficiëntie ertoe leidt dat 
gepoogd wordt transactiekosten zo laag mogelijk te laten zijn. Transactiekosten worden 
gemaakt vanwege het zoeken naar contractpartijen en de onderhandelingen die nodig zijn om 
een contract af te kunnen sluiten en vervolgens na te kunnen gaan of het contract juist is 
nageleefd. Het is duidelijk dat hoe complexer de transacties zijn hoe meer transactiekosten 
dienen te worden gemaakt. De mate van Asset Specificity is daarmee bepalend voor de 
hoogte van die kosten en voor de organisatievorm en de beheersingsstructuur die zal worden 
gekozen om het beste met die complexiteit en de daaruit voortkomende problemen om te 
gaan.  
 
Beide theorieën gaan uit van bepaalde veronderstellingen ten aanzien van de gedragingen van 
mensen. Mensen zijn 'bounded rational', hun vermogens zijn te beperkt om alle contingenties 
te kunnen overzien en bovendien is de hoeveelheid informatie ook veel te groot. Mensen 
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kunnen (maar het is niet noodzakelijk) opportunistisch gedrag vertonen, waarbij hun belangen 
prevaleren en er de neiging kan bestaan de werkelijkheid in hun eigen voordeel aan te passen.  
Agency Theory veronderstelt dat naarmate Information Asymmetry hoger wordt de behoefte 
aan audit toe zal nemen en dat die grotere behoefte ertoe leidt dat eerder gekozen zal worden 
voor het intern institutionaliseren van zo'n functie. Mutatis mutandis voorspelt Transaction 
Cost Economics dat naarmate Asset Specificity toeneemt hetzelfde effect zal kunnen 
optreden. De laatste theorie geeft bij monde van haar grootste contribuant Williamson aan dat 
Internal Audit bovendien altijd het voordeel heeft boven de externe auditor van het zijn van 
'one of us'. Agency Theory maakt duidelijk dat ook de auditor een agent is die opportunistisch 
gedrag kan vertonen, dat op haar beurt weer in banen dient te worden geleid door middel van 
beloningen en het uitoefenen van toezicht door een monitor. Dit betekent dat op basis van de 
theorie belonen op grond van prestaties de voorkeur geniet. Bovendien is toezicht door 
vakmensen zoals de externe auditor een goed idee evenals het hebben van gekwalificeerd 
personeel en het toepassen van tuchtrecht en naleving van professionele standaarden voor de 
beroepsuitoefening. De theorie maakt duidelijk dat als beloningsinstrumenten belangrijk zijn 
voor het beïnvloeden van gedrag het ook voor de hand zou liggen om die onderwerp te maken 
van de taakopdracht (scope of services) van Internal Audit.  
 
Tot slot is duidelijk geworden dat beide theorieën weliswaar aanknopingspunten bieden voor 
diverse vraagstukken op het terrein van Internal Auditing maar nog niet direct harde 
conclusies op kunnen leveren. Daartoe is ook nog veel te weinig onderzoek gedaan. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft de uitgevoerde case studies bij ABN AMRO, Bank Nederlandse 
Gemeenten (BNG), Informatie Beheer Groep (IB Groep) en TNT. Uit de case studies bleek 
dat Asset Specificity een belangrijker bijdrage te leveren voor de internalisering van Internal 
Auditing dan Informatie Asymmetrie. Verder bleek dat geen enkele van de bestudeerde 
organisaties ooit had overwogen om de functie uit te besteden, zelfs niet voor bepaalde delen. 
Ook is dat niet overwogen bij de twee financiële instellingen, waar een dergelijke functie 
weliswaar verplicht is maar niet noodzakelijk intern.  
 
De instrumenten die ingezet kunnen worden om Internal Audit te kunnen monitoren, worden 
– op een enkele uitzondering na - ook ingezet. Een uitzondering vormt de prestatie gebonden 
beloning. Slechts in één geval gebeurde dat, de overige organisaties zagen grote bezwaren 
vanwege de mogelijke negatieve invloed op de onafhankelijkheid van Internal Audit. Een 
andere uitzondering is het gebruik van tuchtrecht. Organisaties handelen slecht presteren 
intern af en zullen niet snel aangifte doen bij de beroepsgroep.  
 
Het mede op de Agency Theory gebaseerde idee om Internal Audit zo onafhankelijk mogelijk 
in de organisatie te positioneren waarbij de Raad van Commissarissen/Audit Committee dus 
de meest in aanmerking komende instantie zou zijn, wordt niet onderschreven. In één geval 
werd zelfs duidelijk gemaakt dat indien de functie ooit onder de hoede van de Raad van 
Commissarissen/Audit Committee zou komen te ressorteren, er direct een nieuwe functie in 
het leven geroepen zou worden, die uitsluitend verantwoording en verschuldigd zou zijn aan 
de Raad van Bestuur.  
 
Met betrekking tot de taakopdracht viel op dat door de Raad van Commissarissen/Audit 
Committee van Internal Audit verwacht werd dat inbreuken door het topmanagement tegen 
gedragscodes en misbruik van beloningsinstrumenten van een organisatie, aan hen 
gerapporteerd zouden dienen te worden. Raden van Bestuur vonden dat Internal Audit op dat 
punt geen taak had en de Raden van Commissarissen/Audit Committees voelden weer niet de 
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behoefte om via het Internal Audit Charter af te dwingen dat Internal Audit zich daarmee 
mocht inlaten.  
 
De resultaten van een uitgevoerde enquête zijn beschreven in hoofdstuk 6. De enquête, 
uitgevoerd onder nagenoeg 100% van de Nederlandse organisaties met Internal Auditing, 
leverde een respons op van tussen de 39% en 66%. Van de acht hypothesen werden er twee 
ondersteund. Indien Information Asymmetry in een organisatie toenam dan leverde dat een 
toename op van 13 medewerkers bij Internal Audit (hypothese 5). Indien een organisatie 
Asset Specific was dan leverde dat een toename op van 25 medewerkers ten opzichte van een 
organisatie die dat niet was (hypothese 2). Daarmee levert het wel of niet Asset Specific zijn 
een tweemaal zo hoge toename van het aantal internal auditors op ten opzichte van een hoge 
mate van Information Asymmetry.  
 
Beide begrippen, Information Asymmetry en Asset Specificity, bleken niet te correleren met 
het vraagstuk van in- of uitbesteden. Blijkbaar, spelen er andere motieven voor dit vraagstuk 
een rol. In het geval van Asset Specificity lijkt dat overigens in tegenspraak met eerdere 
onderzoeken. Hierbij wordt wel aangetekend dat in dit onderzoek niet de mate van Asset 
Specificity van de Internal Audit activiteiten werd gemeten, maar die van de organisatie 
waarvan zij deel uitmaakt. De veronderstelling in dit onderzoek is dat deze activiteiten 
inherent asset specific zijn. Uiteindelijk blijkt iets minder dan 10% van de Internal Auditing 
activiteiten uitbesteed te worden.  
 
IAF's bleken in 40% van de gevallen korter dan vijf jaar te bestaan en daarmee dus erg jong. 
De veronderstelling is dat de toegenomen belangstelling voor de functie, op haar beurt weer 
voorkomend uit de Corporate Governance rapporten, daar debet aan is. Uit de enquête bleek 
ook dat niet alleen de regelgeving sec daar mede verantwoordelijk voor zou kunnen zijn, maar 
ook de aanwezigheid van externe toezichthouders. Hoe meer externe toezichthouders er 
waren, hoe groter Internal Audit bleek te zijn. Dit hoeft geen bevreemding te wekken indien 
we ons realiseren dat het topmanagement uiteraard geen negatieve opmerkingen van externe 
toezichthouders wenst te hebben en dus genegen zou kunnen zijn zich zoveel mogelijk moeite 
te getroosten om eventuele manco's reeds zelf te hebben ontdekt door middel van Internal 
Audit.  
 
Dat Corporate Governance rapporten in het bijzonder en schandalen in de pers in het 
algemeen hun invloed hebben doen gelden, bleek uit de toegenomen contacten tussen Raden 
van Commissarissen/Audit Committees en Internal Audit. Ook kregen zij meer directe 
opdrachten van hen. Ook bleek de eerder geconstateerde potentiële controverse over die 
directe contacten statistisch significante verschillen in scores op te leveren tussen enerzijds 
Raden van Bestuur en Raden van Commissarissen/Audit Committees en anderzijds het hoofd 
van Internal Audit (Chief Audit Executive). 
 
Dat de directe contacten tussen Raden van Commissarissen/Audit Committees en hoofden 
Internal Audit gevoelig liggen, bleek ook uit de scores op vraag inzake het hebben van 
separate vergaderingen tussen die twee buiten de aanwezigheid van de Raden van Bestuur. 
Overigens, bleek 54% van de hoofden Internal Audit nog nooit zo'n vergadering te hebben 
gehad. Ook statistisch significante verschillen werden geconstateerd op de vraag of de Raad 
van Commissarissen/Audit Committee betrokken zou moeten zijn bij aanstelling, beoordeling 
en ontslag van het hoofd van Internal Audit.  
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Op het punt van prestatie gebonden beloning, bleek dat dit in 55% van de gevallen gebeurde. 
De overige elementen waarmee de functie kan worden gemonitord bleken in het merendeel 
van de gevallen toegepast te worden. Verrassend is nog wel dat slechts 64% van de IAF's de 
Professional Standards van de beroepsgroep blijkt te onderschrijven.  
 
In de afgelopen jaren blijkt de taakopdracht op enkele punten bijgesteld te zijn. Zo loopt het 
aandeel van Financial Audits terug van 31 naar 23% en loopt het percentage Compliance 
Audits op van 8 naar 12. Allen de laatste bleek statistisch significant te verschillen over de 
jaren. Operational Audits en IT Audits blijken behoorlijk stabiel met percentages van 
respectievelijk rond de 35% en 15%. Consulting bleek ook een redelijk stabiele uitkomst te 
zien te geven van zo'n 10%.  
 
Tot slot bleek ook de relatie met de externe auditor intiemer geworden te zijn en die relatie zal 
naar verwachting nog verder intensiveren.  
 
In hoofdstuk 7 worden conclusies getrokken en aanbevelingen gedaan voor verder onderzoek.  
 
Ten aanzien van de rol is ten aanzien van de bestaansgrond van Internal Auditing aangetoond 
dat op grond van de Agency Theory er redenen te vinden zijn waarom deze activiteiten plaats 
vinden. In diverse Corporate Governance rapporten wordt melding gemaakt van de noodzaak 
tot het hebben van zo'n functie. In diverse gevallen, zoals beursgenoteerd zijn aan de New 
York Stock Exchange of het een bank en/of verzekeraar, is deze functie verplicht gesteld door 
regelgevers/toezichthouders. In alle gevallen is uitbesteding overigens toegestaan. In dit 
onderzoek is ook aangetoond dat er een positieve correlatie bestaat tussen het aantal internal 
auditors werkzaam in de functie en het aantal regelgevers/toezichthouders waaraan een 
organisatie is blootgesteld.  
 
Opvallend is nog dat 40% van de IAF's korter dan 5 jaar bestaat, waarbij voorzichtig gesteld 
zou kunnen worden dat de toegenomen belangstelling die de laatste jaren voor de functie aan 
de dag is gelegd – vooral in Corporate Governance rapporten – hier mede debet aan zou 
kunnen zijn.  
 
 In dit onderzoek is geen relatie aangetoond tussen Asset Specificity en Information 
Asymmetry van de organisatie waarin Internal Audit activiteiten plaatsvinden en de mate van 
in- of uitbesteding ervan. Uitbesteding van Internal Audit activiteiten bleek voor ongeveer 
10% van het totaal te geschieden. Verder onderzoek is nodig voor het vraagstuk van in- of 
uitbesteding. 
 
Ten aanzien van de positie is geconstateerd dat onafhankelijkheid van grote waarde wordt 
geacht, waarbij dat overwegend wordt gevonden in het hebben van een organisatorische 
positie direct onder het hoogste management. Op grond van de Agency Theory zou het de 
voorkeur hebben om het hoofd Internal Audit direct te laten rapporteren aan de Raad van 
Commissarissen/Audit Committee. Alhoewel in de internationale – lees 'one-tier' omgevingen 
- Corporate Governance rapporten gekozen is voor een directe lijn met het Audit Committee 
is dat in de Nederlandse Tabaksblat code niet gebeurt. Bedenk daarbij dat hier een 'two-tier' 
structuur bestaat. Desalniettemin is ook in Nederland een trend waarneembaar waarbij de 
Raad van Commissarissen/Audit Committee zich meer bemoeit met het functioneren van 
Internal Audit.  
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Een potentieel rolconflict zou daarbij kunnen ontstaan. Een duidelijke keuze zou voor alle 
betrokkenen de voorkeur hebben. Daarbij kan de theorie richtinggevend zijn. Indien aan de 
Raad van Bestuur gerapporteerd wordt, verdient rapportage aan de voorzitter de voorkeur.  
 
Met betrekking tot de omvang is in dit onderzoek aangetoond dat Asset Specificity een 
tweemaal zo grote toename van de omvang van de functie tot gevolg heeft ten opzichte van 
Information Asymmetry.  
 
De wijze waarop de functie beheerst wordt is grotendeels te verklaren vanuit Agency Theory. 
De op grond van de theorie te verwachten instrumenten worden weliswaar alle toegepast maar 
de volgende instrumenten leverden lage scores op:  
 
 Het gebruik van een ethische code (verplicht op grond van de professionele 
standaarden overigens) geschiedt slechts in 38% van de gevallen; 
 Steekproefsgewijze controles door de externe auditor gebeurt ook in slechts 38% van 
de gevallen; dit zou echter te compenseren zijn door; 
 Gebruik te maken van een externe review door een derde partij (ook voorgeschreven 
in de professionele standaarden) maar dit geschiedt slechts in 30% van de gevallen; 
 Het beoordelen van de functie op grond van meetbare criteria gebeurt in slechts 40% 
van de gevallen, waarbij het opvallend is dat in ongeveer 55% van de organisaties 
resultaat gerelateerde beloning van het hoofd Internal Audit plaats vindt waar 
toepassing van de resultaten van onderzoek gebaseerd op Agency Theory 100% zou 
kunnen rechtvaardigen;  
 Interne sancties bij niet goed presteren worden in slechts 34% van de organisaties 
toegepast; en het deponeren van een klacht bij de beroepsorganisaties geschiedt maar 
in 13% van de gevallen. 
 
De taakopdracht heeft de afgelopen jaren nauwelijks significante veranderingen ondergaan. 
Slechts Financial Audit en Compliance Audit zijn statistisch significant in omvang gewijzigd. 
Financial Audit gaat over 2001, 2004 en 2007, terug van 31% naar 25% en tot slot naar 23% 
van de totale tijdsbesteding. Compliance Audit vertoont een stijging van respectievelijk 8% 
naar 10% en uiteindelijk naar 12% in 2007.  
 
Op grond van de Agency Theory zou verwacht worden dat het gebruikte 
beloningsinstrumentarium voor het topmanagement onderwerp van audits zou zijn, maar dit 
blijkt niet of nauwelijks te gebeuren (2% in 2004). Dat laatste geldt ook voor de zogenaamde 
'tone at the top' audits, die slechts 1% van het totaal aan Internal Audit activiteiten in 2004 
uitmaken. Hier was wel een verschil van inzicht te constateren tussen de wensen van de Raad 
van Commissarissen/Audit Committee, die wel verachten daarover gerapporteerd te krijgen 
ingeval van problemen, en de Raad van Bestuur die geen taak voor Internal Audit ziet 
weggelegd op dit terrein. 
 
De relatie met de externe auditor is geïntensiveerd. Statistisch significant waren: het delen en 
gezamenlijk opstellen van planningen en het delen van rapporten. De internal auditor monitort 
de externe auditor vaker. Alhoewel niet statistisch significant, toonden nagenoeg alle andere 
aspecten van de relatie tussen beide functies een toename. 
 
Tot slot is duidelijk geworden dat wetenschappelijk onderzoek op het terrein van Internal 
Audit nog in de kinderschoenen staat en dat veel meer onderzoek noodzakelijk is om de 
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theorievorming  verder inhoud te kunnen geven. Wellicht dat andere theorieën zoals Resource 
Based View (RBV) verdere aanknopingspunten kunnen bieden. 
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Appendix 1: Overview of preliminary results based on the 
study of Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics 
 
The preliminary results based on the literature research are grouped along the same 
dimensions of Role, Position, and Scope of Services. 
 
Role 
 
1. IA can be seen as an instrument that could provide more information about agents' actions 
and results of agents and, therefore, help mitigate agency problems. 
2. Asset Specificity is an explanatory factor for the existence and size of IA. When Asset 
Specificity increases it very probably leads sooner rather than later to a "make" decision.  
3. Due to enhanced levels of testing and liability claims, external audit is more expensive 
and better than internal audit. 
4. In high risk situations - when, say, there is the possibility of being slapped with major 
liability claims when shortcomings in control systems are not detected on time - 
outsourcing is an option sooner rather than later. Because one is looking for the best 
auditor (presumably the external auditor) and the one with the deepest pockets.  
5. The more difficult it is to observe agents' actions and results (hidden information and 
hidden actions) the greater the need for IA.  
6. Asset Specificity, specifically the knowledge required to perform top quality audits, is the 
major contributing factor for IA's size.  
7. If outsourcing is the choice, a qualified in-house staff member is required to supervise 
how it performs. 
8. When outsourcing is the choice, it is recommended to split audits into different phases 
and the work among competing parties.  
9. The higher the need for specialized knowledge of the company, the sooner IA will be in-
sourced.  
10. The larger the size of the organization the sooner economies of scale allow for in-
sourcing IA. 
 
Position 
 
11. Based on theory, IA's organizational position needs to be optimized. Reporting to the 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee seems to be the best solution to the problem. 
12. IA's size is dependent on the size of the company, the use of subjective and objective 
incentive schemes and performance based contracts, the trade off between external and 
internal auditors and the risk management is willing to face. Theory offers no clues 
whatsoever for IA's absolute size.  
13. To address IA's agency problem the following is important: 
a. The use of a code of conduct and adherence to it 
b. Internal quality measures 
c. It is recommended that appraisal be based on finding shortcomings in the control system 
and imposing penalties when not discovering important on time. 
d. There is a need for ad random checks on IA by EA. 
e. Qualified auditors are recommended 
f. Credible disciplinary powers are desired 
g. Professional Standards of the IIA Inc. need to be adhered to.  
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Scope of Services 
 
14. According to Transaction Cost Economics, broadening IA's Scope of Services adds value. 
15. IA's scope is broader than merely financial audit and creates a unique selling point in 
comparison with the external auditor.  
16. From the perspective of Corporate Governance, the Management Board's behaviour is 
crucial. Therefore, monitoring it should be part of IA's Scope of Services. 
17. Since performance measurement and incentive systems are driving factors for how agents 
behave and, therefore, crucial for the success of any organization, they are obvious audit 
objects. 
18. The greater the need for specialized knowledge of the company the sooner IA will be 
called in to assist EA in its tasks.  
19. IA can be seen as an instrument that supports management control and helps reduce EA 
costs. 
20. From a cost efficiency perspective, sound coordination between IA and EA is required  
21. If Corporate Governance developments follow current trends, this need for coordination 
will increase. 
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Appendix 2 Journals surveyed for publications regarding 
Internal Audit(ing) from 1994 to 2005 
 
 
# of 
publications 
  
1. Academy of Management Journal 0 
2. Academy of Management Review  0 
3. Accounting and Business Research 3 
4. Accounting Auditing & Accountability Journal 1 
5. Accounting, Organizations and Society  3 
6. Administrative Science Quarterly 0 
7. Advances in Management Accounting 0 
8. Behavioural Research in Accounting 2 
9. British Journal of Management 0 
10. California Management Review 0 
11. Contemporary Accounting Research 3 
12. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 3 
13. International Journal of Auditing 19 
14. Journal of Accounting & Economics 0 
15. Journal of Accounting Literature 0 
16. Journal of Accounting Research 1 
17. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 0 
18. Journal of Financial Economics 0 
19. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 0 
20. Journal of Management Accounting Research  1 
21. Maandblad Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie (MAB) 10 
22. Management Accounting Research 0 
23. Management Science 0 
24. Managerial Auditing Journal91 155 
25. Organization Science 0 
26. Sloan Management Review 0 
27. Strategic Management Journal 0 
28. The Accounting Historians Journal 2 
29. The Accounting Review  1 
30. The Journal of Management Studies 0 
 
Total number of publications 
 
204 
 
 
                                                 
91 The total includes all publications containing some reference to internal auditing. But many of them contained 
very little that was relevant for this thesis.  
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Appendix 3: Interview scheme 
 
1. What is your view and opinion on the relationship between Supervisory Board/Audit 
Committee, Management Board and the IAF and the external auditor in the realm of 
the current discussions and regulations on Corporate Governance? 
o Will the Audit Committee become a principal of the IAF?  
o How is the Audit Committee to perform oversight of the IAF?  
o Will this enhance or hamper the independence of the IAF? 
o How will the line of communication between the IAF and the Audit 
Committee be drafted? Will it alter upon these recent regulations? 
o Do the interests of the respective participants in the corporate governance 
arena differ? If so, in what way? Does it create any problem and if so in what 
way? 
o Will this affect the relationship with the External Auditor and if so in what 
way? 
o What is your view with regard to the difference between the one tier and two 
tier system? Will there be a convergence?  
 
2. What happened to the Audit Charter in recent history? Was it changed?  
o Why? 
o Who delivered input, who decided based on what? 
o Will the IAF be subject to changes due to the newly adopted regulations and 
initiatives? 
o Will this affect the relationship with the external auditor and if so in what way? 
 
3. What are your views on the independence issue of the IAF? 
o Will there be an effect due to the changes in regulations on the current 
structure of the IAF? 
o What is your view with regard to the hiring, firing and appraisal of the Chief 
Audit Executive?  
o Is there a need to pay the Chief Audit Executive based on a performance-based 
contract? 
o Do you expect that rules imposed on external auditors (oversight, peer reviews, 
quality systems, rotation, disciplinary powers, etc.) will be made applicable to 
internal auditors as well? 
 
4. Make or buy issue 
o What is your view on the topic 'make or buy'? Will that be affected by 
Corporate Governance regulations and the enhanced interest by the Audit 
Committee?  
o Which criteria are most important to come to a decision? 
 
5. Would you be so kind to complete the attached short questionnaire? I estimate that it 
will take you no more than 15 minutes to finish it. 
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Appendix 4: Transaction Cost Economics and Agency 
Theory Questionnaire  
Characterization of your organization: 
  
(SD = strongly disagree, D = disagree, N = neutral, A = agree, SA = strongly agree) 
 S
D 
D N A S
A 
Our services and products vary significantly       
Our services and products require very specialized knowledge       
Our brand name is very important and difficult to build      
Our organization has very specific attributes that makes it unique      
Investments in assets depend upon the specific character of the 
transactions and contracts  
     
Our location is tied to the location of our suppliers and/or customers       
Uncertainty with regard to the specifications of our services and 
products is high 
     
Our processes need to be adapted regularly because we do not know up 
front how to deliver (custom made)  
     
Activities and processes are largely programmable and predictable       
Demand for our services varies significantly       
It is difficult to monitor the processes and activities       
The organization is subject to regular changes       
The organization faces great risk       
Complexity of our processes is high      
Problems that occur require structured solutions       
Problems that occur are solved on an ad hoc basis       
Frequency of problems and bottlenecks is high       
Our processes have a high repetition rate       
It is difficult to monitor the activities of lower level managers       
It is easy to assess the reliability of information provided by lower level 
management 
     
Even after completion it is not easy to assess whether the contract has been 
met  
     
Outcome of processes can be measured quite easily       
Customers cannot easily assess whether the contract has been met      
It isn't easy for superiors to assess the adequacy of reporting by lower level 
managers 
     
Bold printed questions are related to Transaction Cost Economics attributes, the others to 
Information Asymmetry. 
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Appendix 5: Questionnaire used in the case studies 
 
Characterization of your organization: 
  
(SD = strongly disagree, D = disagree, N = neutral, A = agree, SA = strongly agree) 
 S
D 
D N A S
A 
Our services and products vary significantly       
Our services and products require very specialized knowledge       
Our brand name is very important and difficult to build      
Our organization has very specific attributes that make it unique      
Investments in assets depend upon the specific character of the 
transactions and contracts  
     
Our location is tied to the location of our suppliers and/or customers       
Uncertainty with regard to the specifications of our services and 
products is high 
     
Our processes need to be adapted regularly because we do not know 
upfront how to deliver (custom made)  
     
Activities and processes are largely programmable and predictable       
Demand for our services varies significantly       
It is difficult to monitor the processes and activities       
The organization is subject to regular changes       
The organization faces great risk       
Complexity of our processes is high      
Problems that occur require structured solutions       
Problems that occur are solved on an ad hoc basis       
Frequency of problems and bottlenecks is high       
Our processes have a high repetition rate       
It is difficult to monitor the activities of lower level managers       
It is easy to assess the reliability of information provided by lower 
level management 
     
Even after completion it is not easy to assess whether the contract has 
been met  
     
Outcome of processes can be measured quite easily       
Customers can not easily assess whether the contract has been met      
It isn't easy for superiors to assess the adequacy of reporting by lower 
level managers 
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Based on the Corporate Governance regulations IA will:  
 
(SD = strongly disagree, D = disagree, N = neutral, A = agree, SA = strongly agree) 
 
 S
D 
D N A S
A 
Become a mandatory function       
Be a function that is present in organizations       
Gain in stature       
Get a more limited scope of services      
Be supervised by the Audit Committee (or Supervisory Board)      
Be less independent      
Have more work to do       
Take into account other stakeholders       
Provide less assurance with regard to the reliability of financial 
statements  
     
Provide more assurance with regard to the reliability of non-financial 
information  
     
Provide more assurance with regard to the reliability of processes       
Provide less assurance with regard to the reliability of information 
systems 
     
Provide more assurance with regard to ethics and conduct      
Be more compliance oriented      
Provide less assurance with regard to the prevention of fraud      
Provide more assurance with regard to the efficiency of the 
organization 
     
Provide less assurance with regard to the effectiveness of the 
organization  
     
Provide more assurance with regard to the way the Board operates      
Provide less assurance with regard to business risks      
Provide more assurance with regard to the change management      
Provide less assurance with regard to the use of incentives systems      
Provide more assurance with regard to the work of the external auditor      
Provide less assurance with regard to the correctness of decisions 
taken 
     
Be more involved in environmental auditing       
Be more involved in quality auditing       
Be an increasing source of knowledge       
Become a nursery function for management       
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Gain in professionalism       
Have less communication with the external auditor      
Cooperate more with the external auditor      
Provide less consultancy       
Suffer cut down in budget       
Become more subject to review and disciplinary powers by the 
profession  
     
Become less liable       
Be vulnerable to reputation loss       
Give account upon their actions       
Serve more than one master       
Be outsourced to a party other than the own external auditor       
Be outsourced to the own external auditor       
Gain in size      
Be staffed with management potentials and former managers       
Have a different organizational position and become more independent      
Need to cooperate less with the external auditor       
Contain different disciplines       
 
 
IA's independence is enhanced by: 
 
(SD = strongly disagree, D = disagree, N = neutral, A = agree, SA = strongly agree) 
 
 
S
D 
D N A S
A 
Reporting to the Chief Executive Officer      
Reporting to the Chief Financial Officer      
Reporting to the Controller      
Reporting to the Audit Committee      
Reporting to the Supervisory Board      
Head of Internal Audit meeting the Audit Committee privately      
Head of Internal Audit having performance based incentives      
Head of Internal Audit being hired and fired by the Supervisory 
Board/Audit Committee 
     
Independent reporting to monitoring bodies outside the company      
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The wages and bonuses being defined by the Supervisory Board      
Cost of audits being billed to the auditees      
Peer reviews by the professional bodies      
Clear rules provided by professional bodies       
Results of audits being used to appraise management       
Active supervision by bodies like the SEC, AFM, De Nederlandsche 
Bank (DNB), etc.  
     
Serving as a nursery function      
Using Internal Audit in change processes      
Having client satisfaction surveys      
Auditors being involved in interim management      
The external auditor assessing the adequacy of Internal Audit      
Good cooperation between Internal Audit and external auditor      
Performing joint audits with the external auditor      
Having to contribute to the efficiency of the organization      
Delivering consultancy services      
 
 
I do expect the following to happen with regard to the relationship with the external 
auditor: 
 
(SD = strongly disagree, D = disagree, N = neutral, A = agree, SA = strongly agree) 
 
 SD D N A SA 
The need for coordination will increase      
The need of joint reporting will decrease       
The need for joint audits will increase      
The need for cooperation will decrease      
The gap between Internal and External audit will expand      
External audit will monitor the adequacy of internal audit more 
frequent 
     
Internal audit will monitor external audit more extensively      
Other, please specify      
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Audit Committees not only need to exercise oversight of external audit but also to 
internal audit. What will be, in your view, the consequences?  
 
(SD = strongly disagree, D = disagree, N = neutral, A = agree, SA = strongly agree) 
 
 
S
D 
D N A S
A 
More requests from the Audit Committee      
Less requests from the Board of Management      
Different reporting formats for the Board versus the Audit Committee      
More formal communication by internal audit      
Tension may arise for internal audit (serving two masters)      
Internal Audit may become alienated from the rest of the organization      
Internal Audit will report less      
The Audit Committee may become a principal of Internal Audit      
The scope of services of Internal Audit may decrease      
Quality of Internal Audit will rise      
Communication with the external auditor will decrease      
Internal Audit will have a larger budget      
The interest for the work of Internal Audit will be enhanced      
The Audit Committee will do the hiring and firing of Internal Audit      
Tension between the external and the internal auditor may increase      
Outsourcing will increase      
 
Otherwise, please specify 
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Appendix 6: Survey questionnaire for Chief Audit 
Executives (final version) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire for Heads of Internal Audit 
 
(Relating to the PhD thesis of Leen Paape, Erasmus University, 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands) 
 
 
 
Please return preferably before November 12, 2004
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Please Circle Your Answers where appropriate. 
 
Questions relating to who is supplying the answers: 
 
1. Who are you? 
 
a. Head of Internal Audit, or in a comparable role. 
b. Some other function. Please specify. 
.…………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Questions relating to your organization: 
 
2. Are you listed on the stock market? 
 
a. No. 
b. Yes. We are listed on ……………………………………………………. 
 
 
3. What system of Corporate Governance does your organization have? 
 
a. One tier (combined board of executives and non-executives). 
b. Two tier (separate Management and Supervisory Board). 
  
 
4. Do you have an Audit Committee or a comparable oversight structure? 
 
a. No. 
b. Yes, and that is comprised of: 
 
1. Exclusively independent members (independent of the organization). 
2. A majority of independent members. 
3. Half are independent members, half of them are from within the organization. 
4. A minority of independent members. 
5. Exclusively of members that come from within the organization. 
 
c. The Audit Committee or comparable oversight structure has existed since: 
 ……… (year). 
 
 
5. In what areas is your organization active? 
 
a. Trade, transport, logistics. 
b. Production, energy, utilities. 
c. Telecommunications, information technology, media and entertainment. 
d. Professional services.  
e. Financial services (banking, insurance, pension funds, etc.). 
f. Public sector (government, "agentschap", "zelfstandig bestuursorgaan", etc.). 
295
295 
6. How large is your organization? 
 
i. Turnover for 2003. 
a. Less than € 50 million. 
b. Between € 51 and € 100 million. 
c. Between € 101 and € 500 million. 
d. Between € 501 million and € 1 billion. 
e. More than € 1 billion. 
 
ii. Total assets at the end of 2003. 
a. Less than € 25 million. 
b. Between € 26 and € 50 million. 
c. Between € 51 and € 100 million.  
d. Between € 101 million and € 500 million. 
e. More than € 500 million. 
 
iii. Numbers of employees at the end of 2003. 
a. Less than 500. 
b. Between 501 and 1,000. 
c. Between 1001 and 2,500. 
d. Between 2,501 and 10,000. 
e. More than 10,000. 
 
 
How relevant are the following propositions in characterizing your organization? Your answers can range 
from not at all applicable (1) to very much so (5).  
 
 
7. Our products and services are largely made  1 2 3 4 5 
based on the specific requirements of our clients. 
 
8. The production of our products and services  1 2 3 4 5 
requires highly specialized knowledge. 
 
9. Our brand name is extremely important.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. It cost a lot of time and effort to build our brand.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. Our assets are so specific for our company that   1 2 3 4 5 
they couldn't be broken up or disposed of without  
huge losses. 
 
12. The location of our organization is linked to the  1 2 3 4 5 
locations of our customers and suppliers. 
 
13. It is very difficult to specify in advance   1 2 3 4 5 
exactly what standards our products and services 
must comply with. 
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14. In order to understand our processes much   1 2 3 4 5 
knowledge of and experience in our organization 
is required. 
 
15. The knowledge of our employees is very much  1 2 3 4 5 
organization-specific and is not immediately  
transferable to another organization. 
 
16. It is difficult for top management to determine   1 2 3 4 5 
the reliability of reports coming from below.  
 
17. It is not at all simple to measure the results of   1 2 3 4 5 
our processes and activities. 
 
18. For managers it is not easy to observe whether or 1 2 3 4 5 
not employees are adequately fulfilling their tasks. 
 
19. For customers of our products/services it is  1 2 3 4 5 
difficult to determine if they measure up to what was 
agreed on in advance. 
 
20. For us, it is also difficult to determine whether   1 2 3 4 5 
products or services measure up to what was agreed 
on in advance.  
 
21. More than once a year the Management Board is  1 2 3 4 5 
confronted with developments that are different than 
what they were led to expect from previous reports.  
 
22. How many management levels are there between the Management Board and the shop floor? 
 
a. One. 
b. Two. 
c. Three. 
d. Four. 
e. Five or more. 
 
23. Do you have an Internal Audit Function? 
 
a. Yes, since ………….. (year) 
 
b. No. You can stop here. 
 
 
297
297 
In the last 3 years the following has happened with Internal Audit in my organization: 
  
        Strongly                 Strongly 
                  agree          disagree 
 
24. Has been shrinking in terms of size.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
25. Has more consultations with the Board of  1 2 3 4 5 
Supervisors or Audit Committee (or comparable  
oversight structure). 
 
26. Has received less assignments from the  1 2 3 4 5 
Management Board. 
 
27. Has received more assignments from the Board  1 2 3 4 5 
of Supervisors or Audit Committee (or comparable 
oversight structure).  
 
28. Is cooperating less with the External Auditor.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
29. Has received a bigger budget (10% or more).  1 2 3 4 5 
 
30. More internal audit activities were outsourced to  1 2 3 4 5 
third parties. 
 
31. The function has been centralized.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
In some Corporate Governance reports outside The Netherlands the Audit Committee (or a comparable 
structure) is specifically designated to actively oversee Internal Audit in order to optimize its 
independence. By contrast, the latest Dutch code - Tabaksblat - assigns oversight to the Management 
Board. Without taking into account the actual situation within your organization, please give us your 
opinion about the following propositions. 
 
        Strongly                 Strongly 
                  agree          disagree 
 
32. The Head of Internal Audit should be responsible 1 2 3 4 5 
to the Chairman of the Management Board. 
 
33. The Head of Internal Audit should be responsible 1 2 3 4 5 
to the Chief Financial Officer or Finance Director.  
 
34. The Head of Internal Audit should be responsible 1 2 3 4 5 
to the Board of Supervisors or Audit Committee 
(or comparable oversight structure).  
 
35. The Head of Internal Audit should have meetings 1 2 3 4 5 
with the Board of Supervisors or Audit Committee 
(or comparable oversight structure) independent of  
the Management Board. 
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36. Hiring, firing and assessment of the Head of   1 2 3 4 5 
Internal Audit should be done with the approval 
of the Board of Supervisors or Audit Committee  
(or comparable oversight structure). 
 
 
Based on Corporate Governance rules and recommendations being adopted, what changes in Internal 
Audit do you anticipate in the coming 3 years? 
 
        Strongly                 Strongly 
                  agree          disagree 
 
37. More communication between Internal Audit and 1 2 3 4 5 
Board of Supervisors or Audit Committee (or  
comparable oversight structure).    
 
38. The Head of Internal Audit will be receiving   1 2 3 4 5 
assignments not only from the Management Board,  
but also the Board of Supervisors or Audit Committee  
(or comparable oversight structure). 
 
39. A greater distance between Internal Audit and the 1 2 3 4 5 
organization. 
 
40. Internal Audit will become less independent.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
41. A higher quality of Internal Audit activities.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
42. More tension for the Head of Internal Audit,   1 2 3 4 5 
because more masters have to be served. 
 
43. Less conferencing with the External Auditor.  1 2 3 4 5  
 
44. Internal Audit's budget will be cut back   1 2 3 4 5 
(10% or more). 
 
45. The tension between the External and Internal   1 2 3 4 5 
Auditors will increase.     
 
46. Less outsourcing of Internal Audit activities to   1 2 3 4 5 
third parties.    
 
47. Anything else? Please specify. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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Questions relating to approximate size of Internal Audit in your organization (in-house or outsourced) 
yesterday, today and tomorrow. What was it in 2001? What is it now, in 2004? And according to your 
expectations, what will it be in 3 years, in 2007?  
 
 
 
2001 2004 
 
2007 
48. Total number of internal auditors in your organization.
 
…….fte …….fte …… fte 
49. Total budget (including expenses, travel, housing, etc.)
for Internal Audit (not including the budget for the 
External Auditor). 
 
 €………  €………. €………
50. Total insourced in fte's on an annual basis. 
 
 
 
……. fte ……. fte ……. fte 
 
 
 
51. Who is the Head of Internal Audit responsible to? Again, yesterday, today and tomorrow. In 2001? 
Now, in 2004? And according to your expectations, in 3 years, in 2007? Check one for every year. 
 
 
 
2001 2004 
 
2007 
 
a. Chairman of the Management Board. 
 
1 2 
 
3 
 
b. CFO or Financial Director. 1 2 
 
3 
 
c. Board of Supervisors or Audit Committee (or 
comparable oversight structure). 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
d. Division Management/Business Unit management.
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
e. Other. Please specify. …………………………………………………………………….. 
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52. Is there a performance related aspect that helps determine the salary of the Head of Internal Audit 
(multiple answers possible)? 
 
a. No. 
b. Yes, and that is based on: 
  
1.  The organization's financial results. 
2.  The organization's non-financial results. 
3.  Internal Audit’s performance milestones agreed upon up front. 
4.  Anything else? Please specify. 
.……………………………………………………………………………. 
  
 
53. In the past 3 years I have met with the Audit Committee ….. than previously: 
 
a. More often. 
b. The same. 
c. Less often. 
d. Not applicable. 
 
 
54. The Audit Committee (or comparable oversight structure) speaks/meets with me without the 
Management Board being present: 
 
a. Yes. Normally, 1 or more times per year. 
b. Yes, but only in special circumstances. 
c. No, never. 
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According to your estimates, what percentage of Internal Audit's time is spent on the following different 
types of audits? In the past, in 2001? Now, in 2004? And according to your expectations, in 3 years, in 
2007? (The total in each year column should be 100%.) 
 
 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
2007 
55. Financial audit. 
 
………% ………% ………%
56. Operational audit. 
 
………% ………% ………%
57. IT/EDP audit. 
 
………% ………% ………%
58. Fraud audit. 
 
………% ………% ………%
59. Compliance audit. 
 
………% ………% ………%
60. Ethical audit/tone at the top. 
 
………% ………% ………%
61. Audits about the use of incentive and reward instruments 
in the organization. 
 
………% ………% ………%
62. Advising/consultancy. 
 
………% ………% ………%
63. Other. Please specify. 
………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………… 
 
 
………% ………% ………%
Total 
      100%      100%      100%
 
302
302 
64. The relationship between External and Internal Audit in your organization: yesterday, today and 
tomorrow. What was the relationship between the two, in 2001? What is it now, in 2004? And 
according to your expectations, what will it be in 3 years, in 2007 (multiple answers are possible).  
 
 
2001 2004 2007 
a. No relation. 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
b. Sharing plans. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
c. Joint planning. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
d. External Audit monitors Internal Audit. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
e. Internal Audit monitors External Audit. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
f. Reports are shared between the two. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
g. The Management Letter is made together. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
h. Internal Audit is put to work in accordance with External 
Audit's requirements. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
i. Internal Audit controls the budget of External Audit. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
j. Audits are done together. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
k. Other. Please specify: 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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65. Which of the following instruments does your organization have for Internal Audit (multiple answers 
possible)? 
 
a. A specific ethics code. 
b. Audit Charter/Statute. 
c. Quality measures (dossier review, standardized work methods, audit work flow 
software, etc.). 
d. Ad random checks by the External Auditor. 
e. Independent review by an external party. 
f. Appraisal based on measurable criteria. 
g. Credentials and qualifications requirements (for example, diplomas). 
h. Internal sanctions for poor performance (firing, disciplinary procedures, etc.). 
i. Compliance with standards of professional organizations. For example, IIA, Inc. 
(Institute of Internal Auditors) and the Dutch VRO (Association of Registered 
Operational Auditors). 
j.  Under justifiable circumstances official complaints are made to the professional 
organizations.  
k. Other. Please specify. ………………………………………………………. 
 
 
66.  How long does it take before an internal auditor can perform audits independently?  
 
a. Immediately. 
b. Less than 3 months. 
c. 4-6 months. 
d. 7 months to 1 year. 
e. Longer than 1 year. 
 
 
67. Do you wish to receive an electronic copy of the results of this survey? 
 
a. No. 
b. Yes, my e-mail address is ................................................................ 
 
 
 
 
 
End of questionnaire. Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
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Appendix 7: Survey questionnaire for Board Members 
(final version) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire for Management Board or Supervisory Board 
members  
 
(relating to the PhD thesis of Leen Paape, Erasmus University, 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands) 
 
 
Please return preferably before November 12, 2004.
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Please Circle Your Answers where appropriate. 
 
1. Who are you? 
 
a. A member of the Management Board. 
b. A member of the Board of Supervisors or Audit Committee (or comparable 
oversight structure). 
c. Other. Please specify. ………………………………………………….. 
 
 
 
In some Corporate Governance reports outside The Netherlands the Audit Committee (or a 
comparable structure) is specifically designated to actively oversee Internal Audit in order to optimize 
its independence. By contrast, the latest Dutch code - Tabaksblat - assigns oversight to the 
Management Board. Without taking into account the actual situation within your organization, please 
give us your opinion about the following propositions. 
 
        Strongly                 Strongly 
                  agree          disagree 
 
2. The Head of Internal Audit should be responsible 1 2 3 4 5 
to the Chairman of the Management Board. 
 
3. The Head of Internal Audit should be responsible 1 2 3 4 5 
to the Chief Financial Officer or Finance Director.  
 
4. The Head of Internal Audit should be responsible 1 2 3 4 5 
to the Board of Supervisors or Audit Committee 
(or comparable oversight structure). 
 
5. The Head of Internal Audit should have meetings 1 2 3 4 5 
with the Board of Supervisors or Audit Committee 
or comparable oversight structure) independent of  
the Management Board.  
 
6. Hiring, firing and assessment of the Head of   1 2 3 4 5 
Internal Audit should be done with the approval 
of the Board of Supervisors or Audit Committee  
(or comparable oversight structure). 
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Based on Corporate Governance rules and recommendations being adopted, what changes in Internal 
Audit do you anticipate in the coming 3 years? 
        Strongly                 Strongly 
                  agree          disagree 
 
7. More communication between Internal Audit and 1 2 3 4 5 
Board of Supervisors or Audit Committee (or  
comparable oversight structure).     
 
8. The Head of Internal Audit will be receiving   1 2 3 4 5 
assignments not only from the Management Board,  
but also the Board of Supervisors or Audit Committee  
(or comparable oversight structure). 
 
9. A greater distance between Internal Audit and the 1 2 3 4 5 
organization. 
 
10. Internal Audit will become less independent.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. A higher quality of Internal Audit activities.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. More tension for the Head of Internal Audit,   1 2 3 4 5 
because more masters have to be served. 
 
13. Less conferencing with the External Auditor.  1 2 3 4 5  
 
14. Internal Audit's budget will be cut back   1 2 3 4 5 
(10% or more). 
 
15. The tension between the External and Internal   1 2 3 4 5 
Auditors will increase.     
 
16. Less outsourcing of Internal Audit activities to   1 2 3 4 5 
third parties.    
 
17. Anything else? Please specify. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
18. Do you wish to receive an electronic copy of the results of this survey? 
 
a. No. 
b. Yes, my e-mail address is ................................. 
 
 
 
End of questionnaire. Thank you for very much for your cooperation. 
 
 
307
 
  307 
Appendix 8: Introduction letters to Chief Audit 
Executives or Board Members 
 
 
Dear Madam/Sir, 
 
As your Head of Internal Audit has undoubtedly assured you by now, the completion of this 
questionnaire will take about 5 or 10 minutes of your time. All responses will be kept strictly 
confidential. Since I am making that request of you, you have every right to know what it's all 
about. 
 
The short answer is this is research in connection with my doctorate thesis at Erasmus University 
(Rotterdam, The Netherlands) into developments in and around the Internal Audit Function and 
the influence that changes in Corporate Governance rules and recommendations might have on 
that. As you are undoubtedly aware, these rules and recommendations are changing rapidly and, in 
most cases, becoming more stringent. Some believe than Internal Audit can, and is, playing an 
important role in creating assurance in various areas of corporate life.  
 
I am responsible for the post-graduate program in Internal/Operational Auditing at Erasmus 
University in Rotterdam. I am a member of the Advisory Panel of a comparable program at the 
CASS Business School in London. I am an active member of the both the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA) The Netherlands and the Association of Registered Operational Auditors (Dutch 
acronym, VRO). What's more, I am a partner with PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants in The 
Netherlands. 
 
This research is supported by Erasmus University, IIA, The Netherlands, VRO and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers.  
 
Your cooperation in this matter is important for obtaining a good insight into the developments 
around the Internal Audit Function. If you have any questions about this questionnaire, you can 
contact me at paape@few.eur.nl or 06-536-446-23. 
 
I very much appreciate your cooperation. 
 
Sincerely yours, 
 
 
 
 
Leen Paape RA RO CIA 
 
Attn of Members of the Management Board and 
Supervisory Board/Audit Committee 
Doctorate Research on Internal Audit at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
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Dear Colleague,  
 
Enclosed within this packet of "goodies" are two separate and distinct questionnaires relating to 
my doctorate thesis on Internal Audit. The shorter one - of which there are two copies - should be 
filled out by two different individuals. One, a member of your Management Board, or a manager 
on your Board of Directors. The other, a member of your Board of Supervisors, a non-executive 
on your Board of Directors, or a member of the Audit Committee (or comparable oversight 
structure). 
 
Would you be so kind as to give those people the questionnaires and the accompanying 
introductory letter meant for them, and ask them to fill it out. It will take about 5 to10 minutes of 
their time. 
 
The second, somewhat longer, questionnaire is for you as head of Internal Audit - or a comparable 
function. It will take about 30 minutes of your time. All responses - both yours and those of your 
colleagues - will be kept strictly confidential. The questions are in English because I have decided 
to write my thesis in English. However, if you would prefer to receive a Dutch version of these 
questions, please let me know at the below-mentioned e-mail address or telephone number. 
 
Since I am requesting your help, you have every right to know what it's for. Thus a little 
background on the nature of my research is in order. During the last years Corporate Governance 
has increasingly become an interesting topic. Numerous codes - rules or recommendations - have 
been developed in different countries to rectify, or at least mitigate, disasters. These codes pay 
some attention to Internal Audit. Sometimes more, more often less. 
My research is about the influence of these codes on the Internal Audit Function (IAF). 
 
I am responsible for the post-graduate program in Internal/Operational Auditing at Erasmus 
University in Rotterdam. I am a member of the Advisory Panel of a comparable program at the 
CASS Business School in London. I am an active member of both the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA) The Netherlands and the Association of Registered Operational Auditors (Dutch 
acronym, VRO).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This research is supported by Erasmus University, IIA, The Netherlands, and the VRO.  
 
 
 
 
Attn of Head of Internal Audit 
 
 
 
 
Doctorate Research on Internal Audit at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
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Your cooperation in this matter is important for obtaining a good insight into the developments 
around the Internal Audit Function. It goes without saying - but I'll say it anyway - that I am very 
grateful for your cooperation and that of your colleagues. 
 
If you have any questions about this questionnaire, you can contact me at paape@few.eur.nl or 06-
53644623. 
 
Sincerely yours, 
 
 
 
 
 
Leen Paape RA RO CIA  
 
 
 
 
Enclosures: 
 
1. One questionnaire (two copies): One to be filled out by a manager (Management Board, Board 
of Directors); the second by a non-executive: Board of Supervisors, Board of Directors, or Audit 
Committee (or comparable oversight structure) 
 
2. One questionnaire for the Head of Internal Audit 
 
3. A post-paid return envelope 
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Appendix 9: Script for the regressions 
 
Minitab version 14 is applied (www.minitab.com). 
 
GMACRO 
 
DoAnalysis 
 
Factor 'v16' 'v17' 'v18' 'v21' 'v22' 
 
name c400 'v7d' 
let 'v7d' = (v7>=5) 
name c401 'v8d' 
let 'v8d' = (v8>=5) 
name c402 'v9d' 
let 'v9d' = (v9>=5) 
name c403 'v10d' 
let 'v10d' = (v10>=5) 
name c404 'v11d' 
let 'v11d' = (v11>=5) 
name c405 'v12d' 
let 'v12d' = (v12>=5) 
name c406 'v13d' 
let 'v13d' = (v13>=5) 
name c407 'v14d' 
let 'v14d' = (v14>=5) 
name c408 'v15d' 
let 'v15d' = (v15>=5) 
name c409 'v19d' 
let 'v19d' = (v19>=5) 
name c410 'v20d' 
let 'v20d' = (v20>=5) 
name c411 'v66d' 
let 'v66d' = (v66>=5) 
 
name c412 'SumAsq3' 
let 'SumASq3' = c400+c401+c402+c403+c404+c405+c406+c407+c408+c409+c410+c411 
name c200 'AS' 
let 'AS' = ('SumASq3' > 2 ) 
 
name c420 'v16d' 
let 'v16d' = v16 
name c421 'v17d' 
let 'v17d' = v17 
name c422 'v18d' 
let 'v18d' = v18 
name c423 'v21d' 
let 'v21d' = v21 
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name c201 'IA' 
let 'IA' = (c420+c421+c422+c423)/4 
 
name c202 'FTE_IAD' 
let 'FTE_IAD' = v482004 
 
name c203 'FTE_TOTAL' 
let 'FTE_TOTAL' = 'total fte' 
 
name c204 'NR_SUPERV' 
let 'NR_SUPERV' = 'number of supervisors' 
 
Regress 'FTE_IAD' 3 'FTE_TOTAL' 'NR_SUPERV' 'AS'  
 
Regress 'FTE_IAD' 3 'FTE_TOTAL' 'NR_SUPERV' 'IA'  
 
AOVOneway 'v32' 'v1.1:Survey MB' 'v1.1:Survey SB' 
 
AOVOneway 'v33' 'v2:Survey MB' 'v2:Survey SB' 
 
AOVOneway 'v34' 'v3:Survey MB' 'v3:Survey SB' 
 
AOVOneway 'v35' 'v4:Survey MB' 'v4:Survey SB' 
 
AOVOneway 'v36' 'v5:Survey MB' 'v5:Survey SB' 
 
AOVOneway 'v37' 'v6:Survey MB' 'v6:Survey SB' 
 
AOVOneway 'v38' 'v7:Survey MB' 'v7:Survey SB' 
 
AOVOneway 'v39' 'v8:Survey MB' 'v8:Survey SB' 
 
AOVOneway 'v40' 'v9:Survey MB' 'v9:Survey SB' 
 
AOVOneway 'v41' 'v10:Survey MB' 'v10:Survey SB' 
 
AOVOneway 'v42' 'v11:Survey MB' 'v11:Survey SB' 
 
AOVOneway 'v43' 'v12:Survey MB' 'v12:Survey SB' 
 
AOVOneway 'v44' 'v13:Survey MB' 'v13:Survey SB' 
 
AOVOneway 'v45' 'v14:Survey MB' 'v14:Survey SB' 
 
AOVOneway 'v46' 'v15:Survey MB' 'v15:Survey SB' 
 
ENDMACRO 
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Corporate Governance
The Impact on the Role, Position, and Scope of Services of the
Internal Audit Function 
Corporate scandals during the last decade fostered many Corporate
Governance reports. These reports aimed at restoring checks and
balances in companies to prevent fraudulent behaviour and restore
public trust. One of the functions active in many organizations is
Internal Audit. This function operates under the umbrella of the
Management Board and is geared towards monitoring lower level
management. Due to the Corporate Governance reports the interest
in the work of internal auditors has increased. In many reports special
attention is paid to this function. The Supervisory Board and the
Audit Committee are required to oversee the activities and results of
external as well as internal auditors. Furthermore, regulators are also
keen on the results of their work. The aim of this study was to
research the impact of Corporate Governance reports on the role,
position, and scope of services of the Internal Audit Function.
Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics were applied to
further theory around internal auditing. Information asymmetry and
asset specificity were used to test whether there was a correlation
between high scores on information asymmetry and/or asset
specificity for the organization and the size of an Internal Audit
Function, the ‘make or buy’ issue, or its scope of services. Results
showed that such was the case for the size but not for the ‘make or
buy issue or the scope of services. Furthermore, this study contains
descriptive characteristics of internal audit functions.
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Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by
ERIM is focussed on the management of the firm in its environment,
its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its business processes in their
interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage-
ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
Management. Within ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and
Ph.D. candidates are active in the different research programs. From a
variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community
is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of
creating new business knowledge.
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